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FOREWORD
The rapid growth of knowledge in twentieth century
science, has had particularly important implications for
the philosophical foundations of psychology and education.

This dissertation is based upon the conviction that progress

toward more meaningful theories in psychology and more rele-

vant approaches to the practical concerns of education requires increased appreciation of the historical background
the
of our present sciences and also a reinterpretation of

animating assumptions upon which much contemporary theoiy
in psychology and education is based.
formulaWithin the circumscribed area of theoretical

translates
tion in the behavioral sciences, this conviction

into a three-phase process.

First, it is necessary to

with the intenexamine the growth of psychological theory
psychological issues to
tion of relating the formulation of
thought which was prevalent
the larger context of scientific
at that time.

general apSecond, the character of that

compared to the current inproach to science must then be

terpretation of scientific knowledge.

Finally,

m

the third

consider the new possibilities
phase, it is then possible to
our
theory which can be based upon
scientific
behavioral
for
into scientific understanding
more powerful modern insights
of scientific understanding.
of nature and the nature
xii

Aspects of these three phases form the content of this dissertation

.

Clearly, the "size" of the question one is willing to

ask will determine the outcome of such endeavors.

In this

regard, I have used my intuitions and understanding of the

purpose of life as the major criterion in the choice of a
conceptual perspective for this investigation.

For the

purposes of this introductory comment, there are two important levels of this perspective which require comment.

First, as the material of the dissertation demonstrates,
the basis of any approach toward life and science is to be

found in the individual's deeply held convictions about the
final realities of existence.
the Baha'i Faith,

For my part, as a member of

this means that I see the current quest

the
for knowledge and understanding as an expression of

ever-advancing civilization of mankind which has found its
of reprimary direction in the centuries-long tradition

vealed religion.
each major
Man's advancement within the character of

orientation
epoch of civilization follows a fundamental
Whether we have
which has been set by the prophet-f ounder
or more familiar
reference to the prophets of antiquity
Muhammad, the advent
prophets such as Moses, Jesus Christ or
the beginning of a great new
of their message has signalized
.

phase in the development of humanity.
xiii

In this age, with the

advent of the prophet Baha'u'llah, man has once again been

re-awakened to the true nature of his spiritual destiny and
the realities of his material existence.

Thus, the most

important determinant of the "size” of the question

I am

willing to consider comes from the conviction that we are

living in a new era which offers an opportunity for change
and development which is unrivaled in its potentialities
for reform in the standards by which man conducts the af-

fairs of his life and shapes the character of his destiny.

Within this global framework, the creation and conduct of
scientific inquiry can be understood as a circumscribed but

particularly important and useful effort to transform the
reality of belief into the reality of explicit knowledge.
'pjixs

brings us to the next level of importance in the

perspective which is used in the dissertation.

Since man

change
has created science he can, and periodically does,
the major assumptions upon which it rests.

One o± the most

comprehensive attempts to change the basic assumptions of
harmonious
science in a direction which I believe is also
process
with the demands of the modern age is the organic
interprephilosophy of Alfred North Whitehead. Thus, the
efforts toward
tation of historical psychology and the
theoretical
re-establishing the conceptual framework of

primarily from
psychology which are found here derive
science and his
Whitehead's analysis of issues in basic
xiv

formulation of alternatives to the perceived limitations of
traditional science.
The assertion that the way toward improvement in psy-

chological theory and educational practice rests upon a more

inclusive insight into the nature of reality, a reality

which ultimately derives from the animating spirit of an
age, carries with it the companion assertion that some of

the most important aspects of the new view will not be con-

tained in the old approach.

To achieve greater relevance in

psychology and education, we must step beyond the consideration of problems which arise within the era of modern science

and ask a larger question of the era itself.
This is not to suggest that the topics and issues which

belong to this discussion are either totally new or unfa-

miliar in light of traditional thought.

On the contrary,

while we may admit that the new explanatory principles must
come from outside the standard abstractions of the scientific system of things, we should aiso demand that the new

view must shed light on the same problems which have been
the major perplexities of modern times.

non-trivial problem.

This is however, a

To achieve our goal we must balance

of the
the uniqueness of the alternative with the givenness

of the
traditional in such a fashion that the very issues

will not also so
old view upon which we desire to shed light
only see the
completely determine our outlook that we can
xv

possibility of reformed ideas through the apparent gaps in
the pattern of the old fabric of ideas.

The truth of the matter is that in attempting to reach

beyond the limitations of the old system, we have no other
recourse to the basic data of existence than did those who

created the original approach to modern science.

While we

may intellectually struggle to insure that the finest insights and techniques which have arisen from within the sys-

tem of traditional science should also find profitable exem-

plification in any future systems, we must also realize that
the background of our intellectual struggle is both the deep

personal commitment of the individual and the coloration of
thought which is provided by the history of our era.

Again,

in this aspect of our task we are no different than those
who have preceeded us.

This issue can be approached from two main directions.

Chapter One asserts that it was the faith in the possibility
of revealed
of a science which derived from the traditions

disreligion that provided the assurance 'that scientific

closure of the laws of nature was possible.

Again, in

this time from
Chapter Five the same issue is broached but
which has more comwithin the context of latter-day science

background of thought
pletely recognized the role of this
the individual scientist.
as it applies to the behavior of
difference between the two
But there is' an important

xvi

.

interpretations that we must not ignore in this context.
In the first case we have the recognition that the back-

ground of thought provides a programmatic character which
determines what is considered to be the "valid" science of
the era, and in the second case, we have the recognition

that an individual scientist, in order to proceed with the

production of any scientific data, also requires the guidance of deeply held convictions about the true character of
the phenomena he is seeking to understand.

Clearly, the

ideal condition for the development of science is one in

which there is a basic harmony between these two aspects of
the scientific enterprise.

As the era of modern science began, the twin functions
of this background of belief went quite unnoticed because

of the basic harmony which existed between the background
of conviction and the foreground intellectual understanding.
It is as if the direction of an individual's thoughts were

influenced in much the same fashion as the direction of a
of
compass needle is influenced by the meridian like action

invisible, yet pervasive, magnetic fields.

It is to the

contributes
main polarization of the era that the individual

expectation that
the polarization of his own being with the
produce a directed
the interaction of the two forces will
by the system and
movement toward the ultimate ends sought
the individual

xvii

By extension, we can say that the directional orienta-

tion of the belief structure is the least ambiguous when
the individuals who are interacting with it are farthest

away from the basic character of the ideas which polarize
the over-all orientation of the structure.

In these cases

the true directions to scientific certitude form a rather

obvious and clearly marked trail about which there is little

fundamental disagreement and by virtue of which a certain
type of scientific interpretation is carried into many un-

charted regions.

It happens however that the path of scien-

tific progress also brings the seeking individual closer to
the basic polarities of belief.

The predictable result is

that there is a pronounced reduction in the orienting power
of the polar idea.

Just as the terrestrial explorer finds

the guidance properties of his magnetic compass reduced to
the point that all directions seem equally probable when he

has attained greatest proximity to the polarities of the
globe, the conceptual explorer will also find that inter-

action of his beliefs with those of his times will be the
most ambiguous at that point in time when he has drawn
closest to the full assimilation of the explanatory capacity
of that system.

de\elopIn the system of scientific explanation whose
era, it
ment is a function of the cosmology of the modern

orienting power
has become increasingly clear that the
xviii

oi

the basic ideas of the system is greatest
when the questions

which are asked are farthest away from the
character of
human phenomena. As the level and power of scientific
explanation has grown and man has sought greater scientific
unders tanding of himself, it has became increasingly evident
that our system of scientific beliefs is too much a product

of the nature of man's earlier and more limited understanding

himself and his world.

As we have drawn closer to the

subjective character of those beliefs, their ability to

provide the direction and to establish the values toward

which science should aim has diminished practically to the
same level of equiprobability that characterizes the

spinning needle of a magnetic compass that has found its
true home in the heart of the polarity which had been its

faithful guide.
The task which faces us today and which has been placed

upon our scientific horizon by the collapse of materialistic
metaphysics is to once again develop an understanding of
the cosmos into which we can imbed the polarity of our own

beliefs without also drawing so close to the limitations of
that view that its directive power is significantly reduced

in the process.
In a manner suggestive of the terrestrial explorer who
is imbedded in the magnetic perplexity of a polar polarity,

we too must turn for guidance to a different realm in order

xix

that a truer direction can once again be established.

Our

explorer friend can gaze into the heavens and pick a star

upon which to base his beliefs in the true direction he
should follow.

Our heavens consist of a more complete

understanding of man's freedom and destiny; a truer understanding of the processes of life which by their progressive

development of ever novel forms of being, have acted out a
drama that demonstrates an increasing ability to seek its

meaning in that which is beyond and transcendent to itself.
It should be emphasized however,

that the intent of

this study has not been to produce a work in either meta-

physics or philosophy.

It is motivated purely by a concern

for the development of a conception of education that will

begin to meet the urgent needs of our times.

Should the

reader be dismayed in the fact that most of the discussions
tend toward the abstract, that the topics and pages are many

and that there seems to be no immediate bridge between the

products of discussion and the pressing needs of educators,
feelings,
I can only add that while I sympathize with those

moving beyond the comforting familiarity of tradition

to

examine the basis of our approach toward the understanding
suggests a magof man and his world require many steps and

limitations of a
nitude of effort which lies well beyond the
abilities which
doctoral dissertation, to say nothing of the
on the topic.
a single author can bring to bear

XX

For me,

this has been a first, large, step toward seeking disclosure

within a new framework of ideas as opposed to the stultifying closure of much contemporary theory in psychology and
education.

Clearly, such steps are relative to the taker;

however, the important thing is that they be taken, since,
a dissertation is, after all, part of the process of one's

own education.

xxi
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1.0

CHALLENGE OF T11E MODERN TIMES
IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
While the ways to describe our modern frame of mind are

many it is most important for the purposes of this presentation and its relation to education to seek out the roots of
our scientific and cultural tradition that are most closely

associated with the scientific and academic point s-of-view
which characterize our present understanding in the human
sciences
It is probably true that each age has its own pressing

problems that tax its ability to cope with its environment.
That there is also a predominant framework for its ap-

proaches to these problems seems a truism.

In our age, we

have come to rely primarily on solutions which are relevant
of
to the immediate situation at hand because the framework

priour scientific and academic approaches to problems is

marily anti-systematic and anti-metaphysical.

We pride

ourselves that these characteristics also insure that we
tend
will be anti-dogmatic in our approaches and therefore

intellectual tradito forget that a major function of our
and directions is to be prescriptive of long-range goals
immediacy.
tions and not simply descriptive of experimental
that our
When viewed in a larger sense, we must recognize

ages long tradiefforts are simply the latest phase in the

between the
tion of man's desire to find some congruity
heartbeat of the
vitalities of the evolving cosmos and the

.

3

human search for fulfillment.
In this light, we have a dual responsibility in our

efforts toward the solution of problems in general and hu-

man problems in particular.

One is to apply, as we gener-

ally do, the best materials and knowledge available to us
as we seek the betterment of conditions and the other is to

realize that the apparent relevance of the solution at hand
is also imbedded in the context of a tradition which not

only represents the highest form of life we know but which
is also the basis of the astounding realization which has

dawned with the coming of the modern age--that man has the

power to determine the direction and destiny of life on
earth
The history of the development of Western man's cos-

mology since the Middle Ages is characterized by the development of two important movements, both of which have their

roots in the biblical tradition and the cosmology of the

ancient world.

At some point in the ancient past, before

the development of the virulence of the modern mind, man

must have had a fairly complete, if immature, understanding
of himself and his world; however, as the twin developments
of modern science and philosophy grew in importance and

reliance on their explanation of worldly and human matters

became more commonplace, man came to the scientific understanding of himself as a contingent being in a purposeless

1

.

4

cosmos and gradually assumed a philosophical outlook which

increasingly asserted the autonomy of human reason.

Alexander Koyre characterizes the scientific revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries which has

spawned the present "crisis of European consciousness," a
statement which applies equally to all Western nations, as
a time

which changed the very framework and
patterns of our thinking and of which modern
science and modern philosophy are, at the
same time, the root and the fruit.
.

.

.

These two trends cannot be divorced from their common

heritage in the mentality of the Middle Ages and the basis
of that mentality in the ancient past.

Koyre has also

characterized the changes in the structural patterns of

knowledge between the old and the new world-view as reducthat
able to two fundamental and closely connected actions

"geometrizabrought the "destruction of the cosmos" and the

tion of space."

The combined effect of these factors de-

wellstroyed the ancient's view of the world as a finite,

ordered whole whose spatial structure was determined

hierarchy of perfection and value.

b'y

a

This was accomplished

resulted in
by the process of "geome trizing" space which
free of the natural
the picture of an infinite universe, now
the Infinite
’'Alexander Koyre, From the Closed World to
Universe (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1957
p

.

vii

.

,>

5

subordination to value of the older view
and possessing a
new form of unity obtained by virtue
of the identity of its
ultimate and basic components and laws.
Aristotle's space
which consisted of a differentiated set
of inner worldly
places had become the Euclidian space of
infinite and homogeneous extension.
The spiritual basis of life inherent in the
Middle Ages
was pushed aside by the development of modern
science and

philosophy.

Both of these trends not only threatened but,

in fact, have replaced the function previously
performed by
the tradition of revealed religion.

view is,

I

However, to hold this

believe, to ignore a major operating dynamic in

the whole character of modern thought.

that

It is my conviction

the type of transcendent knowledge which has histori-

cally been derived from the tradition of revealed religion
is not only an important source for understanding human ex-

perience but is also one which cannot be replaced by
stitute.

a sub-

As we shall see in greater detail in what is to

follow, many authors (Butterfield, 2 Whitehead,

o

L

Jaki

2

Herbert Butterfield, The Origins of Modern Science
300-1800
1
(London:
G. E. Bell and Sons
1967 )
pp 7-28
,

3

,

.

,

.

Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World
The MacMillan Co
The Free Press 19^7 )

(New York:
pp. 1-20.

.

,

,

4

Stanley L. Jaki, The Relevance of Physics (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 19^6 ) pp 4l2-440
,

.

^

.

6

Gi Ikejr

)

have pointed out that the character of the thought

in the Middle Ages with its firm grounding in the Biblical

vision of God and the world, generated habits of thought

which were particularly suited to the rise of empirical
inquiry

Alfred North Whitehead sums his understanding of the
impetus behind the use of modern science as follows:

My explanation is that the faith in the possibility of science, generated antecedently
to the development of modern scientific theory, is an unconscious derivative from medieval theology.
To state that theme in another and slightly extended way,

this presentation will follow from the assertion that the

evolutionary cosmos which we have come to know in our scientific understanding requires, for its intelligibility, a

cosmology of hierarchical process grounded in transcendent
purpose and that the personal fulfillment we have come to
seek in philosophical quests is to be found in a more com-

plete understanding of the spiritual generality of man's
nature.

Whitehead, again states the issue poignantly
The faith in the order of nature which has
made possible the growth of science is a particular example of a deeper faith. This
faith cannot be justified by any inductive
generalization. It springs from direct inspection of the nature of things as disclosed
of Heaven and Earth (Garden
Doubleday, 1959 ), PP* 109 - 139

\angdon Gilkey, Master
City, N. Y.

*

:

^ Whitehead

,

Science and the Modern World

,

p.

13

*

/
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m

our own immediate present experience.
T here is no parting f rom our own shadow
experience this faith is to know that in To
being ourselves we are more than ourselves:
to kn ow that while the harmony of
logic
lies upon the universe as an iron band
necessity, the aesthetic harmony stands before
it
as a living ideal moulding the general
flux
in its broken progress towards finer, subtler
issues
.

*

*

*

.

Having asserted that the source of our science and
philosophy is a deeper faith, something which transcends them
both,
we are in a better position to judge their status as
shadows
of the larger reality.

The intimate connection of these

issues and their affectionate articulation with larger
issues of faith is seen in the fact that all three of these

issues were often represented in the same early scientists,
e.g.

men like Kepler, Newton, Descartes and Leibnitz.

,

Thus, it is important to underline the fact that the growth

and development of modern science and philosophy also sig-

nalized a very basic change in man's cosmological view.
Seen in this light the threads of science and philosophy
are intimately tied together and interwoven into the fabric
of modern life and form by their mutual interaction a main

aspect of the pattern of life for any given age.
This then, is the challenge presented by the rise of

modern science.

It is the challenge to reconcile the de-

struction of the cosmos of the ancients which resulted from
7

Ibid

.

,

p.

18,

emphasis added.

9

.

^

8

the disappearance of philosophically and scientifically

valid concepts of the world as a finite, closed, hierarchical whole
a whole in which the hierarchy of value
determines the hierarchy of structure of
being, rising from the dark, heavy and imperfect earth to the higher and higher perfection of stars and heavenly spheres.
.

.

.

with their modern replacements which have disregarded views
based on concepts such as value, perfection and purpose in
favor the ideas of
an indefinite an infinite universe
which is bound together by the identity of
its fundamental components and laws, and in
which all these components are placed on the
same level of being.
.

.

.

The combined effect of this divorce of the world of value

from the world of fact has been to generate a world-view in

which man has become a homeless and contingent being in a
purposeless cosmos, a product of random variation and natural selection with nothing but himself to rely on for meaning

and survival
This is not an assertion that no one has or can find

meaning in the modern world.

It is an attempt to say, via

an analysis of some major characteristics of science and

philosophy, that the meaning which we do find in current
8

p

.

Koyre

,

From the Closed World to the Infin ite Universe,

Ibid.

,

p

2
.

2
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scientific and philosophical thought about personality and

education is limited by the nature of the cosmological
framework into which we are attempting to place our finest
and most complete insights which we derive "from direct in-

spection of the nature of things as disclosed in our own

immediate present experience."

It also involves the asser-

tion that however dim and fragmentary this experience may
be it is our only clue to the harmony of the ultimate things

in nature and is therefore the best way to validate the

worth of our scientific and philosophical thoughts about

personality and education.
To our centuries long tradition of faith in reason and

faith in science we must now add faith in man and his transcendent destiny.

We must recognize that education in the

art of being requires self-knowledge of the process of be-

coming.
1

.

1

THE ROOTS OF MODERN
SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY
As indicated earlier, many scholars who have investi-

gated the rise of modern science have focused upon the im-

portance of the ferment in the Middle Ages which was generated out of the increasing impact of modes of thought sepa-

rately derived from the Judaeo-Christian biblical tradition
and Aristotelian natural philosophy.
Of prime importance to an understanding of the nature
law
of these changes is the difference in the doctrines of

10

and order which pertained between the two views.

Aristotle

and the Greek tradition saw nature primarily as an organism
in which laws were based upon internal relations and were

therefore immanent in nature.

This point-of-view led them

to focus upon the formal element in things and was respon-

sible for their efforts to discover the purposive form

which was efficacious in giving actual form to the material
world.
form.

Matter was seen as simply the vehicle of the eternal
By contrast, the point-of-view which ultimately led

to the creation of modern science and which was derived

from Judaeo-Christian beliefs, tended to emphasize, in its
stress on the law in nature as imposed by the Will of God,
a machine-like view of nature based on external relations.

This view saw God as the creator of both the material and
formal aspects of the world.

Since it was the case that

God created all things, their existence had to be accepted
as a reality.

Therefore, it was a natural step to the out-

come that since everything individual had an existence de-

rived from God, it also had a real self —existence and could
therefore act as an independent body capable of causal in-

teraction with other independent and self-subsistent bodies.
Whereas the Greeks had seen matter as resistant to form and
therefore incapable of exact mathematical expression, the

Judaeo-Christian view was that since all matter was created
the
by the omnipotent Will of God it also strictly obeyed

.

.
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Laws of God
In this way, the doctrine of creation functions in the
dual role of providing a way of understanding the physical

world and the assurance that the investigation will result
in the establishment of laws that can be expressed with the

precision of mathematical statement.

Gilkey^

1

summarizes

the assumptions of modern science which evolve directly out

of the long biblical tradition as represented in the Chris-

tian thought of the Middle Ages as three in number, each

following directly from the vision of the relationship of
First, a created universe

the Creator to his creation.

requires that the perfection of God be manifested in his

creation and that that perfection would amount to an order
in nature that could be discovered.

Second, since the order
the place to seek

is expressed in the happenings of nature,

an understanding of it is in nature itself; therefore,

knowledge of reality is to be obtained through empirical
study.

Third, the focus upon the material aspect as opposed

trend
to the formal aspect of things further emphasizes the

toward quantitative examination and mathematical expression
of God's perfection as manifested in nature.

That the foundation of modern science was closely

von Weizsacker, The Relevance of Science (New
Harper and Row, 196 ^ ) pp l 62 -l 6 k
G.

York:

,

i:L

•

Gilkey, Maker of Heaven and Earth

,

p.

115*
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aligned with the biblical tradition seems clear enough;
however, in our times we also recognize that the biblical

basis for the role of a transcendent creator has dropped
out of the picture of modern science.

Thus, elements which

were central to the character of modern science in the

thinking of its sixteenth and seventeenth century creators
are now regarded as antiquated doctrines of the dim past.
We easily feel that science is our only guide to the truth

and that scientific truth is our only reliable source of

insight into that which is really real.

However, it is not

equally obvious that in dropping the biblical tradition from
the explicit basis of justification for scientific inquiry,
we have elevated the status of present scientific methodol-

ogy to that of metaphysics.
In the past, Newton, for example, believed as his stu-

dent and editor Roger Coats tells us in the introduction to
the second edition of the Principia

:

The business of true philosophy is to derive
the natures of things from causes truly existent, and to inquire after those laws on which
the Great Creator actually chose to found the
most beautiful Frame of the World, not those
might have done the same had he
which he Ip
bv
J
so pleased. t
,

i

on
Similarly, the great Leibnitz, though differing sharply

and function of
the proper role to be ascribed to the place
Natural
Isaac Newton, Mathematical P rinciples of
p. 12.
Philosophy p. 85* Ibid
12

,

.

,
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God, felt that:

Sir Isaac Newton and his followers, have a
very odd opinion concerning the work of God.
According to their doctrine, God Almighty
wants to wind up his watch from time to time:
otherwise it would cease to move. He had not,
it seems, sufficient foresight to make it a
According to my opinperpetual motion.
remains
ion, the same force and vigour [ sic
always in the world, and only passes from one
part of matter to another, agreeably to the
laws of nature, and the beautiful preestablished order. 13
.

.

.

~]

Stanley Jaki

in his penetrating analysis of the relation

,

between physical and theological thought, holds that this
mechanistic world-view of a clockwork cosmos had the important effect of clearing away the impediments of past views
.

which had assigned "intelligences" to the heavenly spheres.

14

for
Though this was a blow to astrology it did pave the way
a more

Once

mature understanding of the physical universe.

love in the
the Aristotelian view that it was desire and

motion as an
heavenly bodies that produced their physical
everchanging
imitation of the "Prime Mover whose life was an
15
had been dispelled, it was then necessary
spiritual act"
heavenly bodies was the
to assume that the movement of the
the time of creation
result of the motion imparted to them at
15 Got tf ried Wilhem Leibnitz, quoted in A. Koyre
se, p. 23b.
the Closed World to the Infinite Univer

l4

jaki, The Relevance of Physics

15 Ibid.

,

p»

4l4.

,

pp

.

412-440.

,

From

It is Jaki

'

opinion that:

s

had it not been for the Christian idea
of creation, it would have easily led to a
wholesale doubting whether the world was
really rational in all its parts. Granting
the supreme rationality of a personal Creator, as conceived in the Christian context,
his handiwork too had to be supremely rational.
Such a view furthermore was not
merely a hesitating play with premises and
lo
conclusions
.

.

.

.

,

",

He concludes this thought by quoting with approval White-

head's cogent summary of the situation as being the result
of far more than a "hesitating play" but rather, the issue
of an "unquestioned faith of centuries" and "an instinctive

tone of thought" which created,
an inexpugnable belief that every detailed occurrence can be correlated with its
antecedents in a perfectly definite manner,
exemplifying general principles 1?
.

.

.

.

Jaki drives the point home by citing the results of Joseph

Needham's study of the history of scientific development in

pre-revolutionary China.

Needham, who he claims was "no

particular friend of Theology" was only able to explain the
Chinese failure to build a systematic science, while at the
same time demonstrating great technological proficiency and

inventiveness, as the result of the fact that the Chinese

traditions did not include a faith in a supremely rational
1 f)

Ibid

.

,

p.

4l8, emphasis added.

^Whitehead, Science and the Modern World
quoted in Jaki, Ibid

.

p".
,

4-19

•

,

p.

12,

15

and personal creator.

Needham continues:

there was no conviction that rational personal beings would be able to spell out in their
lesser earthly languages the divine code of
laws which he (the Creator) had decreed foretime 18
.

Thus, modern science can stress its view that the cosmos is

self-contained system only by replacing the assur-

a vast,

ances which early scientists had derived from the nature of

God's participation with the idea that the scientific method
and its philosophical justification are as dignified and

potent bringers of order and understanding to the world as

had been the God of the "ancients."

In this way, science

has come to see its true nature as the non theological search
for and explanation of the nonpurposive natural forces

which animate the material world.

Once again, we find

Whitehead ready with penetrating insight and suggestive
metaphor; he states:
The soil, the climate, the seeds were there,
Science has never shaken
and the forest grew.
off the impress of its origin in the historiIt has
cal revolt of the Later Renaissance.
ic
rationalist
anti—
an
predominantly
remained
reaWhat
faith.
naive
a
movement, based upon
from
borrowed
been
has
soning it has wanted,
mathematics which is a surviving relic of
Science repudiates
Greek rationalism.
In other words, it has never
philosophy.
cared to justify its faith or to explain its
.

•

.

Joseph Needham, Science and Civilizat ion in China,
Cambi-idge
II, History of Scientific Thought ( Cambridge
Ibid.,
Jaki
in
quoted
581
University Press^ 1956 ), p*
:

,

p.

419

.

,

.
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meanings; and has remained blandly indifferent to its refutation by Hume J 9
1.2

THE SCIENTISTS AND THEIR
THOUGHT:
SELECTED EXAMPLES
The best way to characterize the changes in perspec-

tive which attend the rise of modern science and their re-

lation to the educational and psychological problems of
today is to appreciate the historical development of the

newer view as it is manifested in the lives of the key figures in the transition.

Accordingly, the following treat-

ment of limited examples of selected seventeenth century

founders of modern science, i.e., Copernicus, Galileo, Descartes, Newton, and Locke, attempts to capture the flavor
of the individual's thought and to pinpoint the development
of those theoretical constructs which have proven to be of

lasting interest and crucial importance in modern times.
1.2.1

NICHOLAS COPERNICUS

(

1473-1 543)

Copernicus, who is widely recognized as one of the
actucentral figures of the new scientific revolution, was

ally not very far removed from the basic traditions
past.

oi

For example, he felt that,
oi
It is fitting for us to follow the methods
obseitheir
to
fast
hold
the ancients and to
vations which have been handed down like a
Testament. And to him who thinks that they
respect,
are not to be entirely trusted in this
closed.
certainly
the gates of our science are

19 Whitehead,

Science and the Mo dern World, p. 16.

the

,
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he will get what he deserves for believing that he can lend support to his own
hallucinations by slandering the ancients.^®
.

.

.

Arthur Koestler points out that Copernicus' real motive

originated in a desire to remove a minor blemish from the
Ptolemaic system of astronomy; but instead,
He was led to reversing the Ptolemaic system
by his desire to preserve it like the maniac
who, pained by the mole on his beloved's
cheek, cut off her head to restore her per-

—

fection 21
.

The very feature in the change which Copernicus ushered
in was his combined use of mathematical reasoning and ex-

perimental observation.

Mathematics played an important

role because the algebraic formulations which Copernicus

had at his disposal were a much more powerful tool than the
geometric methods available to Ptolemy.

The geometric

foundation of the older system, which make astronomy appear
as a branch of geometry,

simply did not have the descriptive

power of the new algebraic expressions and Copernicus found
great delight in being able to assimilate the older scheme

with its cumbersome and arbitrary explanations into his view
that the movements of the planets and earth around the sun

created a much more elegant mathematical description of the

deserved data.
po

Nicholas Copernicus, quoted in Arthur Koestler, The
Sleepwalkers (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1963 )* P* 200.
21

.

Ibid.

p.

203.

.

,

,
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The importance and depth of this shift in
cosmological

emphasis can be shown in two ways.

First, as E. A. Burtt

indicates
The question went pretty deep, it meant not
only, i s the astronomical realm fundamentally
geometrical, which almost anyone would grant,
but is the universe as a whole, including our
earth, fundamentally mathematical in structure? 22

and second, in the words of Alexander Koyre

... it seems to be psychologically quite
normal that the man who took the first step,
that of arresting the motion of the sphere of
fixed stars, hesitated before taking the second, that of dissolving it in boundless space;
it was enough for one man to move the earth
and to enlarge the world so as to make it immeasurable
to ask him to make it infinite is obviously asking too much. 23
.

.

.

;

Thus the revolution which sometimes bears his name is seen
to require more than Copernicus'

enjoyment of mathematical

elegance and conservative tendencies.

It also required the

outright assertion that the cosmos is infinite, a statement
that Copernicus was unwilling to make.

The distinction of

adding this most characteristic and important element to
the new world view is given by A. 0. Lovejoy to Giordano

Bruno

Though the elements of the new cosmography
had, then, found earlier expression in
22

Edwin A. Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of
Modern Physical Science (London: Rout ledge and Kegan
1932), p. 52.
*~^Koyre,

op

.

ci t

.

,

p.
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several quarters, it is Giordano Bruno who
must bo regarded as the principal representative of the doctrine of the decentralized,
infinite and indefinitely populous universe;
for he not only preached it throughout western Europe with the fervor of an evangelist,
but also first gave a thorough statement of
the grounds on which it was to gain acceptance from the general public. 24

These changes and many more like them are indicative of the

process which was bringing in the idea of quantitative

relationships as a replacement for the qualitative thought
of the earlier times.

The universe increasingly became a

place that had a mathematical structure as opposed to a
place that had a purposeful structure with natural places
for things like fire (up) and earth (down) and where the

rain fell to water the crops.

GALILEO (1564-1642)

1.2.2

This new attitude which found one of its early and com-

plete formulations in the mind Galileo is described by

Whitehead as follows:
This new tinge to modern minds is a vehement
and passionate interest in the relation of
general principles to irreducible and stubborn facts. All over the world and at all
times there have been practical men absorbed
in "irreducible stubborn facts"; all over
the world and at all times there have been
men of philosophical temperament who have
been absorbed in the weaving of general
It is the union of passionate
principles.
interest in the detailed facts with equal
24

bridge

:

Arthur 0. Love joy, The Great Chain of Being (CamHarvard University Press, 1936 ) p~i 11^
,

•
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devotion to abstract generalization which
forms the novelty. 25
Ian Barbour pinpoints this new "novelty*' of detailed passion

and devoted abstraction in the behavior of Galileo by demon-

strating the unique combination of abstract generalization

"thought-experiments" and interest in detailed facts which

characterized Galileo's approach.

He sights Galileo's de-

scription of his experiments with the inclined plane as a
"classic example of the combination of induction and deduction, reasoning back and forth between theory and experi-

ment."^

In these experiments, Galileo made great use of

concepts like length, time, and velocity which were amenable
to mathematical expression.

He tried many theoretical as-

sumptions, calculated the predicted experimental results

and made tests to verify his findings.

Barbour asserts

that in this is to be found all the characteristics of the

new science.
the distinctive type of concept, the combina tion of theory and experiment, and the goal
of expressing laws of nature as mathematical

relationships among measurable variables 27
.

It is important to note that the creation and use of a

method which explicitly formulated the use of both inductive
p. 3, quoted
(Englewood
Religion
and
Science
in Ian G. Barbour, Issues in
24.
p.
Prentice Hall, 1966),
Cliffs, New Jersey:

^Whitehead, Science and the Modern World

26
27

Ibid

.

,

p.

25.

Ibid., p. 25, Barbour's emphasis.

,
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1

and deductive procedures also opened the possibility of

separating the two and concluding, as Bacon, Hume and the

modern positivists have done, that science simply consists
of the collection and classification of observations.

Such

simplistic definitions of empiricism leave out the theoretical or abstract side of science and therefore fail to capture the role of the creative imagination of the scientist.
To make the character of Galileo's contribution more

explicit it is necessary to contrast the results of his ap-

proach to that of the Aristotelian background he was reacting against.

To see this point clearly is to understand

why "Galileo keeps harping on how things happen, whereas
his adversaries had a complete story as to why things hap-

pen

.

,.
"

28

Aristotle was also keen on observation, but failed to
add the incisive theoretical clarity to his observations
that characterized Galileo's approach.

When Galileo ob-

served motion, for example, he departed from the naive un-

examined immediacy characterizing Aristotle's approach by
the addition of abstract concepts which could not be exem-

plified in their own right but only in the behavior of
things.

He saw motion as the interaction of the continuing

inertial motion of the body and a frictional retarding

^Whitehead
phasis added.

,

Science and the Modern World

,

p.

8

,

em-
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force.

Aristotle had observed that things Left to them-

selves would stop, Galileo explained the theoretical basis
of the phenomena.

He handled his analysis of pendular mo-

tion in the same way.

Whereas the ancients had focused

upon the stone's final state of rest at the center of its
swing (its lowest, therefore natural, position) Galileo,

ignoring the incidental properties, saw the pendulum's swing
in a new light and explained how the motion of the pendulum
is naturally damped by the friction of the air.
It is obvious from this that Galileo found no need to

concern himself with the purposes of objects when he could
not only adequately explain how they were moving, but also

had an apparently general system which applied to all bodies
in motion.

In this way, the character of man's examination

at his world became fundamentally different than it had been

in the past.

Aristotle believed that if one did not know

the cause of something he was merely stating an opinion and

did not possess knowledge of the event.

Accordingly, ho had

conceived of four types of causes, ranging from the lowest
"formal"
or "material" cause through the successive stages of

cause,

"efficient" cause and "final" cause which were all

required in order to fully explain the why of nature.

Now,

linal
we see that scientific interest came to ignore the

formal
cause which was directed at the future and also the

object
cause which was seen to be of the essence of the

\
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itself in favor of explanation in terms of efficient causes

which act on the material (material cause) to produce the
observed phenomena.

This state of affairs is also a good

indicator of the "shrinkage M of the world-view which was

occurring with the rise of science:

all-embracing meta-

physical systems, based primarily upon the naive issue of

unexamined sense perception, were being replaced by abstract
descriptions of limited phenomena.
While we owe a great debt to Galileo's creative genius
in firmly establishing the methods of science, we are also

deeply involved in the modern version of some of the products of the content of his thought.

Galileo's quantitative

states of motion led him to assume that the matter, whose

motion he was observing, was ultimately constructed of in-

definitely small indivisible atoms.

In this assumption he

is simply forming an up-dated version of the atomism of the

ancient Greeks by adding the rigor of modern scientific ex-

pression to the purely philosophical and speculative accounts which are to be found in the words of Democritus.
In what must be one of the clearest and longest standing

anticipations of subsequent developments, Democritus in the
fifth century B.C. maintained that:
By convention sweet is sweet, by convention
bitter is bitter, by convention cold is cold,
by convention hot is hot, by convention color
But in reality there are the atoms
is color.
and the void. That is, the objects of sense
are supposed to be real, and it is customary

,

24

to regard them as such, but in reality they
Only the atoms and the void are
arc no t
^9
real
.

.

Burtt observes that while the precise historical parents of

Galileo's atomism are unknown, it is probably true that,

Galilean atomism and its mechanical corollaries were due to the percolation through
the intervening ages of some fragmentary
ideas from the great Greek materialist.
Certainly the doctrine of primary and
secondary qualities, with causality lodged in
exhibits strong marks of a
the atoms
Democritanism brought up to date and fitted
into the new mathematical programme \ sic ] 30
.

.

.

.

.

.

,

.

In coming to this phase of Galilean thought we are on the

threshold of one of the most significant developments of the
This development is none other than the

whole modern era.

formulation of the seventeenth century version of "corpusThis philosophy, which was more than

cular philosophy."

theory of
the atomism of ancients and less than the atomic
of the most
the nineteenth century, should be seen as one

fundamental characteristics of the modern era.

For it was

to two very imby virtue of this view that birth was given
the modern age,
portant trends; namely, the twin children of

science and philosophy.

This is not to say that there were

all credit and or blame
no antecedents of this view or that

quoted in A. Wheelis, The En d oi the
32, emphasis
Modern Age (New York: Basic Books, 1971), Padded.
_L
3 °Burtt, Metaphysical Foun dations of Modern Physica
Science pp. 77-78.

^Democritus

,

should be given to Galileo; lor, whatever our historical

preferences may be and however we may wish to add up the

fragmentary ideas which "percolated through the ages," the
fact remains that in the thought of Galileo we have the

first major metaphysical step in the banishment of man from
the world of nature and the subsequent creation of the meta-

physical and epistemological problems which have characterized the entire modern age.

Focusing first on the human implication of this view
and recalling our earlier discussion of the character of
most ancient and medieval thought, we are reminded that the

natural tendency was to see both man and nature as important
parts of the whole cosmos.

Plato, and his student Aristotle,

always had man in a fundamental position in the value of
things and never regarded him as in any way associated with
the poorer half of any dichotomy between primary and secon-

dary or being and nonbeing.

Man was seen as the micro-

cosmic exemplification of the splendors of the macrocosm.
The elaboration of the doctrine of primary and secondary

qualities marks the beginning of man's spectator status in
the universe.

Burtt asserts that:

Now, in the course of translating this distinction of primary and secondary int o terms
suited to the new mathematical in terpretation
of Nature, we have the first stag e in the
reading of man quite out of t he real and

primary realm 31
.

-^

1

Ibid.

,

p.

79

»

author's emphasis.
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He goes on to elaborate with the observation that man him-

self is a poor subject for the mathematical study required
by the developing science since those qualities seemingly

most characteristic of man e.g., his life of colors, sounds,
hopes, pleasures, passionate loves and intense agonies

belong only to man and are not to be found in the world of
resting and moving material objects.

Hence, the assumption

that the real world was outside of man and that contrary to
the ancient tradition, especially Plato and Aristotle,

which saw a higher reality in Ideas and Forms which man is
able to contemplate in the full reality of his immediate

experience, in the light of all his faculties, the new view

now classed as secondary just those very features which had
seemed most important.

For man, now conceived as an assem-

blage of secondary qualities, the only hope was to rely

upon that aspect of his nature which could alone provide

knowledge --his theoretical and mathematical mind.

Turning now to the scientific impact of this view, we
philossee that Galileo arrived at his form of "corpuscular
the cateophy" as a result of his willingness to generalize

matter
gories he found useful in describing the phenomena of
in motion he observed with the naked eye.

Galileo's thought

time not only
focuses upon the categories of mass, space and
but also bebecause they could be treated mathematically
which was constrained
cause they fitted the scheme of atomism

27

to see the world as composed of particles which were totally

described in terms of their mass and velocity.

Now that

the formal and final causes had been shown away from the

basic system, it was no longer possible to meaningly view
change as the transition of potentiality to actuality; on
this view, one was constrained to see only the efficient

and material causes as represented in the rearrangement of

material particles (material cause) in accord with the math-

ematically describable laws of motion (efficient cause).
This said, we can best conclude this summary of Galileo's
scientific thought by briefly looking at the basic meaning
it had for the issues of primary and secondary qualities

and the phenomenon of time.

Both of these issues are of

immanent importance to the psychological and educational
topics that are to follow.
First, Galileo called the qualities of mass and veloc-

ity primary because he viewed them as belonging only to the

external world and therefore independent of the observer.
His criterion in this choice was to focus the "permanence"
of the qualities in question and to assign secondary status
to anything that was "added" to nature by the subjective

reaction of the individual and his sensory modalities.

It

implicit
is important to observe that Galileo also held an

criterion for this choice; namely, the ability to choose

phenomena that were amenable to quantitative mathematical

28

description

.

Galileo, in terms reminiscent of his ancient

predecessor Democritus, is very explicit about the matter:
But that external bodies, to excite in us
these tastes, these odours \ sic 1 and these
sounds demand other than size, figure, number,
and slow or rapid motion, I do not believe;
and X judge that, if the ears, the tongue,
and the nostrils were taken away, the figure,
the numbers, and the motions would indeed remain, but not the odours nor the tastes nor
the sounds, which without the living animal,
I do not believe are anything else than names,
just as tickling is precisely nothing but a
name if the armpit and the nasal membrane be
removed; ... 32
As an indication of the ultimate fate of the scientific as-

pects of this formulation of the primary qualities of mass
and velocity it is important to jump into the twentieth

century for the insight that modern relativity theory exthese
actly contradicts this position in its assertion that
but
qualities of mass and velocity are not independent of

relative to the observer.
had on
Turning now to the impact this new philosophy
important assumption
the meaning of time, we find another
Aristotle
which still serves to color our modern thinking.
thought, saw
and the medieval thinkers who followed his

transformation of potemporal processes as the continuous
heavily on the mystentiality into actuality— both relying
role as the highest
tical experience of mortal man in his
-^Galileo, quoted in Ibid., p* 78.

.

.
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of the hierarchy of formed mat tor.

God was seen as

tin'

eternal and self-sufficient power which drew out of creation all that is potentially capable of being actualized.
"To put this in modern terms," Burtt writes,

"the present

exists unmoved and continually draws into itself the fu-

ture";^ the apparent absurdity of that statement must

be

viewed in light of the fact that as the modern inheritors
of Galileo's thought, we too, have banished man from the

real world and have no place for time as something lived

but only for time as an abstract category represented by a

measurable continuum— a hypothetical construct in which the
and
present is simply a timeless dividing time between past

future.

Seen in this light, the true nature of time is one

the modern
of the greatest unsolved philosophical puzzles of
the work of
era and has, of course, been a primary topic in
James and
many important modern philosophers, e.g., Bergson,

Whitehead
secondary qualWe will meet the issues of primary and
epistemological probities, and the other metaphysical and
of the modern
lems inherent in this in these foundations
in the present context
era many times in what is to follow;
that both the developing conit is most relevant to remark
the belief in God
ceptualization of a mechanical world and

fathers' philosophy.
were reconciled within the founding
33 Ibid.

,

p.

85

.

•
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Galileo, for example, held that since sensory observations

derive from nature and as God is the author of nature then
there should be no conflict between the two sources of

knowledge
think that in discussions of physical problems we ought to begin not from the authority
of scriptural passages but from senseexperiences and necessary demonstrations, for
the holy Bible and the phenomena of nature
For
proceed alike from the divine Word.
that reason it appears that nothing physical
which sense-experience sets before our eyes,
or which necessary demonstrations prove to
us, ought to be called into question (much
less condemned) upon the testimony of biblical passages which may have some different
meaning beneath their words. For the Bible
is not chained in every expression to conditions as strict as those which govern all
physical effects; nor is God anyless excellently revealed in Nature’s actions than in
the sacred statements of the Bible. 3^

I

.

.

.

In taking this view, Galileo is however, marking an important shift in the biblical frame of reference.

Whereas the

centuries long tradition had viewed an understanding

of

na-

the Bible,
ture as subordinate to the revealed theology of

knowledge
Galileo's asserting that knowledge of nature and
and given
of scripture should be placed on the same level
equal status in the approach toward God.

But the equal

easy to
status was to be short-lived for it was all too
the "clear and
focus greater and greater importance upon
there was
distinct" products of the new science whenever

^Galileo
Religion

,

p.

,

3°

and
quoted in Barbour, Issues in Science

.

.
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uncertainty about the vague connotations of the scripture.
We find this interpretation in many of the important

thinkers of that time, for example, Kepler wrote:
As the ear is made to perceive sound, and the
eye to perceive color, so the mind has been
formed to understand, not all sorts of things,
but qualities.
It perceives any given thing
more clearly in proportion as that thing is
close to bare quantities as to its origin,
but the further a thing recedes from quantities the more darkness and error inhere in
it. 35

Closeness to bare quantities and clear and distinct sensory

information become the hallmarks of the new science; Galileo's own words are an appropriate indication of the legacy
he left,

Philosophy is written in this great book, the
Universe, which stands continually open to
But the book cannot be understood
our gaze.
unless one first learns to comprehend the
language and to read the letters of which it
It is written in the language
is composed.
of mathematics and its characters are triangles, circles, and other geometric figures,
without which it is humanly impossible to
understand a simple word of it; without these
one wanders around in a dark labyrinth.
->

1.2.3

RENE DESCARTES (1596-1650)
chai
For the final touches on the development of the

-

century, it
acter of scientific thought in the seventeenth
for the philosophical
is to Rene Descartes that we must turn

^Johannes Kepler, quoted in
the Machine (New York:
p"]
140

Harcourt

36 Galileo, quoted in Ibid

.

,

,

Mumford, The Myth 9 t
Brace, Jovanovitch, 197

L.

p.

l40

),
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justifications of the now model of man.

In Descartes we

find the full development of the philosophical and psycho-

logical implications of those doctrines which have been

"percolating through the ages."

Descartes, as we have

seen, decidedly did not create the famous mind-body dualism;

instead, he functioned to bring to critical focus and ex-

plicit statement, those centuries long traditions which

formed the foundations of his age.

Dualism in the Middle Ages, following the lead of
Aristotle, was preoccupied with the idea that the body was

rather like a container into which the soul was placed at
conception-- there to remain until the moment of death.
some ways Descartes’

In

criticism of his predecessors is simi-

lar to that which much modern psychology and education has
of its immediate antecedents, including the traditions

which are founded upon Descartes’ thought.

That is to say,

a main part of his motivation is to be found in his dissat-

isfaction with the extant view which made the relation between mind and body appear' rather like a puppet and puppeteer.

Descartes insisted.
It is not sufficient that the soul be lodged
in the human body like a pilot in his ship,
unless perhaps for the movement o.L its memIt needs to be joined and united
bers.
with it more closely, in order that, in addition to any such mo tor- function it may

...

,

,

>
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liavo

sensations* and appetites and thus constitute a true inan.37

Seen in this light, Descartes' efforts are
more appropriately viewed as an attempt to unify the mind
and the body

rather than to sunder the relationship as is
often supposed.

Given that Descartes is a product of the seventeenth
century, it is natural that his philosophy should
reflect
the increasing influence of those views which
asserted the

autonomy of the mind and its ability to discover the nature
of the Creator via the rational and mathematical study
of
the character of creation.

This new outlook found expres-

sion in a desire to make the scientific and philosophical

view of the causal relationship between the soul and body
not only explicit but also, and most importantly, mutual.

This coloration of Descartes' thought by that of his age is
to be seen in the important factors which entered into his

philosophy.

First, was his firm conviction (which he ob-

tained when visited by an "Angel of the Lord" in a dream)
that mathematics was the way to knowledge; everything, he
felt, would ultimately be reduced to a geometrical descript-

tion

—a

second important factor in his system.

For Des-

cartes all non-geome trical properties had to be taken from
37

,

Rene Descartes, in N. K. Smith, ed. and trans.
Descartes' Philosophical Writings (London: MacMillan,
1952 ) pi 1^9 quoted in Richard Lowry, The Evolution of
Psychological Theory (New York: Aldine- Atherton 1971 )
,

,

,

p.

o.

j'l

tlio

world and located in the mind, whose nature as a non-

extendod thinking substance, made it not only totally separate from matter but also of such unique character that
there was no comparison between the machine- like qualities
of extended space and the unextended thinking spirits.

Part of the reason for the radical dualism he estab-

lished is to be found in his rejection of the medieval doctrine of the tripartite "nutritive," "sensitive" and "ra-

tional" souls.

Descartes in a manner suggestive of the

contemporary rejection of "formal" and "final" causes retained only the doctrine of rational soul and saw it as

responsible for all thought processes.

The other phenomena,

i.e., life functions and sense perceptions, formerly as-

cribed to the nutritive and sensitive souls, were now simply an inherent function of the body itself--and bodies, it
will be remembered, are totally determined by the immutable

laws of nature which act upon extended matter in space.

That Descartes explicitly inverts the teleological structure
of past ages is shown in this rejection of the medieval po-

sition that the vitality of the body is dependent upon the

nutritive and sensitive souls.

This error he felt:

arises from the fact that from observing
that all dead bodies are devoid of heat and
consequently of movement, it has been thought
that it was the absence of the soul which
caused these movements and this heat to cease;
and thus, without any reason, it was thought
that our natural heat and all the movements
while in
of the body depend upon the soul:
.

.

.
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fact w e ought on the contrary to believe that
the soul quits us on death only because this
heat ceases, and the organs which serve to
move the body disintegrate 38
r

.

From this basic position, many important consequences
follow.

For example, all living bodies including man’s are

now ’’automata," self-moving machines, only the rational
soul distinguishes man's existence from the rest.

To ac-

complish the interaction between mind (soul) and body he
required, Descartes elaborated a "psychophysiological " theory which related many current doctrines of the times into
a "coherent" scheme.

From anatomy he borrowed the central

importance of the brain as a directive center as opposed to
the heart or liver; from the current technology came the

hydraulic analogy responsible for nerve-hydraulics which
gave meaning to animal-spirits moving from the brain to

operate the muscles.

Obviously, Descartes was building

upon centuries of tradition in formulating this view; he
synthesized, but he also hypothesized and in so doing added
a new dimension to modern thought.

In responding to his conviction that "the soul be

lodged in the body" in a closer fashion so that it would
conform the basis for "sensations and appetites and thus

for the
stitute a true man," Descartes laid the groundwork

conceptualization of reflex mechanisms.

^Descartes

,

quoted in Ibid

.

,

p.

8.

His mental
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hydraulics led, quite naturally, to an understanding of the

possibility that excitation at a sense organ could be mediated by the brain and therefore, communicated to a muscle.
Of course, his whole system requires just such a view.

Automata must be so constructed as to be self-sufficient in
the sense that a stimulus elicits a response in virtue of
the interconnections within the system.

The problems which

flow naturally from the formulation are all too familiar to

modern psychological theory.

Though the term "reflex" did

not arise for another century, Descartes, many of his con-

temporaries and an embarrassing number of moderns were all

involved in the tasks of sorting out why some stimuli create
specific responses and why some create varied responses by

way of attempting to justify a purely machine-like model of
an automatic human body.

Descartes failed and modern psy-

chology is beginning to wonder.
We,

for reasons similar to the original objections

Descartes raised about his predecessors, are finding that
the psychophysical dualism he fostered,

though long aban-

doned in an explicit sense, is still with us and leaves too
little room for the expression of those qualities which

"constitute a true man."
1.2.4

RENE DESCARTES
AND JOHN B. WATSON
shrinkIn earlier sections we dwelt at length upon the

of modern
age of world-view that has characterized the rise

37

science

and.

the attendant diminution of

(die

position of man

in the cosmos; here too, we can pause for another statement
of this theme.

This time however, we can be more specific

both in example and in relevance to modern times.
"Possibly the best way to bring out the contrast be-

tween the old psychology and the new," wrote John

B.

Watson

in 1924
is to say that all schools of psychology except that of behaviorism claim that "consciousness" is the subject matter of psycholBehaviorism, on the contrary, holds
ogy.
that the subject matter of human psychology
is the behavior or activities of the human
Behaviorism claims that "consciousbeing.
ness" is neither a definable nor a usable
concept; that it is merely another word for
The old
the "soul" of more ancient times.
psychology is thus dominated by a kind of
subtle religious philosophy 39
.

Here, Watson rejects the "soul" which Descartes found necesHis view of

sary and concentrates instead upon behavior.

the nervous system, though he could make use of modern elec-

trical knowledge in forming a metaphor and also by then had

benefit of a rather fully elaborated reflex theory, bears a

striking similarity to that of Descartes.

When a stimulus arises in a receptor
the stimulus is carried off along preformed
and definite arcs to the effectors in the
order in which the arcs offer the least
resistance to the passage of the current.
.

^^John B. Watson, Behaviorism (New York:
p

.

3

•

.

.

Norton,

Id,, i),

.

.

.But there

ways ^0

is no formation of new path-

.

Thus, Watson retains the machine-like physical body of

man and rejects the "soul" as the result of the domination
of a "kind of subtle religious philosophy."

What seemed

subtle to Watson was a central factor to Descartes; for far

from being an incidental characteristic, religious philoso-

phy was central to Descartes' formulation.

For Descartes,

it was only possible to explain the interaction of the mind

with the body by including the two in a larger more meaningful framework.

That is, he explained that a) the extended

physical body can give rise to sensations in the unextended
mental substance and b) the unextended mind can have valid

conceptualizations of the external world because God had
made the world of matter in such a fashion that the purely

mathematical concepts which were intuited by the mind were
system required for

Descartes'

perfectly applicable to it.

its complete meaning, a metaphysical wedding between the

world of extended matter in space and the world of unextended
thinking spirits--a wedding performed upon the altar of God.
By the time of Watson, psychology was no longer vexed by the

problems of wondering about the "true" relation of such

widely divergent entities and was unconcerned with whether
or not our scientific picture is a true copy of the real

An Introduction to Comparative
Holt 191^+ ) PP 16-17

^Watson, Behavior:
Psychology (New York:

,

>

•

•
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extended world or if, in fact, it was simply a convenient
ordering of our unextended experiencing mind.

It makes one

wish that Watson had taken the time to be more explicit
about his vision of the fulfillment he foresaw for individ-

uals in the behaviorist scheme when he expressed the sentiment that:
I wish I had the time to describe this, to
picture to you the kind of rich and wonderful

individual we should make of every healthy
child if only we could let it shape itself
properly and then provide for it a universe
in which it could exercise that organization-free of foolish customs and
a universe
have no significance in
which
conventions
themselves, yet which hem the individual like
For the universe will
taut steel bands.
change if you bring up your children not in
the freedom of the libertine, but in behavioristic freedom--a freedom which we cannot
even picture in words, so little we know of
.

.

.

.

.

.

it 4l
.

Perhaps Watson would never admit to a vision from God

which was purveyed by "an Angel of the Lord" in a dream, yet
the scope of his thought seems hardly more circumscribed;
sought
for he not only thought in universal terms but also

behavior.
to "change" the universe by "controlling"

One

of
way or another, it would seem, man needs both a vision

what "constitutes a true man" (the human potentialities

which lie before him), and also
for,

a

method to reach his goal;

principles
sooner or later, and even if the explicit

control his fate
of the science forbid it, man's desire to

^Watson, Behaviorism

,

pp.

247-248.

.

in relation to nonmateriai ends always manifests itself.

In some very important ways, Descartes was simply more

honest than Watson, though it is doubtful that Watson was

intentionally dishonest since his limited materialistic

metaphysics simply did not allow the formulation of larger
questions

Whatever the problems which existed in the forefront
of the minds of those in the seventeenth century may have

been and however we wish to describe them today, it is important to note the tremendous contrasts which have arisen

between the Galileo-Descart es world-view, which itself was
a tremendous departure from that of the medieval tradition,

and the view of a large portion of modern psychologists.
In concluding an earlier section we asserted, that the

rise of modern science and philosophy, has had the combined

effect of divorcing the world of value from the world of
fact

— primary

that cleavage.

and secondary qualities are an expression

oi

We also asserted that the collapse of the

hierarchical teleology of the Middle Ages into the infinite
and indefinite universe in which all components and laws
were placed on the same level of being amounted to the cre-

ation of a world-view in which man became a homeless and
contingent being in a purposeless cosmos, a product of ranhimdom variation and natural selection with nothing but

self to rely on for meaning and survival

— we

see Watson's

kl

psychology as an expression of that existential crisis.
It is an expression of the spirit of man made homeless by

its progressive banishment at the hands of theory, experi-

ment and mathematical laws--the shiny surface of our pure

knowledge has become such a small facet of total being that
it can no longer reflect an adequate image of man.

Watson

attempted, but was "unable to part from his own shadow."
His formulation of a method by which one could rely on one-

self for meaning and survival in the face of materialistic

response determinism is to be seen in the light of those
"larger" aspects of being which, while not recognized by
the theory, are, nonetheless, the stimuli for the type of

response toward a "universe unshackled" that characterized
the background of Watson's thought.

We must now begin to move more rapidly through the

historical channels that lead to modern psychological
thought.

We have dwelt at length upon many issues of a

larger or cosmological nature in order to provide the type
of perspective that will form a useful contrast in latei

chapters when various alternatives to modern interpretations
are explored.

The intent of the remainder of the historical

material of the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is to show: a) its relation to the roots already
of
presented and b) the continued and progressive narrowing

for psychology.
the scope of phenomena considered meaningful

Two seventeenth century thinkers

oi'

present context remain to be considered:

importance to the
one scientist and

one philosopher.

1.2.5

ISAAC NEWTON

(

1642-1727)

Isaac Newton, it is often remarked, was born in the
same year that Galileo died, 1642; thus the two men represent, within their span of two generations, the formulation

of the basic doctrine of modern science.

Newton's inventive

genius is widely known and his contributions of the calculus
and system of physical laws are, in many ways, the capstones
of the innovations of his great predecessor Galileo.

In terms of general scientific thought, Newton held

firmly to the principle that the scientist's role was to

describe and not to speculate, to create literal representations of the "laws on which the Great Creator actually chose
to found the Frame of the World.

"

Newton clearly saw the

world as a law abiding machine in which the laws of motion
and gravity were seen to apply to the smallest particle and
the farthest planet.

The laws of the "Great Creator" were

the source of ordered forces on masses as opposed to a hier-

archy of purposes.

This view contains the perfect justili-

cation that the world is completely predictable and it is
ineasy to see how Newton's belief in the existence of an

favor
telligent Creator could eventually be dropped out in

had no
of a purely self-contained mechanical system that

43

room for human meaning and purpose.
Since Newton's scheme epitomizes the concentration

upon qualities that are treatable in quantitative ways it

naturally came to treat mass and velocity as the basic
terms of description.

In this way Newton's considerable

weight and authority in matters scientific and philosophical was thrown squarely behind that of Galileo and final

causes were totally replaced by efficient causes; causality

became viewed as simply the action of forces between atoms
and all change was seen as totally explainable in terms of
the rearrangements of atoms.

1.2.6

JOHN LOCKE (l632-1704)
John Locke is an important philosopher in that he

wrote with a knowledge of Newtonian physics and therefore

elaborated a doctrine which was completely in keeping with
the status of physical science in the late seventeenth cen-

tury.

When he wrote his famous Essay Concerning Human

Understanding in 1690

,

Locke elaborated a theory of psycho-

logical mechanism in which the basic elements were "ideas"
that behaved in ways very similar to Newton's "particles."
Of central concern to Locke in his treatment of ideas
as analogues of atoms was to establish how it was that

these ultimate particles came about.

For many reasons

Locke found it necessary and advisable to restrict the

origination of ideas strictly to the results of experience,

he held that the mind was a "void of all characters, without any ideas" until written upon by experience.

"Let is

suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all

characters, without any ideas," Lock wrote as he posed the

question of how it might be that,

"...

it becomes fur-

nished?" and "Whence comes it by that vast store which the

busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an
endless variety?

and knowledge?"

Whence has it all the materials of reason
To these questions Locke had one answer,

a total and complete description of reality that left no

remainder.

In framing that answer Locke created the first

real expression of a psychological empiricism when he re-

sponded to his rhetorical questions with, "To this I answer,
in one word, from experience.

In that all our knowledge is

founded and from that it ultimately derives itself.

Our

observation employed either, about external sensible objects
and
or about the internal operations of our minds perceived

reflected on by ourselves, is that which supplies our undeistanding with all the materials of thinking.

These two are

ideas we
the fountains of knowledge, from whence all the

have, or can naturally have do spring."

42

Psychological empiricism then, is really a psychology
atomic texture
in which the basic units "ideas" form the

Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding,
Clarendon, 1894), quoted in
ed. by A. C. Fraser (Oxford:
19*
Lowry, Evolution of Psycholog ical Theory, p.

^ John

of mind.

Locke elaborated this psychology by keying

Ills

mechanistic mental description directly into physical theory.

He held that there were two kinds of ideas "simple"

and "complex."

Simple ideas, he believed were those which

were derived directly from experience with the primary

qualities in nature and complex ideas were his way of maintaining a strict empiricist position upon the derivation of
ideas, i.e., from experience, while at the same time being

able to explain how other ideas which did not derive from

experience came about.

Since some ideas, for example the

concept of infinity, were obviously not derived from direct

experience of primary qualities Locke held that they resulted from the compounding of simple ideas which were ex-

perienced directly.
In providing for the compounding of simple ideas, Locke

used the term association of ideas and thereby created the
"psychology of association" as a description of how ideas

became connected with one another.

Since Locke's times were

still greatly reliant upon the order of nature as created by

God and the mind's ability to know that order directly as we
have seen in Descartes and Newton in particular, Locke did
not find it necessary to elaborate in great detail on why
some ideas allied with others.

He just assumed that the

were
order was inherent in nature; wrong ideas therefore,
than
simply those associated by chance ordering rather

'

nature

s

ordering.

Thus, Locke became the
founding father of a psychology
which was explicitly based
upon the new cosmology of modern
science and one which also
opened up the way for many subsequent "developments" in
psychological theory-many of his
successors were to struggle
with issues relating
to the

formation of complex ideas, i.e.,
how they happen and what
accounts for the naturalness of
some connections and the
unnaturalness of others.
1.3

THE WHITEHEADIAN FALLACY
OF MISPLACED CONCRETENESS
AND ITS RELATION TO THE
SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

Before closing this summary of the
seventeenth century
it is well to consider some of
the issues which, though
they belong to this time, were not obvious
to the people
involved and only result from our modern
interpretation of

their thought.

A major interpretation of these times that

will be useful in later discussions is that
of Whitehead.

Whitehead locates many of his central criticisms of
traditional science here in the seventeenth century.^

Central among these criticisms is what he calls the "Fal-

lacy of Misplaced Concreteness."

This fallacy has three

major presumptive components, each of which was firmly established in this epoch.
43

First, there is the assumption of

Whitehead, Science and the Modern World

,

pp.

39-33.

"simple-location" which is the view that matter or material
can he completely described by the property of being simply

located in space and time.

This assumption, Whitehead as-

serts, is a useful abstraction but one which totally in-

hibits the recognition that entities and processes do not
exist in isolation from one another and do, in fact, require

an explanation which involves other regions of space and
time.

We will meet this assumption again in the next cen-

tury when we consider how Whitehead can assert that modern
science "has remained blandly indifferent to its refutation

by Hume."

Another important presumption of the over-all

fallacy are the closely related categories of substance and
quality.

Whitehead's main point here is that any analysis

of nature is based upon abstract concepts which are simpli-

fications of experience.

He further points out that we

is
should always question just how "concrete" our thinking

are
when it is based upon the "concrete" categories we

using as the basis of our logical system.

The substance-

age which
quality problem arises from the character of that

therefore
believed in the absolute independence and reality,
matter
concreteness, of the indes true table particles of

which were the building blocks of nature.

Thus, objects

some of which we
were observed to have various qualities,

itself (pnmaxy
predicated as belonging to the substance
(secondary); that is,
qualities) and others were accidental

48

added

Lo

the primary spatio- tempo ra

constitute the real world.

L

relationships

that,

The third element is not quite

as visible from what has been said as the other two have

been.

This is Whitehead's "Doctrine of Mere Sensation" in

which he summarizes the tenor of empiricist thought by

pointing out that the early thinkers had assumed that the
primary activity in an act of experience is simply the bare
subjective entertainment of the datum.

Under this assump-

tion they were happy in the concrete assurance that the

data of experience were true and not distorted by any subjective form of reception.

From these examples and in conjunction with the previous material we see that misplaced concreteness is not
the result of an explicit decision to believe certain facts

within the framework of the knowledge and understanding of
an age but is, rather, a statement of the perpetual blindspot in the foveal vision of each age.

When it comes to

comparing ultimate point s-of-view, science cannot be objective enough to weigh and measure the subjective parts of
its own existence.

Certainly the creative geniuses of the seventeenth
century would have been surprised indeed by Whitehead's
colorful summary of the practical outcome of their scientific philosophy.

In characterizing the enormous success of

age, based as it was on the concepts of matter simply

.
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located in space and time and mind as the perceiving and

reasoning but not interfering substance, he concluded that:
Thus nature gets credit which should in truth
be reserved for ourselves:
the rose for its
scent:
the nightingale for its song:
and
the sun for its radiance.
The poets are entirely mistaken. They should address their
lyrics to themselves, and should turn them
into odes of self-congratulation on the excellency of the human mind. Nature is a dull
affair, soundless, scentless, colourless;
merely the hurrying of material, endlessly,
meaninglessly 44
.

1.4

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The proper conclusion of this chapter is a summary of

the main descriptive points which are central to the over-

all theme of this presentation.

In outline form and not

necessarily in order of greatest importance, the following
points have been elaborated and to some extent justified.

First--we have witnessed the displacement of man from the
center of the cosmos and the gradual demise of his perceived

importance to that system.
Second--has been the increased emphasis placed upon the

power of reason as the basis for man’s dignity.
Third--is the all important rise of modern science with its
shift of emphasis from purposive explanations to experimen-

tation and theory in the language of mathematics.

Mathemat-

ical description of "efficient” causes replaced teleological

emphasis on "final" causes.
44
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Fourth

— Divine?

purposes in nature worn increasingly ro-

placed by explanations of tho mechanico-mathematicul typo.
Wo moderns see that the seventeenth contury reaction to a

prior age which was dominated by religious thought

lias

cre-

ated tho modern ago which is dominated by scientific thought
and aro increasingly coming to seek a balance between tho
two types of explanation.

Fifth--wo have soon that the mechanistLc world-view, which
was part of the larger cosmology of tho seventeenth century,

and which was originally closely associated with tho methods
of science has become the modern metaphysics.

At some point

scientific conclusions are also philosophical interpretations which tend to survive even when tho specific fact is

modified.

Subsequent chapters will touch upon the "truth"

of materialism, determinism, and atheism which find their

"roots" in this age and which acted to dissolve man into a

solution of natural facts subject to mechanical law.

Sixth--The great success of physical thought carried over
into psychological thought with the result that only math*

matically doscribable elements of experience could be
classed as primary qualities of the external world.

view of nature was largely static because material configurations were predictable by law so that no Fundamental

ly

new novelty was soon as possible.
issues
Seventh--in terms of the specific psychological

w*>

"
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have seen the creation of the explicit mind-body dualism
and the beginnings of the long-standing problems of how to
deal with tho two abstract entities.

Wo saw Descartes es-

tablish the closely allied doctrine that tho body has a

primary vitality of its own which is responsible for tho
theory of automata and ultimately leads to Behaviorism.
In Joim Loclco we found the elaboration of total psycho-

logical empiricism; ideational atomism with complex ideas

formed by association of simple ideas, and tho translation
of the physical doctrine of primary and secondary qualities

into psychological reality.

Tho amount of space which has been devoted to the

seventeenth century is, perhaps, large in relation to the

remainder of the material that must be covered.

Yet, it is

only the barest sample of the volumes that have been written

and the material which could have been presented which also

would have been relevant to the topic at hand.

Perhaps the

importance of the issues arising in this, the earliest century of scientific development, is best underscored by

Whitehead's terse comment to the effect that the tremendous
success of the major assumptions of this age has "foisted
most cononto philosophy the task of accepting them as the

crete rendering of facts.
45

been ruined.
4.5
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Thereby, modern philosophy has
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2.0

THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY:
AN ENLIGHTENED AGE
In assessing the eighteenth century and its further

impact upon the development of modern thought we are imme-

diately confronted by the great difference between it and
its predecessor, the century which Whitehead referred to as
the "century of genius"; and of which he was willing to say,

A brief, and sufficiently accurate, description of the intellectual life of the European
races during the succeeding two centuries and
a quarter of our own times is that they have
been living upon the accumulated capital of
ideas provided for them by the genius of the
seventeenth century. ^6
The eighteenth century, like its immediate successors, was
science
a time in which the influence of the ideas of modern

There

spread into many and diverse areas of human activity.

biology
were further developments in the physical sciences;
and zoology
was founded in the pioneering work of Linnaeus

was launched by Buff on.

It was an age of transition in

cosmology:
which the major characteristics of the modern
and
distinction between the categories of mind
its sharp

a view of nature
material, were gradually elaborated into
It was an age
which was deterministic and reductionistic
man's perf ec tabili ty
which purchased its optimistic view of
from concepts inthrough reason at the expense of shifting
assumption of skeptical,
volving the role of God, to the
.

^Whitehead

,

Science and the Modern World, p. 39

*

.

atheistic philosophies which venerated material scientific

progress
Before discussing the specific events which are most
relevant to the content of current psychological and educational theory, it is important to catch some flavor of the

over _all context of the times which spawned these specifics.
The eighteenth century, also known as the Age of Reason,

was one which venerated, above all else, the Newtonian

paradigm of scientific discovery as the pattern upon which
the acquisition of all knowledge should be based.

While

Newton had firmly established the principles of satisfactory
scientific explanation, there was apt to be a great deviaof
tion from his findings in the outcome of the application

those principles.

This is clearly shown in the work and

Newton,
thought of Laplace, who, one hundred years after

infinite uniput the final touches on the creation of the

verse of modern man.

Newton had believed that the clock-

the energetic
like world would run down if it were not for
free-will and deciGod who ran the world according to His

sion.

by Leibnitz
Even in his own time Newton was opposed

mechanism was
who was concerned to show that the world
admitted the inself-sufficient and neither required nor

tervention of

God— though

He was still seen as its Creator.

of the phenomena which
However, in the time of Laplace some
hand in nature were reduced
to Newton, were signs of God's

to mathematical formulation,

i.e.,

scientific explanation.

For example, Newton had seen in the irregularities of plan-

etary orbits the requirement for God to interact; otherwise,
the imperfections might grow to unmanageable proportions.

Laplace, on the other hand, achieved a mathematical analysis
of these phenomena which related the questionable behavior
to the mutual attraction of the planets.

Such empirical

success, combined as it was with an equally deterministic

theory of the origin of the solar system (his nebular hy-

pothesis) which apparently explained the original ordering

without the need of referring to God, is reported to have

prompted Laplace to respond to Napoleon's question about
why the role of God was missing in Laplace's volume System
of the World in which he had explained creation--"! had no

need of that hypothesis."

47

This is a simple example of the widely used asseition
in
that belief in God must be exclusively located in a gap

the scientific account of nature.

A scientist with a faith

inin God and also a faith in the advance of scientific

the two
quiry found it increasingly difficult to reconcile

discrepancy to
views, and Laplace seemed to heighten the
strict deterits limits by the forthright assertion of

minism

.

^Pierre Simon Laplace, quoted in Koyre
to Infinite Universe, p.

276.

,

Closed Worl d

5b

We ought then to regard the present stale of'
the universe as the effect of its anterior
state and as the cause of the one which is to
follow.
Given for one instant an intelligence which could comprehend all the forces
by which nature is animated and the respective situation of the beings who compose it-an intelligence sufficiently vast to submit
these data to analysis--it would embrace in
the same foundation the movements of the
greatest bodies of the universe and those of
the lightest atom; for it, nothing would be
uncertain and the future, as the past, would
be present to its eyes. 8

In addition to the determinism expressed in the above quo-

tation is the associated view that "the same foundation of

movements" applies to all bodies in the universe.

In other

words, all phenomena are seen as yielding to an ultimate
This iorm of reduc-

explanation in terms of physical laws.
tionism has two main components.

First

ol

all it relates

to Laplace's epistemology in that it contains the assoi

t

ion

that knowledge is knowledge of physical laws and second,

there is a relation to Laplace's metaphysics which holds
motion.
that reality is actually a composition of matter in

future in
We will meet this assumption again in the near
Mettrie.
connection with the psychological theorizing of La
of these
Here however, it is useful to note the importance
is shown by the
two notions for the belief that causality

impact of one particle upon another.

These views require

in terms of
that cause and effect should be explained

^Laplace, A Philosophical
(New York:

Dover^ 1961 )

,

P*

iv.

Essays on Probabilities

•

mechanical forces between two moving bodies--a view soon to
be exploded by Hume.

Along with the epistemological and metaphysical changes

relating to the new scientific doctrine there was a primary
effect upon the conception of God and His place and function in the lives of people.

This transition has been

traced by Barbour^ and is formulated in three overlapping
stages.

In the first stage, the earliest part of the cen-

tury, broad based support was to be found for traditional

revealed religion and also for rational religion which was
basic
seen as an equally efficacious route to the same

truths.

reIn the second stage of development, rational

was diligion gained prominence and scriptural relevance
Father
minished in authority. In this view, the Benevolent
the world-machine
in Heaven became simply the Progenitor of

on its own.
the Cosmic designer of a world left to run
people became
Finally, in the third stage of transition,
with such a do-nothing God who

increasingly dissatisfied

and were inclined to
was so irrelevant to everyday life
and freedom.
view the church as an enemy of progress

Combined with this reaction

to

the established tradi-

increasingly positive ap
tion was the development of an
the power of his reason.
praisal of the station of man and
accolade, The Enlightenment, as
Out of this trend grew the
49 Barbour,

Issues in Science and Religion, PP

60 - 62

.
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a

description oi the now intellectual climate which saw the

power oi reason as the key to man's problems in all areas
of life-- science

,

religion and human affairs.

The concept

of social law seemed a natural extension of the successes

obtained in discovering physical laws and their discovery
was seen as the key to the well-being of society and man.

What was wanting, was a Newton-like bringer of the knowledge and understanding by which society could be regulated.
It was an age of implacable optimism in which freedom of

expression and opposition to dogmatism were important
values in the translation of the centuries long religious

view of man's salvation into a view which sought human perfection in man's unaided efforts to build a society on
earth which would be the modern version of the ancients'
"City of God.
2.1

THE ROMANTIC MOVEMENT: A
PLEA FOR INTERNAL REALITY
If it is true that the seventeenth century had pro-

duced a world which was seen as the result of the mechanism
of God and the mechanism of matter, it is also true that
the scientific scheme has outlived the religious scheme.

In the demise of that second great portion of its all too

limited metaphysics, modern science has lost the ability to
5°Charles L. Becker, The Heavenly City of t he Eighteenth Century Philosophers (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1932), Chapter 4.
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inward and con-

While competent engineering seemed to be

a complete replacement for religious teleology to some,

the

age was not unanimous in its rejection of aspects of expe-

rience which did not fit within the neat schemes of scientific thoughts.

Accordingly, a movement known as the ro-

mantic reaction achieved visible status by the middle of
the eighteenth century.

There are two aspects of this movement which are most

relevant to our concerns.

First, in the minds of those

involved in the movement there was the feeling, and ulti-

mately the assertion in poetic form, of the awareness that
the beauty of nature held a deeper spiritual reality which

linked all things together.

In the poets'

intuition is

found a greater apprehension of the reality of personal ex-

perience and the beauty of nature than can be found in the
cold categories of abstract science.

Therefore, the liter-

ature of an age is a good clue to those inward thoughts

of

terms of the laws
a generation which are not expressible in

of nature and or the "laws" of society.

Second, awareness

useful in
of the character of the romantic reaction is
limitaformulating a criticism of and a response to those

tions we now perceive in that system.
the topic is of such importance that

For Whitehead

,

51 Whitehead,

Science and the Modern World
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his

endeavor to show that materialistic scientific phi losophy
is incapable of expressing the fundamental intuition of

mankind.

Further, he asserts,

(and we include this state-

ment as an indicator of things to come rather than an ex-

plication of Whitehead's position)

"...

that the whole

concept of materialism only applies to very abstract entities,

the products of logical discernment"

52

and that there

is nothing sacred about these abstractions that renders

them irreformable or unalterable.

His philosophy of organ-

ism is an attempt to bridge the gap between materialistic

science and the fundamental intuitions of the poet.

For

example, he quotes Wordsworth's The Prelude as expressive
of the human feeling for nature, with its character of en-

twined and intermingled entities each suffused with the

presence of the others:
Ye Presences of Nature in the sky
And on the earth! Ye Visions of the hills!
can I think
And Souls of lonely places!
A vulgar hope was yours when ye employed
Such ministry, when ye through many a year
Haim ting me thus among my boyish sports,
On caves and trees, upon the woods and hills,
Impressed upon all forms the characters
Of danger or desire; and this did make
The surface of the universal earth,
With triumph and deli ght with hope and lear,
53
Work like a sea?
,

.

^2
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,
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"^William Wordsworth, The Prelude quoted in Whitehead,
Science and the Modern World, p. 84.

.

It is Whitehead's intent to show that the standardized

concepts of science are too narrow to contain the expression of the more concrete facts of our apprehension and
that in relation to that basic apprehension the view of

nature which modern science imposes upon our thoughts is
very strange and paradoxical indeed.

However one wishes

to describe the immanence of God in the world,

it seems

strange indeed that the apprehensions wo know in our finer

moments of commerce with experience, undistorted by scientific analysis, bear such little resemblance to the Being

early science saw as the external creator of an impersonal

machine
The poet's statement is a statement of divine indwelling, an awareness of the spirit pervading man and nature as

known in man's own experience.
Whitehead's criticism of scientific abstractions is an
effort to establish a new doctrine which will be consonant

with the vivid expression of personal experience and one
which will "transfer to the very texture of realization in
itself that value which we recognize so readily in terms of

human life."^

However, before seeking the characteriza-

tion of this replacement view we must first trace the his-

torical foundation in the thought of the major figures who

simultaneously created the character of modern science and

^Whitehead, Science and the Modern World

,

p.

9
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major landmarks on our historical trek into modern limes.
This and subsequent treatments will become more narrowly

defined in terms of the specific topics of psychology as a
science as those topics begin to raise above the general

stream of scientific and philosophical thought and assume
an independent status.

It has been the intent to establish

a broad enough view of the cultural milieu at the time of

the birth of modern science so that the personality charac-

teristics we will find in the later adolescent and early
adult stages of scientific thought will be more intelligible
on the one hand and more amenable to alteration on the

other
2.2

PSYCHOLOGY IN THE
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
As one would expect, the psychological thought of the

eighteenth century mirrors many characteristics which are
contained in the age in general.

In overview, we find that

the
the self-endowed accolade The Enlightenment carries

very important connotation of being "enlightened"
tion to "darkness"
course.

— the

m

rela-

darkness of the Middle Ages, of

view
For psychology this means that the new

of

of sevenman, which developed out of the characteristics
thought, contains several basic implications

teenth century

had taken place.
of the over-all paradigm shift that

For

example, the shift from "the closed world to an infinite

universe" and

i

Ls

attendant portrayal of man as a contin-

gent being in a purposeless cosmos created the basis for

psychology to view man not as a divine performer in a cosmic drama but as an animal, the most evolved animal, but

none- the-less an animal in a mechanical universe.

Simi-

larly the new metaphysics had no room for the soul as a
first principle in the structure of reality; further, it

didn't simply ignore the concept it abhored it, with the
result that psychology found itself predisposed to eschew
the ancient concept of innate ideas in favor oi a thorough-

going empiricism.

Within this over-all framework, we can

now treat the development of some specific psychological
issues as they occurred in the thought of the age.
The first point of note about eighteenth century psyto evolve
chology is that two quite distinct trends are seen

century ancesout of the thought of its prime seventeenth

John Locke on the
tors; Rene Descartes on the one hand and
other.

inDescartes, it will be remembered, was heavily

physiological
volved in conceptualizations which utilized
being thoroughly
models of mental processes while Locke,
was content with
imbued with the new Newtonian metaphysics,
which all the primary
creating a miniature mental cosmos in
mechanism were difactors in the operation of his mental
metaphysics and epistemology,
rect translations from the new

r»/i

i.o., ma

I-

1-

or

in

mo l ion.

Demonstrating the contrasts between the two views is
easiest if the topics are handled separately.

Accordingly

we will treat Locke's followers first and then the heirs of

Descartes.
ture,

It is also important to observe,

at this junc-

that in entering into the construction of psycho-

logical theory we are adding another order of magnitude to
the abstractive hierarchy of modern psychological knowledge.

That is to say, in the seventeenth century the split between

mind and matter was firmly established as the first abstractive steps in sundering the relationships between man and
the cosmos and of course, ultimately God.

Here in the

eighteenth century, as we begin the formulation of theories

pertaining to the mind, we are building on a basis which
assumes the validity of its foundations and abstracts from
which
that abstraction, as it were, a new set of hypotheses
derived.
are to help explain the basis from which they are

WhiteThis realization is important to the relevance of
Concreteness,
head’s comments about the Fallacy of Misplaced

which are inand the character of the "high abstractions"
eighteenth
volved in it. Our present concerns here in the
the abstractive
century are simply the next logical step in
heights of
hierarchy which ultimately leads to the dizzying

sciences.
specialization which characterize the modern

r

"

GEORGE BERKELEY

2.2.1
In.

(

168 5- 17 5'})

Berkeley we have a lipure that is highly represen-

tative of the over-all changes that were taking place and
the way in which those changes influenced the specific

theorizing of the age.

Berkeley, Whitehead observes,

"launched [a] philosophical criticism against the whole
basis of the system." 55

His primary motive in this came

from deeply held religious convictions which ran counter to
the train of thought which had been developed by Descartes

and Locke.

Berkeley felt that the problems derived from

the supposed existence of matter which made it easy for

"impious and profane" persons to deny providence and to

attribute "the whole series of events either to blind
56
chance or fatal necessity.

In his criticism of the whole system Berkeley intro-

duced a great variety of arguments, some of which bear directly upon the psychological basis of mental mechanism.
Since Berkeley did not believe that the object of scientific

cognition was an independent and inert material substance,
he found it impossible to accept the distinction between

primary and secondary qualities.

He wrote:

They who assert that figure, motion and the
rest of the primary or original qualities do

^ Ibid

.

,

p

.

75
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History—oj_
Ge orge Berkeley, quoted in W. T. Jones, A
World,
and
Brace
Western Philosophy (New York: Harcourt,
1952), P 753
56

.
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exist without the mind, in unthinking substances, do at the same time acknowledge that
colours, sounds, heat, cold and suchlike secondary qualities, do not; which they tell us
are sensations, existing in the mind alone,
that depend on and are occasioned by the different size, texture and motion of the minute
particles of matter.
Now, if it be certain that those original qualities are inseparably united with the other sensible qualities, and not, even in thought, capable of
being abstracted from them, it plainly follows that they exist only in the mind.
In short, extension, figure, and motion, abstracted from all other qualities are inconceivable.
Where therefore the other sensible
qualities are, there must these be also, to
wit in the mind and nowhere else. 57
.

.

.

.

.

.

Clearly, Berkeley’s attack on the doctrine of primary and

secondary qualities hits at the entire modern movement.
Ultimately, his arguments led him to the philosophical position known as subjective idealism since all phenomena were:
a)

in the mind and nowhere else (subjective) and b) the

result of having existence in God's thoughts rather than

empirical reality (idealism).

Of primary concern here, of

course, are the implications of his position for psychology.

It is not necessary to explore the explicit character

of Berkeley's philosophy.

Berkeley's argument against primary and secondary

qualities was extremely effective in its criticism of
Descartes and Locke because Berkeley showed that both the

vaunted primary and the secondary qualities are "inseparably
"^Berkeley quoted in Jones, A History of Modern
Philosophy p. 75^ Berkeley's emphasis.
,

,

>

united" and exist "only in the mind."

In taking this posi-

tion Berkeley is, however, agreeing wi Lh Descartes and

Locke that sense perception is a subjective affair; he sim-

ply equates the two qualities which had earlier been placed
on different ontological levels.

This extreme form of subjectivism created the need to

explain the apparent existence of the external world of
sense objects.

To do this, Berkeley relied upon Locke's

doctrine that ideas were the basic building blocks of the

mind and added the doctrine of contiguity as the means by
which the ideas are associated with one another.

This

formulation led ultimately to Berkeley's famous saying of
objects that their "esse est percipi" that is, to be real,
a stone for example, required the coexistence of the visual

ideas of color, shape, texture, etc. and also the ideas of

resistance and pain so that the whole complex would add up
to the proper sensation when one's toe came in contact with

the stone.

Berkeley extended his views and elaborated them into

a

theory of vision in which he asserted that the perception of

distance is not a pure perception at all but is, on the
contrary, simply a construction which relies upon the

\

e-

peated and contiguous association of the relevant ideas
that constitute the perception of depth.

Depth perception,

visual
he believed, was constructed out of experience with

.

68

impressions (two dimensional retinal images) which wore associated with tactile and kinesthetic sensations.

In this

theoretical account primacy in the determination of depth

perception is given to tactile as opposed

to

visual sensa-

tions and creates an issue that will grow to be of great

importance in later theoretical contexts.
In sum, we see Berkeley's psychology as continuing,

with major modification, the mental mechanist views of
Locke and leaving in its wake a more firmly established

tradition of mentality as composed of the association of
ideas and the operation of contiguous paring.

On the phi-

losophical side, we have ignored the traditional account of
subjective idealism but must, at this point, pause briefly
to explore a topic

that will be of importance to the devel-

opment of Whitehead's alternative

to

materialism and its

uses in psychology.
2.2.2

WHITEHEAD ON BERKELEY AND PREHENSION
Whitehead goes back to those criticisms of the basic

Berkeley
system which are found in Berkeley and remarks that

failed to affect the main stream of
It flowed on as if he
scientific thought.
had never written. Its general, success made
it impervious to criticism, then and since
The world of science has always remained
perfectly satisfied with its particular abThey work, and that is suffistractions.
cient for it. 58
.

.

.

58 Whitehoad,

emphasis added.

Science and the Modern World

,

p.

66,

69

Whitehead's contention

is

that modern scientific

thought

(ours included) rests upon assumptions (abstractions) which

are too narrow for the concrete facts of our intuitive ex-

perience.

Berkeley, he believes, is an important clue to

that wider basis for scientific thought.

It is important

to note that, with the development of this topic, we are

anchoring a modern philosophical criticism of past philosophical thought in the context in which that past thought

originally arose.

This departure from historical sequence

is important because it can allow some anticipation of the

modern Whiteheadian position as we move through the subsequent stages of thought as developed by Berkeley's eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth century successors.

Whitehead asserts that Berkeley was, in effect, denying
the notion of simple location

pies of Human Knowledge

59

when he said in his Pr me 1 -

:

When we do our utmost to conceive the existence of external bodies, we are all the
But the
while contemplating our own ideas.
deluded
is
itself
mind taking no notice of
bodies
to think it can and does conceive
existing unthought of or without the mind,
though at the same time they are apprehended
It is very obby or exist in itself.
vious, upon the least inquiry into our
thoughts, to know whether it be possible lor
us to understand what is meant by the abso
lute existence of sensible objects in them
To me it is
selves. or without the mind.
,

.

.

•

chapter 1, Section 1.3> The Whitehead ian Fallacy.
Seventeenth
of Misplaced Concreteness and its Relation to the
Century
5^cf
.

.

,
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evident tlioso words mo rk out oillior a direct
contradiction, or else nothing at all.
.

.

^

.

As we have seen, Berkeley held an extreme
idealist po-

sition in which the ultimate reality of the mind
is structured by the unity of nature as it arises from the
unity in
the mind of God.

Whitehead offers an alternative to this

view which he calls a "provisional realism"

and by which he

proposes to widen the scientific scheme in a way more useful
to science than Berkeley's metaphysical tactics.

The key

to this all important Whiteheadian alternative lies in the

nature of one's view of the process of perception.

Whitehead

,

For

the traditional topic of perception is a confused

issue because the elaboration, through the centuries, of
the basic assumptions we have seen develop in the thoughts

Descartes and Locke have clothed the topic with many
meanings.

Specifically, perception is primarily associated

with the idea of cognition or cognitive apprehension.

Whitehead is at pains to cut beneath these common usages
and to get at the idea of apprehension as devoid of cognition.

To accomplish this feat he is forced to add another

neologism to the specialized Whiteheadian vocabulary that so
often frustrates initial attempts to understand his scheme
For the notion of uncognitive apprehension

of ideas.

Whitehead substitutes the term "prehension" as a means of
Berkeley, quoted in Whitehead, Science and the Mod ern World p. 68, Whitehead's emphasis.
,

.
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providing the:
vehicle by which one actual
entity becomes objectified in another
they
[prehmsionsi] are "vectors"; for
they feel
itiS£S and transf o™ it into what is
here. 6?
•

.

•

.

.

.

-

a more complete definition,

but one which requires for
its

complete understanding, greater
explication than is possible
in the present context is:
p eh ® nsion consists of three factors:
the ;"subject" which is
prehended, namely,
the actual entity in which
that prehension'
it. a concrete element;
b) the "datum" which
is prehended; c) the
"subjective form" which
xs how that subject prehends
that datum. °2
a
a)

Prehension then, is primarily a means by
which it is
possible to explain the fact that things
here in this place
where the perceived happens to be
can have reference to
other places there where the porceiver
happens not to bo.
Berkeley, in the passage quoted above, held
that it was a
delusion for the mind "to think it can and does
conceive

bodies existing [there

]

unthought of or without the mind."

In other words, Berkeley asserts the
subjectivits position

that in order for entities to be real they must
be perceived

within the unity of the mind and that the mind should not
forget itself in the process.

For Whitehead, prehension is

a substitute for Berkeley's mind and is a process by
which

61

Whitehead, Process and Reality
emphasis
62

Ibid

.

,

p.

35.

,

p.

133, Whitehead's

the realization of a perception arises as a result of the

gathering of things into the unity of a
prehension; and that what is thereby realized
This
is the prehension, and not the things.
unity of a prehension defines itself as here
and now, and the things so gathered into the
grasped unity have essential reference to
other places and other times. ^3
.

.

.

Thus, prehension describes a progressive real izal ion
of natural occurrences in which the idea of process is

a

concrete fact and functions in lieu of the "concrete" farts
of the old system which had the property of simple location.

Process replaces matter and is a main metaphysical assumption of the philosophy of organism.
work,

In the process frame-

space and time are not the containers into which mat-

ter can be placed and therefore simply located; rather, a

region of space and time is a simply located unit of realized experience.
The apparent unintelligibility of that last statement
deshould be viewed in light of the fact that Whitehead is

system
veloping a parallel line of argument which bases its

upon
of thought upon the concept of organism and not

concept of matter.

i

he

And, for the moment, we must concur

expanwith his statement to the effect that a considerable

with the actual
sion is required as well as a confrontation
experience
implications of the view in terms of concrete
can become
before the organismic concept of prehension

^Whitehead

,

Science and the Modern World

,

p.

bd.

:
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1

i.g

I

b o

.'

l

i

Surely il
thought

.

.

is

true that "the main si roam ol sc Lon li lie

flowed on as if [Berkeley] had never written"

.

and a different basis of abstraction seems strange indeed.
This disparity of views is another example of the type of

disparity referred to earlier in connection with the contrast between the idea of time as it appeared to Aristotle

and Galileo

64

and suggests that the threshold of cosmo-

logical change has again caught the toe of the practical
foot of scientific progress.

DAVID HUME (1711-1776)

2.2.3

In David Hume we come to the first Important departure

from the general trends we have been considering up
point.

to

this

Hume, unlike the others, was a man who held no

reverence for religious views and saw the appeals to God
so characteristic of Berkeley's thought as a form of mys-

ticism.

The depth of his conviction is amply demonstrated

by the response he gave, while on his death bed, to a quesHume is reported to have re-

tion about the after-life.

sponded that
It was also possible that a piece of coal
wheh put upon the fire would not burn.
[That] men should exist forever [was] a most
The trash of even a
unreasonable fancy.
new
and
preserved,
age must then be
•

•

•

.

.

,

Chapter

1,

.

.

Section 1.2.2, Galileo

.
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universes
created to contain such infinite numbers. 65
.

.

.

A rationalist to the very end like Hume can be expected to

create some unusual ripples in the pool of accumulated

knowledge and wisdom--such, indeed, was the case.
As Berkeley's successor, he was a mental mechanist who

accepted the dissolution of the distinction between primary
and secondary qualities and also had great affinity for
most of Locke's psychological theory.

Hume's most salient

general characteristic is, then, aside from the incisive
genius with which he is generally credited, his departure
from the "constraints" of religious influence and the com-

plete reliance upon the issue of a clear logical intellect
as the ultimate source of truth.

Once the covering hypothesis of God had been stripped
away, Hume saw, more clearly than his predecessors, that
the whole idea of mental mechanism was keyed into the basic

idea of association.

Unless he could explicitly determine

establishing
the nature of association Hume saw no hope of
a reliable basis for human knowledge.

that
In his analysis, Hume started from the position
is in
the only place reliable knowledge is to be found

basis for
sense impressions; in this, his epistemological
Hume, from Private Papers of J ames Boswelj-,
quoted in Jones, A H isG. Scott, and F. A. Pottle, eds.,
tory of Western Philosophy, p. 764.

^David

7

knowledge was not only

coinp Into

r
>

but also quite explicit:

When we entertain, therefore, any suspicion
that a philosophical term is employed without
any meaning or idea (as is but too trequent),
we need but enquire, from what impression is
that supposed idea derived? And if it be
impossible to assign any, this will serve to
confirm our suspicion. By bringing ideas
into so clear a light we may reasonably hope
to remove all dispute, which may arise, concerning their nature and reality.
Hume therefore, is wedded to an atomistic view in

which the only road to clear and precise knowledge

is

to

refer to the succession of individual sense impressions.
Obviously, the relation between these sense impressions
is based
must be all-important to a concept of mind which

upon their storage, rearrangement and comparison.
been summarizing
Up to this point, Hume has essentially
however, he goes on
the earlier empiricist psychologists;
between ideas
to elaborate the necessary relationship

m

finer detail:
the mind and sense impressions in
of the
we may divide all the perception
are
which
species,
mind into two classes or
ot
degrees
distinguished by their different
and
forcible
force and vivacity. The less
Thoughts 01
lively are commonly denominated
The other species want a name in
Ideas.
I suppose,
our language and in most others;
but
because it was not requisite for any, undei
philosophical purposes, to rank them thereLet us,
general term or appellation.
call them
and
freedom,
fore, use a little
By the term impressi on
Impressions. ...

...

,

I

when
mean alTour more likely perceptions

Human Understanding,
Hume An E nquiry Concernin g
of Western Philosophy, p. 7^1
quo ted in Jones, A History
66

,

'

e

.
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we hear,

or see, or te.Ll, or love or hate
or desire, or will.
And impressions are distinguished from ideas, which are less lively
perceptions, of which we are conscious, when
we reflect on any of those sensations or
movements above mentioned. 67
,

Hume, then, felt he was creating a new category of

understanding by developing the concept of impressions--one
which "wants a name in our language."

An important attrib-

ute of this formulation is that it creates an explicit basis
in mental mechanism for the assertion that "ideas" and "im-

pressions" stand in a one-to-one relationship and differ
from one another only in terms of how lively they are.

In

other words, ideas are generated by impressions and are the
faint copies of which we are aware of when we "reflect."

Another important insight into the specifics necessary
to make the mental machine an operable mechanism is found

in his assumption that both impressions and ideas, which

fit under the general classification of perceptions, can be

analyzed into their primitive components.
There is another division of our perceptions,
which it will be convenient to observe, and
which extends itself to both our impressions
and ideas. This division is into s impl and
Simple perceptions or impressions
complex
and ideas are such as to admit of no distinction or separation. The complex are contrary
to these, and may be distinguished into
Though a particular color, taste,
parts.
and smell are qualities all united togethei
in this apple; it is easy to perceive that
.

67

Ibid.

,

p.

766

they are not the same but are at least distinguishable from each other. 68
,

Thus, complex ideas are seen to derive from the discrete

sensory qualities of the original complex sensation and are
the result of recombination in the mind of those elementary

sensations according to the laws of association.

Hume

found it impossible to account for the apparent fact that
simple ideas can be associated into complex ideas which are
a veridical,

if weaker, copy of the original complex sensa-

tion without having some sort of universal principle

guide the process.

to

While it was clear to Hume that such a

principle was needed, it should also be pointed out that

neither Locke or Berkeley had required such a principle because they had direct recourse to a belief in God and the
Hume, on the other hand, having cut

order of his nature.

himself off from that source of order and meaning, holding
as he did that it was mostly nonsense, needed some bond

between simple ideas which would account for the observed
natural affinity of some ideas for other ideas.

According-

ly, he posited that:

There is a kind of attraction, which in the
mental world will be found to have as extraordinary effects as in the natural, and to
show itself in as many and as varied forms.
A Treatise on Human Nature quoted in R.
Lowry, The Evolution of Psychological Theory p. 28.

^Hume

,

,

,

^Ibid.

,

p

.

29

•

.
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In this,

Hume, duo to

tin*

in II

none <> oC Now Ionian cosmology

in his thinking, can be soon to be seeking the universal

he requires as an analog to the universal force of gravity

which made Newton's world work.

In Hume's mental world

the universal was the association of ideas which functioned

according to two laws:

resemblance and contiguity.

Hume's elaboration of the mental mechanist view of

perception (a category in which he placed all mental operations) led him to challenge the traditional view of causality.

In the very beginning of the development of modern

science Galileo, as we have seen, looked closely into phe-

nomena and observed their behavior in terms of abstract
qualities such as velocity and friction.

In operating with

the quantifyable abstractions which resulted from this

analysis, it was a natural step for Galileo and subsequent

physical scientists to come to the conclusion that the
condition of a physical body at any one moment is the
direct result of its condition at a preceding moment.

Physical events came to be viewed as necessarily determined
by their antecedent events and such "necessary determina-

connection
tion" means the same thing as a law--a necessary
lead to an
by which the operation of a cause must always

effect
theory of
Cause and effect for Hume, according to his
temporal succession
mental operation, was simply the repeated

.

of sense impressions in which the only real connection was
a psychological expectancy that was gradually built up

rather than the operation of any real "law" in nature.

The

laws of nature thus became the force of habit which is de-

termined according to the principles of association--reality
is constructed out of simple ideas.

An important implica-

tion of this formulation is that science does not observe

necessity in the connections of the physical world but only
the operation of probable expectation based on previous

experience
Hume's extreme empiricism actually amounted to a refutation of the supposed efficacy of reason which was a major

characteristic of his age.

In particular, he refuted the

explicit foundation of all modern science in his assertion
reathat science instead of being able to demonstrate the
is
sons why events occur according to the laws of nature,

limited to empirical generalization.

Given Hume's view on

quite
causality, i.e., habit as opposed to law, it was

procedures of
natural for him to assert that the inductive
of past
science amount to nothing more than the observation

experience.

Further, he compounded the problem with the

times event "A"
acute observation that no matter how many

absolutely no
had been followed by event "B," there was
would necessarily
basis for saying that the same sequence
the probabilist
pertain in the future, even if one admitted

.

.
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nature of the connection.

This condition was true, Hume

asserted, because there was no intrinsic reason

In

the

nature of events that made one event necessarily more probable than any other.

He considered every datum in the

world as loose and discrete and that the process of logical
inference was simply a best guess based on past experience
Not only did he show that general laws cannot be

(habit).

derived from particular observations as above, but he also
closed the door on the process by demonstrating its

circularity
We have said that all arguments concerning
existence are founded on the relation of
cause and effect; that our knowledge of that
relation is derived entirely from experience,
and that all our experimental conclusions
proceed upon the supposition that the future
will be conformable to the past. To endeavor,
therefore, the proof of this supposition by
probable arguments, or arguments regarding
existence, must be evidently going in a circle, and taking that for granted, which is
the very point in question. 70

One of the main points upon which we will later criti-

cize Hume

*

s

empiricism is his failure to account for the

role of the creative human intelligence (self) as the in-

ventor of the concepts by which the data is interpreted.
Hume was prevented from realizing such a concept by the

narrowness of his premises on the one hand and the rigor of
his logic on the other.

Since all ideas are not only

^°Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature
A History of Western Philosophy p. 768
,

,

quoted in Jones,

:

81

derived from impressions but are also only found in the
form of simple ideas, they must be compounded by experience
into complex ideas.

problems:

Therefore, Hume was faced with two

first, any way of adding up simple ideas is re-

stricted to the production of the complex ideas of things

which exist only in the external world and is therefore
incapable of generating the complex idea of "self"; second,

given the first constraint, Hume is then restricted to
finding the source of self in some simple idea.

Now simple

ideas can only result from simple impressions so he must

find a simple impression that will account for self.

To

this possibility Hume responds:

from what [simple] impression could
Pain and pleasure,
this idea be derived?
grief and joy, passions and sensations succeed
each other, and never exist at the same time.
It cannot therefore, be from any of these impressions, or from any other, that the idea
of self is derived; and consequently there is
no such idea 71
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

Here, we can anticipate our future commentary with a

few remarks.

First of all, Hume was restricted by his

principle of contiguity from reaching beyond the succession
of momentary sense impressions and thus exemplifies White-

head's more general criticism of abstract theories which
holds that
quoted in Lowry,
added
The Evolution of Modern Psychology, P~T~ 30, emphasis

^Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature

,

82

The relevance of evidence is dictated by
theory.
For you cannot prove a theory by
evidence which that theory dismisses as irrelevant 7 2
.

The evidence in question here, is the evidence of experience which Hume ignored in his theory and which later

formed the basis for William James' criticism and alternative view:
the attempt to treat "cause, " for conceptual purposes, as a separable link
has led to the denial of efficient causation,
and to the substitutes for it of the bare
descriptive notion of uniform sequence among
events [Hume's position]. Meanwhile the concrete perceptual flux, taken just as it
comes, offers in our own activity-situations
perfectly comprehensible instances of causal
agency.
The transitive causation in them
does not, it is true, stick out as a separate fact for conception to fix upon.
Rather
does a whole subsequent field grow continuously out of a whole antecedent field because
it seems to yield new being of the nature
called for, while the feeling of causalityat-work flavors the entire concrete sequence
as salt flavors the water in which it is dissolved 7 3
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

As suggested by James, there is perhaps an entire alternative view of the content of experience which not only makes
a place for the self but also does away with the atomistic

view of experience in favor of a view which not only
recognizes the "concrete perceptual flux" in which

"causality-at-work" stresses the contextual character of

^Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas

,

p.

284.

^William James, Some Problems in Philosophy (New York
Longmans, Green, 191l)> PP» 217-218.

k

knowledge but also posits the appreciation of wholes as
well as parts and connections between them that are closer
to organismic relations than mechanical ones.

David Hume, no doubt, would have found William James'
statement quite unpalatable and completely without the
savor of the salt of self that flavors the entire concrete

sequence in which it is dissolved.

Yet, surely, the poet

Wordsworth would have appreciated the taste and found in
it a place for the entwined and intermingled entities,

each suffused with the presence of the others, that he knew
in his deeper intuitions.

However, in the nearly two hun-

dred years that separate the comments of Hume and James,
the mainstream of scientific thought remained truly imper-

vious to changes in course, flowing on instead, in its ma-

terialistic channel, while busying itself with the task of

wearing a deeper canyon in the territory of abstractions.
2. 2

THE PHYSIOLOGICAL ALTERNATIVE

.

The line of development that has been considered so
far is, as we have repeatedly asserted, primarily inspired

by analogies which derive from the Newtonian physical
theory.

Mental mechanism, as it was developed by Locke,

Berkeley and Hume was always inspired by a basic assumption
of the Newtonian metaphysics; namely, that matter can be

thought of as having the property of simple location, i.e.,
described by
the assumption that matter can be completely

.

8>i

Locating it in space And

other entity.

t-iino

without reference to any

The mental mechanists did not deviate from

this formulation in applying this metaphysical assumption
to the description of the phenomena of the human mind.

Thus, they unflinchingly and unswervingly analyzed all com-

plex mental phenomena in terms of distinct elementary components.

However, the application of metaphysical princi-

ples did not necessarily suffice to formulate a complete
explanation.

In particular, the reference to atomistic

sensations failed to capture another very important aspect
of that metaphysics, namely, motion.

Matter and motion

were hand and glove concepts and the use of one without the

other created, in some minds, the feeling that something
was missing.
In light of this feeling, there were some (those who

followed the lead of Descartes) who were less metaphysical
and more physical.

That is, while the mechanists had never

specified just what it was that an "idea" was, and were

happy with the metaphysical similarity between the mental
and physical worlds; others wanted to pin down the piecise

nature of what an idea was and to define it in physical
t e rm s

However, the problem was not simply restricted to ef-

forts to do a better job of mental engineering through a

more successful application of scientific principles, the

85

question went deeper than that.

On the mechanist explana-

tion Hume had finally come to the point of even being skeptical of self and, as we shall see, the efforts on behalf
of the physiological explanation are to accomplish much the

same goal.

At stake here,

then, is the original insight of

Descartes as to the separation of mind from body.
saw, because of his religious conviction,

Descartes

that the body of

man was animated by the same sort of spirit that animated
other animal bodies but also, in addition, contained a rational soul that was the directive force for its behavior.
He found that he could doubt everything except the fact
that he thought; and was able to use this assurance as a

validation of the fact that in addition to an animal body,
he also had a rational soul that could assert its own exis-

tence in "cogito ergo sum."

However, much of the certitude

of that view comes from Descartes' assumption of two types
of matter, one physical and extended, the other mental and

unextended.

As long as physical and extended matter could

be kept in its place, Descartes' position was unassailable;

however to those who saw no need to make such a distinction
it seemed an obvious move to view thinking as a natural

function of the highly complex organization of matter which
is found in man.

Such a view was first put forth by Julien de La Mettrie in the middle of the eighteenth century.

In 17^8

•
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La Met trie published a volume called Man a Machine which

contained the explicit assertion that it was simply the

complexity of his organizational structure that separated
man from the ape.

Thinking was simply the natural function

of the brain in just the same way that breathing is to the

lungs or secretion to the glands.
La Mettrie's

"...

Lowry remarks that

concern was to present a programmatic

outline for a theory, based upon the concept of complexity
of organization,

.

.

.

[and] his effect upon the subsequent

history of psychological thought must be seen chiefly as a
stimulus and as a challenge,"

74

and then goes on to conclude

with La Mettrie's closing words to his

L'

Homme Machine

:

Let us then conclude boldly that man is a machine, and that in the whole universe there
is but a simple substance differently modiSuch is my system, or rather the
fied.
It is
unless
I am much deceived.
truth,
will. 5
who
now
it
Dispute
simple.
short and
.

.

.

1

DAVID HARTLEY (1705-1757)

2.2.5

La Mettrie's programmatic proposal was also quite con-

sonant with another and contemporary view which was being

independently developed by David Hartley in England.

Since

Hartley was a physician it seems natural that he would lean
more toward some sort of "physiologizing" than

otliei

fol-

philosophers
lowers of the British school of Associationistic

^Lowry, The Evolution of Psychologi cal Theory,
7

Ibid.

,

^ julien

p

.

45

de La Mettrie, L Homme Machine
1

,

p.

quoted in

45.

«7

whose theories of mental mechanism we have been following.

Accordingly, Hartley started from a definition of association which paralleled that of his contemporaries and gave

prominence to the idea of contiguity.
Any sensations A, B, C, etc., by being associated with one another a sufficient number of
times, get such a power over the corresponding
ideas a, b, c, etc., that anyone of the sensations A, when impressed alone, shall be able
to excite in the mind b, c, etc., the ideas
of the rest. 76

Hartley, however, was quick to move well beyond the

mental mechanists by postulating the actual physiological
basis for the association of ideas.

Here again, we see the

presence of the Newtonian influence in psychological theory.
In this case, Hartley called upon the same type of argument

that Newton had used to make an important aspect of his

theory intelligible.

The problem for Newton was to explain

a phenomenon labeled "action at a distance" in a nonmysti-

cal way.

That is to say, any consistent theory which is

based upon a model of a mechanical universe requires some

principle

to

explain the influence of one particle upon the

77
other when there is no obvious contact between them.

Newton chose to call his explanatory mechanism aether
His Frame, His
on Man:
Duty, His Expectations" quoted in Ibid., p. 4bV

^David Hartley, Observations

^ An

illuminating history of action at a distance is
Conto bo found in M. Capek The Philosophical Impac t of
temporary Physics pp. 83-89.
,
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(other) which was thought to ho

a

continuous medium ot con-

tiguous particles that transmitted forces at a distance by
their vibratory motion.

Accordingly, Hartley felt perfectly

justified in creating a corresponding mechanism for mental

phenomena which regarded sensations as the initiators of

vibration in the material of the brain.
Of course, Hartley's speculations upon the nature of
the physiological mechanism for the association of ideas

did not rest upon the results of experimental inquiries;
but then, neither did Newton's.

What was wanted was a

coherent explanation of the facts as given and this is ex-

actly what Hartley found in his "vibratiuncles " (little
vibrations).

Now that he had a physical concept to work

with as opposed to the metaphysical nature of the mechanists'

"ideas," Hartley went on to elaborate the explana-

tory power of his idea.

Specifically, he held that each

sensation generated a localized vibration in the brain.
From this it followed quite naturally that:

a)

the vibra-

tion would die out gradually when the sensation was rebrain
moved; b) vibrations could and would diffuse in the

and thus become associated with one another when their

sensations were contiguous.
developed
In addition to these concepts, Hartley also

physical action
an explanation of motivation in which the
by the
observable as the result of motivation was explained

"fact" that motory vibrat iuncles had become associated with

those of ideas so that ideas could then excite the muscles

and make them contract.

Apparently he did not think to

inquire why a shower of ideas was not generated when, for
example, someone's arm is pumped up and down without their

willing it.
2.2.6

ENLIGHTENED EGALITARIANISM
At the beginning of our consideration of the eighteenth

century we pointed out that its character differed signifi-

cantly from that of its predecessors.

We referred to it as

an "enlightened" age which professed great optimism about
the outcome of its new intellectual adventures in competent

engineering as opposed to the old view which found its

meaning in religious teleology.

We aJ so paused brio! Ly

(o

describe some of the reactions that developed to the narrow

efficiency of scientific thought and developed some preliminary discussion of modern criticisms of those early assumptions.

the
Now, in concluding the direct commentary on

eighteenth century, it will be useful to once again take
century
an over-all view of the character of eighteenth

perspective of
thought but to do so, this time, from the
that have
some of the detailed psychological arguments

developed during the period.
referred to the
In earlier discussions we have often
came to see
shifted cosmological picture in which man

90

himself as a contingent being in a purposeless cosmos.
Here, at the end of the eighteenth century, we see that one
of the implications of that over-all shift has been to re-

move the extreme differences that had existed between the
relative status of men and animals.
tes,

Beginning with Descar-

there was a progressive tendency to equate not only

man's animal body with nature but also to explain all his

mental attributes and finer sensitivities as simply the
result of his complex neural organization.

Thus, man was

seen as differing only in degree from the animals at a time
well before Darwin's great discovery.
Of equal importance was the increased emphasis on

theoretical explanations which placed the primacy of all

intellectual life upon the ideas generated by experience
(Empiricism).

While the earliest theorizers, Locke and

Descartes for example, had ascribed a definite place to the
God's
role of innate ideas which presumably were related to

nature, the shift to increasingly empirical formulations,
of the Newtoas a result of the influence of the success

nian cosmology, brought the neglect of "nativism"

m

favor

to nature.
of a view which stressed nurture as opposed

And

physiological, were
both prevalent psychologies, mental and
the source of
agreed upon the primacy of the environment as

animals.
the ideas that distinguished man from

environmentalism
Thus, it can be said of the wholesale

t
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which prevailed in the latter eighteenth century that

Llio

basis of three important characteristics of the modern out-

look had been firmly established. 7 8

First, to understand

man, one needed simply to understand his environment since

he was a product of that environment.

Second, since the

observed differences between men are due to environmental
influences, the old divisions between princes and paupers,

haves and have nots, were no longer tenable and a new

social-political philosophy developed which asserted the
intrinsic equality of all men.

And finally, a third major

implication was that, man, now beholden only to his environment, had the right to manipulate that environment for
his own purposes and to his own ends.

No longer could the

divine right of kings be viewed as an acceptable doctrine;

men now had the power to define their own ends based upon
their intrinsic human equality.

Perhaps nowhere is the spirit of this age better

summed up than in the expressed sentiments of a dissident
group of people, who, from their remote and savage corner
of the globe, in early July of the year seventeen hundred

and seventy-six, launched a movement, destined to become
one of the greatest adventures in the history of man, with
the following immortal words:
78

Lowry, op

.

ci

.

,

p.

55*
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We hold these truths to bo self-evident; that
all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; that to
secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers
from the consent of the governed; that whenever any government becomes destructive to
these ends, it is the right of the people to
alter or abolish it, and to institute a new
government, laying its foundations on such
principles, and organizing its powers in such
form, as to them shall seem most likely to
effect their safety and happiness.

2.3

IMMANUEL KANT: TRANSITION
TO THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
As the eighteenth century drew to a close, the scien-

tific enterprise seemed to be in rather serious philosophical trouble; recall, that Hume had succeeded, via his

scepticism, in demonstrating that there was no validity to

inductive inference and that scientific thinking amounted
to nothing more than a "leap in the dark."

Apparently, the

working scientists of the day were not bothered by the fact
that they were wondering in the dark and kept right on

making advance after advance; all the while becoming more
secure in the knowledge that science was the way to under-

stand the facts of the universe.

Of course, since the ma-

terial universe was seen as a deterministic machine, they,

along with Hume, saw little possibility of including the
traditional teleological and valuational views of life

within the scientific enterprise which concerned itself
with the world of neutral fact.
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It,

was the German philosopher Tmmanuel Kant who saw

most clearly that something had gone wrong with the scientific account of reality.

Kant (1724-1804), labored to

bring together the two major trends of empiricism and rationalism which existed at that time.

Kant’s solution was

to combine the apparently divergent approaches into a novel

synthesis which left room, within the methods of scientific
thought, for religious and moral thought.

He accomplished

this synthesis by pointing out that earlier scientists and

philosophers had tended to concentrate upon either the rational or the empirical aspect of experience to the exclu-

sion of the other one.

Specifically, the rationalist trend

had taken mathematics as the ideal standard of knowledge
and therefore tended to see all knowledge as relations

which existed between mathematical propositions.

Because

they saw the Will of God as the important source of order
in the world, an order knowable in mathematical terms, they

rejected perception as an unworthy and unreliable method of

acquiring knowledge.

This, of course, was the approach

taken by Descartes.

On the opposite side of the picture

stood the empiricists, who asserted that whatever came from
the rationalistic analysis was based upon the immediate

data of self-awareness and that all knowledge therefore was

based upon the awareness of mental states.

John Locke and

the mental mechanists exemplify this trend; and, as we have

s

.

seen, the argument had reached a genuine .unpass in Hume

'

thought
Kant started from the position that both factors, the

empirical and the rational, were important not only to the

philosophical basis of science but also to the long-standing

problem of how to make a place for value in

a

world of

In this, he was actually providing for a reconcilia-

fact.

tion between science and religion and saw that one of the

main impediments to his task was the metaphysical dualism
of Descartes.

Since Kant did not wish to reinforce his ar-

gument by metaphysical considerations, his was to be a Critique of Pure Reason, he had little use for the old separa-

tion of the knower from the known and of the subject from
the object because that separation, which had appeared real
to Descartes, was not a real substantive one.

trary,

On the con-

the introduction of independent minds and independ-

ent bodies (substances) created the need to have an inter79
vening layer of "ideas" to act as a medium between them.

apOn this account, Kant saw little difference between the

proaches of the empiricists and the rationalists since both
were pursuing the implications of a faulty doctrine.
Kant surpassed the limitations inherent in the oldei
just
view by admitting, with Hume, that all knowledge (not

without
scientific knowledge) arises from experience since
79 Jones, A History of Western Ph ilosophy, p. 814.

1

.

experience there would be no way to awaken the faculty of

knowledge into action.
continues,

"In order of time,

therefore," Kant

"we have no knowledge antecedent to experience,

and with experience all our knowledge begins"; however,

though experience is a necessary condition, it is not in
itself a sufficient condition.

Kant elaborates,

But though all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow that it all arises out of experience.
For it may well be
that even our empirical knowledge is made up
of what we receive through impressions and
of what our own faculty of knowledge (sensible impressions merely serving as the occasion) supplies from itself. 80

He went on to specify that if it is the case that we make

this sort of contribution to knowledge, then it will only
be with a great deal of effort and skill that we can come
to separate out the two components of our knowledge.

He

felt that the problem not only called for closer examina-

tion but would yield an answer to the question of:

whether there is any knowledge that is independent of experience and even of all impressions of the senses.
Such knowledge, he felt, should be

entitled a priori and distinguished
from the empirical, which has its sources
81
a posteriori, that's, in experience.
.

.

.

Kant, as we have said, was a philosopher and not

Immanuel Kant, quoted in Jones, Ibid
8

.

,
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therefore, strictly interested in psychological questions.
Yet, at this stage of scientific development it is hard to

tell the two apart and Kant's formulations are destined to

have important implications for psychological thought, es-

pecially that of his countrymen who were preparing to
launch the psychological arck upon the scientific sea.
Of particular importance was his formulation of the

hypothesis that knowledge is a joint product of sensory
impressions and the structure of consciousness as given by
the categories of human thought (a priori ideas).

From this

point-of-view, Kant saw that the spatial and temporal relations which we know in experience were universal in nature

not because we experience space and time directly but
rather, because space and time are forms of thought which

determine the way we see the world.

They are the framewoik

of the world within which such problems as the one which

plagued Hume, causality, are seen to be "categories of
understanding."

These categories are brought to the inter-

pretation of sense impressions rather than being derived
from sense impression.

Therefore, it is the mind of man

he operates
that provides the important notions with which

intellectually and scientifically.
position is that what
An important implication of this
is only an appearance of
is given in perceptual experience
is, we can know only
what things are in themselves. That

<n

tho "phenomena" and not the "noumona" because we can never

escape the distortions introduced by the processes of our

knowing the world.

This realization led Kant to limit the

realm of intellectual and scientific knowledge to those aspects of the world which are knowable in terms of

gories of understanding.

the*

cate-

Since we have no category of

understanding which is capable of interpreting the world as
but instead are restricted to the serialization of

a whole,

causality in time and space, Kant held that there was no

method by which human intelligence could prove or disprove
the existence of God.

This limitation upon the efficacy of reason, in the

material world, led Kant to formulate a fundamental thesis
which included two kinds of experience, each with different

criteria of meaning and truth.

The first, which we have

already covered dealt with problems of reason, the second
dealt with values and not facts.

Since he saw that man

experiences values as well as facts, Kant felt that there
must also be categorical imperatives in the moral realm
physical
that matched the categories of understanding in the

These categorical imperatives were, he believed

world.

responsible for the fact that:
the moral worth of an action does not
any
lie in the effect expected from it, nor in
borrow
principle of action which requires to
its motive from this expected effect.
can
The preeminent good which we call moral
the
therefore consist in nothing else than
.

.

.

.

.

.

.,

98

this is a
conception of law in itself,
good which is already present in the person
who acts accordingly, and wo do not have to
wait for it to appear first in the result. ^2
.

.

.

Categorical imperatives are to be seen then, as universal obligations which apply to all men irrespective of

personal feelings and inclinations.

These considerations

led Kant to reject the concept of association by which
Hume, for example, would have explained the gradual accrual

of experience into a form which only "seemed" to have the

nature of a categorical imperative.

In this way, Kant's

formulation of categorical imperatives also provides an
answer to the problem of free-will and determinism.

lhis

is the case because strict determinism can be viewed as op-

erating in the realm of the sciences which are ultimately

accountable to the categories of understanding; whereas,
an
the categorical imperatives of the moral realm create

entirely different basis for religious and moral thought.
practical
This basis, Kant conceived, derived from man's

reason and
reason, as opposed to his pure or theoretical

provides the ground for man's response to purpose and

beauty
effects
Kant's philosophy has had many and profound
01
understanding.
upon wide areas of human knowledge and
is that Kant's
primary importance to the present context

Metaphysic o£
Kant, Fundamental Principles of the
852.
Morals quoted in Jones, Ibid., p.
82
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new and unique synthesis of the rational and the empirical,

finding as it did, an important place for the contribution
which the mind brings to the confused flux of fragmentary

sensory impressions, created a valid place in subsequent

psychological thought for reference to the inherent operations of the mind.

Therefore, Kant provided an alternative

to psychological empiricism which was a true alternative in

that it permitted speculation about the nature of psycho-

logical endowment without having to refer to the time-worn

doctrine of innate ideas.
2

.

4

WHITEHEAD

'

S

INVERSION OF KANT

As we leave Kant, here on the threshold of the nine-

teenth century and its direct contribution to the rise of

modern psychology, it is important to single out several
central concerns.

First, Kant and those he influenced

were still operating under the Newtonian cosmology and

therefore can be expected to see the character

of

the newly

revalidated, inherent operations of the mind, in just that
light;

therefore, their formulations are subject to the

same limitations as their predecessors.

Second, this real-

conization provides the opportunity to make an important
of
trast between traditional philosophy and the philosophy

organism proposed by Whitehead.
introduction
Kant's innovation in philosophy was the
for the ordering
of the categorical scheme which provided

.
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of experience as a function of man's subjective nature.

Whitehead criticizes this position because Kant is still
assuming, along with the entire post-Copernican era, that
the sense objects which account for the sensory impressions
are, in fact, disconnected, nonrelated bodies.

This,

Whitehead flatly denies as an example of the doctrine of
Whitehead consistently maintains that the

simple location.

datum always contains its own interconnections and that
these interconnections can only be ignored at the peril

of

completely inverting the true principles by which we funcThat is, Whitehead asserts:

tion.

The philosophy of organism is the inversion
The Critique of Pure
of Kant's philosophy.
by which subjecprocess
the
describes
Reason
of an
appearance
the
tive data pass into
organism
of
philosophy
objective world. The
pass
data
objective
seeks to describe how
Kant,
for
into subjective satisfaction,
the
for
subject;
the world emerges from the
emerges
subject
philosophy of organism, the
from the world. &3
.

.

•

And again, so that the full impact will be felt:
Thus for Kant the process whereby there is
experience is a process from subjectivity to
apparent objectivity. The philosophy of organism inverts this analysis, and explains
the process as proceeding from objectivity
objectivity,
to subjectivity, namely, from the
to the
datum,
a
is
whereby the external world
individual
one
is
subjectivity, whereby there
experience
8

^Whitehead

84

,

Process and Reality

Ibid., p. 236

.

,

p.

135*
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An important clue to a more complete understanding of

Whitehead'

s

intent is to be found in the realization that

the type of experience which traditional philosophers have

talked about is habitually conceived as "experience [which]
is the product of operations which lie among the higher of

the human modes of functioning."

85

Whitehead is asserting

that by restricting awareness to this level, we ignore more

primitive forms of experience which he terms as the causally efficacious or noncognitive aspect of prehension,

mentioned above in connection with Berkeley's philosophy.
Thus, for Kant, his predecessors and a goodly portion

of his successors, especially in psychological fields, the

goal or end product of the whole perceptual/cognitive en-

terprise is the "apparent" objective content of knowledge
For Whitehead, objects are entities that have

(objects).

the potentiality for being included in the "feeling" (non-

cognitive apprehension, or prehension) which ultimately

passes into the subjectivity or cognitive satisfaction
the experience.

oi

This end product or satisfaction, White-

head terms "superject" rather than "subject" in an effort
to show that it is in the "satisfaction"

86

of the prehen-

highest
sive unity that we find our final awareness and
8^

86

Ibid

.

,

p.

172

.

given in
See the second definition of prehension
Chapter 2, Section 2.2.2.
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expression of human capabilities.
It is not possible, at this time,

to go beyond this

brief excursion into the Whiteheadian alternative to traditional thought.

Here, as with the thoughts of the other

major formulators of the modern scientific and philosophical tradition, we have endeavored to plant the seeds of

Whitehead's critical arguments in the same soil out of
which grew the majority of the concepts which pertain to

modern psychological and educational thought.

Whitehead,

as we have begun to show, implicates the whole modern era

in his reappraisal, or better, inversion of philosophical

understanding.

In terms of impact upon psychological

thought, one of the first manifestations of the conceptual

rebirth inherent in the philosophy of organism, can be
expected to come in matters which touch upon the topics of

perception and cognition.

This, as we shall more clearl)

see as time goes on, is not due to the character of While-

head's thought but is, rather, a function of the fact that
the older system developed those topics first and has dwelt

upon various aspects of these topics the longest.
The philosophical development which followed upon

Kant's approach was carried on primarily by Hegel and

Schelling

;

both of whom attempted to establish a new basis

wings"
for physical thought but instead of "giving physics
on the
as they intended actually were putting "physics

•

.
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skids of fancy."

o7

Whatever their effect and importance to

philosophy, the line of development which leads to modern
In fact, James re-

psychology does not follow their lead.

marked that the "true time of philosophical development
lies

.

.

.

88

not so much through Kant as around him";

and

for our purposes it is particularly important to note that

Whitehead considers his work as a "recurrence to pre-Kantian
modes of thought."
2

.

5

89

THE EARLY NINETEENTH
CENTURY IN ENGLAND
As far as the beginning of the nineteenth century is

deconcerned, there were two trends of importance to the

velopment of psychology, one English, the other German.

In

expression
England, associationism was receiving its final
of its transin the work of James Mill and the beginnings
were evident in
lation into a new physiological psychology
the continent, German
the work of Alexander Bain; while on
maturity in the work of
science was reaching a new level of
of Herbart s work is
men like J. F. Herbart. The character
approach is more
important for two reasons. First, his
'

than it is to
closely related to British associationism

under the influence
that of his countrymen who were
8

7 Jaki

88

,

The Relevance of Physics

,

p.

^ >•

ychology I, PJames, The Principles of Ps

89 Whitehead, Process and Reality, p

vi

—
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And second, he not onLy contributed to the development, of

psychology but is also known as the father of scientific
pedagogy 90
.

2.5.1

JAMES MILL (1773-1836)

Taking the direct line of development of associ ationism
first, we can characterize the work of James Mill as repre-

senting the culmination of the whole association! stic movement.

Also, in view of the proximity in time of his thought

to the actual development of psychology as a science,

it

will be possible to focus increasing emphasis upon issues

which are very close to those of much modern psychological
thought
that
By this time it seems hardly necessary to assert
in Mill's
we can expect to find a heavy Newtonian influence
the tradithought, since Mill was indeed the true heir of
by Berkeley, Hume
tion spawned by Locke and carried forward

and Hartley.

in
Yet, there were also important differences

to the over-all
the details which Mill saw as important

associationist scheme.
Mill's thought is
One important shift to be found in
he actually used obthat in his discussion of association
as the basis of the
jects rather than sensible qualities

discussion.

associative nature
In his description of the

History of Experimental Psycholo gy
Appleton-Century-Crof ts 1929), P- 25 U.

9 °Edwin G.

(New York:

Boring,

A

,

9
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of consciousness, Mill pointed out that:

Thought follows thought; idea follows idea,
If our senses are awake, wo are
incessantly.
but
continually receiving sensation,
ideas
sensations,
not sensations alone. After
formerly
are perpetually excited of sensations
received; after those ideas, other ideas; and
during the whole of our lives, a series of
those two states of consciousness, called
sensations and ideas, is constantly going on.
Immethat is a sensation.
I see a horse:
that is an
diately I think of his master:
idea 1
.

.

.

.

In making the separation that he does between the "two

states of consciousness"--sensation and ideas--M:Lll

is ac-

tually bowing to two important aspects of his philosophical
ancestry.

On the one hand, the need to make sensation pri-

Locke's
mary and separate from ideas is a continuation of

precisely
empiricism while, on the other hand, the need
is surely
specify the elements of association (ideas),

continuation of Hume and Hartley.

to
a

Mill also went a step

so doing,
further with this sort of separation and in
concerning causality
avoided the problems Hume had run into

between sensation and
Here, Mill made the sharp separation
the operation of the
ideas work in his favor by restricting
That is to say,
ideas.
law of association to the realm of

habitually occur in
in those cases where sensations
willing to allow that
junction with one another, Mill was
laws of nature which applied
they did so according to the
91 James Mill, The Analysis of the Phenomena of
Ibid., P- 223Human Mind, quoted in Boring,

»

_Hil
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lo

the ubjttcLs

produced

llial

I,

ho son sn

of association of ideas is soon as

a

I

i

oils

.

Thus,

consequence

o

(‘

the

law

the

concurrence observed in sensations which derive from the
laws of the objects, and is an excellent case in point re-

garding Whitehead's assertion that modern science has re-

mained "blandly indifferent to its refutation by Hume."
From this assumption, it naturally followed that contiguity
would be the single important variable of association.
In elaborating the nature of contiguity, Mill speci-

fied that there are two types of contiguity; he wrote:
Of the order established among the objects of
nature by which we mean the objects ol our
senses, two remarkable cases are all which
here we are called upon to notice; Lho synchronous order, and the successive order. The
synchronous order, or order of simultaneous
existence, is the order in space; the successive order, or order of antecedent and consequent existence, is the order in time. Thus
the various objects in my room, the chaiis,
the tables, the books, have a synchronous order or order in space. The falling spark,
and the explosion of the gun powder, have the
successive order, or order in time.

order of
Actually, Mill believed that the successive
the two becontiguous existence was the more important of

thoughts as they
cause that is the mode of the sequence of
This
frequent.
appear in words and therefore, it is more
proposed lo
consideration leads into the criteria that Mill
and,
account for the variable strength of associations
^2

Mill, Ibid
chological Theory

.

,

,

quoted in Lowry, The Evolution
p.

35
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since he had established a separation between sensations

and ideas, he needed two sets of principles.

On the per-

ceptual or ideational side Mill had three principles:
l) permanence,

to express the fact that permanent convic-

tion must be stronger, 2) certainty, an expression of the

subjective assurance felt in the association and
ity,

3)

felic-

or the ease and speed with which the association is

formed.

As Boring 93 points out, this last principle is very

closely linked to the modern formulation of reaction times
as a measure of associative strength.

On the side of sen-

sation, Mill established the ideas of frequency and vivid-

ness as the prime determiners of the conditions of association

.

One of the prime implications of this view,

leads

right into modern American psychology as the association

theory of meaning that was proposed by Titchener in the
early twentieth century.

This implication primarily flows

from the fact that Mill's view of association leads to a

condition in which objects gain their objectivity by synchronous association.

That is to say, in the idea of a

tree or a house there are a great many simple ideas which

have been united by association.

Thus, meaning is seen to

derive from the intimate natural association between the
simple ideas which forms the context that accrues to either

^Boring, A History of Experimental Psychology

,

p.

224.

:
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initial sensation or initial

For the reason why James

ideas.
Mi.

I

L

is often characterized

as the last associationist in the line of inontal mechanism

we have only to look at the outcome of his psychological

theorizing.

Here, Mill represents the inevitable outcome

of Locke's empiricism because he takes the doctrine that

ideas exist as Newtonian-like atoms in the mind (simple
ideas) which are direct copies of the discrete sensory

input and combines them, according to the Millian princi-

ples of contiguity, into complex ideas.

had been created, it was a natural step

Once complex ideas
to

carry the process

to its conclusion by postulating that complex ideas them-

selves could be associated with one another by the same

principles of contiguity so that one could end up with
"duplex," "triplex," etc., ideas.

Mill speaks directly to

the point

Brick is one complex idea, mortar is another
complex idea; these ideas, with ideas of position and quantity, compose my idea of a
wall. ... In the same manner my complex
idea of glass, wood, and others, compose my
duplex idea of a window; and these duplex
ideas, united together, compose my idea of a
house, which is made up of various duplex
How many complex or duplex ideas are
ideas.
all united in the idea of furniture? How
many more in the idea called Every Thing?
This statement, when quoted, usually prompts the
94 Mill, Ibid

.

mental Psychology

,

,

quoted in Boring, A History of Experip.

226.

t
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following sort of comments from those who have used it.
Boring, for example, labels Mill's final theorizing "reductio ad absurdum" the result of utilizing a rational prin-

ciple to "carry us even to the brink of absurdity." 95

Lowry is a bit more gentle but the devastation of the doctrine is just as complete when he comments to the effect

"After James Mill's Analysis, there was simply

that:

nothing that Lockean mental mechanism could do for an
Its accounts with reality were now closed, and

encore.

there was nothing further that could be said about the

matter.

.

.

theory could
parts

.

Given any complex mental phenomenon, the

.

— in

principle

— resolve

it into its component

96

And so, the long line of associationis t development

finally came not only to its logical end but also to its
actual conclusion in that its "success" was its failure.
That is to say, Mill brought the doctrine closer to an ap-

parent account of actual experience than any of his predecessors; thereby, exposing the superficial aspects of the

underlying doctrine.
2.5.2

JOHN STUART MILL (1806-1873)
The next step in theoretical progression is found in

John Stuart Mill, James' son.

^Ibid.

,

^^Lowry,

p

.

ojd.

226
ci

.

.

,

p.

37*

John Stuart avoided the

:

.

.

1

]

o

reduction that had proved his father's undoing by shifting
the metaphysical basis of mental structure from a mechanical to a chemical analogy.

reasons.

This shift is important for two

First, was the effect on the direct evolution of

associat ionis t thought and second, in the character of the
shift in metaphor we find the first clear example of a

theme that will be of great significance in later discussion; namely,

reality.

the concept of levels of explanation and

Mill expressed his understanding of the matter as

follows
It is obvious that the complex laws of thought
and feeling not only may, but must, be generated from these simple laws [of association].
And it is to be remarked, that the case is
the
not always one of Composition of Causes:
effect of concurring causes is not always
precisely the sum of the effects of those
causes when separate, not even always an efSo it
fect of the same kind with them.
formed
Idea,
Complex
the
that
appears to me
by the blending together of several simpler
ones, should, when it really appears simple
(that is, when separate elements are not consciously distinguishable in it), be said to
result from or be generated by the simple
These
ideas, not to consist of them.
it is
which
are cases of mental chemistry in
generate,
ideas
possible to say that the simple
rather than that they compose, the complex
ones 97

...

,

.

•

•

theoThis formulation led Mill into a new arena of

retical understanding.

Since it was seen to be impossible

John Stewart Mill, System of Logic RatiocinaUvo
Mall's
Inductive quoted in Boring, o£. cit_. p. 230,
emphasis
,

,

^ -'Ill-

to

predict the character of a compound even if all the laws

of the elements are known, Mill maintained that it was not

only impossible to reason from the simple to the complex
but also, in the case of mental phenomena, the only way to

understand the phenomenon was to go directly to the experience to discover how a complex idea has been generated;

reason alone is an insufficient proof.

This emphasis on

experiencing the resultant combination led directly into a
position which helped to transfer the main force of psychological theorizing from the armchair to the laboratory.
This shift of emphasis was also aided by the additional im-

plication of Mill's formulation which held that even in
those cases where the so-called "generative process" was
known, it was impossible to deduce the laws of the resultant in advance.

Thus, the laws of the resultant complex

idea are only obtainable by reference to and direct experi-

ment with the resultant.

This emphasis upon experiment and

reference to direct experience of the phenomenon, which
grows naturally out of Mill's position, is a major factor
in the transition which was to bring the label "psycho-

logist," as opposed to philosopher, to those who followed
J.

S.

Mill.
inThe second important aspect of Mill's theory, his

troduction of a more inclusive, higher-order, metaphor

m

of mental
the explanation of mental phenomena (a translation

.

s

.
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mechanism into mental chemistry), is

fin

intimate part

larger topic that is best treated as a unit.

o

I

a

Accordingly,

it is more appropriate to complete the introduction of the

remainder of the individuals who stand on the threshold of

modern psychological thought first, and to consider the
broader implications of the whole movement when that is

achieved
2.5.3

ALEXANDER BAIN (l8l8-1903)
The last English philosopher-psychologist of importance

to the rise of psychological thought is Alexander Bain.
E.

G.

Boring concluded his review of Bain's work with the

following summary:

...

we see that Bain anticipated much of
later psychology, just as he represented the
He stands exculmination of the old.
actly at a corner in the development of psy.

•

•

chology, with philosophical psychology
stretching out behind, and experimental phy
iological psychology lying ahead in a new diThe psychologist of the twentieth
rection.
century can read much of Bain with hearty approval; perhaps John Locke could have done
the same. 98

the end of
We may characterize Bain as representing

of physiological
empirical associationism and the beginning
the implicaexperimental! sm primarily because of some of

First,
point -of -view.
tions which flowed from his over-all
question there were two
he saw that in every psychological

and the "mental
sides to consider, the "physical side"

^Ibid

.

,

p

•

240

"

side

.
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This parallelism of mind and body in Bain can be

seen in the light of the positions on the issue that had
We

been generated practically two hundred years earlier.

earlier characterized Descartes as a dualist because

separation between mind and body.

Bain,

his

oi

while dualistic,

was also a parallelist in that he did not specify that mind

and body interacted explicitly as Descartes had done.

In

this, his thought can be traced to another seventeenth

century thinker, G. W. Leibnitz, who had originated the
interpretation.

This problem was perhaps more acute for

tremendous
the nineteenth century thinkers because of the
in the
elaboration of physical thought which had occurred
define mind or
interim period. Whatever, Bain was loath to
it and so, mainsoul in such a way as to "materialize"

tained a separation between the two.
apparently
Separating mind from body in this way, is
a theorist will focus
one of the best ways to insure that
phenomena as explanations of mental

upon physiological

since there seems no other alternative.

events,

In addi-

great advances had been
tion, Bain wrote at a time when
function, sensation,
made in the various areas of brain
Thus, having a wealth of
nerve excitation and reflexology.

J

99 Tn Bain, and his near contemporaries in the early
an lnnineteenth century, we will see and
the nin
of tne
H half oi
second
physical
asoects of y y
aspects
creasing emphasis upon the dual
phenomen
psychological
mental approaches to
-

.
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technological information at hand, Bain could and did devote a lot of time to those topics.

When he turned to dis-

cussions of the older more general philosophical issues, he

often (usually) failed to draw any important connections

between the

two."*"^^

Of course, this situation is neither

unique to Bain nor is it restricted to the nineteenth century and the reasons behind this condition will form an im-

portant topic of discussion in the next section when the
general nature of the transition from philosophy to the

natural science of psychology is discussed.
In addition to the older philosophical characteristics

which are found in Bain's psychology, there is also a
strictly associat ionistic view of mental functioning which

required both contiguity and similarity as basic principles
Since additional inquiry into the nature of

of operation.

associationism as used by Bain would not add significantly
to that which has already been presented,

it is best to

leave Bain at this point, standing on the corner as it were,

and to conclude the consideration of the history of British

associationism with a general summary of its main characteristics
2.5.6

.

SUMMARY AND CRITIQUE
OF ASSOCIATIONISM
In this presentation of British associationistic

^O^Ibid.

,

p.

238.
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psychology and its derivation From tho school of empirical
philosophy, we have repeatedly asserted that the entire

movement was inspired by, modeled on, and overshadowed by

Newtonian physical theory.

Accordingly, it is most fitting

to summarize the entire movement from this perspective.

One of the first and most consistent points of corre-

spondence between Newtonian mechanics and mental mechanics
is the ever-present underlying assumption that because

physical phenomena resolve into elementary particles, mental phenomena should do the same.

All mental mechanists,

of whatever stripe, were united in the view that whatever
it was that went on as a result of sensory stimulation

(sensations, impressions, etc.), was to be seen in terms of

elementary mental particles.

It does not matter whether

they were called "ideas," "images," "copies," or

repre-

sentations" in each and every case that which constituted
the lowest order of internal mental structure was conceived

direct copy
to be a punctiform mental particle which was a
of its physical counterpart.
earIn terms of the Whiteheadian arguments presented

Concreteness,
lier, specifically The Fallacy of Mi splaced
in which
it is clear that the doctrine of simple location

describable,
entities are seen to be isolated and separately
their existence
requiring no reference to other entities for
as represented
is perfectly applicable to mental ideas

.

'
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in the associationist tradition.

A second aspect of the

over-all fallacy is the so-called doctrine of mere sensation which asserts that the primary activity in the act of

experiencing is simply the bare subjective entertainment
of the sensations.

That is, the data of the world are not

distorted by the subject’s form of reception.

Obviously,

in empiricism we have found nothing to contravene this

assertion and have, in fact, seen its truth demonstrated.
For the sake of completeness, we should also note in passing,

that the third factor in the fallacy, the substance-

quality separation is not accentuated in this case due
the nature of empiricist thought.

to

Certainly, the extieme

idealism of Berkeley with its total lack of reliance upon
external or substantive existence plays down this aspect

of

out
the fallacy, though it hardly seems necessary to point

problem
that this only postponed the consideration of the

and was not a solution.

Another important point of correspondence between
which
Newtonian and mental mechanism is the general need
of relation
mental mechanists found to postulate some sort
the problem
existing between the isolated ideas. This is
earlier and Newton's
of "action at a distance" mentioned
caveat of creating
solution of the problem, achieved by the

associations ts
the ether, was mirrored in many of the
theories

"repugnancy"
Locke spoke of "agreement" and
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between ideas and we have quo tod Hume to the effect that
"there is a kind of attraction, which in the mental world

will be found to have as extraordinary effects as in the

natural."

Additionally, we have seen that the consideration

of this matter was an important catalyst in Hartley's crea-

tion of "vibratiuncles

.

"

It is also interesting to note,

that James Mill was not concerned with this issue and found

no place for it in his "complete" system of mental mechanics.

This situation is, in all probability, due to the

fact that in Mill we find the retention of the ubiquitous

atomism but with the added character that the elements are

now ideas of sensible objects rather than sensible qualities
level
Thus, Mill's use of objects as elements introduced a

postulate a
of phenomenal reality that obviated the need to

force by which simple elements could be compounded.

Of

at issue
course, this created other problems, but the point

shift in level of
is the fact that an apparently innocent

basic abdescription has profound implications for the

stractions of the system.

Had Mill realized this point, it

the ultimate
seems doubtful that he would have gone on to

extremes that he did.
its functionWhile associationism was able to animate
ad hoc assumptions
ing entities to some degree with various
considered to be an active
it never did achieve what can be

view of mental processes.

In this regard it is even less
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active than its physical model since notion and dynamism

had always been important components of the parent metaphysical view.

This condition, no doubt, was largely at-

tributable to the predominant empiricist position which was

generally held by the associationist s and, of course, was a

main factor in the criticism which Kant levied against
them.

The logic underlying the whole formulation was also

strictly Newtonian in nature, briefly considered, it amounts
to this.

All mental mechanists had been concerned with the fact
that sensations of objects were actually given in experi-

ence as a variety of separately distinguishable sensory

qualities (except for Mill, who operated with ideas).

Now,

because of the original Newtonian assumption regarding the
encharacter of sensations and ideas, i.e., simply located

that
tities, the mental mechanists were obliged to assert

or reprethe sensation of a whole object was broken down

sensory
sented in perception as an assemblage of separable

qualities.

Further, these decomposed sensations which re-

to giving
sulted in "simple sensations" were restricted
to some
rise to "simple ideas" out of which, according
to reconstruct
principle, e.g., contiguity, it was possible

a complex idea of the original object.

primary reason for
It seems fair to assert that the
this complex mental
the associationists' commitment to
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paradigm was their prior commitment to the doctrine of simply located entities.

For, had they been able to avoid

that prior assumption there would have been no need to

elaborate the intervening stages of conversion which first

created the simple out of the complex and then recreated
the complex out of the simple.

Surely,

there was no other

restriction which prevented them from making the direct and
equally reasonable assumption that complex sensations are

directly responsible for the creation of complex ideas.
In addition to those aspects which are directly at-

tributable to the Newtonian cosmology, we should also remark
that the original separation between mind and body which

arose in the thought of Descartes has not only been con.

ued but actually heightened by the progression of the movement.

To the end, as seen in the thought of Alexander Bain,

at
the problem was not only implicit in the whole era but

principle
times was explicitly formulated as an important
of scientific explanation.
2.6

THE EARLY NINETEENTH
CENTURY IN GERMANY
Germany
The first half of the nineteenth century in

for the
was an important time in which the foundations
Up until
founding of experimental psychology were laid.
contribution from
this time there had been little direct

Immanuel Kant was coupled
the Germans; however, the work of
intellectual lite
with a general increase in the tempo of

.
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that seems to have provided a favorable environment for

broad scale development in the physical and mental sciences.
As might be expected in the type of theorizing that went on

in those early decades of the nineteenth century that is

relevant to the continued rise of psychological thought, we
can find the further elaboration of the earlier traditions
of mental and physiological mechanism.

An important aspect

of the material to be considered in this section is the

continued impress of the Newtonian cosmology.

In this

treatment, we will be less concerned to demonstrate the

validity of that continued assertion and will pay more attention to the character of the theorizing which results
from the further elaboration of concepts in the physical

sciences

When we first considered the early nineteenth century
the cultural
in England, there was no great need to include
debackground of that time as an important factor in the

velopment of the empiricist associationis t thought.

This

modes of thought
is primarily due to the fact that the
outgrowths of longwhich were relevant to our concerns were
heavily influstanding traditional doctrines and were not

rapidly develenced by the influx of information from the
The corresponding
oping corpus of scientific knowledge.

situation in Germany is quite another matter.
century was a fruitful
The early part of the nineteenth
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time of great

technologic*!

I

advances which were combined

with an optimistic outlook in diverse areas of life.

While

the industrial revolution was born in England, it was the

Germans who realized that great gains were also to be had
by combining an intimate and disciplined intellectual study
of scientific ideas with the search for new technology.

Whitehead remarks of the German intellectual that "their
feats of scholarship during the nineteenth century were the

admiration of the world.
Those aspects of the historical development of psycho-

logical thought which will be covered in this section are

important examples of that high water mark of intellectual
achievement.

In addition, a good portion of that history

will show the narrowing trend which is engendered by the

increased specificity of the developing fields of investigation.

Here, as we seek critical insight into the nature

of those times, it hardly seems necessary to point out that

seeds of the specialized disciplines which were sown during
these early days of scientific development have, today,

grown into the great compartments of specialized knowledge
by which we name our disciplines and structure our univer-

sities

.

"There have always been people who devoted their lives
to definite regions of thought" Whitehead remarks concerning

]

01

Whitehead, Science and the Modern World

,
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the developing specialization of the early nineteenth

century;
In particular, lawyers, and the Clergy of the
Christian churches form obvious examples of
such specialism.
But the full self-conscious
realization of the power of professionalism
in knowledge in all its departments, and of
the way to produce the professionals, and of
the importance of knowledge to the advance of
technology, and of the methods by which abstract knowledge can be connected with technology, and of the boundless possibilities of
technological advance--the realization of all
these things was first completely attained in
the nineteenth century; and among the various
countries, chiefly in Germany. ^2

And indeed it was that "chiefly in Germany" came the
impetus to a greatly sophisticated style of psychological
thought, a style which will increasingly emphasize restrict-

ing the psychological field to sense objects and minor as-

pects of human sentience.

Yet, for all its success, it has

never been without opposition from those who sought to include a more complete repertoire of human behavior within
the domain of psychological science.

We will trace this

all important interaction between the two main contrasting

views of psychological science in the next section; for
the present, it is important to consider the general scien-

tific tenor of the times.

2.6.1

J.

F.

HERBART (l776-l84l)

Herbart is important in the present context because
102

Ibid.

,

p

.
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his work was a direct influence upon both Fechner and
Wundt, two figures of primary importance in establishing

experimental psychology; he was a transition figure in the
shift from philosophy to experimentalism and combined many

diverse concepts into what appeared to be a complete psy-

chology

.

Herbart maintained that psychology was a science
(

Wissenshaf t ) which was grounded in experience; yet, he

also held that since there was no obvious way of experi-

menting with the mind, psychology could not be experimental.

Instead, the basis of psychology was seen to be meta-

physical, which meant to Herbart that it was possible to
create a mathematical description of the metaphysical ele-

ments which comprised the mind.

While Herbart held that

the mind was unitary and could not be divided into func-

tional parts, he readily allowed the influence of both the

Newtonian idea of attractive and repulsive forces and the
character of his mathematical treatment of the metaphysical
"ideas" to lead him into explicit formulations concerning
the character of mental operations.

It is necessary to

touch on these factors because some of them are to become

very important in the history of psychology.
Herbart

1

s

"ideas" were seen to interact and to have

varying strengths; accordingly, they could attract or repel
each other in ways which were expressable in mathematical
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equations.

In this over-all view he is rather close to the

line of mental mechanists we have followed; but, he also

added an important element.

Clearness in consciousness, he

felt, was related to the force of action of an idea, and

active ideas were conceived of in strict Newtonian fashion:

Every movement of the ideas is confined between
two fixed points:
their state of complete inhibition, their state of complete liberty, and
there is a natural and constant effort of all
the ideas to revert to their state of complete
liberty (absence of inhibition) 103
.

This dynamic view of mental mechanism underlies the

creation of an entirely new aspect of mental science and
one which will become of increasing importance.
sis of the concept goes like this:

The gene-

ideas which are not

opposed to one another may coexist in consciousness and
contribute to a simple mental act.

However, since we are

not simultaneously aware of all ideas, it must be that in

those cases where ideas oppose one another the stronger
(clearer) of the two must repel the other out of conscious-

These suppressed ideas were seen to have passed from

ness.

a "state of reality" to a "state of tendency" and a "state

of tendency" is another name for an unconscious conscious
Thus, we have the first explicit formula-

or unconscious.

tion of the unconscious within the ranks of psychological
10
-^

p.

255-

Johann

F.

Herbart

,

quoted in Boring, ££. cit

.

,
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theorists.

We did not meet this earlier because the Brit-

ish had not discriminated between consciousness and mind

and simply assumed that they were identical.
In extending this mechanical analogy, Herbart came up

with another important concept-- threshold or, in his terminology, limen of consciousness.
By the limen of consciousness I mean those
limits that an idea seems to overlap in
passing from a state of complete inhibition
to a state of real idea. 1^4
Thus, mental content which is suppressed still exists and

according to its "natural and constant effort to revert to
a state of complete liberty" is actually attracted back

into consciousness by its own efforts.

Therefore, the un-

conscious is also seen to be dynamic and as such can have
an effect upon conscious thought.

For this mechanism

Herbart recurred to the philosophy of Leibnitz and borrowed
the concept of "apperception" which he felt explained how

conscious ideas could select from among the unconscious
ones those which were consonant with themselves.

Since his

doctrine explicitly stated that consciousness was a unitary
-thing,

the assimilation of ideas into it from the uncon-

scious, was seen as adding to the totality of ideas which

already existed there and which he named, the "apperceptive
mass."
104

The concept of apperceptive mass became, in the

Ibid
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late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries an important

characterization of the psychological processes which were
thought to underlie the process of education.

Herbart

then, can be seen as the popularizer, within

,

psychological theory of the idea of the unconscious,

Leibnitz being the chief philosophical mentor.

His concept

of limen (threshold) is obviously well known and became an

important tool in the hands of Fechner whom we shall conAlso, Wundt will be seen to recur to the

sider shortly.

Herbartian unconscious in order to explain perceptual pheHowever, lest we be carried too far along by the
105
points out that
similarity of the formulations, Boring

nomena.

Freud's concept of the unconscious could have come from

Herbart but in fact did not; we will however, be able to

attribute the origin of the concept to Fechner and also

demonstrate its link to the physical sciences.
2.6.2

M. W.

DROBISCH

(

1802-1896)

In Drobisch are to be found the seeds of another

mechanistic formulation of a higher-order mental phenomenon;

this time, the concepts which were developed by

Herbart are extended to include emotion and motivation.
theoretical
In this, we have another clear example of the
of
dynamics which characterize the increasing elaboration

First, for the basis of Drobisch

the Newtonian mechanism.
"'"^Boring

,

ojd.
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system we find Herbart

1

s

psychology:

The fact that only a few ideas can enter our
consciousness at once, shows to be sure at
first glance, that they displace, suppress,
therefore, as it were, expel one another; but
also on the other hand, that they are not
able to avoid one another, but are held together by an attractive force. The same
thing likewise appears in associations, those
quite involuntary and artless combinations of
simultaneous ideas. It is, therefore, possible to attribute similar attractive and repellant forces to ideas, after analogy of the
physical-chemical hypothesis of attractions
and repulsions of elements.1^6

Drobisch's commitment to mental mechanism ended in a

Newtonian theory of motivation and emotion because he conceived of the relationship between conscious and unconscious
as a state of dynamic equilibrium

That is to say, since

.

new perceptions were always adding new ideas there must be
a continued rebalancing between the two.

Since he felt

that the state of equilibrium was more natural, the state

of disequilibrium would be unnatural, therefore unpleasant

and would be the source of our feelings and desires.
equilibrium, a
If I have a feeling of
of disturbance.
feeling
be
a
change in it will
equilibrium
psychological
The feeling of
health,
bodily
of
is precisely similar to that
The
feeling.
of both there exists no positive
eof
state
body as well as the mind is in a
quilibrium when one has no feeling of its activities, just as a machine in which there is
the least possible friction makes but little
Desires and feelings are, therefore,
noise.
the indices of the deviation from the state
.

.

10
p.

73.

.

.

.

.

^Moritz W. Drobisch, quoted in Lowry,
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of equilibrium of ideas.

2.6.3

107

TRANSITION TO PHYSIOLOGICAL THEORIZING
With this brief introduction into some of specific ex-

amples of theorizing in the early nineteenth century, we
are in a better position to explore tho general character
of the transition to more empirical forms of psychological

theorizing.

In this, we will see that the overt and thoro-

going metaphysical approach which was evident, for example,
in Herbart does not survive but that aspects of his psy-

chology which derived from that metaphysic, his empiricism,
mathematics, notions of activity and the concept of threshwhich
old, are all taken over and built into a now structure
is heavily influenced by physiology and physics.

times
An interesting summary of the character of these

has been provided by Lowry

108

in which he recounts the

the area of
nature of the changes that were taking place in
nineteenth
physiological mechanism at the beginning of the

century.

First of all, there was an elaboration of the

which is found
original doctrine of physiological mechanism
how DesWe have seen
in the philosophy of Descartes.
vital bod
cartes' opposition to the ancient view of
10

^Drobisch, quoted in Ibid

.

,

p.

i
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Theory,
Lowry, The Evolution of Psycho logical
Chapters 5 and 6.

109

Cf., Chapter 1,

Section 1.2.3, Ren6 Descartes.
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activities as imposed by an external source grew out of his

conviction that only unextended mental substance could reBodies on the

spond to such external, spiritual influence.

other hand, were "mechanical" in nature and their vital

functions of heat and movement were seen to be the natural

outgrowths of mechanical action.

Thus Descartes could hold

that the soul left the body because the heat and movement

had stopped rather than the reverse.
Through the intervening ages there was an increasing
dialogue between the vitalists and the mechanists in which
the mechanists, largely under the influence of physiological

discovery finally won out.

However, not all vitalism was a

reasimple mystical doctrine as indicated in the following
the last
soned statement made by an English anatomist in

quarter of the eighteenth century.

John Hunter felt that:

Animal and vegetable substances differ from
common matter in having a power super added
totally different from any other known property of matter, out of which arise various
new properties; it cannot arise out of any
peculiar modification of matter, but appears
Organizato be something super added.
protion may arise out of living parts, and
of,
duce action; but life can never arise out
Organizaand depend on, organization.
things.
different
tion and life are two
.

.

•

.

.

•

an important property
In this example, Hunter is pinpointing
will figure significantly
of organizational hierarchies that
Here, we will simply note that such
in future discussion.
110
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styles of thought were effectly swept aside by the great

successes of those mechanistic physiologists who saw all

phenomena as directly caused by combinations of elementary
particles which existed at the same level of being.

Nor is

all the credit or blame to be given to the physiologists

since it was a character of the age that the idea of ato-

micity should permeate all phases of scientific activity.
For example, biological thought had assumed a new maturity
and also contributed to the acceptance of the validity of
the atomistic interpretation when Schleiden and Schwann
"Thus by 1840," Whitehead

established cell theory in 1839*
remarks,

"biology and chemistry were established on an

atomic basis.

The final triumph of atomism had to wait for

the arrival of electrons at the end of the century."

1

'1"'1'

An example of the transition to complete mechanism is
this 1842 version of the doctrine of vitalism which was ex-

pressed by the chemist Justus Liebig:
The vital force causes a decomposition of the
constituents of food, and destroys the force
of attraction which is continually exerted
It causes new
between their molecules.
different
altogether
compounds to assume forms
attracthe
of
from those which are the result
tion of cohesion when acting freely
there is nothing to prevent us from considering the vital force as a peculiar property,
which is possessed by certain material bodies
and becomes sensible when their elementary
particles are combined in a certain arrangement
.

.

.

.
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Liebig's thoughts on digestion arc also indicative of
the main character of thought concerning the nervous system.

In this case the central issues of concern involved

the nature of nervous activity, the type of conduction

which was involved in nervous activity and the type of
scientific explanation which was appropriate to describe
the phenomena.

Focusing first upon the nature of nervous

activity, we find that the naive doctrines of Descartes

(hydraulics and tubes) and Hartley (vibratory motions) have

been displaced by Galvani

'

s

1780 discovery that nervous

activity is electrical and by the continued elaboration of
increasingly sophisticated elec trophy siological teclmiquos,
e.g., Volta in 1800,

such that, again, by 1840 nervous ac-

tivity was universally viewed as being electrical in nature.

Further since even the "electricians" of the age, as those
who studied electrical phenomena called themselves, were

convinced that electrical phenomena could be explained by

Newtonian principles there seemed to be an important metaphysical similarity between the various branches of the
scientific enterprise.
Not only were the general electrical properties known

and understood but also their unidirectional nature was

widely accepted.
112

Broad scale studies of the peripheral
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nervous system had shown
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nerves conduet

in a "forward" direction, afferent activity, and that motor

nerves, on the other hand, were essentially efferent in
nature.

With this knowledge of the nature of the inputs

and outputs of the central nervous system, it was all too

compelling to view its activity in terms of another very
important and central part of a seemingly similar communications apparatus-- the telephone system; and so, in the
wake of A. G. Bell's first telephone conversation on the

twenty-third of May in the year 1844, man's central nervous
system became a very complicated elec Lri cal switchboard.
It is important to note that in spite of the modern

technological basis of this analogy, the long-standing reflexive character of the nervous system is retained, due to
the fact that the functional nature of the system does not

depend upon the exact technology involved.
2.6.4

CONSERVATION OF ENERGY:
A NEW PRINCIPLE
In the earlier discussion of the underlying dynamics

which operated to channel the theorizing of the British associationists into an otherwise unnecessary and excessively

complex doctrine of mental functioning, i.e., the translation from complex to simple sensations and from simple
upon
ideas to complex ideas, primary stress was placed

their prior commitment to the physical and metaphysical
particles;
validity of the existence of is olable elementary

hence,

the applicability

location.

of’

Whitehead's doctrine of simple

Of importance in the present context is the fact

that having accepted the doctrine of atomicity and the laws

attendant to those assumptions, physical scientists were

moving to understand further implications of those laws.
Thus, at a time when there was great interest in the ideas
of conservation of force and energy, the reflection of

those thoughts is also to be found in physiological science

and ultimately in psychology.

Therefore, it is not sur-

prising to find the same sort of underlying dynamic which
was implicit in the earlier century in operation here.
We have said something of the conflict between the

mechanists and the vitalists as regards the nature of biological functioning but it is important to pursue the matdelicacy
ter a little further in order to detect the greater
of the issue.

In this discussion, the figure of Hermann

figure
Helmholtz will loom large because he was an important
in physics, physiology and psychology.
fact that the
The whole argument will boil down to the

phenomena,
mechanists can be construed as saying that all
be exincluding those of living matter, will ultimately
of the physplained in terms of the established principles
di^However, that is to form an arbitrary

ical science.

and an exagchotomy between a fancied mystical vitalism

really an insult
gerated mechanistic determinism which is

13 ^

to

the genius and integrity of tho individuals involved,

the real issue is a bit more involved than that.

An important aspect of the whole issue involves the

"theory of heat" as known to physicists.

As in so many

other areas of scientific endeavor, the older caloric concept of heat which involved the interpretation of the phe-

nomenon as a fluid which flowed from place to place, i.o.,
hot to cold, was being replaced by the experimentally de-

rived interpretation that heat resulted from tho "vibration
of the corpuscles of bodies."

Joule had finally established

the so-called mechanical equivalent of heat and Helmholtz's

first scientific paper was a work in which he tied together
the various mechanical forces in the universe in such a way

that the heat which was a necessary by-product of all such

action became an important factor in the formulation
"constancy principle."

of

*

ho

The constancy principle means that

converted into
the various forms of physical energy can be
one another with no gain or loss in the process.

Now for

physician
an individual who was both a physicist and a
such a contrained in physiology, it was only natural that

happened to be
cept should also apply to the matter which

associated with living organisms.

And so, the vitalist

sophistication
mechanist controversy reached a new level of
did not have to
with the realization that vital processes
were, but in accord
create something out of nothing, as it
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with the principle of constancy it is possible to conceive
that a vital process is simply one in which there is a

qualitative transfer of energy within the system while the
total energy of the system remains quantitatively constant.

This formulation of the quantitative constancy of energy
can be seen as a further elaboration of Newton's three

principles of motion which essentially asserted the constancy of motion or the conservation of force as opposed
to the conservation of energy.

However, the fact that simple-minded vitalism is in-

compatible with the conservation of energy does not mean
that Helmholtz and his contemporaries held out for a

strictly mechanical interpretation of life.

In fact, there

was widespread support for the position that physics could
not subsume all biological phenomena.

What the true mecha-

physinist assertion came to then, was the fact that while

perhaps be
cal life processes could conserve heat, and

need to
modeled on a model of a steam engine, there was no
part, Helmholtz
equate life with machine processes. For his
mechanical and
held that since the life processes produced
ruled by necessity,
chemical effects, "their effects must be

under the same conand must always be the same when acting
arbitrary choice in
ditions; and so there cannot exist any
the direction of their actions."

113

Seen in this light,

113 Hermann Helmholtz, On the Application of the
quoted in Jaki
Conservation of Force t o Organic Nature,
Relevance of Physics, p. 298.

,

^

.
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the actual position taken by many prominent men of that

time was more of the nature of an assertion that physical

processes were, after all, physical processes and that
while life did not necessarily have to be totally identified with mechanical processes, its interface with the material world certainly did have to conform to established
law.

Yet, it is also true that the only way for physiology

to advance was to seek the continued explanation

oi

all

life phenomena in terms of the physico-chemical processes

upon which they were based.
That it is possible to temper mechanistic determinacy

when focusing upon specific issues of a highly quantifyable
theoretical nature, should not however, foster the concluage was
sion that the overriding cosmology of the entire

not,

built upon a
to the depths of its mechanical heart,

conceptualization of an indefinite and infinite universe,
which all ocbound together by the laws of its components
Perhaps the following arc
cupy the same level of being.
In the
reference.
more indicative of the over-all frame of
expressing the
mid-eighteenth century, we find Voltaire

sentiment that it would be strange indeed:
obey
that all nature, all the planets, should
lita
be
should
eternal laws, and that there
contempt
tle animal, five feet high, who in
pleased, solely
of these laws, could act as he
at
according to his caprice. He would act
means
random, but we know that randomness
We have merely invented the word
nothing.

-

•
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to denote the known effect of all unknown
causes 14
.

i

And, lest we are too inclined to excuse the "ignorance" of

early scientists and men of letters and pride ourselves on
the maturity of modern science, we should not forget that

standing upon the threshold of our own century we find the
same point-of-view represented in no less a thinker than

Bertrand Russell, who, with zeal reminiscent of religious
fervor proclaimed:

man is a product of causes which had no
prevision of the end they were achieving;
that his origin, his growth, his hopes and
fears, his loves and beliefs, are but the
accidental collocations of atoms; that no
fire, no heroism, no intensity of thought
and feeling, can preserve an individual life
beyond the grave that all the labors of the
ages, all the devotion, all the inspiration,
all the noonday brightness of human genius,
are destined to extinction in the vast death
of the solar system, and that the whole temple of Man's achievement must inevitably be
buried beneath the debris of a universe in
ruins--all these things, if not quite beyond
dispute, are yet so nearly certain, that no
philosophy which rejects them can hope to
Only within the scaffolding of these
stand.
truths, only on the firm foundation of unyielding despair, can the soul's habitation
henceforth be safely built. 5
.

.

.

;

it
Actually, Russell is right, as far as he goes; for

J

alternative except
is true that there can be no other

H-^Voltaire, Ignorant Philosopher
p.

,

quoted in Ib

i

d..

,

37511

Ibid

.

,

quoted
^Bertrand Russell, A Free Man's W orship,
p

.

379

m
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"unyielding despair" for a system which is based upon a

mechanistic cosmology.

Now, however,

there are alternatives

to this view which not only include Russell's science but

also modern science within a framework which unites the

separate universes of physical and mental existence into

meaningful whole.

a

We will consider the foundations of this

view in the next chapter after the relation of modern psychology to the older view has been examined.
2.6.5

FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN
PRE- EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY
The next major step in the transition from metaphysi-

successor
cal to physiological psychology is found in the
of Herbart, Rudolph Hermann Lotze (l8l7-l88l).

Lotze was

sysopposed to pure materialism and sought anti-mechanical

greater wealth
tem while at the same time bringing a

physiological fact into psychology.

of

He is best known for

he tried to combine
his theory of space perception in which
system and its
the modern understanding of the nervous
description of
electrical characteristics into meaningful

how space is perceived.
empiricist view somehow enWe have seen that the old
of objects are repretailed the notion that small copies

yield the direct percepsented in the mind in ways which
objects are perceived spation space and therefore the
had become untenable
By Lotze's time, this view
tially.
system was now seen as a
due to the fact that the nervous
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complex of individual circuits which in some way conducted
impulses to the central nervous system.

Therefore, Lotze

held that while the retina is stimulated by a spatial signal, the image on the retina was sent to a projection area
in the brain where it was known to the mind not as an ob-

jective image but as the perceived condition of the nerves
in that area.

Since advanced anatomical and physiological under-

standing dictated that whatever information reached the
central nervous system had to be in the form of discrete
elements, it was a pressing problem to describe how it was

possible that unified perceptions could be formed.

In the

various answers to this problem are found the beginnings

ot

the controversy, within modern science, betweeen the na-

tivists and the empiricists.

For his part, Lotze took

a

rather Kantian nativistic outlook by asserting that the
was
mind could not conjure up space out of something which

space
not spatial and therefore the ability to perceive
To make
must be due to some inherent property of the mind.
the excitation
this intelligible, Lotze had to specify that

of any receptor neuron produced two signals:

one which was

excitation
representative of the content of the image of
signal
and the other which was a "local sign" or a

to

the

receptor had been
mind which allowed it to determine which
in the
From the combined information contained
excited.

i4o

local signs of the whole image the mind was supposed to

have derived a pattern of intensities which could be corre-

lated with the movements of the body to produce the perception of solid space.
In terms of the nativist empiricist controversy, LoLze

actually included both views since the theory required re-

peated experience with sensations and signs in order

to

perceive space and yet there was also a requirement to have
an inherent capacity which could interpret the signs in

order to arrange the content spatially.
Herbart

'

s

concept of the unconscious also came into

the picture as a description of how it was possible that

all of the processing relating to local signs could go on

without conscious recognition of the process.

Lotze also

used this explanation in cases where there was perception

postulating
of objects without any movement of the body by
"incipthat it was possible for the mind to experience an

unconscious.
ient movement" which was known only in the
takes on a new
Note that the concept of unconscious here
which
coloration in that it now includes mental contents
required for normal
are actually operations whose outcome is

house for
conscious sentience rather than simply a store

excess ideational elements.
theory put forth
One of the major alternatives to the

by Lotze came from Ewald Hering

(

183^-1918 )

.

Hering is

I

n

1

so

known

case o

I'

I’or

his theory o

I

co

I

or

vision.

space perception nml color vision,

In

ho

Ih'i'ing

I.

h
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(.In*

found

himself at odds with Helmholtz who also had theories for
those typos of phenornona.
thorn is

variously known as

The groat controversy between
tlio

nativist empiricist or

nature nurture question and is, obviously, still an open
issue in most psychological theory.

Hering is identified as a proponent of nativism because his theory of space perception, which ho put forward
deal of
as an alternative to Lotze's, relied upon a good

internal preprogramming in order
tion.

to

explain space pei

<

<i

,_

Hering
Lotze’s local signs wore too cumbersome lor

neural hardsince that postulate effectively doubled the
ware required for visual processing.

Instead, Hering

system in
relied upon an analogy of a simple coordinate
of as fitted into a
which each retinal receptor was thought
three signals or "spagrid such that it actually produced
These are simply, "
tial feelings" as Hering called them.
Y and Z axis wliuh
today's language, signals on the X,
about the horizonyielded, in Hering' s view, information
of a given retinal stimtal, vertical and depth "feelings"

vision liering was
In accounting for stereoscopic
signal, or depth signal,
forced to assume that the third
negative values.
could assume either positive or
empiricist whose
Helmholtz on the other hand is an

ulation.

<

roots are to be found in John Locke.

Therefore, in con-

trast to the rather popular Kantian influence, Helmholtz
was maintaining that an object was nothing more than an

aggregate of sensations which fitted together because they
were habitually found together.

However, in line with the

more recent views which espoused an active nature for the
mind, Helmholtz believed that mental processes contained an

active unconscious; and the unconscious processes that actually transformed the punctiform sensations which had been

projected to the cortex, were "irresistible" in the sense
that they were automatic and not subject to conscious re-

cognition.

Those processes which were viewed as among the

"irresistible" operations of the unconscious, were thought
to have been developed in empirical fashion by association

and repetition.

In addition to an empirically derived ir-

resistible structure for the active unconscious, Helmholtz
also held that the form of the process in the unconscious
was the same as for conscious inferences from analogy.

In

this way, Helmholtz sought to insure the possibility that a

conclusion could be reached in a novel case or in the case
perof an ambiguous perceptual illusion that shifted its

ceptual appearance.

Perhaps the true meaning of unconscious

pasinference is best summed up by Helmholtz himself in a

sage from his work concerning physiological optics:

The psychic activities, by which we arrive
the judgement that a certain object of a

at,

.

certain character exists boforo us at a certain place, are generally not conscious activities but unconscious ones.
In their results
they are equivalent to an inference in so far
as we achieve, by way of the observed effect
upon our senses, the idea of the causes of
this effect, even though in fact it is invariably only the nervous excitations, the effects, that we can perceive directly, and
never the external objects. ... It may be
permissible to designate the psychic acts of
ordinary perception as unconscious inferences
as this name distinguishes them sufficiently
from the ordinary, so-called, conscious inWhile the similarity of the psychic
ferences.
activities of the two cases has been doubted
and will perhaps always be doubted, still no
doubt can remain of the similarity of the reand conscious
sults of such unconscious
inferences
,

.

.

.

Thus, the Helmholtzian theory of perception is one which at-

tempts to provide for the outcome of observed experience as

well as giving a reasonable account of the scientific data
In including these aspects,

relevant to the matter.

Helmholtz is opening the way for Wundt to formulate the explicit mechanism of introspection.
An important aspect of Helmholtz's theory is that it
is the tie between the tradition of British associationism

and the German roots of psychological theory found in

Wundt's introspective psychology.

Since this is the

important
case, it is well to focus more clearly upon the

operating characteristics of the theory.

The basic term in

quoted
Helmholtz, Handbook of Physiologic al Optics,
emphasis.
in Boring, ££. cit., p. 309, Helmholtz's
ll6

'*'

1

^Boring,

ojd.

cit

.

,

p.

312.

tho theoretical structure is

the bare sensory pattern which

is derived from the object.

This pattern is however, rare-

ly pure since it is almost always added to by the results
or the irresistible unconscious processes and supplemented
by memory.

Thus, objects in the world are the product of a

Lock an associa tionism supplemented by the observer's meni

tal apparatus, especially the unconscious.

This formula-

tion also retains the doctrine of primary and secondary

qualities because it clearly specifies that in the trial
and error accumulation of unconscious experience, wo perform a sort of "mental experimentation" by which wo learn

which properties of tho objects can be changed by our additions (secondary qualities) and which properties cannot be

changed (primary qualities).
In closing this account of Helmholtz's perceptual

theory, we should note that cases where the mind is active

without receiving sense impressions are called imagination.
Such experiences were labeled Vors t ellungen by Helmholtz, a

word which is usually rendered as idea in English, but
which, in the original, carries the definite connotation of

something that is cast up out of the unconscious into tho
conscious; it thus seems to imply a more active derivation
for the experience while at the same time indicating that
it came from somewhere intimately associated with its host

as opposed to coming from "out of the blue," as it were.
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this point in the discussion, as wo turn to tho ac-

At

tual birth of experimental psychology,

it

1h

essential to

make two major elements in the discussion quite explicit.
On the one hand, wo will attribute the actual creation of

experimental psychology to Gustav Fechner rather than

Vilhelm Wundt and therefore,

more complete account,

(jive a

of his psychology than is usually the case, while on tho

other hand

,

we will utilize the riegioctod half of Fechnor’s

psychology as a major element in structuring the remainder
of our consideration of the development of psychology. 1

H

1

In considering the "founding" of experimental psychol-

ogy,

it is important to see tho "new" developments

of their historical context.

In actuality,

in

light

the development

of this now phase of psychological thought is simply the

confluence of two long-standing streams of historical
thought, modern science and modern philosophy.

quoted Alexander Koyre

'

s

We have

statement to the effect that the

crisis of the modern consciousness is a result of the
1

K

No loss an authority than Boring feels quite an am"One may call him [Fechner]
bivalence about tho matter:
tho founder of experimental psychology, or one may assign
t
does IK) inn lor " Boring, 0 X1
that title to Wundt,
added.
emphasis
p. 295,
For reasons that will become clearer in what is to
follow, what matters is that Wundt offectivoly developed
only half of Fechner' s psychophysics and the neglected hall
not only haunted him then, but is still with us today, as
wo will endeavor to show.
I

I

I.

I

I

>

-

1

•

j

.

,

,
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scientific revolution which has colored the entire history
ol

ry.

western man since its inception in the sixteenth centuHis assertion is that this revolution has:

changed the very framework and pattern
of our thinking and of which modern science
and modern philosophy are, at the same time,
the root and the fruit.
.

.

.

The importance of that statement is, perhaps, a bit more

obvious now that we have traced a good deal of the content
of that revolution with the intention of concentrating on

those aspects which have the greatest bearing on psycho-

logical history.
Before we touch on the meeting of those two main
streams of modern science and modern philosophy as "roots"
of our traditions, it is important to remark that in this

discussion we are dealing with their "fruit" as it is manifest in the life of one individual, Gustav Fechner.

While

that statement mostly serves to make the obvious explicit
it is also intended to open the way to an appreciation of

the spirit of the times

Fechner'

general.

s

"

Zeitgeist " as it is evidenced in

life and as it was manifest in the culture in
Since the proper treatment of this all important

topic would not only require more space than is available
but would also take us from the study of psychology into
the fields of history and literature,

to say nothing of the

author's inability to pursue such topics, we must be content with the barest intimation

of'

the central content of
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the change as it relates to psychology.

That part of the great drama of man's unfolding nature
as it is mirrored in the narrow aspects of the philosophy

and science that we are considering, gives us an important
clue to the character of the developments we are seeking.

The author feels that it is highly significant that we
find, in the last half of the nineteenth century the com-

bined developments of:

a)

the meeting of modern philosophy

and modern science, b) the birth of a new dimension in the

awareness of man's nature; hence, the development of the
scientific study of man and c) an organic change in the
whole character of western thought.

Whitehead admirably recounts the major dynamics of
these times which were animated by the impulse of great

technological discovery and the excitement of new vistas in
scientific theory.

Of these times he remarks:

Both the material and the spiritual bases of
social life were in the process of transforWhen the century entered upon its
mation.
last quarter, its three sources of inspiration, the romantic, the technological, and
the scientific had done their work.
Then almost suddenly, a pause occurred
and in its last twenty years the century
closed as one of the dullest stages of
thought since the time of the First Crusade.
The period was efficient, dull, and
It celebrated the triumph of
half-hearted.
the professional man.^^
;

.

.

.

^^whitehead, Science and the Modern World
emphasis added.

,

p.

101,

This then, is the context in which we find the development of modern psychology; it is a time carried on by

a

professional dynamic but also one which found the heart of
its whole cosmology shaken to the core.

We have seen some-

thing of the rise of the idea of the conservation of energy
in earlier sections, and have appreciated the rather uni-

versal nature of the concept.

Whitehead believes that the

rise of this concept, that is, the ability to consider en-

ergy as a quality in its own right, was not only a challenge
to the basic notion of mass

(matter) in the old cosmology

but actually succeeded in replacing it as a basic metaphysical category.

In fact, Whitehead asserts that:

Later on, we find the concepts of mass and
energy inverted; so that mass now becomes the
name for a quantity of energy considered in
relation to some of its dynamical effects.
This train of thought leads to the notion of
energy being fundamental, thus displacing
matter from that position. 120
the
Thus far, we have touched upon the development of

concept of the conservation of energy in the work

of

further
Helmholtz, its creator, and we will now see its

creation of
elaboration as one of the key elements in the
heart of the dethe metaphysical fusion which lies at the

velopment of psychological thought.

The new foundation of

transition
physical reality which is evident in the

inverted concept of mass in which it simply
120

Ibid., p. 102, emphasis added.

"...

to an

becomes

.

,

L50

the name Tor a quantity

<>l'

energy eons derod
i

in

ro

l

at,

ion

to

some of its dynamical effects," can aLso bo seen as an im-

portant basis for the Whiteheadian alternative of organism
as a replacement for matter.

In this view, the identifica-

tion of a basic happening (event, or elementary unit) avoids
the old description involving matter with the fallacious

property of simple location by substituting the notion that
"

.

.

.

energy is merely the name for the quantitative as-

pect of a structure of happenings; in short, it depends on
the notion of the functioning of an organism."

121

In this

first superficial mention of the organismic alternative, it
is important to note that one of the basic principles of

that alternative includes the recognition that the happen-

ings involved in any phenomenon contain two fundamental as-

pects.

That is to say, each event has an intrinsic and an

extrinsic reality, the event is its own prehension and
is also the prehension of other events.

it

There is, in fact,

both a within and a without in nature that must be considered in any system that would aspire to understand reality.

Detailed evidence for this view, which supplements that
which Whitehead provides, will be given in later chapters.
For the present, we will proceed on the assumption that the
most developed aspects of contemporary science are harmo-

nious with this interpretation and will therefore:
121

Ibid.

p

.

102

a)

fool

free to use these categories as basic criteria in structuring our further consideration of psychological thought and
b)

take great pleasure in noting that these same categories

are to be found within the entire development of psycho-

logical thought.

Thus, we do not consider that the rendi-

tion of psychology which is to follow is distorted by the

imposition of abstract categories which bear

a

rather tan-

gential relation to the actual animus of psychological
thought.

On the contrary, this treatment will allow the

data to speak for themselves, as it were, and if therefore
the resultant seems a distorted image of more familiar in-

terpretations, we will be more comfortable in asserting
that new "irresistible" operations of the interpretative

Helmhol tzian unconscious are required for the more adequate

assimilation of the data presented rather than easily ca-

pitulating with an admission that the old frame of refeience is equally efficacious in its disclosure of reality.
In closing this section, it is appropriate to remark
in
that the events we are about to observe in history and

Fechner's life stand in the same relation of within to
without that we have asserted is a primary characteristic
philosophof the new metaphysical basis for psychological,
ical and scientific thought.

That is to say, the twin

scientific
strands of modern philosophical and modern

reality of the
thought can be seen as the internal (within)
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unfolding drama of western man; they are the pattern of his
collective existence which has translated across time.
Now, when we come to their union (or better, re-union), in
the life of Fechner,

they become the extrinsic factors

(without) which are relevant to the unfolding of the in-

trinsic (within) reality of his own prehension into the

unity of a new creative synthesis of the various data
which present themselves as relevant to that process.

Whitehead calls this process "concrescence" and we mention
it here, along with that which immediately preceeded it,

an effort to:

a)

in

indicate that it is the complete senti-

ence of the whole individual which is most efficacious in
the advancement of knowledge (an obvious statement it it

were not for the second point) and b) to underline the fact
that the only place novelty can be introduced into man’s

philosophical and scientific system is within that same
sentient individual.

Accordingly, it is to the understand-

while
ing of that new novelty which was animating Fechner
been
apparently stultifying the wave of progress which had
matter, to
founded upon the old notion of simply located

which we now must turn.
3

.

0.1

GUSTAV FECHNER (I8OI-I887)
of philosophy and
In considering the external aspects

science which were united in Fechner’

s

unique vision, we

which was lirst
can begin with the clear-cut dualism

1

formulated by Descartes in I65O.

As wo have soon,

53

this

dualism was a main characteristic of the entire phase of

British empiricism (Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Hartley, the
Mills, and Bain, to name only those few that have been ex-

plicitly considered)

;

Fechner repudiated this dualism and

sought to defend spiritualism against materialism.

In terms

of the current scientific doctrines of the day, Fechner,

who had become a professor of physics at an early age, was

well grounded in all phases of science and mathematics.

Particularly important to the development of his ideas wore
the modern under standings of the electrical nature of the

nervous system and the newly developed principle of conser-

vation of energy.

These two concepts led to the natural

conclusion that a system which simply conducts electrical
energy (the nervous system) must also conserve energy, that
is, it will not gain or lose energy in the transformations

which take place between stimulation and sensation.

From

this it naturally followed that the greater the stimulus

These basic relation-

the greater should be the sensation.

ships are central elements in Fechner

1

To this brief account of Fechner’

s

system.

s

place in the history

of philosophy and science, we should also add that he was a

rather unusual and creative genius.

He was a poet, a sati-

rist and intimate friend of many important artists of his
day, Mendelssohn and Schumann being two examples.

He also,

154

in the last decade of his life, attempted to found an ex-

perimental aesthetics.

Perhaps one important aspect in

shaping his theorizing was an unusual period of three years
in which he suffered an extreme depression during which he

not only resigned his professorship but also became a com-

plete recluse.

This period, 1839-1841, is credited with a

lasting influence upon his outlook, his interest in religious thought and the true place of the soul in the scheme
of things.

His publications tell the tale:

the Zendaves ta

,

in

I 85 I

came

literally "the revealed word," which among

other things, argued that consciousness is to be found in
some degree in every created thing, and that the soul does

not die.

Earlier, in 1936 there was a book that concerned

life after death in which he asserted that the true solution to the materialistic problems of the world was to be

found in the affirmation of the spiritual principle that
there was an identity between mind and matter and that an

enlightened view point was one that held that the entire
universe should be regarded as to its consciousness.
called this view

"

He

Tagesansicht " or daylight view and con-

trasted it with the materialistic assumption of inert matter which he labeled

"

Nachtansicht

11

or night time view.

Needless to say, his assertions that things like plants

possessed consciousness did not make him a popular figure
in the more materialistic scientific centers.
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Fechner considered himself as a philosopher with

a

mission to implant the idea that everything in the world
could be viewed in two ways, as mind or matter, within or
without, and his efforts to give expression to this view
led directly to the creation of a new science--psychophysics.

"While the knowledge of the material world has blos-

somed in the great development of the various branches of

natural science and has benefited from exact principles and

methods that assure it of successful progress," Fechner
wrote in the Introduction to his Elements of Psychophysics

,

"and the knowledge of the mind has, at least up to a cer-

tain point, established for itself a solid basis in psy-

chology and logic, knowledge of mind and matter, body and
soul, has up to now remained merely a field for philosophi-

cal argument without solid foundation and without sure
122
principles and methods for the progress of inquiry.

Fechner based his search for sure principles and methods upon a basic set of truths "factual circumstances"

which he felt opened the way to a solid foundation for
scientific knowledge.

First of all, the external world is

known by the senses and given in experience such that we
can know its external relationships, this knowledge being
He also

limited by the acuity of our sensory apparatus.
122

Gustav Fechner, Elements of Psy chophysics, H. E.York
(New
eds
Adler, trans., D. H. Howes and E. G. Boring,
!•
Holt, Reinhart and Winston, 1966), I,
.
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felt

that wo could have direct knowledge o

world" by direct observation.

('

our "inner

This knowledge,

was

too,

limited, but this time, it was the limitation of the mind

rather than the senses which determined the precision of
the knowledge.

On this latter point he is, no doubt, re-

ferring to the new German physiological psychology of
Herbart

,

Lotze and Helmholtz.

Fechner

1

s

unique contribu-

tion was his further observation that while these two separate approaches could each give "basic facts, basic laws,

and basic relationships" in their separate fields, there
was no way in which those isolated efforts could actually

describe the relationship between mind and body.

These

were separate areas of discourse in which "the situation
was not the same," as when one attempts to understand the

relationships between the material and mental worlds, because

:

each of these two inextricably associated
fields enters into immediate experience only
one at a time, while the other remains hidden .123
Here then, is Fechner'

s

formulation of the internal/external,

within/without relation to which point, because of its importance to our concerns, it is better to allow Fechner
speak for himself:
At the moment when we are conscious of our
feelings and thoughts, we are unable to
123-!-.

•

Ibid.
,

,

p

•

1
1

*
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perceive the activity of the brain that is
associated with them and with which they are
in turn associated-- the material side is then
hidden by the mental.
Similarly, although we
are able to examine the bodies of other people, animals and the whole of nature directly
in anatomical, physiological, physical and
chemical terms, we are not able to know anything directly about the minds that belong to
the former nor of God who belongs to the latter, for the spiritual side is hidden by the
material 124
.

Perhaps this formulation should be called the Fechner

inclusion/exclusion principle of conscious awareness since
in it he established that mental life includes physical
life, but is not directly conscious of it

— for

the material

side is hidden by the mental side; while, at the same time

mental life is excluded from direct knowledge of the mental
life of others by their physical bodies--the spiritual side
is hidden by the material.

He attributed the confusion and argumentation which

resulted from this limitation to the simple fact that the
a
normal mode of observation of things was to see things in

cause-effect relationship which usually occurred contiguously in time.

In the case of mind and body however, this

of this
was never true; in fact, in the absolute nature
that
permanent exclusion, Fechner saw a fundamental truth

stood inside
forever determined, for example, that when you
by the concave
a circle the convex side would be hidden
124

Ibid

.

,

p

•

2

•
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However, since "both sides belong together as indi-

side.

visibly as do the mental and material sides of man [they]
can be looked upon as analogous to his inner and outer

sides."

12 5

His intent, he stressed, was not to enter into

dogmatic dicta regarding the metaphysics of the matter, on
that score, he felt, everyone should seek his own answer;

his concern was to build upon the simple observational fact

And so he did:

of inclusion/exclusion.

prove [s] to us that
The whole world
will appear as two
thing
one
fact
what is in
Who would not
view.
of
from two points
cannot be
and
thus
admit that it is always
otherwise?
What will appear to you as your mind
from the internal standpoint, where you yourself are this mind, will on the other hand,
appear from the outside point of view as the
material basis of this mind. There is a difference whether one thinks with the brain or
examines the brain of a thinking person.
These activities appear quite different, but
the standpoint is quite different too, for
here one is an inner, the other is an outer
[Thinking of the mind heightpoint of view.
ens the differences] for the twofold mode of
was after all
appearance of the circle
different extwo
basically gained by taking
of
appearance
The
ternal standpoints.
is
hand,
the mind to itself, on the other
gained from the truly inner point of view of
the underlying being regarding itself, as in
coincidence with itself, whereas the appearance of the material state belonging to it
derives from a standpoint that is truly ex126
ternal, and not in coincidence.
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

psychoBefore we turn to more specific issues within the
^

^ Ibid
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physical formulation, there arc two additional elements

ol'

the over-all programmatic proposal that should be mentioned.

First, his position on the unity of a "single thing."

The natural sciences consistently employ the
the humanities are
external standpoint,
The common opinions of everyday
internal.
life are based on changes of the standpoints,
and natural philosophy on the identity of
what appears double from two standpoints.
A theory of the relationship of mind to body
will have to trace the relationship of the
two modes of appearance of a single thing
that is a unity 1^7
.

.

.

.

We will have more to say about the importance of the
two modes of appearance in the next section, here we shall

briefly nod to its significance and elaborate slightly with
the second of the programmatic elements we are recounting.

The whole of nature is a single continuous system of component parts acting on one
another, within which various partial systems
create, use, and transmit to each other kinetic energy of different forms, while obeying the general laws through which the connections are ruled and conserved.
We know, even without awareness of the
special nature of psychophysical processes,
what we have to understand by their magnitude,
if we are clearly to relate psychophysics
with physics, physiology, and everyday life,
and we can base generally valid conclusions
kion the universal conditions and laws of
netic energy. 128
.

•

•

example of
Clearly, Fechner's psychophysics are an
gave to the general
the interpretation which Whitehead
12

^Xbid.

,

p.

5»

~^^Ibid.

,

p.

23*

emphasis added.

.

metaphysical meaning

oi'

the

transition from simply iocated

matter to energy as the basis of scientific thought.
Fechner's appreciation of the meaning of this change and
the formulation which he gave to some of its consequences

provided the key to the novel view he attained regarding
the relation between mind and body and the proper approach
to the study of that relation.

To see this more clearly,

we will need to explore the specific interaction of the

principle of conservation of energy, the electrical nature
of the nervous system, and the theory of sensations more

carefully as they operate in the basic assumptions of the
theory
It is best to start with an explicit statement of

Fechner's actual methodological strategy:
To sum up, we may say that the production as
well as the use of the kinetic energy of the
psychophysical processes within us, as far
as we can observe it or make deductions about
it from our observations, obeys everywhere the
same laws as kinetic energy of nonpsychophysiological activities within us and outside us.
As free as the mind may be, it still cannot do
anything contrary to this law, but only whatever is based on this law. 129

From this, we see that Fechner needed to establish a

quantitative identity between the mental and the physical
effects of stimulation in order to give empirical justifi-

cation for his theory.
129 Ibid.

,

pp.

His problems, of course, were

33-3^»

l6i

nontrivial since he hud to deal with the measurement of the
mental products of sensation, a task which, before Fechner,
was considered impossible, due to the fact that there was
no way to measure the specific values of the actual inner

energies deep in the nervous system.

Fechner'

s

solution to

this dilemma proposed that even though it is impossible to

measure the activity deep in the nervous system, it must,

according to theory, be at least a dependent function
the external stimulus energy.

of

With this assumption firmly

in hand, Fechner took the next step by assuming that, if he

could measure the magnitude of the mental effects and show
that they were also a dependent function of the external

stimulus energy then, he would have a method of demon-

strating the quantitative identity between the mental and
the physical.

This quantitative identity, when established,

was to have defined the fundamental facts and laws which

pertain to the connection of outer to inner psychophysics.
Even before the means are available to
discover the nature of the processes of the
body that stand in direct relation to our
mental activities, we will nevertheless be
able to determine to a certain degree the
Senquantitative relationship between them.
strongei
sation depends on stimulation; a
sensation depends on a stronger stimulus; the
stimulus, however, causes sensation only ’via
the intermediate action of some internal
process of the body. To the extent that lawful relationships between sensation and stimulus can be found, they must include lawful
relationships between the stimulus and this
same
inner physical activity, which obey the
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general laws of' n o rnr on of bod ly processes and thereby give us a basis for drawing
general conclusions about the nature ol' this
inner ac tivi ty
i

I

I

i

i

1

.

Before considering Fechnor

1

s

method of measuring the

magnitude of mental effects, the previously impossible task,
the centrality of

it is important to underline, once again,

the concept of conservation of energy to formulation of the

psychophysical system.

Actually, Fechner's use of this
"This is the

principle stems directly from Helmholtz.

great principle of the so-called conservation of energy
he wrote in granting Helmholtz his due,

which while related to the law of conservation of kinetic energy, is even more universal
This principle, while founded
in importance.
on long-known general principles of mechanics,
was first clearly developed by Helmholtz, who
pointed out its full meaning and explained its
Up to now
most important applications.
general
its
no one has found reasons to doubt
and
organic
the
applicability in the areas of
the inorganic !31
,

.

.

•

.

which
The one aspect of the kinetic energy principle
of energy
derives from the generality of the conservation

refers
which has not been covered to this point,

lation to the metabolic processes of the body.

to

its il-

This energy

health and condiwhich is a function of the body's general
tion is seen to be subject to:
^-^ Ibid

.

,

p.

10*

^ Ibid

.

,

p

29

^

•
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rather sudden redistributions, accomplished
partially either through stimuli or through
voluntary direction of attention or change
of the field of activi ties 132
.

In terms of the physical relations within the body, this

means that the energy which underlies "chopping of wood" or

thinking are "not only quantitatively comparable but each
can be transformed into the other."

In this transformation,

"partially [a.ccomplished] either through stimuli or through

voluntary direction of attention," are to be found the
basis of the argument Fechner would have used against modern behavioristic stimulus-response theories.

Fechner says:

The idealist may trace the action of the
stimuli to a mental reason, the materialist
may attribute choice and attention to a material reason.

and then concludes with the position which comes naturally
to someone utilizing a view espousing organismic relations

rather than mechanical ones
We, however, take the facts as they appear
directly on observation, where at one time
the material side (or mode of appearance),
at another the mental sides provides the
evidence for the changed distribution -^33
.

Then, as if to answer the materialists once and for all, he

concludes his chapter on kinetic energy with a statement
that would have made Hume on his deathbed more serene, if

not more humble;
132
13

Ibid

.

,

p.

35*

Ibid.

,

p.

37.

concerning freedom of the will.
By the explicit statement that the general
laws of kinetic energy merely limit its free
disposal in general [we have assumed that],
freedom is given every right which it truly
deserves. The law of conservation can neither dictate whether and how we transform
potential energy into kinetic energy, nor
whether and in what direction it should be
transmitted.
In this respect the will remains completely free within the limitations
set by this law. 134
.

.

.

.

.

.

In this, we find an extended and spiritualized version of

Helmholtz's more cautious assertion against the vitalists,

which we have already quoted to the effect that, since life
processes produced mechanical and chemical effects, "their
effects must be ruled by necessity

.

.

.

there cannot exist

any arbitrary choice in the direction of their actions."
Of course, the two men are talking about the same thing,

and it is the difference in their points-of-view, external
for Helmholtz and internal for Fechner, which therefore

casts an entirely different light on the issue; actually,

both are right since freedom is never arbitrary.

We will

also ultimately conclude that such "decided"condi tions do
not banish freedom but only qualify it.

However, it should

also be noted that the organismic alternative to which we

will turn requires more than the simple assumption of an

internal/external Fechnerian frame of reference.

This con-

dition will become more apparent at the beginning of the
134

Ibid.

,

p

.

37
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next section when the concept

is

formal

l.y

introduced.

We must now treat the actual rationale for the psycho-

physical measurements which were to demonstrate the empirical validity of Fechner'

s

theory.

In this, we will have

the opportunity of including the important and prior work

of E. H. Weber and also, we will be able to form a bridge

into the experimental psychology of W. Wundt.

Fechner, it will be recalled, needed to establish the

functional relationship between stimulus intensity and the
The obvious

resultant intensity of the mental sensation.

solution, that of applying just enough stimulation to pro-

duce a sensation, i.e., overcome the threshold value,

yields only one point of correspondence between the two.
Clearly, this is insufficient and Fechner*

ingenious one.

s

solution was an

He established the "differential threshold

whose property it was to detect the difference between two
stimuli.

In this, he reasoned that it is always possible

to state whether one stimulus is greater or less than an-

other such that the "just noticeable difference" between
the two can become a means of pinpointing the magnitude of
the sensation that corresponds to the stimulus intensity.
Now,

it is at this point that Fechner'

s

treatment of

requirethe phenomena becomes heavily influenced by the

ments of the mathematics he was required to use.

Fechner

an
recognized the problems in this area and even included

a pp°logia to both the nonmathematicians

(those who would

not understand) and to the mathematicians (those who would

understand) in the introduction to his Elements of Psycho -

physics

These assumptions are, perhaps, the archetypal

.

case of mathematical and statistical imperatives dictating
the character of the treatment which is afforded to psycho-

logical phenomena.

Certainly, the assumptions of "true

score theory" in testing psychology and the assumptions,

often violated, of the standard analysis of variance model
in experimental psychology are but the modern variants of
the assumptions which Fechner included in his measurement

system.

Specifically, and briefly, he had to assume that both
the scale of stimulus intensities and the resultant scale

of sensation magnitude estimates had the properties of an

interval scale.

That is, that both scales had an absolute

zero point and that the increments in the scale were equal
to one another.

In the case of the stimulus dimension thi

seemed a reasonable assumption; however, in the case of

sensation magnitudes, this is a completely unsubstantiated
In Fechner'

assumption.

s

words, we see the importance oi

this assumption:
the intensity of a single stimulus itself can be looked upon mathematically as the
sum of positive increments starting with zero,
looked
... a sensation of difference canorbenegative
positive
upon mathematically as a
.

.

.
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increment to one or the other sensation
[therefore]
such would be looked upon
as the sum of positive increments starting
with [a difference of] zero. Now if the
functional relationship between the sum of
stimulus increments starting from zero and
the sum of the related sensation increments
is known, the problem resolves itself for
every degree of the stimulus and the resulting sensation ^ ^5
.

.

.

.

At the conclusion of this consideration of Fechner 's

thought, we will be able to relate the above assumption to

Freud's theory of the unconscious but for the present, we

need to see that Fechner established the equal increments
of his scale by assuming that the just noticeable differ-

ences of threshold he could detect were, in fact, the equal

increments he required for his scale.
In principle, then, our measure of sensation
will consist of dividing every sensation into
equal divisions (that is, equal increments),
which serve to build it up from zero. The
number of equal divisions we conceive is determined, like inches on a yardstick, by the
number of corresponding variable stimulus
increments that are capable of bringing about
1
identical sensation increments. ^

correct apWith this principle, firmly established as the
the determinaroach, Fechner had the method he needed for

tion of the magnitude of the sensation:
we determine the magnitude of a sensaasking
tion, which we cannot do directly, by
an
unit,
how many times it contains the same

...

^ ^ ^

Ibid

.

,

^^Ibid.

,

p.

^9

p.

50*

68

I

operation that we are able to perform directly, and road off the result not as a number
of sensations but as the stimuli that determines the sensations and that are easier to
read. 137
E.

H.

Weber of whom Fechner said "in my opinion [he]

should really be called the father of psychophysics," 1 38

had already given a considerable amount of empirical support
to the measurement of sensation magnitude.

His true contri-

bution lay, according to Fechner, in the fact that he gave
an exact formulation which stated that:
the magnitude of stimulus increment must increase in precise proportion to the stimulus
already present, in order to bring about an
equal increase in sensation.

Always one to show deference to his mentors, Fechner concluded,

"I have therefore called it Weber's law."

We should

stress, at this point, that the principle of conservation
of energy was an important factor in Fechner'

s

willingness

and security in the assumption that the stimulus and the

sensation would covary.

That the fundamental relation be-

atween the two was not a direct but a proportional covar
i

tion was not upsetting because Fechner believed that once

methods were developed which could actually measure the

translation of stimulus energy into kinetic energy, "or
some other specific function of the underlying psychologic

^ Ibid

.

,

p

.

51

138 Ibid

.

,

p

.

113

1

•

•
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processes," then,

this would yield a law which "will take

on lor the field ol mind-body relations just as general and

fundamental a meaning as the law of gravitation in the
lieLd

of

celestial movement."

Can there be any doubt

that Fechner's cosmological picture was only partially

shifted from mechanism to organism?

That he is still seek-

ing an ultimate solution in terms of the Newtonian gravitational analogy is not only similar to the approach we have

seen in many others but also reminds us of the situation

with regard to another great pioneer in new vistas of
thought, Nicholas Copernicus.

Recall Koyre

1

s

assessment

that it was enough for one man that he should have arrested
the motion of the sphere of fixed stars,

make it infinite was asking too much.

"

"to ask him to

In much the same

way, we have in Fechner the pioneering spirit of a new view

which recognizes in the "unity of every single thing" both
a mental and a physical existence which is a part of the

one continuous system of the whole of nature.

Surely it

would be asking too much to require him to see beyond the
task of formulating the relationships of the two modes of

experience into their natural implications for a reformu-

lated cosmology similar to Whitehead's philosophy of organism.

To continue the simile a bit further, we may say that

just as Copernicus required the assistance of Giordano Bruno
139 Ibid

.

,

p

.

37

•

1

lo

make Uie univorso infinite, wo can find,

70

lor Forlmcr, a

similar helpmate in the figure of Wilhelm Dilthey.

Wo will

touch on Di 1 they at greater length in subsequent sections.
Here, let us simply remark that if Fectiner and Dilthey are

equivalent to Copernicus and Bruno, the next figure we
should expect on the scene is the psychological version of
Galileo.

Where is this Galileo of the psychic world?

On

this point we can lament with William James that:
at present psychology is in the condition of
physics before Galileo and the laws of motion, of chemistry before Lavoisier and the
notion that mass is preserved in all reactions.
The Galileo and the Lavoisier of psychology will be famous men indeed when they
come.
Meanwhile the best way in which
to facilitate their advent is to understand
how great is the darkness in which we grope,
and never to forget that the natural science
assumptions with which we started are provisional and revisable things. 1^0
.

.

.

Our position, as is obvious from the nature of our polemic,
is that the natural science assumptions have yet to be seri-

ously challenged.

True, they have often been ignored as in

most humanistic approaches but only at the price of losing
the scientific status of the effort.

Where is our Galileo?,

we are not prepared to make a definite assertion but we are,

however, prepared to categorically assert that when the true

alternative is specified, it will involve a cosmology

oi

hierarchical processes which is grounded in a transcendent
1+0

James The Principles of Psychology (New York:
World Publishing^ 1892 ) ij 46>7
,

,

•
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purpose and which emphasizes Ihe spiritual generality of
man's being.

The main thrust of this presentation is an

effort to prove this Galilean assertion.
Since in this presentation we have referred to Fechner
as the father of experimental psychology, we will conclude

this section with a short summary of his lasting contribu-

tions to psychological thought.

First of all, it is accurate to say that it was Fechner
that actually established the basis of psychology as an ex-

perimental science, an exact science which was modeled on
physics.

He accomplished this feat by the brilliant appli-

cation of the new ideas of conservation of energy to the

phenomena that had simply been a part of the physiological

mechanism of the earlier German theorists.

In so doing, he

created a new way of looking at organic functioning and
felt that it was the intricate energy exchanges in the system that made the various activities of "chopping wood" or

"thinking" possible.

Another important aspect of his contribution was,

oi

course, the elaboration which he gave to the doctrine of

thresholds.

We have seen this concept in other contexts,

specifically Herbart and Weber, but it is Fechner'

s

right

oi
to claim priority in elaborating the meaning of a scale

sensations which equated the absolute threshold

of

sensa-

tion with the mathematical zero point of sensory stimulation.

The final aspect of Fechner's contribution that wo can

touch on here is his relation to Freud's thinking.

To go

back a bit, we saw that Fechner equated the intensity of a
stimulus, which started from zero intensity, with the in-

tensity of a sensation, which was also seen as a continuum
of sensations starting from zero (in this case, of course,
it is zero sensation and not zero stimulation).

Now one

could look upon the following situation as a mathematical

antifact but to Fechner, and ultimately Freud, there was
real meaning in the fact that it is possible to measure

stimulus values which are smaller than we can sense directly

with our sensory apparatus.

In these cases, Fechner's meas-

urement formula yields a negative value for the sensation
that should accompany the stimulation--negat ive sensation.
In his chapter on Thresholds in Elements of Psycho -

physics

,

Fechner asserts, that since it is possible to

measure these small stimulus values without being able to
sense them it is therefore possible to "refer to the thresh-

old of a sensation
of a stimulus ."
a problem,

1 ^1

...

as well as to the threshold value

This realization, rather than presenting

is actually a central part of his system since

he felt that:

psychophysics may be divided into an
outer and an inner part, depending on whether
consideration is focused on the relationship
.

1

.

.

^Fechner

,

Elements of Psychophysics

,

p.

199

-
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of the psychical lo l ho body's external aspects, or on those internal functions with
which the psychic are closely relat ed 1^2
.

Also,

"since the body's external world is functionally re-

lated to the mind only by the mediation of the body's internal world," the inner part of psychophysics which are

unconscious must also conform to the same laws that regulate the external psychophysics.
since general higher phenomena of consciousness also have a point of expiration
and a point of origination, we will be able
to generalize the concept and expression of
threshold to them. Examples of this type of
phenomenon would be the level of total awareness with respect to sleeping and walking,
the way single thoughts become conscious,
and the focusing of attention in a given diIn these instances we cannot speak
rection.
of a threshold value of an external stimulus
responsible for lifting consciousness above
But the question may be raised
threshold.
whether we would not have to assume a
threshold value of the underlying [inner]
psychophysical processes and whether stimudo not exist as far as
lus thresholds,
sensations are concerned only to the extent
can be translated into such pro.

.

.

.

•

.

With this, we have the formulation of

a

dynamic unconscious

to
which is also related to the outside world and sensitive

it.

Not only is the analogy to Freud's unconscious com-

pelling, it is also direct:
1^2

Ibid

.

,

p.

~*~^Ibid.

,

pp

9,
.

Freud says:

emphasis added.

199-200.

17*4

I was always open to the ideas of G. T.
Fechner and have followed that thinker on
many important points.

Additionally, the notion of psychic energy is directly re-

lated to Fechner'

s

application of the principle of conser-

vation of energy to mental phenomena.

And finally, "the

role Freud assigned to the unconscious in The Interpreta -

tion of Dreams had its acknowledged source in Fechner'

writings." 145
Before moving on to Wundt and the subsequent develop-

ment of psychological thought, we should summarize those

aspects of Fechner'

s

thought which were most neglected by

his immediate contemporaries and a major portion of the

main stream of psychological thought.

Since we will develop

these aspects more fully in subsequent sections it is im-

portant to highlight them here.
First of all, from our vantage point and the meaning

which we ascribe to the development of the Helmholtzian
concept of the conservation of energy, we have labeled

Fechner as the first psychologist to explicitly recognize
Whitehead as-

the major implication of that formulation.

serts that conservation of energy had the effect of removing

dead matter from the basic assumptions of scientific
lZ|Z+

Sigmund Freud, Autobiographical Study quoted in
Elements of Psychophysics translator's preface, p. xix.
,

,

lZ+

^Adler, in Elements of Psychophysics

,

p.

xix.

metaphysics by replacing it with the concept of a quantity
of energy which can only be considered in relation to its

dynamical effects.

He called this situation an "inversion”

which places primary emphasis upon the quantitative aspect
of a structure of happenings-- "the notion of a functioning
of an organism."

Fechner's psychophysics can be seen as

an exemplification of that new meaning since it represents
the first attempt to formulate a scientific approach aimed
at understanding both the internal and external reality of

all things as being the two separate perspectives or modes

of appearance "of a single thing which is a unity."
ther,

the unity he saw was not a restricted unity.

Fur-

Recall

his statement:
The whole of nature is a simple continuous
system of component parts acting on each
other, within which various partial systems
create, use, and transmit to each other kinetic energy of various forms, while obeying
the general laws through which the connections are ruled and conserved.

Another important aspect of this early organismic view
is the stress Fechner placed on the associated doctrine

that each individual unity can be regarded as to its inter-

nal or external aspects.

In this, he departed from the

past dualistic formulations of the mind-body relationship.
We would assert, in line with the position taken in Chapter
One,

that it was Fechner's animating spiritual passion to

know something of the mind of God and the minds of the other

176

unities

o

I"

nature whose "spiritual side [s]

an hidden
1

by

the material [sides]," that formed the central determina-

tion of his day and night view of mental knowledge and material knowledge.

As we have seen, the mental and the

physical were important principles upon which he constructed
the edifice of his psychophysics.

The depth of his convic-

tion on this account is amply shown by the place which he

ascribed to the operation of free-will and the possibility
of viewing the expenditure of kinetic energy by an individ-

ual as being the result of either internal or external control

.

Fechner'

s

goal was to describe the relation between

mind and body in a scientific fashion.

Key to his position

was his conviction that minds alone had been studied for a

long time as had bodies and matter.

His insight was that

their interrelation was occluded by the fact that focusing
on mind hides the body while focusing on the body hides the
mind.

Further, knowing them separately is not equivalent

to knowing them both in relation to each other.

Natural

aspects
science, he believed, focused mainly on the external
of studying
of phenomena, leaving to the humanities the task

the internal aspects of human life.

Thus, to the knowledge

world via our
we gain by the examination of the external
we could
sensory apparatus, he wanted to add the knowledge

experiences
gain by the direct observation of our inner

oi
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mental life.

That psychophysics could only deal wi th stim-

ulation and sensation should not be allowed to obscuro the
fact that its role was to form the scientific basis upon

which higher-order levels of understanding could be built.
Clearly, Fechner accepted the highest levels of mental and

spiritual life as well as the reality of the lowest levels
of physical processes as being relevant to the true under-

standing of man.

His labor was to bring the two together

into a meaningful system.

Since we see in Fechner none of the British associa-

tionist philosophical psychology which had influenced

Helmholtz and which will become important to Wundt, and
precious little of Kantian nativism, it seems safe to assert that his vision was far more global than those we have

considered to this point.

Yet, it is the very expanse of

his vision which provided his undoing at the hands of his

successors.

The world was simply not ready for a transi-

tion beyond the dominant and externally oriented world-view

which characterized the atomism of physical science and the

elementism of psychological science.

Thus,

the sophisti-

cated methodological approach which Fechner had elaborated
in an effort to measure the interface of the two great

worlds of physical and mental, body and mind, external and
internal phenomena, fell into the hands of those who were
still trying to explain the world from the bottom up, as it
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wore, and who could only hoc

I.

lie

task of [isycholog on 1 scii

ence in terms ol its ability to emulate the successes of
the physical sciences.

Therefore, in those who followed Fechner and formed
the main stream of psychological thought, we will search in

va n for greater insight into the issues of mind and body,
i-

free-will and the unity of the whole of nature.

But treat

them we must and so, it is to the nonspiritual experimen-

talism of Wilhelm Wundt that we must turn for the next major segment of our story.

3.0.2

WILHELM WUNDT

(

1832-1920)

First, let us start with the fact that Wundt was not a

complete experimentalist.

That is, from the very beginning

of his published works he held the position that there were

actually two psychologies.

The one, which we know as ex-

perimental psychology and which focused upon the natural
scientific approach of discovering the elementary contents
of experience, was actually the one to which Wundt devoted

most of his career, the other, which Wundt thought of as

dealing with the higher mental processes, was called
"

Geschicht

11

or natural history of man, whose role it was

to study the behavior of groups of men--a sort of social

psychology.

The important thing about this division, is

that Wundt felt that:
It is true that the attempt has frequently
been made to investigate the complex functions

L79

of thought on the basis of mere introspection.
These attempts, however, have always

been unsuccessful. Individual consciousness
is wholly incapable of giving a history of
the development of human thought.
The
problem of [Geschichte] relates to those mental products which are created by a community
of human life and are, therefore, inexplicable in terms merely of individual consciousness, since they presuppose the reciprocal
action of many.l^
.

.

.

Aside from the utter falsehood of the main premise, if one

accepts the validity of Piaget's genetic epistemology that
is,

we see that Wundt is making a sharp separation between

the two psychologies.

Even his vaunted method of intro-

spection was unsuitable in the case of Folk psychology, as
he also called it, since it is clear that such a study can

never be experimental but only historical..
case,

This being the

it seems quite natural that the entire stress which

Fechner had placed upon the inner aspect of unified things
would get lost in the shuffle, as it were, and receive
almost no attention while, at the same time, those aspects
of his experimental method which suited the experimental

task of dealing with immediate sensations would receive

great attention.

Wundt's system is known as the structural school of

psychology because of its primary emphasis upon the generation of sensation by stimulation and on the interconnections
E.

L.
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in consciousness of the various sensations.

Structuralism

had a threefold impact upon the development of psychological
thought.

1^7

First it helped via Fechner's psychophysical

method to establish the experimental nature of psychology.
Second, it provided a thorough test of the method of intro-

spection which, incidentally, was imported to this country
by E. B. Titchener in 1898

And third, its strong orthodox

.

positions were good targets, especially in this country,
for the alternative systems of psychology to react against.

Behaviorism, functionalism and gestalt psychology all found
a fertile field in which to plant the seeds of their criti-

cisms.

Wundt, like Helmholtz and unlike Fechner, borrowed

from the old system of British empiricism and took over the
Again

associationists mental mechanism almost completely.

like Helmholtz, he fitted this together with the popular

and more advanced German physiological mechanism.

Obviously,

these views are mutually congenial since they have a common

derivation from Newtonian physics and therefore share the
common goal of explaining how the simple, elementary sensations can be associated into a whole unified perception.
Since we have already covered both of Wundt's primary

sources in rather great detail we will not enter into a
l47

M.

H.

Marx and

W.

in Psychology (New York:

Hillix, Systems a nd Theories
McGraw-Hill, 1963) P* 61
A.

>

•

thorough discussion

o

I

I

hat background material.

Instead,

we will focus upon the new ways in which Wundt utilized

those resources.
To begin with, it should be noted that Wundt did not

succeed in actually creating his
"science of experience."

u

Erf ahrungswissenshaf

11

or

In general, what he succeeded in

establishing as the result of his experimental program, was
to provide illustrations of the principles which supported

his important systematic concepts and did not achieve an

experimental proof of those concepts.

Since what was known

of the electrical nature of the nervous system indicated

that only punctate elements of stimulation could be provided
to the projection areas of the brain, Wundt's program was
to analyze the components of experience which he knew to be

physiologically given as elements.

In this, unlike Fech-

ner's unified entities, Wundt assumed that the mind and the
body, because they belonged to two totally separate uni-

verses, could never be compared.

His position on the mat-

ter is often known as psychophysical parallelism.

In this

view, physical and psychical processes are believed to be

concurrent but not identical or even causally related.

Be-

cause of this strict separation and also because of his
focus upon the analyses of experience Wundt actually played

down the role of the body and failed to grant it a very important role in behavior.

Certainly this must have been

part of the reason for Watson's subsequent frustration.
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To elaborate on his commitment to the elements of con-

sciousness we find Wundt generalizing his knowledge that
the nervous system is composed of many interconnected ele-

ments

:

The principle of the connection of elements
may be understood in an anatomical, a physiological and a psychological sense. Anatomically regarded, the nervous system is an unitary complex of numerous elements; ... in
more or less close connection with the others.
Physiologically, the principle of the
connection of elements implies that every
[activity of the nervous system] is
composed of a large number of elementary
functions, the nature ... of which we can
never completely isolate from the given complex activity.
Lastly, there is a psychological
formulation of the principle.
the
It means, psychologically, that
facts of consciousness always presuppose as
their physiological substrate, complex nerve
processes, the result of the co-operation of
many elementary parts. This complexity of
the physical condition of elementary psychical
[the observafacts manifests itself in
simple
elements,
psychical
the
tion] that
always
are
feelings
simple
sensations or
products of psychological abstraction, and ^g
never actually occur except in connections.
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

For all of its sophistication, this statement adds very
little to the content of John Locke's associationism

Of

.

course, Wundt was also concerned with the means by which

these elements were connected and the determination of the
laws of their connection, as any good associationist would
be.

Accordingly, he found that the concepts of association
1

^Wundt Principles of Physiological Psychology
Edward B. Titchener, trans. (New York: Macmillan, 1904),
pp 105-106.
I, 320-321, quoted in Lowry, ojd. ci t
,

,

.

,

.
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by contiguity and association by similarity were adequate
to describe the phenomena of consciousness.

As might be

expected, he was, therefore, forced to see all mental expe-

rience even "higher psychical processes" as simply a complex
reordering, under the laws of association, of the various

sensory elements which were the basis of mental life.
In earlier sections we have seen that British associa-

tionism had rather dried up on the vine, as it were, and it
is interesting to inquire into Wundt's ability to plump it

up again.

There are two important and related factors.

The one, which we have already mentioned, was the new impetus provided by the modern German physiological discoveries.

The other was Wundt's addition of an experimental paradigm

which based itself upon the analysis of immediate experience
via the process of "Introspection.

"

Since this process is

often mentioned but seldom explained in any detail, we will

mention it here in the context of its creation by Wundt.
Using the experimental method assured Wundt that he was
creating a

"

Naturwissenschaf

the image of physics.
"

"

or true science modeled after

By using the method of introspection

Selbstbeobachtung " Wundt, sought to insure that the study

focused upon the immediate experience of the subject.

In

differthis respect, psychological knowledge was seen to be
the self
ent from physical knowledge because knowledge of

not mediatedas given in introspection was "immediate" or
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direct, whereas, knowledge about something other than sell

must be mediate or involved with the character of that object and not pure "immediate" experience.

In order to be

useful for scientific purposes, introspection had to be

carried out in a controlled laboratory environment under
experimental conditions.
All accurate observation implies that the object of observation (in this case the psychical process) can be held fast by the attention, and any changes it undergoes attentively
followed. And this fixation implies
that the observed object is independent of
the observer.
.

.

.

This thesis, if one can go along with the assumption
that the object is independent of the observer, was sup-

ported by the experimental method which created external
conditions designed to produce specific mental processes
and to make it possible for the observer to maintain a par-

ticular state of consciousness.

In addition, the observer

had to receive a great deal of training so that he would be
able to separate the meaning which he naturally attributed
to the sensation from the sensation itself so that he could

identify the pure parameters of the sensation.
Before summarizing the over-all effect of structural

psychology, there is one important point about Wundt’s ele-

mentalism that should be underlined.

Probably due to the

static character of most British associationism as regards
148

Ibid.

,

p

.

107

183

actual mental operations and also duo to the highly structured impression one gets when thinking of tho fact that

psychic procsMHCH aro directly resultant from tho "physiological substrate," Wundt's system is often seon to have
statLc flavor in which tho contents

ol

consciousness

a

liavo

the same rigid character as tho norvos from which they

arise.

Ilowovor,

committed to
stated,

objects

it is not

static view.

a

the case that Wundt felt strongly
"As a matter of fact," ho

"ideas, like all other mental experiences, are not
,

but processes

,

occurrences

149
.

"

We point

this out

as a caution for those times in future discussion, when Un-

concept of process is introduced in the organismic context.
From this example, it should bo evident that tho simple as-

cription of bare process to a phenomenon, actual or theoretical, whose main characteristics are seen as a reflection
of the atomistic Newtonian metaphysics is not sufficient to

guarantee an improvement in the explanatory power of the
conceptual system.

In fact, such half way attempts to In-

still the notion of process in any other than its rightful

metaphysical milieu should be seriously questioned and carefully scrutinized so that the uncritical crossing of meta-

physical contexts will become evident.

^ Wundt

Human and Animal Psychology (New York: Macmillan, 1894), p. 236, quoted in Marx and Hillix, o^. cj_U
Wundt's emphasis.
p. 63
1

,

,

,
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3*0.3

WUNDT TITCHENER AND THE END
OF STRUCTURAL PSYCHOLOGY
,

At this point, more for the sake of completeness than

anything else, we can consider the net effect of Wundt, his
ma n disciple E. B. Titchener in this country, and the
-*-

whole school of Structural Psychology.

This is possible

primarily because the development of structural elementism
largely came to an end with Titchener*

s

death in 1927.

Structuralism as a method always held firmly to the principle that its brand of introspection was the only way to

study consciousness and its dogmatism on this matter was
one of its main failings.

True, it tried to cope with the

obvious problems that arose from within like, for example,
the fact that the observer in observing his own experience

was also changing his experience.

Or the fact that differ-

ent introspectionist s kept getting different results from

similar experiments.
from without.

However, the telling challenges came

For example, psychologists could produce

many changes in animal behavior without any reference to
"introspecting rats" and psychoanalysts were making great

headway with their concepts of unconscious influences as
important determinants of critical mental balances.
In addition to these criticisms, the rising tide of

gestalt psychology which explicitly formulated the meaningfulness of the whole as opposed to elements of construction

provided other important challenges.

To further insure the

final demise of the venerated tradition, there came the

American functional school closely followed by the behaviorists

Functionalists could not see that the so-called

.

elements of experience really made any important difference
in anything

— they

truly seemed to have no function.

of course, the behaviorists denied consciousness.

And,
But,

interestingly enough, they did not simply deny the concept
out of hand, they disproved it by applying the principle of

conservation of energy.

Thus, the final irony is that a

doctrine, which at least in its German physiological half
was inspired by the same man who had created the doctrine
of conservation of energy, is now defeated by application
of that same principle.

150

In brief, the argument went like this.

Since all

energy in a physical system is theoretically accountable in

physical terms, conscious processes would have to be viewed
as either adding or substracting energy, or mass, if they

are to affect the behavior of the body.

But this sort of

addition or substraction is just what the principle of conservation of energy denies.

Now, here is where the behav-

iorist is often misunderstood in his criticisms of conWbat he is saying is that if you hold that

sciousness.

^^^An excellent discussion of the various mind-body
positions in relation to the doctrine of conservation of
energy can be found in Marx and Hillix, Systems of Psy chology pp 141-145.
,

.
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ideas can, for example, move muscles, as we all would,
then

you must also restrict ideas to the same phenomenal level
of the physical events in the nervous system.

Ideas so re-

stricted can be viewed as nonmental and restricted to

operation within the physical system.

On this account the

behaviorist can, with some reason, assert that consciousness
is a meaningless concept while also admitting that ideas,

in his sense of the word, do in fact move muscles.

This account of the principle of conservation of energy
is clearly a total refutation of the entire rationale of

the introspectionist school and, by implication, the allied

doctrines of mental and physiological mechanism.

In this

\

demise of structuralist psychology it is interesting to

note that it seemed to succumb to the same general malaise
that affected the physical sciences in the last half of the

nineteenth century.

That is to say, focusing upon the

character of energy, as we have often asserted, has the effect of killing whatever explanatory vitality existed in
the older material based views.

Even Wundt's attempt at

inserting process in place of static elements did not prevail against the more basic metaphysical challenge which is

offered by the organismic nature of a dynamical quantity of
energy.
In quite another context, in a subsequent section we

will again have the opportunity to meet this behaviorist
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interpretation of conscious processes.

For the present, we

simply remark that the strict physical interpretation
°f all mental phenomena as merely a description of the way

physical events function was seen by the behaviorists as an
excellent scientific refutation of the old system which

ascribed to consciousness an independent status as unique
experience.

Further, it is also a corroboration of their

own point-of-view.

In this argument is also to be found

the completion of the scientific banishment of the mind of

man from the meaningful cosmos— a theme that seems to require no further elaboration now that the final proof is in.

THE COEXISTENT ALTERNATIVE
TO EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY

3.1

Up to this point, we have been considering approaches
to the study of psychology which were heavily patterned

after the mode of understanding which was provided by the

natural sciences.

Yet, as we are well aware today, there

are many contemporary psychologists who do not feel that

aspiring to create a psychology based on the natural scientific model is either desirable or possible.

We have de-

which is a reaction

veloped a rather extensive literature
1

"^Critiques of psychological theory which are in line
with the material presented here can be found in J. F. T.
Bugental, The Search for Authenticity (New York: Holt,
Lyons Psychology an d the
Reinhart and Winston, 1965 )
Measure of Man (London: Free Press, 1963) and A. Vann
Kaam Existential Foundations of Psychology (Pittsburg:
Duque sne Univ. Press 1966 )
»

,

>

,

,
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to the perceived premature delimiting of psychological phe-

nomena which is inherent in the psychology of earlier times.
Over and over, one hears the complaint that psychology
lacks unity; direction; that its emulation of the physical

sciences has prevented it from investigat ing meaningful
phenomena; that those phenomena which it does investigate

which also happen to have intrinsic meaning are, nevertheless, handled in an unmeaningful way;

that the atomism of

our methodology prevents recognition of the whole phenomena

which rightfully belong to the human person.

However, the

problem does not stop there since the seeker of greater
knowledge and understanding is soon swept up into

a great

divergence of opinion, fact and theory regarding the matter,
once he ventures outside of the narrow confines of psycho-

logical science and seeks to find firm ground in any of the
"more established" areas of discourse--scientif ic and phil-

osophical

.

One finds great argument over central issues like the

role and nature of experience and interpretation in sci-

ence/^

The deep and aesthetic nature of the commitment

which goes into scientific creativity is often composed
153
with the fields of art, history, literature and music.

i52

Northrop, The Logic of the Sciences and
Macmillan, 19^7)*
the Humanities (New York:
F.

S.

C.

Bronowski Science and Human Values (New York:
Julian Messner, 1956).
,
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Iho

importance of the

.social

nature of Lho scientific

coni-

raumty has been admirably portrayed in singularly
different
ways by Michael Polanyi 1
and Thomas Kuhn 153 Finally,
.

great debates rage over such basic issues as the
relation
of scientific concepts to reality.

The result has been a

plethora of divergent views which seem jointly to demonstrate their paucity of philosophical content.

Psychology

has been rocked by the successive impacts of posi tivism

operationism

idealism

,

5

1

55

,

and finally, realism''"^ arrives

on the scene with something to say to each of the other po-

sitions and also something of its own to add.
Our ultimate position, following the process philosophy
of Whitehead

,

will involve a realist epistemology which

rejects, as we have seen, the positivism originating with

Hume

,

and the idealism and a priorism due to Berkeley and

Kant, in favor of the interpretation of personal experience
154

Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge (New York:
Harper and Row, 1964).
155

Thomas
tions (Chicago:
156

S.

Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolu The University of Chicago Press, 1962 )
.

Karl Pearson, The Grammar of Science (New York:
Macmillan, 191l).
157 Percy

Bridgman, The Logic of Modern Physics (New
Macmillan, 1927)*
158
Arthur Eddington, The Philosophy of Physical Science
(Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1949 )

York:

159

/
York:
Ernest Nagel, Structure of Science (New
Harcourt Brace and World, 19^1 )
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unity in intimate interaction with its environment.

Whitehead, unlike the majority of those wo have considered
to this point,

finds that the most basic aspect of our

awareness of the world is that of being in a world as given
in immediate experience such that it is erroneous to con-

sider that it is necessary to construct what we know to be
real.

That is to say, it is our awareness of the world

which arises out of our basic participation in the network
of relations, including both the knower and the known in

mutual interaction, which forms the basis for knowledge.
The over-all position is called realism because it is a
basic principle of the organismic cosmology that the world
can only be understood by having reference to the existent

beings with whom we are participating in the life of the
cosmos

Organism suggests process and process implies that
events and not things are fundamental.

Also, complete

understanding of an organism involves understanding both
its sides (internal and external).

"We must start with the

event as the ultimate unit of natural occurrence," Whitehead

asserts,

"an event has to do with all that there is, and in

particular with all other events.

..."

There is
an intrinsic and an extrinsic
reality of an event, namely, the event as in
its own prehension, and the event as in the
prehension of other events. 1^0
.

l60yj1 itehead,

.

.

Science and the Modern World, p. 103

*
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By now the theme of within and without,
intrinsic and

extrinsic is becoming more familiar, and we have
hinted at
it

m

those places where the character of history seemed

most receptive to such an interpretation.

Thus far, its

grand master is Gustav Fechner and that is why we have chosen to label him as the father of psychology.

Wundt,

the

prodigal son, attempted in his later years to develop his
"Geschichte"

;

yet, was not successful in the attempt and

did not, in any case, undertake to recant his original

heresy of developing only the external part of Fechner'
psychophysics
1

This section is labeled a "coexistent alternative to

experimental psychology" because, it is now possible for us
to do two important things.

On the one hand, we can apply

the Whiteheadian assertion that what is most basic in the

world is the wholeness of our immediate experience (its
internal and external connectedness); while on the other
hand, we can develop an important and often neglected aspect
of the history of psychology which is highly relevant to

our theme
What we mean by applying Whitehead's basic assertion
is this:

since immediate experience is the totality of our

awareness, scientific languages and theories are a selective

abstraction from that total situation.

Up to now we have

dealt with many such selective aspects but have never been
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able to achieve their useful reintegration into a complete

picture of man.

We have also placed the problem squarely

upon the mechanistic nature of the Newtonian cosmos and its
simply located bits of matter.

Additionally, by our men-

tion of the indirect influences of cultural milieu and

poetic insight we have tried to show that the wholeness of

immediate experience does, in fact, contain factors which
are excluded from, but none- the-less important to, the goal
of meaningful scientific disclosure of reality.

Therefore,

in presenting the following history of psychological

thought we can accomplish an important reality check on a

key Whiteheadian assumption.

If,

as Whitehead asserts,

immediate experience is the pristine pure mode of man's

knowledge of reality, in this case his own psychological
nature, why does it appear that the idea is unique to

Whitehead?

Surely other intelligent human beings must

have come to a similar, if differently phrased, understanding.

As is obvious from our rhetorical tone, and the

title of this section, there is in fdct a line of individuals, whose work bears a specific relation to psychology,

that have recognized the same truth contained in White-

head's assertion.

For our purposes, we have begun with

him
Fechner, though it is possible to go back well beyond
the roots of
[to the Renaissance if desired], in locating
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the view.

This view can be callod many things and for

the present it is best

than an organismic one.

to

eai

I

it a humanistic view rather

This is because it is not until we

got to the modern era and Whi t ehead

1

s

complete cosmology

that we will find a clear unwavering apprehension of the

basic cosmological change which is an important characteristic of the new era in which we live.

Let us say,

then,

that we are now about to recount a history of psychology
as a human science as opposed to psychology as a natural

science
3*1.1

WILHELM DILTHEY (l833-191l)

Dilthoy was a contemporary of Herbert, Helmholtz,
Foeliner and Wundt,

wrote extensively in psychology, but was

primarily a philosopher with an eye to the broad aspects of
nature and life.

He published widely in the fields of lit-

erature, music, religion, history and, of course, psychology.

His influence in psychology has been restricted not only by
the fact that he was a philosopher and spoke the philoso-

pher's tongue at a time when psychology was learning an

entirely new language but also, and more importantly, because he saw psychology as a human rather than natural
Hodges, The Philosophy of Wilhelm DilLhey
Rout ledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1952), p xiii.
(London:
1 am indebted to Dr. Juan Caban of the IJ. Mass. School
of Education Faculty for his insight into the sixteenth
century thinker Gambiattista Vico and his relation to the
approach which underlies this segment of psychological
development
D.

•
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science.

It is

this aspect of his basic approach that

probably accounts for his invisibility
tal psychology.

We note with interest,

in

modern experimen-

that Boring's au-

thoritative History of Experimental Psychology

,

which is a

sort of "Old Testament" for the revealed word of modern

positivistic psychology, neither mentions Dilthey in its
index nor includes any reference to him among the copious

chronicle of "begats" that are important to the spread of
the seed of modern scientific psychology.
In entering into Dilthey'

s

thought, we do not intend

Our concern

to provide even a sketch of his complete works.

is to sample the character of his psychological thinking

and to trace its influence into modern times.

Dilthey, un-

like those whom we have considered to this point, did not

start his theorizing from a basis of mathematics and science
but, rather, drew mostly upon inspiration from historical

studies and aesthetics.

Yet, his concern was to show that

human science could be just as rigorous and systematic as
the natural sciences but in a different way.

Dilthey believed, in line with the thesis we developed
in our consideration of the early development of scientific

thought, that one of the main attractions of the reliance

upon mathematics and natural sciences was the fact that
they offer an apparent method of obtaining not only exact

knowledge but also ultimate control over nature.

He was

J

(

)7

intimately familiar with the history and character of the
centuries long traditions which led to the modern view and
came to see that it really represented only half of the

"globus intellec tualis "
the other half is composed of the study of
man in society and in history. Here we meet
with a different type of study. Instead of
observing our object directly, we have to
approach it indirectly through written testimony and other similar evidence; instead
of clearly formulated theories which can be
tested by experiment, we have an attempt to
analyze and describe the concrete complexities of life; instead of explanation of particular events and processes through general
laws, we have an appreciative understanding
of the meaning and value of the unique individual. There is no reason why the one
sphere of knowledge should not be as thoroughly studied by philosophers as the other.

^

^

The above statement by Hodges, who is the main interpreter
of Dilthey for the English speaking world, is meant to

summarize Dilthey'

s

main intentions.

We can best relate

these intentions to our approach by first taking a brief

look at Dilthey'

relation to philosophical thought and

s

then focusing on the more detailed area of his psychological

thought
Since modern psychology had grown up with modern philosophy, Dilthey'

s

over-all view shares an intimate rela-

tion to the aspects we have covered in earlier sections.

Dilthey, like Helmholtz and Wundt was closer to the British
162

Ibid., pp. xiv-xv
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r j.ca.1
tiis

philosophy which derived

diroc t German ancestry

in

Kant.

I'rum

llumc

than ho was to

There is, however, an

important difference in Dilthey's approach, as contrasted
either Hume or Helmholtz and Wundt.

to

Seeing this difference

is important to being able to accurately place Dilthey's

efforts toward the creation of a human science of psychology in the scheme of things.
To digress a bit, we have been asserting that the

basic characteristic of the rise of modern science is its

adherence to and belief in the underlying validity of the
basic metaphysical categories of time, causality, mind and
matter.

From an ever increasing reliance on the truth of

these basic assumptions, the movement toward scientific

explanation gradually elaborated an epistemology which was

harmonious with those basic elements.

This epistemology

saw its methods of inquiry, its criteria of truth and de-

fined the relation between the knower and the known in
strict conformity to the dictates of the basic metaphysical

imperative of the age.

Now, before focusing on the major

difference between Dilthey and his antecedents, it is important to discuss the more basic similarity that exists

between them.

This similarity also forms a common bond

between all of the scientists, philosophers and psychologists that we have discussed; for that matter, it is also a

major characteristic of many psychologists which remain

to
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bo discussed.

Wo are rei'orriri^ to tho basic metaphysical

similarity that underlies the whole era of scientific development, especially that portion before the twentieth

century when the basic categories of matter, energy, time,
etc., were drastically revised.

These underlying metaphysi-

cal assumptions were, as we have seen, generally rather

tacitly assumed as the proper starting point for one's ap-

proach to philosophy, science and psychology.

Out of these,

were generated the epistemological systems which were to

account for how knowledge was possible.
At this point we can return to our consideration of

the differences between Dilthey and the others with tho

realization that the differences we are observing are epistemological rather than metaphysical.

Dilthey, unlike

Helmholtz and Wundt, did not accept the critical episte-

mology which characterized Hume.

Hume's total metaphysical

atomism had led him to the skeptical denial of causality
God and even self.

He ended up with a picture of man

s

mind based on the association, through repetition, of the
elements in the world which were given in experience.

This

mini]
is why Hume spent so much time on the nature of the

and associationistic psychology.

For Hume, mind was basic

based upon
and natural science and even theology had to be
could only
the logical and epistemological foundation that
be provided by the science of the mind.

We have also seen
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that

is

th i s

trom Hume.

the point of dopar tuj'n for Kant's divoi’genco

Kant asserted that aiL knowledge, including

psychological knowledge, is derived from more basic, a
priori
ject.

,

relations which exist between the mind and its obHe was however willing to hold, with Hume, that "all

our knowledge begins with experience" but he departed from

Hume by asserting that "it does not [necessarily] follow
that it arises out of experience."

Instead, he asserted

the requirement for the "faculty of knowledge to

.

.

.

sup-

ply from itself" the basic epistemological structure of the
world
The stage is now set for the introduction of Dilthey's

psychological thought.

Dilthey denied Kant's claim that

the psychology of the mind was not basic to science and,

while he therefore accepted Hume

accept his total skepticism.

'

s

position, he did not also

Hodges summarizes the multiple

aspects of Dilthey's psychological position by recounting
n
his position regarding the basic issue of epistemology.
•

x.
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Dilthey did not need an epistemology to convince him that
he had knowledge because he already knew he had knowledg

In any case, epistemology itself has to presuppose the

knowledge that there is such a thing as knowledge in order
to have something to talk about.

Similarly, he did not

need an epistemology to tell him what the test
163

Ibid.

,

pp

.

37-38

oi

knowledge
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ox-

truth was because ho,

like ovorybody o.Lse,

Ixad

loarned

the basic tests of knowledge in childhood and utilized
them

throughout life.

Realizations of this type were the basic

empirical facts that Dilthey felt should be handled by any

psychological theory worthy of the name.

He did not need

an epistemology to tell him that the real world exists be-

cause the world is a fact of consciousness; if this were not
the case,

about.

there would be nothing for epistemology to talk

The questions which naturally arise about the na-

ture oi the real world should, he felt, be referred to the

science of psychology for a close analysis of consciousness
itself.

Epistemology finally fitted into the picture only

after the basic empirical facts of consciousness had pre-

pared the foundation upon which its articulate superstructure could be built.
It is through this approach to psychology that Dilthey

intended to prepare the way for a fruitful study of the
other half of the "globus int ellec tualis

.

"

For Dilthey it

was impossible to attempt to build an epistemology without

laying its foundations in psychology, he saw that the only
real question was whether one decided to do it consciously

and therefore critically or pretend to do something else
and therefore do it amateurishly.

To claim independence

from psychology is not so much as to free oneself from its
bonds as it is to insure that they will actually become
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stronger

.

Dilthey says of one who attempts such efforts:

presupposes it. He makes use of it.
But he does not control it. ^4

lie

For Dilthey there were two main failings of the psy-

chology of his day.

First, was its inability to meaningly

treat man's higher mental functions.

Pronouncements about

sensations and the association of simple ideas did not

possess very much explanatory power from his point-of-view.
He wanted a psychology which would at least be open to

meaningful consideration of creative imagination, sense of
values, religious devotion and poetic insight.

At

the

heart of this criticism was his feeling that there is a

reality of man's inner life (he called it instinctive)
which is the actual basis of moral and spiritual life.

To

this inner aspect of man one must also add the outer or so-

cial aspects of life of which he is both a product and a
In a statement that we will ultimately relate to

source.

an important principle in Whitehead's cosmology, the so-

called ontological principle.

Dilthey asserts that:

Man as a fact prior to history and society is
a fiction of genetic explanation; the man
whom sound analytical science has for its
object is the individual as an element in
society. 1&5

By way of contrast we will insert a statement of Whitehead's
l64

Wilhelm Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften V, 149,
quoted in Hodges, Philosophy of Dilthey p. 38.
,

,

"*"^^Dil they

,

quoted in Ibid

.

,

p.

40
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P r ^ nc Pi e so that the similarity will be clear.
-*

The ontological principle assorts the relativity of decision; whereby every decision
expresses the relation of the actual thing,
for which a decision is made, to an actual
thing by which that decision is made. 1^6
In the present context, one should simply draw a parallel

between Whitehead's use of "actual entity" and Dilthey's
use of "man" as the basic unit of explanation.

Dilthey’s

purpose is humanistic while Whitehead's is cosmological,
and the difference between the two is the difference between metaphysics and epistemology.

Dilthey simply re-

formed epistemology based upon the "basic empirical facts"
of which he was naturally aware, but did not go beyond that

point to a reformulation of metaphysics; the times simply
were not right for it.

By the time Whitehead was writing,

half a century later, conditions were remarkably different.
Thus, we find in Whitehead a new basis for the humanistic

epistemology of Dilthey; and humanistic epistemology requires organismic metaphysics.

But we do not have to become

involved in intimate details at this point.

Dilthey repre-

sents an important new view upon the scene and we should

not occlude our appreciation of his historical importance

with too many outside excursions.
head,

Until we come to White-

"men" and "actual entities" will have to be synonymous.

l66

emphasis

Whitehead, Process and Reality

,

p.

56

,

Whitehead's

20U

We can make this equation because both
writers use the same

criterion of knowledge.

Whitehead's basic position was that:
All human discourse which bases its claim to
consideration on the truth of its statements
must appeal to the facts.
The final
court of appeal is intrinsic reasonableness.
.

.

.

Dilthey wanted a psychology which recognized its basis
in:

The mighty reality of the content of mental
life
[known in experience] which is
consciously lived and originally given with
immediate power 168
•

•

•

.

Whitehead said of his "actual entities" that:
in separation from [them]
there is
nothing, merely non entity--" The rest is
silence "1°9
.

.

.

.

Dilthey could not have seen that only silence existed
outside his epistemology because the old metaphysics was
still there with its noisy hurrying and scurrying of ele-

mentary particles.

He would however, and in fact did, feel

that in relation to his epistemology the old point s-of-view

were nothing, merely non entities derived from partial con-

sideration of the internal and external aspects of the individual and social nature of man.
1
-I

67 Ibid.

,

p.

52

.

/TO

Dilthey, quoted in Ibid
169

added

.

,

pp

.

131-132.

Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 53» emphasis

20 rj

To return to our consideration of Dilthey's
criticisms
of psychological thought, wo find him putting his
finger

directly upon the pulse of materialistic metaphysics and
the mechanist epistemology which it inspired in the earlier

psychologists.

Psychology, he felt, is mainly characterized

by the uncertainty of its results, and he saw that this

derived from the adoption of the method of physical sciences.
Physical sciences had near certitude in the realities of

mathematics and the assumptions of atomic physics which
existed at the time.
a good example,

However, early psychologists, Hume is

were led astray when they assumed that the

procedures of physics were applicable to mental life.

Ac-

cordingly, their attempts to reduce all varieties of mental
life to the combinations and interactions of simply located

sensations and ideas held together by the laws of association, created the problem of how to verify the psychological

analogues of physical phenomena because of the basic differences in their natures.

Physical science could progress

because its basic elements are always open to direct exper-

imentation and its exact measurements were separately re-

peatable by the community of scientists.

Psychological

science on the other hand, did not have such direct recourse
to measurement.

Even if elementary principles of the rela-

tion between mind and body can be experimentally derived,
there is no corresponding method by which we can check the
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precision of the hypotheses wo make about
tho higher-order
phenomena of the mind. The possible
hypotheses are many
and experimental controls are not
available.
Thus, in his criticisms of psychological
theorizing,

Dil they recognized the limitations of
materialist meta-

physics and chose to supersede them by relying
upon the

phenomena of experience as he knew it.

His problem in

creating a psychology then, was to come up with a
rigorous
and systematic position which would rival the older
systems

without also having to assume the same limiting metaphysical
basis.

He published his answer to this problem in the year

189 ^ in a work titled Ideas Concerning a Descriptive and

Analytical Psychology

.

Dilthey's attempts to construct an alternative psy-

chology were based on a premise that there are actually two
kinds of science--descriptive and explanatory.

Both, of

course, had to start from a contemplation of the object of

their efforts so that its natural and irreducible units

could be obtained and so that the laws which express their

interrelation would be evident.

For Dilthey, a descriptive

science was one which went beyond this point by building

upon the units and laws which resulted from this analysis
of actual experience.

Explanatory science, on the other

hand, is one which takes a prior stand on the proper units

and laws which are appropriate to the phenomena and then

207

jjroceeds to analyze the phenomena in terms of them.

In

this case, all that can arise upon these foundations is
a

hypothetical assumption.

In Dilthey's eyes the classic

example of an explanatory science was modern physics.

Physics was restricted to the use of explanatory method

because the data of human experience could provide no direct

perception of the unity principle that applied to the phenomena.

Therefore, physicists were required to "explain"

the world of atoms in terms of the primary qualities which

made that world appear meaningful.

Dilthey recognized that

this explanatory influence was evident in psychology and

accordingly held that psychology should not start with explanations based on hypothetical units of sensations and
feelings which "go behind the facts of experience" but,

rather it should seek, in the data of inner perception, the

principles of order which bring coherence to mental life.
For his task only a descriptive approach will suffice.

Mental life, on this view, is an irreducible unity

which is devoid of more fundamental units.

Its natural

unit is the total reaction of the whole self to the situation which confronts it.

Rather than importing external

elements of explanation like sensation, and feeling or even

attempting more global, but ultimately just as limiting,
constructs like intentional actions in which content is

something separate, Dilthey's descriptive psychology was
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based upon an analysis of the whole self into
three basic,

mutually dependent and equally important elements.

He says

The various types of relation [the cognitive,
affective and conative attitudes of mind]
stand to one another in a relation of cause
and effect; one of them evokes the other.
Images presented by the senses, or thoughts
about them, give rise to feelings of satis1 action
of expansion of our personality and
fulfillment of our being, and these in turn
produce the effort and the resolve to maintain this state of things.
,

As he continues, recall the arguments of Hume and the em-

piricists; especially, the skepticism of Hume in which he
came to doubt even the concept of his own self due to the
fact that a rigorous application of the explanatory princi-

ples he utilized was incompatible with the phenomena he was

explaining.

Ask yourself which basis seems more applicable

to naive experience.

Returning to Dilthey's analysis, we

have
This causal process, which leads from objective apprehension to feeling and from that to
will and action, falls within inner experience.
The causation itself is consciously lived; if it were not consciously
lived, then it would not find so direct and
powerful expression in poetry and history.
It is not that a regular sequence of particular states is given and their causal connection inferred, but the power of causation,
the irres tibility with which an apprehended
object sets all our feelings in tempestuous
motion, the irres tibility with which a man,
in spite of all reason, is as it were enchanted and constrained to snatch to himself
Only from
the object of these feelings.
the depths of lived experience can the strong
impressions of these things be drawn--it is
not from inferences that our knowledge of
.

.

.

.

.

.
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&LiSci t i on
which makes bbo bruo sysbem of
life accessible bo us, has orison. *70
,

We have quoted at such length from the original because

the heart of Dilthey's psychology is of such a fundamentally
^-*-

<

^ e:ren ^

:

point.

character than anything we have considered to this

We should also note that it is different still from

the psychologies of Brentano and Husserl which we have yet
to discuss.

These later psychologies, which spawned modern

phenomenological psychology, retain a more elementaristic
fl avor since they still seek explanations in terms of iso-

lated "intentional acts" which have some "content."

Dilthey takes a giant step toward Whitehead’s position
in postulating the basic triumvirate of cognition, feeling

and conation as the "ground-rhy thm" of mental life.

This

is not to say that Whitehead uses those elements in that

order, in fact he does not, but that is another story for

another time.

What is similar however, is the idea of a

unit-reaction in which the basic elements always participate.
For Dilthey, cognition comes first, then feeling and then
conation.

From the point-of-view of "lived experience" as

the basic empirical fact for psychology to deal with the

argument runs as follows:

"I cannot cognize a thing with-

out being interested in it and also having feelings or de-

sires about it.
1

X

cannot feel unless I have an idea of the

^°Dilthey, in Lived Experience, Expression and Understanding, quoted in Ibid., p. 246.

2 10

object, and loo ling tends to pass over into action.

cannot act unless

I

J

know the situation and my own aim, and

action is usually motivated and always accompanied by
feeling." 171

Dilthey refers to this shifting interrela-

tionship as a "structural system."

It is this structural

system which makes possible a descriptive psychology as

given in lived experience as against the explanatory systems which must rely on hypothetical inference.

Briefly, what this means to psychologists is that they

should view conscious life as an activity (our complete

activity) which is mostly directed toward other people and
things in the world.

That is to say, wo do not usually

focus attention upon ourselves--we cognize others and things
and react to them.

However, consciousness of other things

is also accompanied by an awareness or "enjoyment" of our

own mental processes and actions but this awareness is not
As Dilthey would

explicitly presented to consciousness.

have it, we can only see ourselves out of the corner of our
eye, as it where, and then only while our attention is fo-

cused on something else.

172

"'^Hodges, Philosophy of Dilthey

,

p.

172

k '}

Note the functional similarity of this view with
Fechner s view that mind and body are not known simultaneously but, in fact, hide each other. Dilthey' s position
also has important relations to Polanyi s "tacit knowing"
and Whitehead's split mode of perception.
1

'
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When we direct the focus of our attention inward,

Dilthey claims that what we observe

is not

the entirety ol

our mental structure but only fragments of it which are

describable in terms of the basic structure of the three
elements.

Thus, the succession of events which we observe

bond
as "belonging together" do not require an associative

between them which is based on the explanatory hypothesis
fact that
of contiguity but are rather, related due to the

part
they are themselves successive elements which are

of

unit of lived exthe larger reaction pattern which is the

perience.

of a
To Dilthey, it was obvious that learning

consequence
friend's death would bring sorrow as a natural
could lead to
just as the suffering of injury or insult
was seen n
This type of unity of patterned action,
is, we know the
functional and teleological terms. That
the experience because
link between the various segments of
system within ourselves
they are parts of the structural
These
of causality.
and from which we derive the idea
with the relations
structural relations may be contrasted

anger.

which relies upon the
which are postulated by any view
as the basis of
association of elements of consciousness
criticism of the concept
mental life. Recall also, Hume's
He could
the material world.
of causality as it applied to
the
concept and concluded that
find no significance in the
between the
the temporal relation
is
observe
we
thing
only
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cause and the effect.

Hume became skeptical of everything

and Kant tried to resolve the problem by providing that

causality is an a-priori category of the mind.

Dilthey

would claim that they both failed because they are attempting to explain the successive stages of a single reaction-

pattern by analogy to causal associations and mechanical
habits between isolated mental constructs.

In such cases

we can, with Hume, Kant and anyone else who is utilizing an

elementaris tic epistemology as the basis of his thought,
only infer an apparent cause-effect relationship to explain

succession in time.

This approach is completely without

the ability to see any meaning or significance between the
two events.

It is rather like taking one critical focus

on the mouth of a baby and another critical focus upon the

baby's finger, and then wondering how the finger gets into
the mouth without taking into account that both belong to
the same baby.

Dilthey'

s

structural sequences by contrast,

contain the meaning in themselves and it is our experience
of this meaning from which the idea of causality is derived.

Dilthey'

s

approach to the analysis of individual con-

sciousness was balanced by an historically based view which
he saw as able to give some insight into the early stages
of the development of various human achievements which were

now sunk deep into man's unconscious.

He did not feel that

introspection was the way to approach the study of the
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unconscious
man is, he learns not by rummaging
about in himself, nor yet by psychological
experiments, but by means of history. 173

Wliat

Seeing the products of past lived experience, now sta-

bilized by the objectivity of history, in light of the same
structural system which applied to immediate experience,
was to have provided an assurance that explanatory entities

which were foreign to conscious life were not imported into
the system from external sources.

Similarly, Dilthey felt

that if there were areas of understanding which were not

adequately resolved in this manner, then it was permissible
to develop hypotheses and explanatory investigations as

long as the hypotheses are derived from the basis of the

structural system itself.

Now that we have given some consideration to Dilthey'
basic programmatic position, we can conclude our treatment
of his psychology with a brief look at the main divisions
he thought were appropriate to the framework of psychology
As regards the divisions which were appropriate to a

psychology which is based on the "structural system,"

Dilthey held that the first major division was the study
This would provide a

of the structural system itself.

clearer understanding of the various elementary functions

which go into the cognitive, affective and conative activity

'"^Dilthey

,

quoted in Ibid

.

,

p.

45*

and also, it would yiofd inlonnation relating to the natural.,

© 1 e o 1 ogi c al

was directed.
is

onds,

toward which the conativ© behavior

One of the strengths of this interpretation

that it focuses upon those ends as natural concomitants

of the whole sequence which represent the subjective satis-

faction of all the impulses which wore involved in the
uni t- reac t ion

.

This is the inner awareness Dilthey spoke

of as a natural concomitant to our consciousness of other

things.

His word for this was

"

Innowerden

11

which can be

translated as "enjoyment" of those mental states, processes,
and activities which accompany all consciousness but which
are actually below the explicit threshold of consciousness
in the sense that we mobilize them and utilize them for

L

t

process of attending to the focal aspects of our conscious
lives.

Again, for Dilthey, the ends toward which the whole

system drives must only be interpreted in terms of the evi-

dence of consciousness itself.

Attempting to equate this

understanding with a hypothesis from biology regarding the
preservation of the individual and species is to distort
the argument's structural image of the consciousness of man.

This aspect relates directly to the second major division
of Dilthey 's psychology.

Here, the laws of development

would be studied with an eye toward defining how the "ac-

quired system" of man's conscious life has been developed
and also how that system functions in influencing future
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events.

Di 1 limy Uiouglit

llial.

pools and novelists had do-

veloped the greatest insight into these areas and that psychology needed to develop its own characterization of these

phenomena based upon the structural system.
Important ingredients in Dilthey's observations on the

development of a new human scientific psychology were the
natural facts with which psychology should explicitly deal.
For example, he saw that the common mental structure and
the common external world which was shared by all men led
to similar fundamental presuppositions about the world and

about behavior, i.e.
obedience, etc.

,

personal obligation, cooperation,

This was the natural starting point for a

truly psychological epistemology.

From this position he

saw that the processes of human development which lead to
the mature individual were not quantitatively different

between human beings but qualitatively different in the
sense that all development involves the same elementary

capacities which constitute human nature.

The great varia-

tions in qualitative development were seen as the joint

product of physical environment, social environment and the
inherent capacity of the individual.
In summarizing the psychology which results from this

approach, we see two important conceptualizations which

Dilthey has added to the development of psychological
thought.

First, was his assertion that mental processes
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are predominately purposive or structural and that they
tend toward the building of an integrated mind and character.

He held that the elements of cognition, feeling and

conation were always present though their mutual importance
would vary with circumstances.

The second important addi-

tion which is truly unique up to this point is the fact
that he developed a highly empirical epistemology without

also having to create an associationist psychology in order
to explain mental processes and life experience.

Dilthey's own words place the appropriate stress upon
the character of his basic contributions to psychological

science.
All knowledge is knowledge of experience; but
the original unity of all experience and its
resulting validity are conditioned by the
factors which mold the consciousness within
which it arises, i.e., by the whole of our
nature.
In the veins of the knowing
subject constructed by Locke, Hume and Kant
runs no real blood, but the diluted fluid of
reason in the sense of mere thought-activity.
But I was led, by my concern as historian and
psychologist with the whole man, to make this
whole man, in the full diversity of his powers,
his willing, feeling, thinking being, the
foundation for explaining even knowledge and
its concepts (such as those of the external
world, time, substance, cause), however much
it may seem that knowledge weaves these concepts only from the material of perception,
imagination and thought. 1?4
.

.

.

,

For Dilthey the important elements in the way we picture and structure the reality of the external world, the
174

Dilthey, quoted in Ibid

.

,

pp

.

113-114.
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existence of life in others and our interactions with them,
can only be explained in terms ol the whole nature of man
in which volition, feeling, and thought are seen as simply

different sides

of

a single real-life process.

Man's aim,

he felt, was to act and the true character of that action

should always be guarded by a psychology which protects the

inner nature of man, "which ought to be sacred to us" from
the "rashly experimental hand" of explanatory science.

FRANZ BRENTANO (1838-1917)

3-1.2

In Brentano we have another psychologist and philoso-

pher who was actively concerned about the application of
the methods of natural science to the "sciences of the

mind."

In fact, Brentano was also concerned about the ap-

plicability of the same inductive approach to science that
we have seen Whitehead criticize.

recently translated Brentano

'

s

A.

C.

Rancurello who has

Psychology from an Empirical

Standpoint into English also has documented the approaches
and attitudes which Brentano felt were deterimental to the
17
sciences of the mind and points to their modern relevance.

Brentano felt that:

a)

the adherence to the cannons of sci-

entific methodology was an easy way to mask the inner lack
of "all earnestness" in the actual conduct of research,
b)

there was a "dilettante encroachment" upon the sciences
1

C. Rancurello, A Study of Franz Brentano
Academic Press, 1968 ) p. 24

^Antos

(New York:

,
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or the mind by the export*

vam

in

natural science, e)

effort to attempt to give meaning

to

it

was a

the sciences of

the mind by simply exerpting principles
of explanation

from the natural sciences, d) the failure to
recognize that
'the boundaries

between formal learning and scientific and

artistic tact" cannot be ignored and

e)

the "logical un-

knowledge" of the true nature and foundation of the inductive process which is usually found in those who practice
the scientific method.

Given this type of approach at a time when psychology
was

Li

ying so hai'd to become a science it seems strange

that Brentano was recognized as a psychologist or that he

had a very wide influence.

Yet on both accounts he seems

to have succeeded very well.

Brentano, the man, is interesting because at heart he
was really a philosopher rather than a scientist and in

psychology he was an empiricist rather than an experimentalist.

Because of his training as a priest (a position he

resigned because he was unable to accept the doctrine of
Papal infallibility) he had an extensive background in phi-

losophy and religion which greatly influenced the character
of his contribution to psychology.
In historical perspective, we find Brentano

1

s

influ-

ence attenuated by the fact that in the separation which

occurred between philosophy and psychology at the beginning
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of the twentieth century,

there turned out to be little

room for doctrines which viewed the relation of mental phe-

nomena and mental contents from the perspective of both

psychology and philosophy.

Philosophers, for their part,

were disregarding the old psychologically based view of
logic and were turning instead to principles of logic which

were independent of the way a person thinks.

This shift

marks the beginning of the development of linguistic analysis in philosophy and also the analysis of language itself

which has become a major characteristic of modern American
philosophy.

Of course, psychology had taken the other fork

at the crossroad and was about the business of eliminating

philosophical issues as sources of its experimental approaches to research topics.
The separation which occurred between psychology and

philosophy also had another important effect.

Once the two

were sufficiently separated it was possible for each to

ascribe to the other any problems which seemed unsuitable
in terms of the basic assumptions of the discipline.

Phi-

losophers came to increasingly assert that the nature of
the mind is a factual problem which the psychologists

should investigate experimentally; while the psychologists,
for their part, were unwilling and also unable, because of

their methodology, to tackle problems that did not fit the

direct mold of the basic assumptions they had borrowed from
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the physical sciences.

Thus, psychologists quite easily

formed the counter assertion that the nature of the
mind
was really a problem for the philosophers and
philosophical

analysis.

Seen in this light, both modern science and

modern philosophy have ignored the direct study of the mind
of man in favor of radically reduced views of human exis-

tence which focused upon highly abstractive explanatory

principles
Brentano is difficult to place in any particular psy-

chological context because he stood upon the threshold of
that transition to de-psychologized philosophy and de-

philosophized psychology.

In the middle of this transi-

tion we find Brentano with a stake in both camps, claiming
that the mind should be understood in terms of the inten-

tional relations which always exist between the mind and its

object of contemplation.

Mental events, for Brentano were

really mental acts or processes in which it is not the content but the process that is important.

Thus, if we see or

hear something, the truly mental act is seeing or hearing
and not the object or its physiologically based sensation.
"My position in psychology," he claimed,

"is that of

empiricism"
experience alone is my teacher: but along
with others I am of the opinion that such a
position is quite compatible with a certain
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idealistic

v io w point

.

'

^^

As wo elaborate Brenlano's psychology a little further, it

seen that he retains a basic elementaris tic view

Li

toward psychic phenomena.

He defined psychology as the

"science of psychical appearances" but went on to specify
that the purpose of his "descriptive psychology" was to:

...

show forth the totality of psychic elements, the combination of which makes up all
psychic phenomena, in the same sense in which
the letters of the alphabet make up all the
words .177

Brentano

1

s

insight, as we have said, was that the psychic

phenomena which result from such combinations of letter-like
elements was the act of presentation and not the contents
of the act.

To achieve this separation Brentano specified

that there are two classes of things.

like colors and tones

— things

One was simple sensa

or qualities input by the

senses and the other was simple acts.

Simple acts were

things like the seeing of colors, the hearing of tones or
the feeling of heat, etc.

But in addition to these, and in

order to account for higher mental phenomena, Brentano also

specified that there were psychic acts which corresponded
to judging and remembering and also to such things as

"^^Franz Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Stand point p. 1, quoted in John J. Sullivan, Franz Brentano and
the Problem of Intentionali ty in Benjamin J. Wolman, ed.,
Historical Roots of Contemporary Psychology (New York:
Harper and Row, 19^8")"^ p~! 250
,

~^^Ibid.

.

p.

254.
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emotions.

In short, he developed an inventory of psychic

acts which had throe basic categories:

and emoting.

presenting, judging

It was from these basic categories that Bren-

tano sought to describe mental activities.
One of the first characteristics which he ascribed to
the psychic phenomena was a rather curious quality known as

"intentional inexistence.”

What he was attempting to do

with this concept was to explain the ambiguous relation
that existed between basic psychic phenomena and the various

objects with which they could be associated.

Each act had

an object but the objects varied markedly, ranging from

physical things to imaginary objects.

Thus, Brentano as-

serted that

Every [psychic phenomenon] contains something
as its object, but not every psychic phenomenon does so in the same manner.
In presentation something is presented; in judgement
something is affirmed or denied; in love
something is loved; in hate something is
hated
and so on.
This intentional inexistence is exclusively characteristic of mental phenomena.
No physical phenomena manifests anything
similar.
Thus, we can define mental phenomena as include an object intentionally
within themselves 178
.

.

.

In formulating the concept in this way Brentano was

very close to the long-standing dualism of mind and matter
that is usually present in scientific psychology.

His for-

mulation was, however, different in the sense that he
178

Ibid

.

,

pp.

256-257.
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(U

sUuguishod between art and

matter,

in ton

I.

i

on and not mind and

Sullivan observes that thi s distinction has a very

important property.

First of all it establishes the

traditional two-level world of physical phenomena and mental phenomena.

But beyond that, there is the fact that the

classical distinction of form and matter refers only to

physical phenomena whereas, the act— intention formulation
applies only to mental phenomena and not physical phenomena.
To speak of act-physical or matter-mental is nonsense according' to the logic of the system.

Important ramifications of this condition are found in
several areas of modern psychology.

For example, the

Gestalt tradition of the relation of wholes and parts is a
theory which relates the physical world and psychophysical

properties and does not produce theoretical statements which
relate directly to the character of perceptual processes.

Speaking of this relation, which is known in Gestalt theory
as "isomorphism," Wolfgang Kohler stated:

actual perception is in every case
related by real structural properties to the
psychophysical processes (phenomenal and physical) that belong to it; the union is not
left to chance:
it is subject to laws. 1^0
.

.

.

Thus, it is theoretically inappropriate for someone to
17

Ibid

.

,

pp.

257-258.

l80

Wolfgang Kohler, On Isomorphism quoted in Richard
Bernstein and Edwin G. Boring, A Source Book in the
History of Psychology (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1965 ), P- 264
,

J.

.
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oT a

whole Lo a perceptual

process since according to the theory wholes ultimately
derive from the structural psychophysical processes and the
outside world.

We should also add that "outside world" in

this case refers to all events which have anything to do

with the material world.

This includes, of course, the

psychophysical processes of one's own body such that only
conscious phenomena (phenomenal qualities) may, on this
basis, be viewed as the mental counterparts of the psycho-

physical Gestalt qualities.
In the same vein, we can observe that in reinforcement

theory, the laws of reinforcement are simply relations be-

tween the stimulus operations in the physical world and

their corresponding responses also in the physical world.

Thus the generality of any reinforcement situation must
always be restricted to a class of behavior and the rein-

forcement operations appropriate to it to which it is re-

lated by the "laws of reinforcement."
In both these examples, as we have said, the theories
are restricted to the physical world and can only formulate
a form-matter distinction between their theoretical terms.

The act-intention relation we are considering with Brentano
is however, not of this type.

Act-intention is strictly

limited to the logical and linguistic domain and is not

a

theory which derives basically from a prior position relating
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to either the phenomenal or physical domains.

tion is important because Brentano

'

s

This distinc-

influence is primarily

felt in the tradition we have labeled psychology as a human

science and is one of the reasons why the two psychologies

have been so difficult to bring together.

At this beginning

level of distinction between the two, we have the contrast

portrayed in its clearest form.

Brentano

'

s

system is organ-

ized around the psychical act whereas Wundt's system was

based upon sensory contents.

Since both men were contempo-

raries there was, as one would expect, great controversy

between the "Act" psychologists and the "Content" psychologists.

Of course, the "content" school is the one which

operated within an experimental paradigm and the "act"
school focused upon the description of pure consciousness

by immanent inspection.

This basic emphasis is responsible

for the development of the very influential school of

"Phenomenology" which is rather closely associated with the

human scientific trend in psychology.
One important aspect of this sort of psychological de-

velopment is the fact that Brentano, and as we have seen,

Dilthey both thought that their psychologies were empirical
yet neither was experimental.

We often equate the two by

thinking that the only way to be empirical is to be experimental.

Yet, it is that very experimental approach that we

have also seen is the primary reason why modern American
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psychology was created in the image of the physical sciences as opposed to the human sciences.
ever,

It is obvious how-

that being empirical in the sense of Dilthey and

Brentano does not require one to reject the experimental

approach out of hand.

Actually, both men had respect for

experimentation as long as it could operate within the
larger explanatory context of their empirical psychology.
As we have said, Brentano, though he focused on mental

phenomena as empirical facts, retained a much more elementaristic approach than Dilthey did.

Thus, Brentano'

s

psy-

chology is actually closer to the basic metaphysical assumptions of standard physical and psychological science than

were those of Dilthey'

s

psychology.

Perhaps this is one of

the reasons why Brentano became a more direct influence in

the subsequent development of psychological thought.

In the

present context, the important distinction that we must form
'

v

is that the basic characteristic which underlies the sepa-

ration of the natural and human scientific approaches to

psychology is that the human scientific must:

a)

study

characteristically human phenomena in a rigorous but human
way;

this means recognizing the presence of mind, b) recog-

nize that mental phenomena have an empirical validity which
is given in immediate experience, c) recognize that mental

phenomena are not directly reducible to physical or physiological or psychophysical processes and d) recognize that

mental phenomena have

a

basic

intent ional

character in that

they always have directedness toward an object.

3.1.3

EXTENSIONS OF DILTHEY
AND BRENTANO IN
PRESENT PSYCHOLOGY
The purpose of this section is to briefly consider the

historical importance of the human scientific alternative
we have found in Dilthey and Brentano so that its influence

will become clearer.

In tracing this history, we will find

a continuity of development which moves away from a psy-

chology that consists entirely of content and toward one
that is based on psychical functions.
We have seen that the development of psychological

thought in nineteenth century Germany was primarily charac-

terized by a heavy reliance upon physiological mechanism
and experimental techniques.

Wilhelm Wundt as the champion

of this view believed that introspection was the method by

which the mind could be observed and analyzed.

Psycholo-

gists of this era also explicitly separated mind from matter.

Given this separation and the belief that the mind

should have the same structure as the physical world, intro

spection became a tool for the analysis of consciousness
that sought to reduce it to elementary sensations and ele-

mentary ideas.
The view which we have characterized as the human sci-

entific alternative to such elementarist ic approaches held
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that the only appropriate way to observe truly conscious

phenomena was as they were yivon in immediate experience.
This view, it should be added, does not necessarily require
that one give up dualism as a description of mind and body.

This is particularly noticeable in Dilthey and we have as-

serted that one must change the basic metaphysical assumptions of scientific description before a meaningful alter-

native to dualism can be found.
The alternative movement was arguing simply that the

analysis of consciousness into elements via the method of

introspection destroyed the true nature of the phenomenon
since consciousness is essentially a unitary thing that

consists of functions or acts and not sensations and images.
An important aspect of the shift to functions or acts
of a unitary consciousness was the dynamic character it

imparted to psychology.

Wundt and the associationis t s had

only been able to describe a passive mind which weakly

reacted to sensory stimuli.

Conscious functions and acts,

on the other hand, gave the mind an active role in perceiving, judging and feeling.

The old doctrine of associa-

tionism, which we have traced through two centuries of deI

velopment, lost out as a fundamental description of mental

phenomena once the mind was endowed with the power to act.
Others who can be viewed to have at least partially

ascribed to this position are William James, James Ward,
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Edmund Husserl

,

Edward Sprangei'

,

William McDougall, and

finally many more modern psychologists like Donald Snygg,
R.

B.

McLeod and Gordon Allport.

We will touch on key

aspects of most of these men as we recount the development
of this type of psychology.

Obviously there are many im-

portant names which are left out; however, this simply is
not the pj.ace or time to dwell exclusively upon history and
of those we do cover we shall only be able to show the

barest elements of similarity to the new alternative.

Following upon Brentano

1

s

work, there was a growing

importance to the study of the phenomena of the mind.
I 9 OO

In

Edmund Husserl greatly popularized the movement and

succeeded in establishing "Phenomenology" as a method of

psychology which sought to describe pure consciousness by
process he called "immanent inspection.

"

a

There were also

many others in Germany who, around the turn of the century,
were deciding that the new psychology had a lot to offer

and was, in fact, closer to reality than Wundt had been.
Specifically, Carl Stumpf (1848-1936) who was a major com-

petitor of Wundt showed the characteristic human scientific
approach when he held that the proper way to study the perception of auditory tones was not, as Wundt would do, to
employ trained introspec tionist s who were supposed to introspect the pure sensation of the tone, but to use expert musicians.

Stumpf, like Dilthey thought of phenomenology as

2 30

a basic science out of which ail other
sciences could bo

derived.

It is interesting to note that three of his stu-

dents became quite famous by founding Gestalt psychology
(Wertheimer, Kohler and Koffka).
shali

Also Kurt Lewin (who we

consider in a later section), an important field

theorist, was one of Stumpf's students.

An interesting aspect of Stumpf's work was his attempt
to show that mental acts or functions and their contents

could independently vary.

For example in observing a color,

the mental function can change from noticing to judging

while the content of the color remains the same.

Of course,

the content could change while the mental act remains the
same.

In this we can see part of the reason for the demise

of Wundt's introspective structuralism.

Wundt was con-

strained to see only sensations and to explain these only
in terms of the physical dimensions of the stimulus.

Those

who were considering higher-order perceptual processes

found characteristics that could not meaningly be reduced
to the qualities of sensation.

Max Wertheimer launched Gestalt psychology in 1912

with an observation similar to but far more conclusive than
Stumpf's had been.

Wertheimer was able to show that motion

could be perceived when there was no motion in the stimulus.
This finding which was both experimental and easily replicable made it clear that there were types of experience
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which could not be reduced
sensations.

Certainly,

l.o

this

Wundt's elementary visual
type of development was an im-

portant confirmation of the basic trends of the phenomenological movement.
We should note however,

that Gestalt psychology is

only partially in the camp with phenomenology.

The Gestalt

approach focused primarily upon the mechanisms of perception and generally sought to explain territory, which had

previously been explored, by adding interpretations in
terms of their own methodology.

Others who were part of

the movement away from elementism stayed much closer to the

basic view point of intentionali ty as a key factor in mental phenomena.

William James (1842-1910) is a good example of the intentional trend.

James' own colorful words are the best

indicators of the reaction which had developed against the
old school:

Within a few years what one may call a microscopic psychology has arisen in Germany, carried on by experimental methods, asking of
course every moment for introspective data,
but eliminating their uncertainty by operating
on a large scale and taking statistical means.
Their method taxes patience to the utmost,
and could hardly have arisen in a country
The mind
whose natives could be bored
minwhich
in
seige
must submit to a regular
the
by
day
ute advantages gained night and
forces that hem her in must sum themselves up
1
at last into her overthrow.
.

181

.

•

•

James, The Principles of Psychology
emphasis.

,

I,

192, James'
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James usually spoke of purposivism rather than intention-

ality but the meaning is much the same.

In the German

the main connotation is process or action whereas

in the American version there is, in addition to the action-

oriented flavor, a definite indication of purpose; Americans seemed to require processes that did something useful
also.

So James'

psychology is characterized by a purposive

approach to mental phenomena which were a continuous "stream
of consciousness."

The pursuance of future ends and the choice
of means for their attainment are thus the
mark and criterion of the presence of mentality in a phenomenon. We all use this test
to discriminate between an intelligent and a
mechanical performance. 10 ^
James'

"stream of consciousness" has much the same deriva-

tion as Dilthey's empirical structural system.

James ob-

served that the main characteristics of consciousness were
its individualistic nature (it belongs only to single in-

dividuals); its ever changing nature (stream); its conti-

nuity of personal identity (in spite of lapses in consciousness as in sleep, etc.) and its selective or attentional

character which belongs to purposiveness.

Another individual who belongs to this line of theorists is Edward Spranger

(

1882 - 1963 )*

Spranger is inter-

esting because he was successor to Dilthey at the University
182

Ibid.

,

p

.

8

.
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of Berlin and also strongly influenced by him.

Spranger,

like Dilthey, took his departure from cultural rather than

physical sciences. 83
1

His Psychology is sometimes known as

"Understanding Psychology" because he sought to exp Lain the

interrelations between meaningful aspects of the inner lives
He also recognized that the individual's

of individuals.

subjective experiences were interwoven with the events of
the social and historical world.

This view led him to deny

purely subjective states and to focus upon consciousness as
it relates to objective reality.

cent of Dilthey'

s

With reasoning reminis-

approach, he considered that the objec-

tive reality of mental relations is assured by the fact
that:

a) mental relations are attached to physical forms

and can either receive value from the world or give it to
the world--as in art forms, b) mental relations are devel-

oped in interaction with many single subjects such that
they are collectively determined forms of meaning relationships and c) mental relations are seen as objective pre-

cisely because they have a supra-individual validity which
creseem to function as the norms by which the individual

ates some mental fact.
of
In this approach which emphasizes an explanation

mind,
objectivity in terms of the activity of the knowing

Edward Spranger, Types of Men J. P.
Niemeyer Publishing, 1928).
(Halle:
,

trans

W.

Pxgors

Spranger felt that ho had solved the age-old mind-body
problem; and also had formulated an explanation of why the

natural scientific approach should be avoided.

In this

case, Spranger held that the so-called objective world or

external nature to which elementaristic psychology was at-

tempting to relate its basic sensations, was, in fact,

nothing more than a correlate of a special cognitive attitude.

Since he placed such emphasis upon interrelations as

opposed to elements Spranger, like Dilthey, thought of his

psychology as a "Structural Psychology."
Spranger also developed a typology of personality
types which was a strong influence in Gordon Allport's work

and led directly to the famous Allport-Vernon Study of
-i

Values Test, 1931.

QU

Allport used the six fundamental

types of subjective evaluation which Spranger had developed
as the basis of his rationale.

It is interesting to note

that the actual scales on the test instrument

theoretic,

economic, aesthetic, social, political and religious-the
derive from Spranger's analysis which he carried on in

tradition of human scientific theorizing.

It is unfortunate

between
indeed that the underlying philosophical differences
the more elethe tradition to which Spranger belongs and

in thxs
mentaristic and behavioral traditions so prevalent

l84 Marx and Hillix, Systems and Theories in Psychology,
P« 426.
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country arc not morn dourly
publicized.

niuln ph l.ood

and morn widely

If this were the case, it is doubtful that the

various "trait slices" of human personality would have been
so proliferated in modern psychology.

Since our American

psychology is so anti-philosophical, the tendency has been
to turn to techniques for "construct validation" as a means

of compensating for the lack of a clearly established philosophical basis. 185

In addition to the influences between German and Amer-

ican thought that we have been tracing, there was also an
i-

n fl uence that came from England.

to this phase of development,

Two names are important

James Ward (1843-1925) and

William McDougall (1871-1938).
Ward was primarily a philosopher but wrote extensively
in psychology.

He,

like his contemporary Brentano, did not

adhere to the older views of a passive associat ionis tic
mind.

Ward’s basic premise is, however, different than the

German approach in that he held an evolutionary view of
consciousness in which mental processes were seen
evolved from indif f erent ialed mentality.

to have

For Ward an ele-

mentary sensation was simply an erroneous abstraction because even at its first appearance in psychic life one must

consider that a sensation is really a modification of

a

^'; Lee J. Cronbach and Paul E. Meehl "Construct
Validity in Psychological Tests," Psychological Bulletin
,

LIT (1955), 281-302.

,
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pre-existing presentation and
that it is also true that
the
resultant whole presentation
is more complex than it was
before.

Further, in this complexity
we never experience
any parts which are as
discontinuous as the supposed elements in physical nature. 18 ^

Ward also spoke out against the
reductionism of comparing higher mental states with
lower.
We noted earlier
connection with the mental chemistry
of J. S Mill that
it formed a more inclusive
concept than the older mental
mechanics. Here we find Ward questioning
the "propriety"
of physical analogies and wondering
if analogies to living
objects would not be more appropriate for
mental processes.

m

.

We shall find in the growth of a seed
or an
embryo far better illustrations of the unfolding of the contents of consciousness than
in the building up of molecules:
the process
seems much more a mere segmentation of what
is originally continuous than an aggregation
of elements at first independent and distinct. 187

In William McDougall we find the extension of Ward's

psychology and also close contact with modern American
psychology since McDougall spent most of his professional
life in this country, first at Harvard and than at Duke.

McDougall was an interesting mix between psychology as the
study of consciousness and psychology as the study of
186

T
James
Ward, "Psychology," Encyclopedia Britannica
9th ed. XX, 46 in Herrnstein and Boring, op. cit ., p. &08
187
Ibid
606
p
,

,

.

,

.

behavior

However, by behavior he did not mean
the type of
behavior that Watson was popularizing
at the same time; for
McDougall behavior was a purposive action
in which the
whole animal was involved.
In his comprehensive work The
O utline of Psychology
published in 1923, McDougall listed
seven marks of behavior which made it necessary
to consider
behavior as purposive. In order of appearance,
they are:
,

l)

spontaneity of movement,

2

)

persistence of activity in-

dependent of the continuance of the impression which
may
have initiated it, 3 ) variation of direction of
persistent
movement, 4) cessation of movements upon achieving a
particular kind of change in the situation,

5

)

preparation for

new situation toward the production of which the action
contributes,

6

learning, i.e., improvement in the effec-

)

tiveness of behavior when it is repeated under similar con-

ditions and

7

the total involvement of the organism.

)

From

this list of purposive characteristics McDougall drew the

conclusion that reflex based behaviorism does not meet
the criteria for a true behavior theory which should be a

"purposive behaviorism."

McDougall

1

s

efforts to deal with something more con-

crete than mere sensations are clearly shown in the following warning which he placed in the preface of that same
1923 Outline.
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The psychophysiology of the senses is a rich
field in accumulated observations, the fascination of which as a field of research is
not unknown to me.
The student who approaches psychology by this route is almost
inevitably led into the mechanical, atomistic
way of thinking which I would have him avoid.
The study of the senses is seductive;
for this is one way of simplifying psychology
and of enabling the student to feel that he
is acquiring a solid basis of facts.
But it
is a simplification achieved at the cost of
an abstraction from actual experience, the
degree of which the young student does not
easily understand.
We do at least deal
with concrete realities rather than with abstract and artificial entities such as "the
sensations" are. 1^8
•

•

.

.

.

.

.

.

•

The fact that McDougall's seven marks of purposive be-

havior are oriented toward animals should not lead to the
impression that he dealt only with animals.
to define psychology as

He preferred

"the positive or empirical science

of conduct or behavior" and in this sense empirical means
the same type of psychology that was to be found in Bren-

tano.

In fact McDougall was very close to Brentano

chology in many ways.

1

s

psy-

For example, on the issue of the in-

terpretation of experience McDougall, like Brentano felt
that

Experience is not made up of things; it is a
process and perhaps a train of activity.
The most general and fundamental facts about
experience as we know it, or enjoy it, are
First, experience or experiencing is
two.
always an experiencing of something
even when, as in psychologizing that object
.

.

.

,

l88

William McDougall, Outline of Psychology (New York:
Scribner's and Sons, 1923) P» xi
»
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is itself an experiencing or thinking.
Second,
all experiencing or thinking is the experiencing or thinking of someone, some person,
some organism.
So far as we positively know,
this someone, this subject, is always a material organism or is embodied in and manifests
itself to us only in and through the medium
of a material organism. 189

He followed this statement with an elaboration of the use
of the verb "to think" in which he likened his usage to
that of Descartes' famous "cognito

,

ergo sum" by way of

indicating that he saw this as the most general form of
This generalized form of experience was, for

experience.

McDougall

,

a unitary whole in which aspects may be seen as

distinguishable but not separable.

His programme for the

construction of a psychology which would deal with the

unitary whole of experience was outlined as follows:
build [s] up his deThe psychologist
scription of the human mind by inference
from the observed facts of behavior, the behavior of men and animals and from the observed facts of experience, facts of his own
experience observed introspectively and
facts of others' experience described and
recorded by them 190
.

.

.

,

.

From

McDougall

'

s

critique of elementism and the "accumu-

lated observations" of "mechanical and atomistic ways

of

thinking" it is obvious that the introspection he speaks
by Wundt
of above is not the same introspection practiced

and Titchener.
^^^ Ibid

190

McDougall argued forcefully against

.

,

p.

40.

Ibid.

,

p

38

.
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"in t rospoc tivc mechanical

psychology" and also against tho

"behavioral mechanical psychology" which was being pro-

pounded by Watson.
This criticism of Watson's psychology by McDougall

points up the fact that when Watson stated his original

position in 1913

>

be was reacting to both the tradition of

introspection (Wundt and Titchener) and also the study of
consciousness (Brentano and McDougall).

The extent of his

criticisms, while well known today, still seems shocking,
to this writer at least,

since, in the first major theoret-

ical publication he made after taking his original stance,

Watson undertook to explain mental images as implicit language responses and also to define affect as slight vase ul

changes in the genitalia.

Given this type of disparity it is not surprising th
and the
the strongest American proponent of "mentalism"
a

foi
creator of behaviorism should find ample opportunity

clash of opinion.

Their debates over the issues were pub-

Behavioi
lished in 1929 under the title of The Bat tle of
that:
In this volume, we find Watson maintaining

He who would introduce consciousness,
vitaldoes so because of spiritualistic and
can
behaviorist
istic leanings. ... The
of his
tube
find no consciousness in the test
He finds no evidence anywhere for
science.
but J he does
L
a stream of consciousness
.

.

.

.

.

.

1
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convincing proof of an over- widening
stream of behavi or

l'ind

Part of McDougall

•

s

rejoinder included the following

colorful account of some missing aspects of behaviorism.
I come into this hall and see a man on this
platform scraping the guts of a cat with
hairs from the tail of a horse; and sitting

quietly in attitudes of rapt attention, are a
thousand persons who presently break out into
wild applause. How will the Behaviorist explain these strange incidents: How to explain
the fact that the vibrations emitted by the
cat-gut stimulate all the thousand into absolute silence and quiescence; and the further
fact that the cessation of the stimulus seems
to be a stimulus to the most frantic activity? Common sense and psychology agree in
accepting the explanation that the audience
heard the music with keen pleasure and vented
their gratitude and admiration for the artist
But the Behavin shouts and hand clappings.
iorist knows nothing of pleasure, pain, of
admiration and gratitude. He has relegated
all such "metaphysical entities" to the dust
heap, and must seek some other explanation.
Let us leave him seeking it. The search will
keep him harmlessly occupied for some centuries to come 192
.

Perhaps even Watson chuckled at McDougall

's

comment in

in
which the concept of consciousness could be approached

such a light hearted way.

It is doubtful, however,

would have found amusement in McDougall'

s

that he

more serious and

consciousness.
theoretical attempts to explicate the role of

neural
In attempting to relate his knowledge of
191 John B. Watson and McDougall, The Battle of Behaviorism (New York: Norton, 1929), P- 26
‘

192 Ibid.

,

p.

63

.
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processes to his conception of a unitary consciousness,
McDougall was up against the same problem that the German

physiological psychologists had faced.

Their solution was

to borrow British associat ionism as a basis for mental op-

eration.

McDougall, of course, was not willing to admit

any explanation that did not meet his empirical criterion
of the unity of consciousness which he knew directly through

introspection.

Thus, in his first published work, a volume

titled Physiological Psychology

,

McDougall solved the prob-

lem by postulating a unitary psychic entity as follows:
We are compelled to admit, or so it seems to
the writer and many others, that the so-called
psychical elements are not independent entities, but are partial affections of a single
this is
substance or being; and since,
material
a
not any part of the brain, is not
substance, but differs from all material substance in that, while it is unitary, it is
yet present, or can act and be acted upon, at
many points in space simultaneously (namely
the various parts of the brain in which
psycho-physical processes are at any moment
occurring) we must regard it as an immateAnd this being,
rial substance or being.
as the ground of
postulated
necessarily
thus
we may
consciousness,
individual
the unity of
^93
individual
call the soul of the
.

.

.

,

.

With this statement, we have come to an important
Up

crossroad in the development of psychological thought.

to this point, we have traced the rise of modern psychology

from philosophy and into various versions of theory.
1

1905)

,

Physiological Psychology (London:
p. 78, McDougall' s emphasis.

^McDougall

,

We

Dent,

have also characterized

I.

ho development of modorn psychol-

ogy in two mutually exclusive ways by considering the main

development of psychology as psychology developed in the
image of the natural sciences; a view which we have con-

trasted with its antagonist psychology as a human science.

With this statement of McDougall we have come to the interesting comparison of the two views and the problems that
exist between them.

3.1.4

A COMMON PROBLEM IN
NATURAL AND HUMAN

SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY
We have placed McDougall in the human scientific camp

because of his basic theoretical position and fundamental
similarity to Brentano.

Thus, his over-all emphasis is

toward the appreciation of immediate experience and the

fundamental recognition of awareness as the most generalized form of experience.

Recall that he likened Descartes'

"cognito" to his "think" and that he asserted that the psyof
chologists' description of the human mind was born out

observation--observation of others' behavior, self -observaothers.
tion, and the reported self -observations of

Yet,

struggling with
in the above quotation we find McDougall
with; namely, how
the same issue that Wundt was struggling

phenomena when
do you account for the unity of conscious
body assert that everythe obvious facts of the biological
has a rather discrete
thing that goes to make up the body
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oharac tor?

Certainly, we are not nurpri

gument because variations

oi'

It

h(m!

to

soo

tli j

h

fir-

have been involved in most

of the philosophy and jjsychology we have considered to this

point.

The fact that Wundt and the Structural school of

psychology, appear to have ended up in the same place that

human scientific psychology also naturally gravitates

to,

requires that we resolve the apparent lack of utility in
the human scientific approach if we are to continue its

meaningful use.
As psychologists, both Wundt and McDougall were con-

cerned to explain consciousness.

Wundt

,

good Newtonian

that he was, started from the bottom up, as it were, and

found that he could only explain the complexity of mental
life by assuming that the elements of experience had some-

how become associated with one another.

Further, he was on

solid ground in assuming the elemental nature of conscious-

ness because; a) the entire cosmos appeared to be composed
of elements and laws and b) nervous sensations in the brain

were obviously punctiform sensations which had arisen in
the sensory surfaces of the body.

McDougall, for his part,

followed Dilthey and Brentano and basically asserted that
fact
the unity of man's conscious life was a more important

conand a better place to start a description of man's

sciousness than any other.
seemed
When they met in the middle, we find that each
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to be missing something.

Wundt, as he reached into the

upper ranges of mental phenomena found himself severely

criticized by Dilthey, and others, because the picture he
was painting was not remotely related to life as they knew
it.

McDougall

,

as he descended into more intimate inter-

face with physical phenomena found himself severely criti-

cized by Watson, and others, because the description he was

making apparently relied upon the out-worn doctrines

of

spiritualism and vitalism.
"The time seems to have come when psychology must dis-

card all reference to consciousness"; Watson retorted as bo

delivered the opening salvo in his reaction to Wundt,
McDougall and the theories they represented:
When it [psychology] needs no longer delude
itself into thinking that it is making mental states the object of observation 19
.

American
This was also the reaction of a good portion of
aspect
psychology and signaled the rise of a very pervasive
thought.
of the character of modern psychological
the human
Since we are not interested in giving up
the history
scientific approach to the characterization of
turn briefly from diof psychology, it is appropriate to

the underlying
rect historical concern and to consider
greater detail.
character of the alternative view in

if,"
"Psychology as the Behaviorist Views
Psychological Review XX ( 1913 ) 158 177

194 Watson,

*

,
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3.2

NATURAL SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY
AND DETERMINISM VS. HUMAN SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY AND FREEDOM
"Understanding has two modes of advance, the gathering

of detail within assigned patterns, and the discovery of

novel pattern with its emphasis on novel detail.

The his-

tory of thought is a tragic mixture of vibrant disclosure

and deadening closure.

The sense of penetration is lost in

the certainty of completed knowledge.

the antichrist of learning.

195
"

This dogmatism is

This sweeping statement by

Whitehead is an appropriate opening to this section for we
must now touch upon one of the classic problems of the

modern era.
Our task is to define the issues of human freedom,

which require a novel pattern of understanding, and mechanical determinism, which is the standard pattern of under-

standing, in such a manner that we can pass between the

horns of the dilemma upon which Wundt and McDougall find
themselves impaled.
In the psychology we have considered to this point,

there has never been any doubt about the fundamental meta-

physical validity of a completely determined world of
atomic elements and immutable laws.

Additionally, we have

been at pains to show the relation between those basic
193 Whitehead, Modes of Thought (New York:

1968 )

,

p

.

58

Free Press,

assumptions and the types of psychological theory that was
created
The first significant departure from tradition that we

found was the psychology of Wilhelm Dilthey which derived
from his insistance that the "individual as an element of

society" was the basic fact upon which psychological theory

should be based.

The approaches of this type which we have

followed up to McDougall, generally have a significantly

greater breadth and intrinsic satisfaction in their formulations about the character of consciousness than is to be

found in other types of psychological theory.

However, as

we have seen with McDougall, changes in the epistemological

basis of the system also require changes in the underlying

metaphysic if greater fundamental coherence is to result.
So far,

the human scientific alternative has not represented

such a shift.
The need for this shift and the lack of it was best

illustrated in the discussion of Brentano

1

s

concept of "in-

tentional inexistence" which he used as a paradigm case for
the act-intention distinction which was basic to his psy-

chology.

As we pointed out then, it is not possible, when

using distinctions of this sort, to cross the boundaries
between the physical and mental worlds without also reducing
the argument to absurdity.

Thus, Brentano could formulate

meaningly treat
the act-intention distinction, but could not
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a matter-intention distinction.

McDougall

'

s

It

is for this reason that

explanation of consciousness sounds so spiri-

tualistic to someone with a material ear and a mechanical

heart
The issue is physical determinism versus human freedom.

All along the historical trail, the orthodox position

of hard-headed physical science has been that the absolute

determinism which exists at the atomic level must also
exclude the possibility for human freedom.

We observed

Laplace's statement that the exact future could be pre-

dicted if we knew the exact state of all particles at one

particular point.

La Mettrie and Russell were quoted in a

similar vein of "hard determinism."

Further, this is also

the view of modern behaviorism whose basic "Laplacian"

assumption is that if we knew all the conditions (stimuli)
then we could exactly predict behavior since the behavioral

responses are lawful functions of external factors.

That

we are not able to completely predict behavior is attributed

by Skinner, and most others, to our lack of knowledge of
the causal stimuli.

While more timid souls are inclined to

ascribe the uncertainty to personal freedom, Skinner's
sentiments are clear enough:
If we are to use the methods of science in
the field of human affairs, we must assume
We
that behavior is lawful and determined.
must expect to discover that what a man does
is the result of specifiable conditions and

Lha t one o these coudi ions have Ixmmi discovered, wo can anLicipal-o and to some oxlojit
determino his actions.
The so Li' is
most commonly used as a hypothetical cause
of action.
So long as external variables go
unnoticed or are ignored, their function is
assigned to an originating agent within the
organism.
If we cannot show what is responsible for a man's behavior, we say that he
himself is responsible for it. 196
I

.

.

.

As Skinner would have it, human freedom

is

simply another

name for ignorance of the actual causative stimuli.
In this day and age it is difficult to excuse Skinner

for such a hard determinism, based as it is upon the cau-

sality notions which derive from classical physics.
is for two reasons:

This

First, classical physics has given way

to atomic physics in which the concept of atomic causality

is no longer applicable since the advent of the indetermi-

nacy principle of quantum mechanics.

Second:

even the

early concepts of Helmholtz and Fechner seem to be more
advanced.

Recall that they both left open the possibili ty

that the operation of the mind could interface with the

known facts of the law of conservation of energy in such
fashion as to:
b)

a)

a

preserve the validity of the law and

insure the freedom of the mind.

Before moving to other aspects of the discussion we
will balance Skinner's behaviorism with the view of another
Skinner, Science and Human Behavior (New York:
The Macmillan Co., 1956), p. 6, 283 quoted in Barbour,
306
Ibid
p
B.

.

,

F.
.

important contemporary psychologist thereby showing that
the Wundt-McDougall problem is still with us.

Carl Rogers

states

believe that psychological science will
advance along the lines of' discovering the
order which exists in human behavior and experience.
As a psychologist I am always
looking for the invariant relationships.
But I am also a therapist, a person who
has lived deeply in human relationships.
X value the person.
Of all the incredible forms of life and non-life which exist in
the universe, the individual human being
seems to me to have the most exciting potential, the greatest possibilities for an expanding development, the richest capacities
for self-aware living. 197
I

.

Rogers,

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

then, can be said to exemplify a modern expression

of the old desire for scientific expression which relates

behavior to prior causation, and the equally great desire
to recognize the fact of responsible personal choice as it

exists, prior to any scientific description, as a prominent
fact in our lives.

THE ACTIVITY OF SELF
AND THE LAWS OF ATOMS

3.2.1

It seems evident that we can neither deny the possi-

bility of behavioral science nor ignore the experience of
responsible choice.

But if we are not careful, we will

find that we have not advanced much further than Descartes

did when he formulated his original solution to the problem
1C

Rogers, On Our Science of Man in William
Man and the Scie nce of Man
Coulson and Rogers, eds
C. E. Merrill Company, 1968), p. 5».
(Columbus, Ohio:

^Carl

R.

.

,
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or how

l.ho

"soul

could

1)0

lodged

ill

Uio body" so

U.at

i

I

could not only enjoy motor functions but also
"have sensations and appetites and thus constitute a true
man."

Re-

lating the activity of self to the laws of atoms has led
either to Descartes' sort of dualism and its many sub-

varieties or to a reductionist point-of-view which asserts
that

the laws of higher levels can be explained in terms of

the laws which explain the lowest levels of existence,

i.e., a physico-chemical explanation.

thus add up to determined people.

Determined atoms

And some method of in-

troducing "slack" in the system seems to be required if we
are to provide for the scientific possibility of human

freedom.

William James struggled with this issue and con-

cluded that the universe requires some "looseness" or

connectedness

1
'

"

dis-

if man's experience of moral responsibility

is to be considered as a viable scientific fact.

198

The first problem to overcome is that of the "splitlevel" universe which was created as a result of the sepa-

ration of mind from matter.

Early scientists needed to

push mentalistic concepts out of the way so they could get
at a more meaningful description of the physical "facts"

and modern psychologists need to push physicalis tic con-

cepts out of the way so they can get at a more satisfying

^^James, The Dilemma of Determinism in The Will
Believe (New York:

Longmans Green and Co., 1921 )

to
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description of menial
indeterminate atoms

is

"facts.

Modern Physics, with its

"

often looked upon as an excuse lor

"sol'tening" the do tortninisin of past scientific views.
the assertion here is that

ever,

How-

there is no more "mental"

or "spiritual" in the probability-wave of modern quantum

physics than there was in the old world of billiard-ball
Either view is equally reductionistic in terms of

atoms.

199
supporting a concept of human freedom.

We will develop this topic at greater length in future

discussions; for the present, we can rely upon the Gestalt

insight that "the whole is more than the sum of its parts."
On this view, complexly organized human behavior is an as-

pect of higher-order levels of complexity whose principleof operation are not derivable from levels of organization

which are of inferior order.

This distinction can be

translated through all biotic levels and into the various

hierarchies of the material world.

However, befoie we

g<

into details it is necessary to tease out the general mean-

ing of the proposition and to understand it in terms

of

I

be

psychological issues we have been treating.
When Dilthey's thought was introduced, we sought to
psychology
demonstrate that his departure from traditional

psychological
was a change in the epistemological basis of

theorizing.
*

In seeking explanations in terms of the

^Barbour, op

.

cit

.

,

Chapter 10.
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empirical facts of his own awareness, he, like the others
who followed him, saw that there were no separate entities
in the unity of consciousness.

This denial of the appro-

priateness of elemental descriptions of consciousness has

subsequently been corroborated by modern physics which

lias

shown that in the physical realm the old concepts of visu-

alizable, independent atoms and the total separation of
the observer from the observed are naive assumptions.

In

their place, we have stress on the interaction of the ob-

server and the observed and the weakness of visual models
in portraying the reality of atomic events.

With these

developments came the realization that the connection between theory and experiment is very indirect and that

theory can no longer be viewed as a literal representation
of reality.
One of the ways which the physical sciences reacted
to this situation was to conclude that

theories ai

useful means of coordinating observations.

e

only

Percy Bridgman

developed the view that concepts should be totally identified with performable experimental observations.

"The con-

operations
cept is synonymous with the corresponding set of
definihe said, and the subsequent effects of "operational

psychological
tion" upon the approaches thought useful to

experimentation are well known to even the beginning

2 r)k

student of modern psychology

.

The development of opera tionism was a substantial con-

tribution to all types of scientific inves tigation and we
see its epistemological implications as a major corroboration of the human scientific

insistence upon the empirical

validity of the unity and scientific knowability of conscious life.
tha

L

Of course,

this comparison is not to suggest

the methods which seemed appropriate to human scien-

tists and the methods which are appropriate to operational

definition in the physical sciences bear any obvious similarity.

Rather, both operationism and the human scientific

approach are to be seen as reactions, which came at different times,

in different ways, and for different reasons,

to

the inappropriateness of attempting to account for the

basis of knowledge with an epistemological atomism.

As we

have said earlier, epistemological changes are insufficient
to resolve the basic issues which inhibit meaningful inter-

pretation of the interface between physical and mental phenomena.

It is not until we change

the metaphysics of mate-

rialism which was the basis of the old atomistic episte-

mology that we will be able to escape the dilemma upon
which the spirits of Watson and McDougall are still
00

Bridgman The Logic of Modern Physics (New York:
1927 ) P* 5*
The Macmillan Co
See Chapter 5 for an expanded discussion of the character of scientific knowledge and its relation to philosophy and psychology.
,

.

»

#

skewered

This point

is

also coiTohoral.i'd by

t'lio

l‘a<

I.

)

r r

I.hal.

their modern counterparts, Skinner and Rogers, seem headed
lor the same late in spite of the intervening years of sci-

entific progress in the behavioral sciences.

THE LAWS OF ATOMS AND
THE ACTIVITY OF SELF

3.2.2

In focusing more closely upon the basic issue of meta-

physics and its relation to the problems of psychological
theory, we should also survey a Little larger piece of the

landscape as we begin to burrow into metaphysical abstractions

.

In his poem "In Memoriam" Tennyson invokes a priestess

from the vaults of death and implores her to reveal her
secrets:

"’The stars,’

she whispers,

’blindly run.’"

"Tennyson goes to the heart of the difficulty" Whitehead

writes
and states starkely the whole philosophical
Each molecule blindly runs.
problem.
The human body is a collection of molecules.
Therefore, the human body blindly runs, and
therefore there can be no individual responsibility for the actions of the body. If you
once accept that the molecule is definitely
determined to be what it is, independently of
any determination by reason of the total organism of the body, and if you further admit
that the blind run is settled by the general
mechanical laws, there can be no escape from
this conclusion 201
.

.

.

.

In this poetic statement and Whitehead's assertion, we have
20i

Whitehead, Science and the Modern World

,

pp

.

77-7<s

»

Ili<'

conl-rai

problem

ol

has charac torizod

Llial

thought.

relation bo Lwoon mind and body

I,

Ik*

I,

ho entire development of western

Since we have soon the historical eoritoxl, we can

now focus upon the issues i.hernsolvos.

Our problem is this, since mental experiences derive
from

(die

actions of the body, including its internal ac-

tions, we seem forced to conclude that they are either to-

tally determined by the body or at least are restricted lo

those types of occurrences which do not determine the motions of the body.

In neither case do wo find a position

that is useful for human scientific psychology.

If we opt

for the view that the mind cannot originate experiences
then we

siial

I

have

to

assort that the human being

responsibili ty for the actions of his body.

lias

no

On the other

hand, oven if we admit the possibility of some undetermined

mental experiences, we are still without a means of affecting the body because the theory does not provide that mental experiences can act on bodily functions.

But,

the

human scientific tradition asserts that we know this action
intuitively.
.

.

.

"The mighty of the content of mental Life

which is consciously lived and originally given with

immediate power" was the way Dilthey described

it;

however,

this view does not prevail against the arguments of deter-

ministic psychologists, e.g., Skinner, unless we can modify
the basis for argumentation.
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states of the body, or both, and a groat deal of time,
ta ont and effort has gono
l

into

the creation of the various

theories that characterize modern psychological thought,
hut

we do not need to go into them here because the way

tin'

present argument is formed (assuming its validity) the ren

I

issue is quite simple.

Either tho bodily molecules blindly run or
If they do blindly ran, tho
they do not.
in discussing
mental states
bodily actions.
This statement would be

a.

proof of the behavioris!

claim if it wore not for tho fact that modern science has
shown that tho basic evonts of the molecular world are not

independent of the external world.

We now know that tho

Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle applies to a world

thal

is

nothing like the atomic entities which have been assumed as
the basis for the metaphysics and epistemology of modern

psychological thought.

Tho key to this criticism of the

asdoctrine of materialism is to be found in Whitehead’s

sertion that tho whole concept of materialism applies
very abstract entities.

By this he means that the original

abstracting
doctrines wore established as a result of
202

Ib id

.

,

p

.

79

•

to
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spec xal descriptive terminoLogy which applied
only to very

narrow aspects of the real phenomena; thereby, ignoring
the
richness of the interrelationships of the entities in question.

In his words, we have:

The concrete enduring entities are organisms,
so that the plan of the whole influences the
very characters of the various subordinate
organisms which enter into it.
In the case
oi the animal, the mental states enter into
the plan of the total organism and thus modify the plans of the successive subordinate
organisms until the ultimate smallest organisms, such as electrons, are reached.
Thus an electron within a living body is different from an electron outside it, by reason
of the plan of the body.
And this plan
includes the mental state 203
.

.

.

.

The elements which are so modified by the plan of the body

are still viewed as "blindly running" only they now do so
in accord with the properties of the organism in which they

find themselves.

Whitehead calls this doctrine a substitu-

tion for the doctrine of materialism and appropriately

names it "The Theory of Organic Mechanism."
With this formulation, we are back to the necessity of

unders tanding the relationship between the whole and the
part.

To psychologists, already familiar with the Gestalt

tradition that it is possible to discern immediate wholes
in primary perception, the statement that a whole is not

simply a juxtaposition of previously separate elements is
quite acceptable.
203 Ibid.,

p.

However, since the Gestalt whole is

79

»

Whitehead's emphasis.
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elements of

there has not been very much emphasis upon

going beyond the bare formulation of the dependence of the
pari on the whole.
However, on the organismic concept, we can recognize
that there are organisms of different complexities.

In

broadest terms they can be said to range from electrons,
atoms, molecules, cells, organs, organisms, groups and

communities.

Such a generalized approach to organism imme-

diately suggests that various levels of analysis are appropriate to understanding the various levels of "wholes”

which are to be found in existence.

Since these various

levels differ as to the complexity of their organization,
the concept of level forms an important part of the meta-

physical alternative which is offered by the organismic
concept
In this view, a level of being is actually a meta-

physical concept.

In the older atomistic view the ideas of

mechanistic laws (physical and psychic) were defined in
terms of a methodological program and were not seen as

metaphysical concepts.

The fact is however, that such

mechanism usually became a one-level metaphysics
rialism or atomism.

of mate-

This tendency is especially marked in

American psychology which has had such a long-s tanding

260

abhorrence

of'

philosophical issues.

Since the focus upon

materialism has been so dominant in the modern era, psychology has always been at a loss

to

surmount the charges

of vitalism and spiritualism whenever they were levied

against any theory that sought
lowest level of "real" things.

to

raise its head above the

Any transition from dead

matter to living func tion--ospeci a Lly conscious functions-is

viewed with suspicion and alarm by those who have truly

fathomed the meaning of materialism.
3.3

the philosophy of organism
AND PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY
What we have seen of the philosophy of organism to

this point is essentially those aspects of its f ornmlat ions

which have some direct articulation with various problems
of traditional psychology.

Rather than continuing to "back

into" the highly complex and abstract system which Whitehead

has created, it will be more useful if we briefly introduce

Whitehead’s philosophy in a more formal fashion.
Interestingly, Whitehead, like those in the human scientific trend which we have followed, uses systematic concepts which are derived from basic aspects

rience

of

human expe-

.

We can refresh the idea in our minds with a few cita-

tions from earlier material:
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Fochner stated:
will, appear to you as your mind from the
internal standpoint,, where you yourself are
this mind, will on the other hand, appear
from the outside as the material basis of the
mind
VTtiat

and
The idealist may trace the action of the
stimuli to a mental reason, the materialist
may attribute choice and attention to a material reason.
We, however, take the facts as
they appear directly on observation, where at
one time the material side, at another the
mental side provides the evidence for the
changed distribution.

From Dilthey we have:
only from the depths of lived experience
can the strong impressions of [satisfaction,
expansion and fulfillment] bo drawn it is not
from inferences that our knowledge of causation, which makes the true system of Life accessible to us, has arisen.
.

.

.

—

In Brentano we find:

My position in psychology is that of empiricism, experience alone is my teacher.
.

and,

.

.

the science of psychical appearances should:

show forth the totality of psychic elements the combination of which makes up all
psychic phenomena.
.

.

.

Finally, there is McDougall
build [s] U P his deThe psychologist
scription of the human mind by inference from
the observed facts of behavior of men and of
animals and from the observed facts of experience, facts of his own experience observed
intro spec tively and facts of other's expertence described and recorded by them.
.

.

.
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Each in his own way, the early pioneers of the human
scientific approach felt the need to establish the validity
of the personal experience which was the main part of their

personal identity.

Whitehead takes a radical stand on the matter:
any doctrine which refuses to place huoutside nature, must find in
experience
man
descriptions of human experience factors
which also enter into the descriptions of
If
less specialized natural occurrences.
there be no such factors, then the doctrine
of human experience as a fact within nature
is mere bluff, founded upon vague phrases
whose sole merit is a comforting familiarity.
We should either admit dualism, at least as
a provisional doctrine, or we should point
out the identical elements connecting human
experience with physical science. 204
.

.

.

We have seen that Whitehead's metaphysics is a set of gen-

eral principles which are applicable to all levels of

events and that the universe which is constructed with such

levels and events is therefore both continuous and interrelated.

In the abstract, all that sounds rather remote

that
but it is also obviously true that man is a part of

descriptive
universe and is therefore subject to the same

properties, with one important addition.

Namely, huma n

portion of
consciousness is our direct aware n ess of the one

reality that

we
f

can know fro m the inside.

of different
As Whitehead moves to the description
20 ^Whitehead

Press, 1967

))
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•

,

Adventures of Ideas (New York:
184-185*
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entities which, exist on different ontological levels, he

maintains the coherence of the system by asserting that the
same internal processes of which wo are conscious, in the

portion of reality of which we are internally aware, are
also present in all other entities on all other levels.

This realization is the basis for Whitehead's departure
from the old metaphysics and can also be seen to far surpass the assertions of the human scientific psychology sts
who were merely attempting to chip away enough of the mono-

lithic material world to give their spirits, which they

knew they had, enough room to breathe.

For Whitehead, by

extreme contrast, human experience is the paradigm case

of

all events in nature and therefore it is taken as exempli-

fying the generic attributes of al

experience of anj ac-

tual entity on any level in the whole universe.

Whitehead, has therefore turned the tables on the sciin
entific world, instead of explaining human experience

level entities
terms of low level entities, he explains low
in terms of human experience.
was menAnother important aspect of human experience
of Kant.
tioned earlier in connection with the philosophy
is
Thus, for Kant the process whereby there
experience is a process from subjectivity to
or
apparent objectivity. The philosophy of
ganism inverts this analysis and explains
objectivity
the process as proceeding from
objectivthe
from
to subjectivity, namely,
a datum,
is
world
ity, whereby the external

to the subjectivity, whereby there is one
individual experience 205
.

A key word in this quotation is the word "inverts."

White-

head makes infrequent but important reference to the idea
of inversion when he is attempting to show that the normal

methods of analyzing material or mental phenomena are actually based upon the use of mental operations which are

among the highest and most sophisticated modes of human
functioning.

He does not condemn this process but

tie

is

extremely forceful in rejecting it as constituting the sole

method of human experience.

Undue concentration upon the

world of abstract thought has led us away from the realization that we also can and do know an important part of re-

ality from the inside.

Hence, Whitehead never misses an

opportunity to get things inverted (in this case, the resultant would be right side up) so that he can begin to
focus upon the validity and explanatory power, of which
are immediately aware and know by virtue of the fact that

human experience, as an important instance of an event

in

nature, also demonstrates generic features of all experience.

MATERIALISM AND ORGANISM

3.3.1

Now that we have human experience firmly established

within nature we can reexamine the all important problems
of volition, intention, purpose, act, etc.,
'

added

(J

;

Whitehead, Process and Reality

,
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We are not treating

these categories simply because they seem
like important

loose-ends xn the traditional approach.

On the contrary,

the precise reason for their apparent ad
hoc character

under the old metaphysics is to be found in a
central aspect of the organismic alternative.
The core of the argument runs like this,

The natural

science out of which psychological thought grew was based
upon principles which essenlially assorted the position
thal nature was
Wc have

i

dead— mater

j

ul bodies and inexorable lows.

ollowed the development of these concepts and

appreciated the fact that, while there originally was

h

a

broad cultural and spiritual context of meaning in which
the increasing specificity of scientific thought could

grow,

the scientific picture of reality gradually assumed

prominence and claimed to be a complete system of truth.
However, we now find cause to criticize the basic assumptions of that whole era.

In place of materialism we have

organism, and it is in organism that we can find expression
o±

the self- creative aspects of being that were excluded

the old view.

in

We can say that these aspects were excluded

because of the following reasons:
ysis of causality.

First,

take Hume

1

s

anal-

He basically ended up concluding that
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what we know in sense perception does not provide
the data
for its own interpretation.

So causality just became a

habit of the mind and nature was without its own reasons
for doing things.

Second, Newton had created a great edi-

fice of physicaL understanding whoso main ingredients, material bodies and laws oT motion, had no intrinsic relationship.

The Newtonian concept mass, for example, gradually

became understood to offer no reason for the law of gravitation

.

These two dominant factors of the scientific era provide a picture of nature in which no reasons can be found
for the events of nature

— sense

perception is devoid of any

data for its own interpretation and the basic system of

scientific interpretation does not offer any reason

phenomena behave as they do.

wiiy

the

What has happened in this

progressively abstract development of science is that those
aspects of the universe which we directly experience and
the ways in which we experience them have been gradually

pushed aside.

The increasing adherence to the idea of iso-

lated material entities and imposed laws has led to the

conclusion that nature aims at nothing.

When all scien-

tific knowledge is restricted to a metaphysics which is

based on narrow abstractions which give no reasons for the

possibility of life and the phenomena of life are therefore
forced to appear illusory.

Dead nature can give no reasons
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for events since only life can express aim at value.
\

Whitehead thereto re
because if we continue

,

to

wants to invert things precis**

l.y

generalize about nature by basing

those generalizations only on the highly abstract knowledge

which is acquired on the basis of sense perception, we will
find no reasons, and we will forever be unable
our intuitive modes of understanding.

to

recognize

It is in our own

deep experience "the mighty reality of the content of mental life" that we find the penetrating understanding which

enables us to realize that it is the essence of life to
exist for its own sake and to exist as the intrinsic reali-

zation of absolute self-on joymon t
aim.

,

creative activity and

206

3.3.2

EFFICIENT CAUSE
AND FINAL CAUSE
Against the old sharp division between nature and Lite

Whitehead is asserting that the two should be fused together
into a system which sees them as "essential factors in

1

be

composition of 'really real' things whose interconnections
and individual characters constitute the universe,

„207

_

the resultant web of interconnected entities which inter-

penetrate each other's boundaries, Whitehead stresses the

necessity of also regarding each event as an entity which
Whitehead
"'^Ibid.

,

p.

,

Modes of Thought
150*

,

p.

152.
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lias

its own .perspective* on the world.

Tho event LLseir

-

an

bo considered as a moment of experience
which takes other

events into account and which responds to them.
In contrast to Hume's causality, Whitehead finds that

causality is far more than a mere habit of mind.

Causality

in the organismic framework is a complex process in which

the internal and external factors in the awareness

of an entity are woven into the pattern of self-creation.

Thus, every new event is partially a product of the condi-

tions which preceeded it.

These previous events are its

data to which it must conform but by which it is not totally
determined.

We may say that these data are the efficient

cause of tho event Ln question.

This

is

Hume's causality

whose relation with the other aspects of Aristotelian cau-

sality we have already explored.

In addition to efficient

causality, each entity contains an element of self-causation
or self-crea t ion in which it is in the nature of an entity
to take account of or unify the data which are presented to
it.

The event unifies the data in its own manner and in

accord with its own perspective on the universe.

Thus each

event is seen as contributing something unique to the

process of its creation.

Events, then, are not simply re-

quired to repeat the past but can also select from various

possibilities that are open to them and thereby produce a
novel synthesis which is more than the sum of its parts.

Given this sort of interaction of efficient cause and
self cause we find that the resultant of the process is to
pi'ovide,

via the mechanism of creative selection of unreal-

ized potentiality, in terms of the entities’ own goals and
aims, the equivalent of final causation.

This self-creation which ultimately results in final

causation is seen to operate under what Whitehead terms
J

e c t i ve

aim.

"

Subjective aim is an expression of the

internal reality of things.

It is also Whitehead's way oi

phrasing the insight of internal/external and within/without
that we have found useful in earlier discussions.

Here,

however, in the philosophy of organism, the concept finds
it most mature expression.

In this view, each event is an

individual instant of experience which is controlled by its
own subjective aim.

Antecedent events which are the influ-

ence of the past upon the present event can be viewed ex-

ternally

a!s

efficient causality, they can also be viewed

internally as the objectified past which produces a definite pattern for the new momentary subject to reproduce.
Were it not for the possibility that each new subject can
also possess an element of creative freedom there could be
no escape from empty reenactment of past experience.
ever,

How-

each subject is able to influence the coming together

of the data which are presented to it and thereby create a

new unity which combines past experience with present

70

experience and which, in turn, presents itself to the world
as a datum for the future experience of other entities and

also, of course, as a datum for its own future experience.
Thus, if we focus on the external view and consider

only efficient causality we are then concerned only with
the transition between events.

In Fochner's words,

material hides the spiritual."

On the other hand,

"flu*

if we

focus on the internal view and consider only final causality
we are then concerned only with the ephemeral process

change

.

ol'

Again in Fechnor's view we have "the spiritual

hiding the material."
Another way of phrasing the Whi teheadian insight

is

I

>

roaiizo that both the material and the spiritual are re-

quired to be fused together so that we can realize that
that which is "really real" is the actual

entity which com-

bines them both into the unity of its existence.
in separation from actual entities the;ro is
nothing, merely non-entity-- "The rest is

silence

.

The reality of the actual entity is contained in its sub-

jective aim, its identity, its own inner awareness of its
own being and its own destiny.

It is this reality that

Whitehead would have us enjoy and not turn away from in
favor of abstract scientific views which focus only on efficient causality and the external aspects of entities.

This also applies to the transcendental philosophical views
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In

the progressive no ua
I

potentiality
1

j

na

1

ol

causality,

I

i

za

l

i

on of

l

he pattern and

the past under the momentary influence of
the actual

entity is actualizing its own

synthesis by a process which Whitehead calls "conceptual

prehension

.

The point to remember is that the fact that
each individual occasion is transcended by
the creative urgo
belongs to the essential
constitution of each such occasion. It is
not an accident which is irrelevant to the
completed constitution of any such occasion.
In the formation of each occasion of actuality the swing over from re-enaction to
anticipation Is duo to the intervening touch
of mentality.
Whether the ideas thus introduced by the novel conceptual prehension bo
old or now, they have this decisive result,
that the occasion arises as an effect facing
its past and ends as a cause facing its future.
In betweon there lies the teleology
of the Uni verse 2(5%
,

.

IMPLICATIONS

3.3*3

Lot us go back for a moment and review the basic as-

sertions.

First, the philosophy of organism puts forward

a

metaphysical view which is applicable to all events on all
levels.

Second, the universe is clearly seen to be unified,

continuous and interrelated.

Man is therefore obviously

a

part of this system and we therefore arrive at another im-

portant realization.

Third, it is in human experience that

wo can know this one aspect of nature from the inside.

'^Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas
sis added.

,

pp

.

193-1-9^

>

W<‘

empha-

272

are deeply aware of this internal reality and in its es-

sence it forms "self."
ol

It is where we entertain the data

the past and respond to

is really that

in

I

he destiny of i'uture ends.

It

between where "there lies the teleology

of the universe."
For the purposes of psychological

theory and educa-

tional practice, we must realize that both mind and matter
are simply two separate aspects, two different patterns of

events, which have been abstracted from a single unified
but complex entity.

If we are concerned to educate chil-

dren, we should not shrink from the realization that the

highly abstract knowledge which we consider

to be

the es-

sence of education has by and large been developed in ex-

clusion from the complete reality of existence.

However,

it is one thing to criticize the mataphysics and epistemol-

ogy of the materialist cosmology; it will be quite another
to see the implications of the new view and to revise our

approach to the psychological foundations of education and
curriculum construction in accordance with them.
We must now seek to balance whatever "vibrant disclo-

sure" is to be found in the philosophy of organism against
the "deadening closure" of the philosophy of materialism.

We cannot heighten our ability to know unless we enhance

our ability to appreciate the sense of penetration which

comes from the "discovery of novel pattern with

i

ts

emphasis
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on novel detail.-

In this task, we share a common goal

with those we would presume to educate for
the teleology of
the universe truly operates in the being
of man.

Further aspects of the organismic reinterpretation
of
issues
science, philosophy and psychology will

m

be con-

sidered in Chapters Five and Six, after consideration
of
the historical development of psychological
thought is com-

pleted in Chapter Four.
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EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY
AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGY
By now, we have considered enough of the history
of

psychological thought to be able to develop the implications
of Whiteheadian process philosophy.

As we have seen,

the

basic metaphysical issues which Whitehead raises apply to

concepts which were primarily developed in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries.

The result of this is that it is

therefore possible to talk about the psychological implications of Whitehead'

s

thought with considerable disengage-

ment from the topical issues of current psychology.

How-

ever, while that is possible it is not desirable since it
is important to understand something of the relationship

between any new development and its predecessors.

In addi-

tion, if our intent is to understand rather than to pre-

scribe, to describe rather than decry, we must seek to ar-

ticulate the relationship between alternative points-ofview.

Appearances to the contrary not withstanding, the intent of the previous historical material has been to provide
a preparation for the introduction of the process alterna-

tive rather than to compile a history of the development of

psychological thought.

In past centuries and until the

early part of this one the central issues with which we
have dealt are rather closely related both in terms of the

ideational base and also in terms of their relative

geographical diffusion.

In the twentieth century the situa-

tion is quite different, for we now have the burgeoning

growth of American psychology to deal with.

Since we have

already made the basic statement as to the departures which
are suggested by the organismic alternative we can now,

with this portion of the history, focus primarily upon the
contrasts between the organismic approach and the various
dominant schools of psychological thought.

Thus,

the fol-

lowing rendition of psychological history will be even more
stylized and topical than that which has already been presented.

In a very important way, this is purely a practi-

cal matter since it is obviously impossible to serve the

purpose of this presentation while clinging to the goal of
a detailed account of modern psychology.

Twentieth century American psychology is generally
recognized to have begun its mature formulation just about
the turn of the century.

The initial phase of this devel-

opment which lasted until about 1930 is a period in which

psychology was divided into various "schools."
divisions are generally agreed to encompass:

These main
a)

associa-

tionism, which is the old British school reshaped into the

American stimulus-response format, focused primarily on
learning and memory, b) structural psychology, the development and demise of which we have already considered--Wundt

and Titchener being the key figures, placed greatest
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emphasis upon sensation, c) functional psychology, the
fiist American school, tended to be diffuse but generally

focused on "what" was done and "why," d) behaviorism, originated with Watson in 1912, primarily concerned with motor
activity, e) Gestalt psychology, originated in Germany in
1912, primarily concerned with patterned perception and
f) psychoanalysis,

originated in Austria in 1900 with Freud.

At the beginning of the twentieth century the situa-

tion with the developing schools was quite similar to the

conditions which prevailed at the beginning of its predecessor, the nineteenth century.

In both cases, the growth

and development of the newer views was being spurred on by
a strong reaction to the older traditions.

At the begin-

ning of the earlier century, psychology gave up the philosophier's armchair for safety and security of the laboratory

and its recorded data.

By 1900 the trend was so well es-

tablished, that psychologists were finding far more inter-

esting subjects for empirical investigation than the "old"
subject of consciousness.

Associationism was the main

theoretical position that was available, although even

before the advent of Behaviorism there was a shift of em-

phasis toward the study of behavior and the use of objective methods as opposed to introspection.

In general, at

the turn of the century there was an abundance of open and

interesting questions to pursue, a generally accepted

27 «

rejection of the "classical'' approach to
the study of consciousness and a youthful vigor and optimism.
E. G. Boring
writing in 1950 stated:

Psychology as an institution, replicating the
life of an individual, has now passed beyond
the adolescent to an independent maturity of
both living and thinking. 209
Thus, the period of the "schools" in psychology is
equiva-

lent to the thirty year adolescence of the "being" we
know

today as modern psychology.

Boring follows the above

statement with the observation that, "Actually the change
has been secured more by proliferation than by individual

growth."

We would certainly agree in the sense that the

fractionated personality of modern psychology is probably
a direct result of the deep conflict and extreme identity

crisis which it suffered during its adolescence.

With this brief over-view we can now turn to the stories of the schools themselves.

Taking them in the order

mentioned above, the first major division is that of Associationism
4.0.1

ASSOCIATIONISM
Associat ionism is obviously an old school of thought

whose history we have covered in considerable detail.

The

figure of one man looms of considerable importance for the

doctrine of associat ioni sm in the nineteenth century
209

Boring, History of Experimental Psychology

,

p.

742.
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because he simultaneously deflected the course of the
doctrine and created a new and important approach to psycho-

logical experimentation.

Hermann Ebbinghaus (I85O-I909)

also came about his important discovery in an interesting
way.
Boring 210 relates that Ebbinghaus, at an early point
in his career, spent seven years in independent study during

which he ran across a copy of Fechner's Elements of Psycho physic s in a second-hand bookshop in Paris, became interested in the possibility of exploring the higher mental

processes and set to work on the problem.

He did most of

the work on his formulation while living in England and

therefore quite naturally came across the associationist

approach to mental functioning.

With the theory from Eng-

land and the method from Fechner, Ebbinghaus created the
first empirical study of association or (in the new frame
of reference) memory.

His was a rare pioneering effort in

its own right and doubly significant because his original

data yielded memory curves which are still valid for that
type of experiment and, of course, the nonsense syllable

will forever stand as a symbol of his inventive genius.

Needless to say he gave associationistic theory
Ivan Pavlov

(

a big boost.

1849 - 1936 ) was also operating at this

time with quite another slant on associationism.

The ver-

satility of the doctrine is shown by the fact that Pavlov
210

Ibid., pp. 386-387.
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the physiologist could also apply

it,

to

the relations be-

tween glandular secretions and muscular movements.

This

adaptability of the associationist doctrine brings to
mind
Lowry's cryptic comment regarding J. Mill's associationism
to the effect that:

"there was simply nothing that Lockean

mental mechanism could do for an encore."
By far the major figure in the American school of as-

sociationism was Edward Thorndike (1874-1949), not only because he was a well-known and influential psychologist but

also because it is said of him that "he represents the

closest approach to a purely associationistic system since

James Mill." 211

Apparently, there was room for an encore,
i

and Thorndike made it

.

Thorndike saw psychology as the

study of stimulus-response connections but also went far

beyond the narrow traditional view of stimulus and response

Practically everything from external stimulation to hypothetical internal states seemed to be connected with responses which themselves could range from muscle twitches
to mental arousal.

He is best known for the so-called "law

of effect," which basically means that behavior which has a

welcomed effect is learned as the correct response (the response became fixated by "connection" with the stimulus).
His later work, done with humans rather than cats, prompted
211
pp.

Marx and Hillix, Systems and Theories in Psychology

116 - 117

.
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a revision of the

theory in which the eoncepi

„r reward

replaced that of effect as the key variable.
Thorndike led a long and active career in
psychology
during which he published extensively on highly
technical
subjects and did much, via his learning theory
toward de-

fining human learning.

This interest led him into mental

testing and also into educational practices.

He published

a work in 1903 entitled Educational Psychology
which was

closely followed by Mental and Social Measurements

These

.

texts largely established the basis of educational psychol-

ogy as distinct from pedagogy and child-study. 212

In addi-

tion they also brought the first application of Galton-

Pearson correlative statistics into the area of predicting
educational success.
It remains to be said of Thorndike's psychology,

that

because of the mechanistic determinism which is inherent
in the whole associationis t program, Thorndike found him-

self severely criticized for destroying human values.
ever, he did not see it that way;

How-

speaking of the need to

treat man and nature by the method of science, Thorndike

asserted
Thus, at last, man may become ruler of himself
as well as the rest of nature.
For strange
as it may sound man is only free in a world
212

Boring,

ojd.

ci t

.

,

p.
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whose every event he can understand and foresee.
Only so can he guide it. 21.3
Further, speaking in quite another context, he said of phi-

losophy and its relation to psychology:

Under no circumstances, probably, could I
have been able or willing to make philosophy
my business. 214
Thus, we see that the major popularizer of the doctrine of

associationism in this country also established the doctrine
as a methodology and was not concerned with either the phi-

losophical issues or those aspects of conscious life that
were ignored by the doctrine.

Thorndike's psychology was

clearly in the tradition of psychology as a natural science
approaches
and we may therefore, safely assume that modern

upon a very narto educational psychology were established
based on an
row view of the mind of man which was, in turn,

impoverished philosophical doctrine.
declined in
After Thorndike retired, associationism
medley of
systematic importance and degenerated into a
became
methodological applications in which associations
on between the S and
simply whatever it was that was going
the R in S-R psychology.

Clark Hull used it in his elabo-

Spence and Guthrxe have
rate hypothetical-deductive theory,
in their own theories
applied doctrinaire association theory

op

.

213 Edward L. Thorndike, quoted in Marx and Hillix,
1^4
cit
p
.

21

.

.

Ibid

.

,

p

118.
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learning.

In addition other important atlempts Lo use

the doctrine by alloying it with other types of psycho-

logical theory are to be found in the work of Miller and
Dollard, whose f rustration-aggression hypothesis was a mixture with Freudian psychology.

Tolman achieved a synthesis

with Gestalt psychology which was concerned with the association of stimuli with each other into "sign-gestal ts
while Skinner, on the other hand, requires some sort of as-

sociation between the response and the reward in order for
the behavior of the animal to be modified.

In all, it is

easy to casually agree with Marx and Hillix when they conclude

:

It is clear that the associationistic principle must be accorded a key role in psychology,
whatever the ultimate fate of the various systems and theories which build upon it as a
necessary and sufficient principle. Some kind
of associationism is certainly necessary, in
a methodological if not systematic or theoretical sense
.

.

.

They continue by equating the longevity of the doctrine
with its vitality and conclude by stating:
It will be most interesting to observe the
fate of associationism under the increased
empirical and theoretical attack which it is
now sustaining, as in the rapidly expanding
research utilizing mathematical models. 215

We find several major problems with the above summary which
is a typical commentary on associationism.

^^^Marx and Hillix, Ibid

.

,

p.

128.

First, is the

suggestion that methodological associationism can somehow
be a useful doctrine.

This statement clearly shows the

typical American disengagement from philosophical issues.

Observe the levels that must be transversed in order to get
to

the real problem with associationism.

Methodology would

have to fall back upon some systematic theory, which in
turn would require an appropriate epistemology which could

only meaningly be based upon a correspondingly harmonious

metaphysics.

Yet, we rarely address these issues, pre-

ferring instead to elaborate more sophisticated methodological approaches while assuming that tilings like math

models can represent a challenge to the doctrine.

If a

challenge did occur it could only be a methodological one

which was capable of destroying the one methodology which
it challenged and thereby serving only to prepare the way

for the regeneration of a new one from the underlying

philosophical basis.

One may call such replacement "vital-

ity" but it hardly seems that either the death, transfigu-

ration or creation of such methodologies has anything to
add to the study of psychology as a human science.
4.0.2

STRUCTURAL PSYCHOLOGY
Structural psychology is the next system on our orig-

inal list and we mention it here solely for the sake of

continuity since there is nothing to add to the commentary

already provided in Section 3*0*3*

^.0.3

FUNCTIONAL PSYCHOLOGY
Functional psychology, it is widely held, is difficult

to classify because it has never developed a tightly
defined

anc

^

Formal systematic position.

It can however, be broken

down into phases which coincide with major aspects of its
development.

These are; its antecedents, its founders and

two styles of popularizers

.

Taken in order, we have first

the antecedents who were William James (1842-1910), James

Cat tell (1860-1944) and G. Stanley Hall (1844-1942).
of course is

the,

James,

best known of the group and we have already

considered his criticisms of Wundtian elementism in an earlier section.

Rather than repeating that material here, we

can consider the program which James offered in place of
the older doctrine.

James, good American that he was, was concerned that

psychology should be pragmatic.

There needed to be some

value and use that could come from the study of psychology.

Accordingly, he stressed that psychology should study the
functions that man's behavior served in terms of his useful

adaptation to the environment.

Of course, his most famous

contributions concern the character of consciousness.

In

the original contributions he made to this area, James in-

veighed against any view which did not account for the obvious facts that consciousness was a unitary and individu-

alistic process which in addition to being able to make

'
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issuos wore doop philosophical issues and spent

l

ho

portion of his career as a philosopher rather than
chologist.

later
a psy-

We will consider this aspect of his work in

greater detail in later chapters when we come to further

Whiteheadian implications for personaiity and educational
theory.

Here, we will simply remark that James' concern

with the necessary philosophical basis of psychological
theory was shared by Whitehead who considered that one of
his "preoccupations" had been to "rescue their [James,

Dewey and Bergson] type of thought from the change of antiintellec tualism

.

"

George Miller has provided a useful

summary of James' contribution in which he concludes that
it is easier to appreciate him than to attempt to evaluate

him.

His inspiration, sensitivity to the richness of inner

experience, intelligence and penetrating prose all add up
to the fact that

"it is obvious that he was and still is,

the foremost American psychologist." 217
G.

Stanley Hall and James Cattell were highly influen-

tial at the time of the dawning of American psychology.

Hall was the first American Ph.D., under James, and con-

tributed greatly to the actual founding of psychological
216

Whitehead
.

,

Process and Reality

,

p.

vii.

217
‘George A. Miller, Psychology (New York:
Row, 1962 ), p. 78.

Harper and
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science, founded the American Journal of Psychology and the

Journal of Genetic Psychology, and was twice president of
the American Psychological Association.

He is known as a

genetic psychologist because of his concern with development
in humans and animals.

His work was heavily influenced by

the rising tide of enthusiasm for Darwin's work.

To Hall,

the study of children was the way to "reveal" the j>ast his-

tory of the human race.

He was very impressed by the wide

and varied evidences of recapitulation that were to be

found in what he considered to be the original psychological
tendencies of the human race.
It is perhaps this very tendency to account for human

physical and psychological development in terms of its com-

parison with environmental aspects that was most responsible
for alleviating the need to create a highly abstract ex-

planatory theory.

Hall described rather than explained and

as a result produced much data in the area of child devel-

opment and education.

As such he left a legacy of impor-

tant data; unfortunately, his emphasis upon the evidences
of recapitulation created a dominant bias to see most child

behavior as evidences of lower-order phylogenetic phenomena
and therefore, was not led to emphasize the emergent as-

pects of that same evolutionary process.

It is to James

Cat tell that we can turn for the creation of a dominant

preoccupation of American psychology-individual differences.
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Practically every author who deals with Cat
toll or Wundt
and his first American Student, remarks
about Cattell

's

aggressive insistence on becoming Wundt's first
iaboratory
assistant and his further insistence on studying
individual
differences, a topic for which Wundt feit no enthusiasm
other than labeling it "ganz Americanish" (completely

American)
Cat tell founded the journal Psychological Review and
was
a major proponent of mental testing.

Like Thorndike, his

student, he saw Galton’s measurement and statistical meth-

odology as an important method of quantifying people into
rankings and ratings.

Because of the strong bias toward

the evolutionary aspects of development, Cattell's "mental

tests" were biased toward detecting differences in more

elementary bodily functions rather than higher-order mental
abilities.
Cattell, as might be expected, was a highly independent

individual

,

even to the point of living fourty miles out of

town and refusing to submit his children to traditional
schooling, preferring instead to allow their independent

exploration of both the physical and intellectual worlds.
Ernest Hilgard relates that Cattell used graduate students
to meet some of the highly individualized educational

requirements which developed out of the growth of the
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children's own independence. 218
Thus, Cattell, like Hall, did not contribute'

a

greal

body of theory but did manage to popularize a large amount
of the psychological tools which were at hand.

As an indi-

cation of the gene tic/ developmental basis of the mental
testing movement, John Dewey is reported to have accounted
for the fact that mental testing did not flourish in Eng-

land where it actually started because "a psychology of in-

dividual differences can only flourish in a democracy, as
the findings of a psychology of individual differences

never support the notion of innate class differences." 21 ^
That remark, coming as it does from John Dewey seems rather

astonishing in light of today's awareness (Arthur Jensen
and William Shockley to the contrary) of the ability of
those efforts to not only perpetuate but to re-create, in

each new generation, the same "innate" class differences
they pretend to measure.

The "security" of the older view

must certainly have been a direct result of the mechanist

views of science which spawned the psychological inquiry.
In comparison with the European psychology of the time

and also today, for that matter, American psychology must
be seen as a sort of rough and ready shirt-sleeve affair,
pi O

Ernest R. Hilgard, personal communication.
21

^Donald P. Schultz, A History of Modern Psychology
The Academic Press 1969 ) p* 122

(New York:

,

,

.
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bent upon the same type of pioneering exploration
that

characterized the western frontier.

As in national devel-

opment, psychological development, has subsequently
found
that great "progress" along narrowly defined lines can, and
does, inevitably lead to serious ecological problems.
It is no doubt a deep appreciation of these problems

that led John Dewey (1859-1952) to become the founder of

what is recognized as the formal functional school of psy-

chology.

Dewey at one point studied under Hall and was

always concerned with the molar environmental aspects of

behavior rather than the molecular approaches common to

introspection and physiological psychology.

His classic

contribution to psychology is his paper on the reflex-arc
concept of behavior.

For Dewey stimulus and response were

simply convenient, but misleading, abstractions from the

realities of man's unified conscious life and the continuity of his physical environment.

^

Dewey's main concerns were however, with philosophical
issues and their relation to social practice.

His intent

in progressive education is an outgrowth of the pragmatic

spirit which animated his philosophy.

Education, for Dewey,

was life, learning was doing and the student was more im-

portant than the subject matter.

In many ways his protest

was similar to that which we have labeled human scientific

and his basic feelings seem quite similar to some of those
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we have observed in Dilthey.

For example, he felt that be-

havior should never be treated as an abstract artificial
construct which appeared to have meaning outside of its re-

lation to the organism and its adaptation to the environment.

The total organism and its environment was the only

proper subject matter for psychology.
With this broad definition of the field of psychology
it seems little wonder that functionalism is so difficult
to classify.

As a movement it was larger in scope than any

of its rivals, e.g., behaviorism (obviously), Gestalt psy-

chology and even psychoanalysis.

It was the different

basis for the abstraction of its central concepts, life itself,

that proved to be both its greatest strength and its

greatest weakness.

Strength because it opposed artificial

abstraction and the useless reification of mentalistic
concepts and weakness because its lack of these same concepts exposed the heart of its philosophical doctrines to
the "slings and arrows of outrageous fortune."

Eventually,

especially after Dewey's retirement, the functionalist insistence upon both the objective and subjective aspects of
I

behavior, the need for applied rather than pure psychology,
the use of mental operations as opposed to mental elements

and the functionalism that characterized the individual or-

ganism's relation to the environment, were all slanted back
again into the direction of natural scientific psychology.

292

One of the basic reasons for this change

is

Hint

Hie

true basis of psychological theory was neither
discussed
for what it was, nor altered in directions
suitable to sup-

port the functionalist epistemology.

Functionalists of the

more experimental orientation used associationistic
principles in their explanations of learning processes and

although they were primarily interested in the rate and
course of learning behavior rather than the hypothetical

basis of the internal processes, it must be said that their

position represented no greater metaphysical shift than
that which characterized Dilthey's psychology.

Thus, it

seems quite natural that the demise of progressive educa-

tion in this country could have been realized at the hands
of a more limited but far more vigorous and rigorous emphasis upon the "scientific" aspects of psychological thought

which were the first cousins of functional psychology in
the family of metaphysical materialism.

The two important trends which emerged from function-

alism were started with James Angell (l897-t9^9) at Chicago
and Robert Woodworth (1869-1962) at Columbia.

These

branches, the Chicago and Columbia schools of functionalism,

have left an important legacy of psychological theory and
data.

Chicago is mostly known for its emphasis on verbal

learning, B. J. Underwood being one of its better-known

alumni

Woodworth stressed a dynamic psychology in which
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he had a del ini to place
ism.

1’or

the contribution of the organ-

His insistence upon this fact was originally symbol-

ized and is now immortalized by his alteration of the faS— R formulation into the form S— 0— R.
^ er>ence

A primary

between the two trends of functionalism was

Woodworth's emphasis upon motivation.

In this, Woodworth

went a long way toward establishing the "drive" concept in

psychological thought as the mechanism by which the "purposive" responses of the organism are activated.

Thus the

drive concept was established early on and, like many other

aspects of functionalist thought, had a definite bias

toward more elementary bodily functions as opposed to

higher-order aspects of purposive behavior.
One of the major criticisms of the whole functional

approach has come on just that topic which was the closest
to their central position.

Functionalism obviously focuses

upon the utility and purpose of behavior.

It is therefore

also interested, by definition, in the "ends" of behavior.

However, mechanistic natural scientific psychology is

always found to be extremely intolerant of explanations

which imply a purposive teleology.

As we have seen,

"dead

matter can provide no reasons" and the same philosophical
problem which prevents the understanding of human freedom
is active here in functional psychology.

The major effect

of this criticism was to force functional psychologists to
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focus upon immediately proximal stimuli as causally effi-

cacious in the behavior they described.

Out of this bias

has grown the great reliance upon physiological explanation
of drive and need states so that the charge of teleology

can be avoided.

We will meet this topic in later chapters

when we will consider just how "purposive" a "functional"

definition really is and will also explore the epistemological alternative of using levels of analysis which can
be equated with the Whiteheadian organismic alternative of
a multi-level metaphysics.

BEHAVIORISM

4.0.4

Behaviorism.

Since classical behaviorism has figured

so prominently at several points of the presentation there

is little that remains to be said at this point.

we can simply catalog its main aspects.

Instead,

For Watson, and

those he influenced, behaviorism was "that division of

natural science which takes the behavior
as its subject matter."

220

...

of people

Its main postulates were:

a) behavior can be analyzed into elements by the methods

of natural science, b) behavior is composed entirely of

glandular secretions and muscle movements ultimately reducible to physiochemical explanations, c) every response has
a stimulus which determines it and d)

22
P«

i4o.

conscious processes

°Marx and Hillix, Systems and Theories in Psychology

,
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are vestigial remains of the earlier philosophical
era of

psychology.
Watson, in spite of his anti theoretical emphasis, sup-

plemented the classical conditioning of Pavlov, which he
thought was basic to all learning processes, with a few

concepts borrowed from Thorndikian associationism

.

That is,

the factors of frequency and recency from associationism

were required

to

explain, for example, the acquisition of

conditioned fear in infants.

This is because the classical

conditioning paradigm involves the substitution of one
stimulus for another whereas, instrumental conditioning

involves the substitution of one response for another and
the associationi s tic variables are the only ones useful in

such a situation.
One of the longest standing and most authoritative

critics of behaviorism is Sigmund Koch who says:
I have
to the

given half a career as psychologist
detailed registration of scholarly
horror over the phenomenon--and strange
time course of behaviorism ... I am
tired of "demonstrating" that the main
thread of continuity in the wildly erratic
50 -year course of this "school" is a misinterpretated version of an epistemology
which even in its "proper" philosophical
formulations was monstrously deficient;
it was always biased toward the selection of nonsensical or trivial problems
[and] has produced a science which
denies its subject matter in principle and

—

.

.

.

.

.

.

296

insults it in practice. 221
We obviously agree -with Koch's assessment and
would on] y

like to add, in line with the comments we made in Section

1.2.4 when Watson was compared with Descartes, that the

main philosophical effect of Watson's psychology was to
mitigate the strict determinism demanded by a completely
reduc tionis tic natural science approach in favor of a con-

tingent determinism which "ought to make men and women eager
to rearrange their own lives."

How the novelty of "rear-

rangement" was to be accounted for apparently did not occur
to Watson and in this he exemplifies Rogers'

later criticism

of Skinner in which Skinner is ridiculed for his use of

subjective concepts.

Rogers claims Skinner's story of how

he became a scientist is:

studded by such phrases as, "This was,
the kind of thing I was looking
"Of course, I was working on a
basic assumption.
.

.

.

of course,
for,"
.

.

.

To Rogers, these phrases can only relate to an "intuitive

trust which he [Skinner] placed in his own experiencing,

222

failing completely to realize, as also Watson did, that it
was those very experiences that guided his subjective
221

Sigmund Koch, Value Properties: Their Significance
for Psychology, Axiology, and Science in Toward a Unity of
Knowledge Marjorie Grene ed. Psychological Issues VI,
International Universities
No. 2, Monograph 22 (New York:
251-252.
Press Inc., 1969 )*
,

,

,

,

,

222
eds

.

,

Rogers, On Our Science of Man in Coulson and Rogers,
Man and the Science of Man pp 62-63.
,

.
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apprehension of his proper scientific directions.

While we

agree wxth Rogers, we, and surely also
Rogers, would be the
last to claim that infallibility is also an
important aspect
of the universality of man’s conscious and
purposive life.
We should also note that there were others who
assimilated

and carried the mark of behaviorism in their work.

Albert

Weiss popularized the doctrine for many years, published a
text called Theoretical Basis of Human Behavior in which,

among other things, will power was seen as excess brain excitations which built up because there was no immediate
outlet and subsequently spilled over once the inertia of
the system had been overcome.

Perhaps Karl Lashley is the

best known of Watson’s students, who by virtue of his focus
on physiological psychology, gradually moved away from the

strict S-R position and became closer to a field- theoretical

position
4.0.5

GESTALT PSYCHOLOGY
Gestalt psychology is the product of the response to

elementism which Wundt's psychology generated in Germany.
The Americans went functional whereas some of their European

colleagues turned to the gestalt experimentalism which arose

after the initial loosening up had been provided by Dilthey,
Brentano and Stumpf.
One of the most important aspects of gestalt psychol-

ogy

,

for our purposes, is the nature of the new theoretical
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basis which it introduced into psychological theory.

The

major characteristic of gestalt explanations is that
they
are not elementalis tic and mechanical and as such differ

significantly from classical associationis tic approaches to
the explanation of mental phenomena.

However, in terms of

one of the major themes of the argument presented here, it
s

a lso true that gestalt psychology is just as physical—

istic in its orientation as had been the psychology of John

Locke or Wilhelm Wundt.

A gestalt field is an equally re-

ductionistic borrowing from the physical sciences as were
the "elements" of the old view.

The unique nature of ge-

stalt psychology is to be found in the advent of the field
I

concept in the physical sciences and subsequent application
to psychological theory.

There is an interesting repetition of history that is

associated with the development of the field concept in

psychology that demonstrates the influence of physicalis tic
reasoning in a very direct way.

In Section 2.2.5 when we

discussed the eighteenth century psychology of David
Hartley, it was noted that his unique contribution to asso-

ciationistic psychology was the use of the Newtonian concept of "action at a distance" as a major element in the

explanation he developed regarding the physiological processes which were responsible for the association of separate
ideas.

What Hartley did was to assume that the physical
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principle of action at a distance, which
explained how two
physically separated bodies could attract
or repell
each

other, must also have a mental
counterpart which was based
upon some equivalent property of the nervous
system.
We

have seen that Hartley's formulation was
not a major contribution to the associationistic school and

that, in gen-

eral, associationists tended to ignore the
problem of actu-

ally specifying the physiological substrate of
memory.

The

interesting aspect of this discussion is that it is not
until we get rather well into the twentieth century
and the

revision of the Newtonian concept that we find another and
far more serious attempt to tackle the problem of what is

going on in the brain during mental operations.

That at-

tempt was the gestalt psychology that came as a direct out-

growth of the change from the old action at a distance concept to the newer field theoretical constructs.

Once we

see the main differences between the two concepts,

lationships

ol

the re-

gestalt psychology to both natural scientific

and human scientific psychology will be much clearer.

Turning first to the older view, we find that Newton's
use of "action at a distance" was a direct outgrowth of the

basic metaphysical assumptions of the Galilean tradition.
In this tradition all physical phenomena had to be explained
in terms of matter in motion.

Newton's difficulty was to

explain how bodies which were physically separated could

•jOl)

influence one another.

There was obviously some sort of

"action at a distance" between two things that might be at-

tracting or repelling each other.

But this is not easily

explained in terms of a metaphysics that consists of only

matter in motion.
to a "nonscientif ic

So what Newton did,

Unless, of course, one wants
"

to

result

or spiritual explanation of the facts.
in order to preserve the integrity of

the whole explanatory system, was to create a material

medium that could transfer the force from one body to the
other.

He called this hypothetical material "ether" and

in so doing saved the materialistic metaphysic from a basic

inconsistency.
Without seeking out any of the exact details, we can
see that an ad hoc hypothesis about such a basic issue is

bound to cause trouble for the physical sciences.

By the

early nineteenth century it was quite obvious to physicists
that there were such things as forces that were capable of

being propagated in empty space and in the complete absence
of any requirement for an "ether."

Once forces had become

independent of any material medium and were seen in their
own right they then came to assume the attributes whxch
ether.
were originally thought to belong to the material

properties
Thus, forces became fields of force that had
also strength
like extension and configuration in space and
the density
which was a continuously variable function of
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of the field.

Seen in this light, Wolfgang Kohler is something of a

latter day David Hartley, since his application of the
field of force concept to psychology is exactly analogous
to Hartley's use of that concept's predecessor which had

been created by Newton.

Before we consider the direct ap-

plication of the physical theory to psychological phenomena
we should take a brief look at the main psychological phe-

nomena that seemed in most need of a new interpretation.
The concept of a psychological gestalt was actually

developed in 1890 by Charles von Ehrenfels who discovered
that in the perception of musical form,

the melody perceived

was not simply the sum of the tonal elements.

That the same

melody can be composed of different tones or that different
melodies can be constructed of the same tones indicated to
Ehrenfels that perceptual form-quality was a more basic
factor than the explicit sensory elements.

Form-quality

was seen to derive from the pattern of interrelationships
of the sensory elements.

He actually called the form-

qualities "Gestalt quali taten" and even extended the concept into other sensory modalities.

Even if the basic facts do seem a bit naive, this is

really a significant departure from the elementalistic view.
In Wundt's psychology, for example, there was only room for

punctiform sensations which were associated with one another
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On

l

his view, the perception of a square was determined by

the fact that while the individual sensations which corre-

spond to

(die

lines and the various parts of the figure

could be perceived the "form" of the square was not given
in direct perception.

This all important quaLity which

gave the meaning to the elements was thought not to be the

result of perception but, in fact, the result of apperception.

That is, a process which is established as a result

of associative inference.

This inferential process also

included information which was added by the motion of the
eyes in sensing the figure so that the additional information as to the configuration of

the'

stimulation could be

obtained
From this it can be seen that the necessity of eye

movements is basic to the Wundtian elementalistic theory.
What the gestalt psychologists did was to show that there

were cases where the motion of the eyes was not required
for the perception of a quality that, on the basis of the
old theory, required the use of eye movement.

Their cru-

cial experiment involved the use of alternately flashing

lights whose duration was too short to allow eye movements
but were, none- the-less

,

perceived as one light moving back

and forth rather than two flashing lights.

Armed with this sort of conclusive experimental evidence the early gestalt psychologists sought out a
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field of force,

which was something both extended and configured, seemed
like a natural choice to explain a perceptual process which

seemed to possess inherent perceptual properties.

Since

the brain is also a physical system, it was assumed to ex-

hibit the same configurational aspects which are found in

purely physical fields.

The major assumption that was re-

quired, aside from the original one of field forces in the
brain, was that the perceptual processes of which we are

aware are actually isomorphic with the brain processes

which underlie them.

Unless the gestalt psychologists

could insure that the physiological processes in the brain
were actually of the exact type that seemed to be required
by the nature of perception itself, they would have no

grounds for asserting the field interpretation of perceptual
processing.

To accomplish this needed feature they postu-

lated the principle of isomorphism which asserts:

Experienced order in space is always structurally identical with a functional order
in the distribution of underlying brain
pro cesses. 223
By projecting this definition back into the brain

process the gestalt psychologists were able to insure that
The basic

the hypothesis of field could be made functional.

223

Kohler, quoted in Marx and Hillix,

ojd.

ci

.

,

p.

183
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theoretical change this represented amounts

to

this.

The

old theory assumed that elements of sensation were acted on

by brain processes which simply mediated the transfer of
these sensations to the various projection areas in the
brain.

In this case, the final perception was seen as the

result of an apperceptive process that derived from unconscious associative inference.

In the new gestalt theory,

the mediating brain processes are no longer simply a one-to-

one transfer of sensation but, instead, actually become the

mediating brain processes that have the character of the
actual perception.
This new concept of active mediation by the brain pro-

foundly changed the old view which saw the brain as a passive receptor.

Whereas the old theory basically considered

the brain as a telephone exchange with fixed neurological

pathways and interconnections the gestalt view definitely

predicted that there are distributed field-like forces in
the brain that account for its behavior.
It is possible to pursue the rise of gestalt concepts

into many and diverse areas of psychological thought.

How-

ever, for our purposes it must be stressed that the field

theoretical concepts are just as reduc tionistic and deter-

ministic as those which they replaced.

This is not to deny

that gestalt psychology did not provide a more reasonable

explanation of many phenomena than the associationist ic
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more inclusive than simple concatenation ol eLemojils and
one would expect a higher quality explanation to result.

What is to be denied however is that the gestalt approach

allowed any greater freedom to consciousness than its predecessor.

Even though Kohler himself wrote about extensions

of the gestalt principles into widely diverse areas such as
ego, attitudes, emotions, will, memory, and learning, he

was forced to do so only by strict generalization of the

basic physiological field processes which had been postu-

lated as the basis of the whole gestalt process.

Thus,

in

order to talk about higher-order processes from the field

theoretical point-of-view one had to start with two important assumptions.

First, one had to assume that the field-

like qualities of gestalt configurations were actually a

direct function of the brain.

operates in a field fashion.

That is, the brain itself
Second, one had to extend

that reasoning by assuming that other psychological processes, the higher-order ones, are also dependent upon the

same brain function.

Once this was done, all psychological

processes could be seen as amenable to the descriptive

principles which seemed to apply to pure perceptual phe-

nomena

.

Thus, while gestalt psychologists did not deny con-

sciousness in theory, as Sigmund Koch says of the
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behaviorist s

,

thoy certainly did "insult it in practice"

since their principle of isomorphism implies

some;

dualism but does not specify the matter clearly.

form of

Whatever

the status of that philosophical issue may be, it is clear

that for gestalt psychology consciousness is the isomorphic

phenomenal counterpart of the basic field-like operation of
the brain.

Since physicists do not attribute any greater

inherent freedom to fields than they did to the atoms which

inspired the old view, it is reasonable and necessary to
conclude that the "dynamic" operation of the gestalt brain
is just as deterministic as the older traditions it sought
to replace.

It should be noted that the criticism of the exten-

sions of gestalt psychology which was made above, comes

from utilizing the basic criterion that applications

the

oi

first principles of a scientific explanation must be done
in a coherent fashion.

Therefore, to imply that gestalt

psychology provides any greater basis for either the existence or freedom of consciousness is an incoherency in
terms of the doctrine.

Similarly, to think one is doing a

"gestalt therapy" by doing anything other than directly

manipulating the character of psychophysical processes is
also an inconsistency.

These problems are examples of the

problems he had in mind when in 1955 the physicist

J.

Robert

Oppenlieimer told the American Psychological Association

that he did not have the slightest idea of what a "psycho-

logical field" could be.

2211

Yet, with it all, there is a uniqueness in the gestalt

doctrine since it is the first physicalistic psychology
that we have seen which was not based directly upon the

atomism of the entire era of modern science.

In this light

it forms a further example of the inversion of the concepts

of matter and energy in which "mass becomes the name for a

quantity of energy considered in relation to some of its
dynamical effects," that Whitehead spoke of as the major

metaphysical change which occurred in nineteenth century
physics

PSYCHOANALYSIS

4.0.6

Psychoanalysis is a very large and involved subject
about which so much has been written from so many points-

of-view that the subject almost seems to become larger with
each attempt at description.

Scientifically minded authors

are often moved to decry the theoretical foundation of the

system whenever they attempt to describe the character of
the psychoanalytic system.

The following is typical:

Presumably the [psychoanalytic J theory exists
but noin the collected works of Freud
are
what
of
statement
where is there a clear
short
in
...
theorems
postulates, what are
.

22 ^j.

Ibid

.

,

p

.

.

.

Robert Oppenheimer, quoted in Marx and Hillix,
180
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one misses all the paraphernalia usually
associated with a scientific theory 223
.

In searching for that scientific theory wo would
have
to ask.
ol

Is

i

t

clear that psychoanalysis

a phy s i ca L i s t i c

Is

another example

natural scientific theory?

The answer

to this question is an emphatic yes and this author con-

siders himself fortunate to have come across a rather com-

plete analysis of the psychoanalytic theory which was done
from just this perspective.

The following account of

Freud's theory derives largely from the insightful work of

Richard Lowry

and will focus upon the application which

Freud gave to many of the same physicalistic concepts we
have seen in other contexts.

Freud's first major theoretical work is a piece that
was not published until 193^*

This work was called Project

for a Scientific Psychology in which Freud set forth a

neurological model which was designed to account for the
phenomena of memory, thinking, stress, pain, pleasure.
When reviewing the character of the theory which Freud presented the modern neurophysiologist Karl Pribram concluded
that many of Freud's ideas actually anticipated modern de-

velopments in neurophysiology, especially as concerns the
22 3

"Marx and Hillix, Ibid., p. 230.

226

Chapters

See Lowry, Evolution of Psychol ogical Theory
8

and

9*

,
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organization

tho norvous .system.

oi

it is also in tills

~

work that the physicalis tic bias of Freud's theory is the
most evident:
The intent of this project is to furnish us
with a psychology which shall be a natural
science:
its aim, that is, is to represent
psychical processes as quantitatively determined states of specifiable material particles and so to make them plain and void of
contradiction .228

Freud elaborated that psychical processes were to be considered as a quantity of energy which was subject to the
laws of motion and that the material particles were the

neurons in the brain.

The system which he created with

these categories predicated that the functional unit of the

nervous system as the neuron, which Freud also believed to
be a distinct cell that had, no connection with other cells.
It was the character of these cells that they had a tendency
to discharge energy--a process Freud called "the principle

of neuronic inertia."
It was from this basic character of neuronic inertia

that Freud derived the notion of primary and secondary

processes.

Freud theorized that as an organism grows in

complexity there would be an ever increasing need to do two
227

Karl H. Pribram, The Neuropsychology of Sigmund
Freud in Experimental Foundations of Clinical Behavior
Basic Books Inc )
ed
(New York:
A. J. Bachrach
442-468
pp
,

,

,

.

.

228

Freud, quoted in Lowry, Ibid

.

,

p.

138.

.

'HO

things within

I,

ho nervous system.

()no

would ho

i

he <|jw-

chargo of energy from Lho neurons of the neuronic systoni.
The discharge of this energy which had boon generated by
the internal needs of the body, hunger, etc.

,

was the pri-

mary function of the neuronic system, hence primary process.
On the other hand, there was also the need to store enough
of this energy to meet the demands of Lifo hence, secondary

function and secondary process.

The idea of storing energy

led directly to the idea that there needed to be some sort
of contact-barrier that would regulate the passage of

energy.

Thus some nourons were soon

to

be highly permeable

(these functioned in perception) and others were highly im-

permeable and therefore functioned in memory.
With this basic theory Freud could develop explanations for such things as pleasure and pain, pleasure being
the rapid discharge of large quantities of excitation

wheroas pain resultod from the rap>id eruption of large

quantities of excitation in nourons which were relatively
impermeable.

Ho wont on to add that each of those experi-

ences left bohind a "residue" which was responsible for

creating either an attraction or a repulsion for the memory
images of tho events which caused them.
I3y

adding a few more explanatory hypotheses Freud came

up with a system he could call "ego."

On this view, ego

was tho organization of neurons of various permeabili ties
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into distinct patterns such that they could control the

flow of the energy involved in primary and secondary
processes.

Seen in this light, the ego's job is that of

diverting excitation away from the hostile memory-images by
the process of transferring it to associated neurons of

more suitable memory-images.

The net effect of this trans-

fer was to "repress" the hostile image.

Adding all this up into one operating unit we have

a

picture of mental functioning which was built upon the idea
of neuronic inertia which specified that neurons tend to

divest themselves of energy.

From this it follows that the

primary function of the nervous system is to divest itself
of this energy,

saving only that amount required to meet

the demands of life (secondary processes).

Secondary

processes were seen as the prime mechanism of self-preservation.

and

The ego was the total of the various permeable

s emipermeabl e

neurons which had stabilized into rathei

permanent ways of handling and storing the psychic cneigy.
for
In the process of this energy transfer it was possible

and
memory- images to attract and repell other memory-images
I

thus to repress them from consciousness.

Certainly the physicalism in this approach is obvious.
appealed to the
From the initial statement of intent which
of at"general laws of motion" to the use of the concepts
was,
traction and repulsion of memory residues Freud,
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through and through, framing his theory of mental functioning by exact analogy to the physical

sciences.

Ulti-

mately Freud came to abandon this approach and felt that

it

had been a total failure to attempt to bring a direct synthesis between neurophysiology and psychology.

For the re-

mainder of his career, and he had most of it left, Freud
concentrated upon clinical studies.
is however,

The interesting tiling

that although this transition brought a change

from neuronal to psychical systems, Freud still largely

used the same theoretical framework in his explanations.
A few examples from Lowry's treatment of the relationship

should suffice to make the point.
In his first purely psychoanalytic work Studies in

Hysteria on which he collaborated with another physician,
Joseph Breuer, Freud undertook to describe his observations
of the emotion laden hysterics who also were observed to

have a considerable amount of unconscious information that
could only be brought out under hypnosis.
tion he gave was entirely physicalistic

.

The interpretaThus, experience

was seen to be some sort of excitation in the nervous system, whose task it was to discharge that energy through the

mechanism of voluntary or involuntary reflexes.
discharge is sufficient then all is well but

ii

If this
it is not

then the remaining undischarged energy becomes "attached"
In
to the memory and eventually can only get relieved
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conversion into hysterical systems.

Thus, we have the en-

tire rationale tor psychoanalysis:
It will now be understood how it Ls that the
psychotherapeutic procedure which we have
described
has a curative effect.
It
brings to an end the operative force of the
idea [the excitation] which was not abreacted
[discharged] in the first instance, by allowing its strangulated affect to find a way
out through speech. 229
.

.

.

In his last major theoretical work, The Ego and the Id

Freud sought to dispell some of the ambiguities that were
in his system.

He attempted to clarify the exact mechanisms

of psychical processes by developing the concepts of ego,
id and superego.

These concepts compare favorably to the

functions which Freud had assigned to the ego of his
"Project" of 1895.

Lowry notes that for some reason Freud

had refrained from using the ego concept for many years,

referring only to "conscious" processes instead.
The ego of 1895 had three basic functions:

l)

to

store energy (secondary process) for the purpose of coping

with the demands of life, 2) to evolve various strategies
for carrying out the coping behavior and

hostile psychical contents.

3)

1° repress the

In The Ego and the id

,

1 1

eud

came up with the same breakdown of functions only this time
he was referring to psychical apparatus and not neuronal

apparatus.
22

In this new view, ego got the job of "binding"

^Freud, quoted in Ibid

.

,

p.

1^7*

energy for the purpose of coping with problems
and also,
the collateral task of mapping out the strategies
for that

coping behavior.

The third aspect, super ego, came from

Freud’s long clinical observations to the effect that people had a certain resistance to getting too close to re-

pressed materials.

He established links from this repres-

sion behavior to what he thought were aspects of the person

bisexual nature that had been attracted and repelled

s

during childhood by relationships with his parents.

Out of

this Freud derived the Oedipus complex and the idea of

superego which was to have been the internal representative
of the old external parental authority.
Thus, it is possible to make a strong case that Freud'

theory is truly, in its inner most theoretical being, a
i

physicalistic theory.

However, in the application which

Freud gave to that theory, he did something that no one had

presumed to do before him.

He literally took the theory

directly into man's consciousness, and unconscious, and

proceeded to set up explanations based on clinical experiences.

Therefore, it is also possible to rather ironically

assert that in its inner most psychological being, the

theory is much like a human scientific theory.

It is

ironic because we also find that Freud completely retained
the views of materialistic metaphysics while also being

able to talk about the human person with his "purposes,
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intentions and aims."
Now that we have seen the basis of Freud's theorizing
it is clear

that he represents less of a radical change

than did Dilthey and Brentano.

As a matter of fact, Freud

really did not represent a change in either the metaphysical
or the epistemological approach to the conduct of psychology
as a natural science.

Also, it is quite true that his use

of the basic physical theory in this way represents a dis-

connection of the first principles of the science of such
great magnitude that one wonders if J. Robert Oppenheimer

would not have excused the gestalt psychologists on the
basis of a minor infraction.
4.1

THE AGE OF THEORY ( 1930-1950)
AND CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOLOGY
As the various orthodox schools of psychology passed

into history, the character of American psychology changed

by becoming far more eclectic in its approach to theories,

methods and concepts.

The topics which came to captivate

the attention of most American psychologists were of a much

more circumscribed and restricted theoretical nature.

These theories are often referred to as "miniature" theories which attempt to deal with very small aspects of be-

havior in ways that are not designed to last for much more
than the duration of the immediate experimental context.
It is also true,

that a substantial portion of current

31

rosea rob goes on

in

reticaJ. structure.

llio

total

absence of any formal

I

lico-

The research simpJy goes from one topic

to the next one that seems most plausibly based on the re-

sults of the former, or to the one which is most likely to
get published, or to the one which is most likely to get

funded, or all three, or any combination there of.

In all,

the dominant trend has been toward greater specialization

by individual psychologists into narrowly defined areas

which are concerned only with highly limited areas of

behavior
It was Sigmund Koch who coined the phrase "The Age of

Theory" as a description of the rush toward maturity that

followed upon the first three decades of adolescence which
we have covered in the development of the

1

schools.

Koch's major sentiment in the epilogue to the first three

volumes of Psychology:

A Study of a Science which he edited

was that,
and from which the term "Age of Theory" is taken,
be found
by the time of his writing in 1959, there could

indications to the effect that:
For the first time in its history, psychology
its
seems ready— or almost ready--to assess
rei primary
goals and instrumentalities with
It
erence to its own indigenous problems.
seems ready to think contextually, freely,
suband creatively about its own refractory
from a
ject matter, and to work its way free
dependence on simplistic theories of correct
0
scientific conduct. 2 ^
23 °Koch, Psychology:
A Stu dy of a Science (New York
McGraw-Hill, 1959 ) YYI 7^3
,

,
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There is clearly a contrast between Koch's sentiments
and those of the previous paragraph which suggest that

a

greater convergence on narrower doctrines is the outstanding
characteristic of modern psychology.

It is in this contrast

that we can find the same distinction of psychology as a

natural science and psychology as a human science that was
useful in the middle of the nineteenth century.

The one

hundred years of progress which separates us from those
initial beginnings has in many ways served to heighten the

discrepancy between the two approaches.

In addition,

there

is now a well identified dissident element in American psy-

chology which is seriously questioning the motives and
goals of the traditional approach to the science of psychology.

We can therefore, most meaningly conclude our

consideration of the development of psychology with an examination of these two major aspects of current psychological thought

Turning first to the natural scientific trend in psychology, we can best describe the post-school period

ol

development in terms of the various major varieties of
theoretical emphasis which derived from the earlier monolithic schools.

In addition, we should also point out

t

as the systematic importance' of the theories themselves

weakened, the dominant focus has been to develop topical
areas of research.

We will cover both of these topics

ha
lias
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briefly

;

however, we can assert at the outset,

type of fundamental change we are seeking,

that

the

the change that

would bring the insights of process phi Losophy into active
concern in psychological thought, is not to be found in the

extensions of natural scientific psychology.

This limita-

tion not withstanding, we can best explore the major varieties of psychological theories by categorizing them into
three main groups.

These groups are the various varieties

of S-R Theory, Field Theory and Personality Theory.

We

should also note our bias that the transition from schools
to theories to miniature theories to nontheore t ical

topical

areas of research has done nothing toward improving the

scientific status of psychology.

The reasons for this bias

are best shown in the actual history of the various schools

rather than in an abstract criticism of selected theoretical issues.

Accordingly, we will be able to use the various

theoretical positions as a backdrop against which we can

develop a general assessment of the whole movement.
4.1.1

STIMULUS-RESPONSE PSYCHOLOGY
Stimulus response theory has been developed in two

main categories; the difference between the two lies simply
in the emphasis which is placed on the process by which the

stimulus is connected to the response.

The besl known

group is called reinforcement theorists because the idea
of a reward for activity is given central prominence as the

3 19

fTicii-n

factor which accounts for newly learned behavior.

The

second major grouping of theorists are known as contiguity

theorists because they stress that it is simply the conti-

guity between the stimulus and the response that is the socalled "reinforcing" aspect of the situation.

In this ap-

proach one finds that a good deal of John Locke's associationistic psychology is alive and well and living in the

twentieth century.
The reinforcement theorists mentioned above can be

further divided into two groups and it is in these two
groups that we will find the major conclusions we wish to

draw from this aspect of psychological history.

These

groups differ on the role that reward is believed to play
in the process of reinforcement.

One group has focused on

the relation of reward to the change which the reward causes

in the organism's internal state and therefore defines reward
in terms of drive reduction.

The other group has been con-

tent to focus on reinforcement as an external fact and

therefore has not been interested in dealing with the

underlying nature of the process, a position popularly
known as the psychology of the empty organism.

The major

figures associated with each of these positions are Clark
Hull and his hypo the tico-deduc tive psychology of drive

reduction and
conditioning.

B.

F.

Skinner and his psychoiogy of operant

These are the two gentlemen we will use as
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the major examples of the predicament of modern psychological theory.

In themselves they are perfect examples of a

heavy handed deductive approach on the one hand and

a

rigidly conceived methodological approach on the other hand.
In order to make the difference between the two as

clear as possible, it is necessary to introduce a few an-

Taking the hypo the t ico-deduc t ive approach

cillary factors.

first, we need to clarify the nature of this type of ap-

proach.

When we examine it we see that Hull created his

system as a direct copy of those which had been highly successful in the physical sciences.

It is a system which

starts with formal postulates and their corollaries which
in turn are used to deduce theorems.

These theorems are

then translated into empirical statements that can be

tested experimentally.

Should the deduction be confirmed

cases where a
in this manner all is well; however, in those
rediscrepancy exists, the hypothesis of the experiment

quires revision.

From this, it is obvious that the final

directly
explanatory power of the system is going to depend
of the system
upon the extent to which the first principles

which are imporinclude those aspects of human experience
tant to life.

sysShould it happen that the basis of the

narrow that
tem is defined in a fashion which is so

it

matter, before
ignores most of the meaning of the subject
the deductions have begun,

then it is obvious that the
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explanatory power

ol'

any deduction in the system will also

be limited to a subset of that original

limitation.

Thus,

the proper first level question to ask of the Hullian sys-

tem is, How inclusive are the first principles of the system?

We will do this after we have considered the character

of the Skinnerian approach.

The main characteristic of Skinner's psychology dif-

fers sharply from that of Hull.

theoretical psychology.

In Skinner we find an a-

His main emphasis is on

a

descrip-

tive approach to the acquisition of facts so that one can

discover the empirical relationships which exist before any
attempt is made to systematize then into a theory.

In this

insistence on factual behavior he also is against any sort
of physiologizing

,

which is simply the attempt to explain

behavior via a hypothetical internal state of the organism.
The major question we need to ask of Skinner is, What are
the empirical facts of behavior that are so important to

building a proper psychology?
Now that we have the two crucial questions, we can ask
them and then compare and contrast the results.

As we do

this however, we should reiterate that these are paradigm

cases for much of modern psychology.

Because Hull was his-

torically first and also because his system has largely
died out we should take his system first as a preparation
for the reaction of Skinner to such approaches.
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We said that we needed to know just how inclusive
the

first

principles of Hull's system was.

We can easily de-

termine this by examining Hull's intentions.

A rather com-

plete statement of his formal position was contained in

Hull's 1937 presidential address before the American Psychological Association.

The title of this address was

"Mind, Mechanism and Adaptive Behavior," and in it Hull

dealt explicitly with each of the topics in the title.

To

Hull, mind was simply another name for the adaptive behavior
of humans and animals.

Since species are largely dependent

upon their ability to adapt to their environment, "mind" is
simply a name or inference which describes that very basic
form of purposefulness.

Thus mind became the operation of

the second topic of the speech--mechanism

.

In this, Hull

felt that the behavior of an organism is learned by the

ultimate fate of the behavior itself.

That is, a stimulus

response bond is strengthened by a reinforcing state of
affairs, and a reinforcing state of affairs is something
that results in the reduction of a drive state.

Thus, Hull

created a system in which mind was just another name for
adaptive behavior and adaptive behavior itself was something that was tied into very basic need satisfaction and

survival requirements.

Hull felt it was impossible to

meaningly consider any reference to mind when the hard
facts of adaptive behavior were before one's eyes.
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Since this is the framework within which Hull chose to

create his psychology, it would appear that there would be
little room for anything other than totally determined behavior.

Hull provided his view on this age-old problem in

the last major theoretical publication of his career.

He

said

The reader has seen by now that the organism
is here conceived as a completely automatic
entity; that in our approach to behavior
theory there is no entelechy, no disembodied
mind, soul, or spirit which in some way
tells the various parts of the body how to
cooperate behaviorally to attain successful
adaptation, i.e., how to achieve survival. 231
We may now take these examples of Hull's approach to
the study of behavior along with the hypothetico-deductive

framework and ask ourselves what is likely to come out of
that system that will be of use to anything other than sim-

ilarly defined systems, since to argue a point of Hull's
theory is to accept his premises and to throw away the most

meaningful aspect of man- -hi s consciousness.
Before closing accounts with Hull we can add two
First, one should not shut the door completely on

things.

the possibility that some useful data might come directly

from Hull's approach or those which have the same general
We say this in the same way that we sajd that Freud's

form.

2^1

Clark L. Hull, A Behavior System (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1952), p. 3^+7, quoted in Lowry, op. cit.,
p.

201.
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man's conscious Life that in spito oi its fundamon ta iy
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mechanist orientation was able to capture something of the

pervasive spirit of what it is to be human.

Similarly, we

can say of hypothe tico-deduc tive systems that they may do
the same thing but we should also observe that such gains

by either system can only come about as a result of an ar-

bitrary disconnection of the conclusions and the basic
premises of the system.

At some point,

in the development

of each topic, levels of meaning in excess of those con-

tained in the original premises must be introduced in order
to add the additional content.

Since this is the case,

there is no way around the realization that

sucli

also constitute an incoherence in the system.

additions

Thus, we

have meaning and psychological relevance only at the expense
of logical incoherence.

The psychology which results from

these efforts is perhaps best described as a psychology

because of incoherence rather than
ence; but,

in any case,

a

psychology of incoher-

there is really no way around the

realization that the exactness of the system is

a

sham

i

I

it is also co-defined as insuring a meaningful psychology.

Turning to Skinner, whose system we have labeled

a

methodological approach in contrast to a theoreticaJ system
facts
like Hull's, we need be concerned with the empirical
by virtue
and empirical relationships he hoped to discover
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of his methodology.

One must say that Skinner's atheoret-

ical approach to psychology is really a theory about not

having a theory in which he can derive the same sort of
security from methodology that Hull did from the formal
logical nature of his system.

As we have already seen,

Skinner can be meaningly criticized for ignoring the role
of his own subjective intentions as the main determinants

in guiding him to the atheoretical position he assumed.
It is also true that there is nothing in his writings that

suggests any concern about the atomism and mechanism of

natural scientific approaches to the study of man.

In

fact, his approach is exactly in line with the main stream
of natural scientific thought.

That is to say, Skinner's

basic assumptions are that one should seek to determine the

individual and clear-cut responses which can be directly

manipulated by various schedules of reinforcement and to
further define these responses as the basic facts of an empirical, atheoretical psychology.
So,

just what are the empirical facts that are impor-

tant to the creation of the behavioral psychology that

Skinner would have us adopt.

Skinner maintains that these

facts are the facts which one can determine by the methodo-

logical approach which is based upon the study of

a

freely

operant form of behavior and then subseqiien tly demons t rat ing
that the behavior itself is dependent upon the result of
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the behavior,

L.e., does it produce a reward.

The scien-

tific credibility of this approach is buttressed by the use
of an elaborate laboratory environment in which animals can

be placed in precisely controlled conditions and then sub-

jected to various conditions of reinforcement under elaborate methodologies.

The types of operant behavior most

frequently studied in this type of experiment has been bar

pressing in rats and key pecking in pigeons.
Since Skinner believes that his method is producing

basic empirical facts of animal behavior there is an ever

present tendency to generalize the findings to all levels
of everyday-life situations of humans.

Today,

the world is

filled with this sort of spin-off from Skinner's behaviorism
and the diverse areas of social control, education, mental
health, technical training and animal training all seem to
be not only amenable to but also explained by the simple

facts of Skinnerian psychology.
What then is to be said of Skinnerian psychology in

terms of the need to understand man's higher-order human

characteristics?

First, we can assume since Skinner does

of
not specify any rejection of the standard assumptions

atomistic and mechanistic science that he is in complete

harmony with that approach.

On this point, we note with

Ikoninterest that his 1957 volume called Schedules of

forcement is a work in which the results of over 70,000

'127

hours of continuously recorded data relating to over 250

million responses of individual pigeons is presented.

~

One could hardly believe that a human being could muster the sort of commitment and energy to produce a compen-

dium of this magnitude if there was not a basic belief in
the certitude of the approach.

Second, and most important,

we can explain the apparent utility of the behavioral ap-

proach in psychology in the same fashion that we were able
to summarize both Freud's and Hull's contribution to the

understanding of man's nature.

To repeat slightly, we have

asserted that the real human meaning which could come from
those systems had to be of a rather ad hoc nature.

That is

to say, because the first principles of the approach were a

direct function of a mechanical cosmology in which life itself is somehow explained away as an epiphenomcnon

,

there

was no way which the issues of human freedom and dignity

could be addressed from within any system which was limited
to those abstractions.

The result was that one essentially

had to smuggle in those aspects of human character that
were expressed in the system.

psychology.

Now, let us look at Skinner's

Skinner's atheoretical approach really only

specifies a methodology and the fact that it can be applied
in a wide variety of situations is a testament to its free
~

Ferster, Schedules of Reinforce Apple ton-Century-Crof ts 1957)-

^Skinner and

ment (New York:

C.

B.

,

JL>8

floating nonsystomatic nature.

Thus,

in

order Lo be of any

use to human situations, the system must be cloaked in the

relevance which people bring to the situation.

It matters

not whether one is a humanist or a facist, a theist or an

atheist, the principles of behavioral methodology can operate to manipulate some forms of behavior but then, so do

voodoo dolls and the incantations of medicine men.
In forming these conclusions about Skinner's system,
we must also slightly shift the basis of our argument from

what it was with Freud and Hull.

Those earlier attempts

wanted to derive behavior from theory and hence to explain
it in the sense that Dilthey used the term.

In Skinner's

psychology, we really have something quite different, in
place of explanation we really have something approaching
a descriptive form of psychology but a seriously circum-

scribed effort at description.

Skinner would have us be-

lieve that the meaningful universe of human behavior is to
be explained in the same type of terms that he found to be

applicable in the limited four-walled universe of rising
and setting reinforcement bars which he created for the

study of animal behavior.

Even if he created this world in

six days and rested on the seventh, there is no way to

escape the obvious fact that any methodology, and especially
one as limited as this one, can only serve the purposes of
its creator.

The essence of our argument is that we need a

view of psychology which itself roco^nizos and makes explicit the purposiveness of human behavior’.

Since Skinner

effectively assumes this by being athcore tical he has allowed many others to assimilate his doctrine to their own
purposes.

In many ways the effect has been salutary; how-

ever, only at the expense of making a complete muddle out

of the possibility of achieving a more useful and truly

scientific study of what it means to be human.
There remains one major type of S-R theorist

discuss-- the so-called contiguity theorists.

to

Contiguity

theory as we have said is essentially a replay of Lockean

associationism which is however devoid of its philosophical
context.

As one might expect, a twentieth century version

of this theory will usually find itself couched in a mathe-

matical or probabilistic context rather than a philosophical
context.

Seen in this light, the simple idea of an S-R

connection is just the kind of unitary thing about which
abstract mathematical treatments can be built.

A main ef-

fect of the added mathematical sophistication has been to

mitigate to some extent the compulsive determinism of many
of the older views.

In this more modern case, we find be-

havior considered as a probabilistic rather than determinant
function of the mechanical stimuli which impinges on the
organism.

Thus, while a statistical learning theory may

the
allow the organism to sample the stimulus field before

response is decided upon, that sampling procedure is,
nonethe-Jess, constrained to be a random process.

Since ran-

domness is not equivalent to purposiveness, one can expect
to find little except

"random" flashes of insight within

the "purposive" framework of statistical learning theory.

U.1.2

FIELD THEORETICAL PSYCHOLOGY
The next major variety of theory to be considered is

Field Theory.

Since we have already covered the status of

the field interpretation in Section 4.0.5 in connection

with Gestalt psychology we need not reconsider it at this
point.

Since there is a close relationship between modern

field theory and classical Gestalt psychology, we find

field theorists focusing on the role of the totality of
events in the organism’s environment as the important fact
of behavior.

The different field theories have simply dif-

fered on the role of these factors without also questioning
the basic field concept or arguing it among themselves.

The two most important names in this area are Kurt

Lewin and Edward Tolman.

Lewin's use of "field" is typical

of the later stages of most of the developments which fol-

lowed upon the doctrinaire positions of the "schools."

Lewin modified the key Gestalt doctrine of Isomorphism by

thinking of the environment and the individuals in it as
field.

Even though this meant that field was now

a

a

socio-

logical rather than physiological concept, Lewin thought
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it had important explanatory characteristics:

The possibilities of a "field theory" in the
realm of action, emotion, personality are
firmly established. The basic statements of
field theory are that a) behavior has to be
derived from a totality of coexisting facts
b) these coexisting facts have the character
of a "dynamic field" in so far as the state
of any part of this field depends on every
other part of the field.
According to
field theory, behavior depends neither on
the past nor on the future but on the present
field.
This is in contrast both to the
belief of teleology that the future is the
cause of behavior, and that of associationisrn
that the past is the cause of behavior. 233
.

.

.

.

.

.

From this, it is clear that Levin intended a rather

metaphorical use of field but was none- the-less willing to
truncate man's relations with the past and anticipations of
the future by allowing the field concept to introject. the

idea that the forces which determine a physical field are

obviously immediate and causal.

However, it is also true

that by viewing field in this way Lewin was able to overcome

many of the limitations of atomistic views and as

a

result

found many new and exciting areas of experimentation and

theorizing open to him.
We will not cover the explicit character of his psy-

chology at this point and will only have opportunity to

mention aspects of it in later sections.
2
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an important characteristic
We have already mentioned

the fact as the original systematic position has softened,

the subsequent popularizers often transport the concept

into areas for which it has no other validity than the fact
that it sounds good.

Sounding good and making plain sense

is obviously an important characteristic of any doctrine;

however, it does become quite confusing to someone trying
to make sense out of the scientific status of the resultant

and J. Robert Oppenheimer seems to be a good example as we

have mentioned.

Lewin's use of the field concept fits this

category perfectly.

Tolman made much less use of field theoretical concepts
than Lewin.

Tolman'

s

system is known as a purposive behav-

iorism because he felt that a role for cognitive expectancy
was required in a description of behavior.

His focus on

cognitive aspects of behavioral situations provided a stark
contrast to Hull and his followers and has led to many new
and varied research problems.

It should also be pointed

out that Tolman was a so-called "rat psychologist" because

he felt that it was possible to study "most of the under-

lying laws of intelligence, motivation and instability"
rats as well as men.
2

^ Edward

Tolman, A Stimulus-expectancy Need Cather's Psychology Science ( 19^5 ) Cl, loo quoted in
p. 288.
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Tolman's emphasis on the cognitive role in behavior
led him to the development of the concept of intervening-

variable and also to the formulation of the distinction

between learning and performance.

Both of these concepts

have received wide recognition in circles concerned with

psychological theory.

The intervening variable was a

highly useful device for Tolman because it is

a

hypothetical

intra-organismic function that can be used as a sort of
summary for one's intuitive feelings about the reasons for
a particular kind of behavior.

While this can be a useful

approach it is clearly open to great abuse if taken too
seriously or used too freely.

Had we gone into the details

of Hull’s learning theory we would have seen both styles of

this abuse which followed from Hull's adaptation of this

aspect of Tolman's theory.

Tolman's distinction between learning and performance
has been an important theoretical tool because it permits
the experimenter to recognize that the animal's motivational

status is also important in behavior.

In itself it repre-

sents a shift from the purely machine-like analogy of

learning processes.

It also sparked vigorous debate between

Tolman and Hull due to the fact that Tolman's formulation
of cognitive factors and motivation as distinct from per-

formance were exactly contrary to Hull's position which was

asserting that drive reduction produced by reward was the

efficacious factor in learning.
We can conclude this very limited treatment of field-

like theories in modern psychology with a few general re-

marks relating to the character of field theory as contrasted to the older S-R and associationistic approaches.
Obviously, the natural bias that one finds in the field

concept toward the appreciation of fields of organization

creates a basic shift away from focusing on discrete ele-

ments and connections.

In some very important ways, the

two alternative approaches form an interesting complement

for each other.

Since the traditional approach had been so

intent on the peripheral aspects of behavior, the field

oriented theorist with his concern for perception and cog-

nition tended to provide a needed corrective influence in
the direction of psychological thought.

Thus, Lewin could

open up the new areas of personality and group-dynamics and

Tolman could, for the first time in theoretical psychology,
find room for the concept of purposiveness as it relates to

actual observed behavior.
We can therefore conclude that the advent of field

theoretical constructs had, and is still having, an important effect on the breadth and depth of psychological theory.

We must also note however, that since the field

theory is essentially a metaphor which produces useful ap-

proaches to various phenomena, it will continually be

V3 r)

diluted by Inappropriate application* which totally divorce
the concept from its first principles and therefore actually
do a disservice to the cause of psychological theory.

As

we have seen in this section, there is no direct relation-

ship between the Gestalt theoretical physiological field in

even the most orthodox modern psychological field theorist,
Kurt Lewin.

As a matter of fact, Lewin explicitly modified

the Gestalt concept of Isomorphism and spoke of "field"

rather than field as the Gestalt psychologists had done.
Our opinion is that a truly scientific psychology cannot be
built upon a system of thought which is made incoherent by
such separations between theoretical statements and the
first principles upon which they rest.

We will further as-

sert that the ultra-modern trend of shifting to forms of

cognitive theorizing which are increasingly based on com-

puter models of thinking processes has done little more
than to teach and old dog new tricks.

Also,

the closely

associated developments in ever increasingly sophisticated
experimental techniques, while they may dazzle the woi Id
and make an apparently rigorous curriculum for graduate
students, are themselves limited to the analysis

of

the now

tricks that we would attempt to teach the old dog. The

ini

-

ther operation of this form of theory development and esca-

lation of experimental techniques can do nothing therefore
between
except blur the already vague and hazy distinction

VJ6

the concepts which separate the different divisions of psy-

chological thought.

One might gratuitously call this

sort,

of development eclecticism but in reality it only amounts
to the gradual grinding down of differing shapes and sizes

of ideas into a homogeneous mass of minute data which

is

unified only in the fact that its parts are in no way diverse from each other.
4.1.3

PERSONALITY THEORY
The last major variety of modern theory to be consid-

ered is personality theory.

We are going to defer treat-

ment of the more organismic aspects of personality theory

until they can be considered in the context of the White-

headian organismic approach to personality and will therefore, following a brief over-view, only consider the more

mechanistic types of personality theory in this section.
The general class of theories that have attempted to
focus on the issue of personality are primarily noteworthy
in that the nature of their subject matter has caused them
to be much more complete than those theories we have con-

sidered to this point.

Personality theorists have, in

general, recognized the functional autonomy of individual

personalities and have been willing to admit such factors as
survival, adaptiveness, purposiveness and motivation, as

important aspects of the whole person in his natiu at habitat.

This emphasis on real aspects of whole people in
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tionaL psychological theorist who tends to specialize

i

in

the hypothetical mechanisms underlying narrow aspects of

statistical subjects in a highly specialized laboratory
environment.

It is hardly surprising that one finds such

little commerce between the two approaches.

It is also

interesting to note that some of the outstanding developments in psychological theory have, none- the-less

,

come

from those who indulged in the theories which are closely

associated with human life as it is lived.

Sigmund Freud

is the outstanding traditional example of this category and

in modern times we can perhaps turn to Gordon Allport for
the impetus toward a new view of psychology.

We will have

more to say about Allport's role and the movement of which
he was a member in the conclusion to this section after we

have considered those types of personality theory which are
closest to traditional psychological theory.
The outstanding example of a personality theory which

includes both a traditional stimulus response orientation

and a psychoanalytic orientation is to be found in Neal

Miller and John Dollard's use of the overarching scope

oi

psychoanalytic theory as the vehicle in which to transpoi
the highly restricted independent and dependent variables

which are found in S-R theory.

They chose to use Hullian

because
theory both because of its elaborate structure and
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For example,

Freud saw an important organismic role in the process

ol‘

tension reduction (pleasure) and Hull's central notion was
the idea of drive reduction (reinforcement), as the effec-

tive stimulus in learned behavior.

Hull also developed

numerous intervening variables to deal with such things as
the build-up of inhibition as a result of practicing the

same task and this type of concept seemed to fall fairly

well in line with Freud's ideas on repression.
Thus, with Hull's theory as the methodological model

and Freud's psychoanalysis as the content mode L

,

Mi Ller and

Dollard set out to produce a theory of personality.

They

developed a behavioristic account of the development of
learning of a neurosis and also saw its cure during the
process of psychoanalysis as an "unlearning" or relearning
of something more functional.

In addition to this small

example, their work has probed into many areas of psycho-

analytic theory and also has produced feedback into Hullian
theory which Hull himself adopted as a meaningful addition
to his theory.

Miller and Dollard'

s

work can be seen as an expression

of the need to find a complete context into which the nu-

merous partial psychologies of the various branches can be

integrated and also, to find a way

to

bring the more global
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concepts of personality theory to some meaningful experi-

mental test.

As important as this attempt has been it

seems to have died, out as an active line of research and
its creators have become occupied with other areas of re-

search.

We might point out in passing that as important

as synthesis is, whatever problems are common to both sys-

tems in the synthesis will also be common in the resultant.

In this case, since both Freud and Hull shared the mecha-

nistic model then we can expect a mechanistic resultant.

Another attempt at the methodological production of

personality theory has been the use of the factor analytic
approach to the analysis of data which are thought to bear
some important relationship to personality.

This trend is

a direct spin-off of the factor analytic methodologies

which were developed to analyze the statistical characteristics of intelligence tests.

The idea is to obtain data

on a large number of measures from a large number of people

and then to correlate each measure with every other measure
so that the common factors which account for most of the

observed variance can be found by the process of
analysis.

i

actor

Factor analysis is a highly complex and extremely

cumbersome technique that, were it not for the modern computer, would not find nearly as much use as it does.

From this it is easily seen that the particular content of the personality theory which is based on a factor

y io
analysis is Utile inlluoncm] by the analyllcaJ methodology.
As long as some numerical representation can bo achieved

for the data one thinks relevant, then a factor analysis

can be performed.

To date, even though there are factor

analytic personality theorists of widely recognized status,
this sort of approach has only demonstrated its ability to

analyze factors which are contained within the inclusiveness of the theorists' formulations.

Like behavioral tech-

niques, factor analytic methodology will

serve any master

who can master its technique.
4.1.

<4

HUMANISTIC PSYCHOLOGY
At this point,

rather than going into the various

types of organismic, analytic and self-theories of personality, we will leave those details for later discussion and

conclude our consideration of the development of psychological thought by considering the rise of the newest self-

proclaimed factor in the history of psychology.

We are re-

ferring to the gradually increasing level of criticism
which has arisen since the early 1950

's

which has called

itself a movement toward humanistic psychology.

The cham-

pions of this young revolt that seeks basic reform in psy-

chology have been men like Gordon Allport, Abraham Maslov,

Gardner Murphy and Carl Rogers.
The strongest bond of unity in the whole movement

been a reaction to the narrow artificiality of the
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they assert,

to oncornpass those aspects of man, his h Lghly subject ivo

qualities and capacities, which set him apart from the rest
of animal

Humanistic psychologists are not reductive

life.

analysts who think that the beauty and complexity of human
life is somehow synonymous with beautifully executed and

elegant laboratory experiments.

Such efforts they feel

have added little to our understanding of man.
The humanistic view point has not attached its goals

and aspirations to some now theory or even methodology
which is to become the panacea for the

psychology.

Rather,

il Ls

of contemporary

the humanist movement is an effort to

reorient psychological thought so that it takes account of
the same sort of factors that we have seen to be the con-

cern of the originators of human scientific psychology

in

The first president

the middle of the nineteenth century.

of the American Association for Humanistic Psychology,
J.

F.

T.

Bugental, included the following sentiments in his

presidential address given in 19&2.
Humanistic psychology has as Its ultimate
goal tho preparation of a complete description of what it means to be aLive as a human
Such a complete description
being.
would necessarily include an inventory oJ
man's native endowment; his potentialities
of feeling, thought, and action; his growth,
evolution, and decline; his interaction with
the
various environing conditions
to
possible
range and variety of experience
.

.

.

.

.

.
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him; and his moaningf'uj place
verse .^35
Wllile such

in

I

ho mi

i

-

sentiments are, for humanistic psychologists,

something of an orienting goal rather than an envisioned
attainment, the humanists are, none- the-less

,

vitally con-

cerned with experience as it relates to those aspects of

daily living which are important to the process of life
and are quite willing to talk about issues such as love,

purpose, fear.
One

oi

the earliest champions of the movement, Abraham

Maslow, coined the expression "third force" as a character-

ization of those psychologists who see psychology as "holistic rather than atomistic, functional rather than taxonomic, dynamic rather than static
than simple-mechanical."

.

.

.

purposive rather

On this interpretation, one

could perhaps go back to the publication of Kol'fka's

Gestalt Psychology in 1935 or perhaps even Lowin'

s

A Dynamic

Theory of Personality also published in the same year, for
the antecedents of the latter day "third force" psycholo-

However, the field theorist revolt against the

gists.

atomistic and associationistic psychologies of old is not
the same as the emphasis which is found as the common

m
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thread that binds the humanistic psychologists together.
The "third force" people share a common position in their

concern for the unity of the human person--the person and
his problems as they are manifest in the webs of life's

interrelationships.

Nevitt Sanford's often referenced

article says of this movement:
The critique is not of the experimental approach in psychology or of general psychology
as a discipline; it is of a state of affairs
in which the advocates of a particular kind
of p sycho logy- -psycho logy- without -a-per sonhave been able to gain power through putting
across the idea that they are the representatives in psychology of true science ^37
.

Although Koch has stated the position negatively to the effect that the central factor in the "third force," a term

which is an unhappy metaphor to Koch, is nothing more than
"a feeling of disaffection from the emphases of recent

poO

American psychology,"

J

the central position of the whole

movement was eloquently and succinctly stated by Carl
Rogers as a problem relating to which philosophical view of

man is chosen as the basis for one's theoretical framework:
Each current psychology has its own implicit
philosophy of man. Though not often stated
explicitly, these philosophies exert their

^^Nevitt Sanford, Will Psychologists Study Human
Problems
emphasi s
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Press,
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influence in many significant and subtle ways.
For the behaviorist, man is a machine.
For the Freudian, man is an irrational being,
irrevocably in the grip of his past and the
product of that past, his unconscious.
It is not necessary to deny that there
is truth in each of these formulations in
order to recognize that there is another perspective.
[Man] is a person in the
process of creating himself, a person who
creates meaning in life, a person who embodies
a dimension of subjective freedom.
He is a
figure who, though he may be alone in a vastly
complex universe and though he may be part
and parcel of that universe and its destiny,
is also able in his inner life to transcend
the material universe; he is able to live dimensions of his life which are not fully or
adequately contained in a description of his
conditionings or of his unconscious 239
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

We agree with Rogers’ contention that the problem lies

in the choice of a proper philosophy of man as the basis

for psychological theorizing.

However, it should also be

evident that our view as to what constitutes the proper

philosophy of man differs rather distinctly from that generally found in the traditions of regular psychology or,
for that matter, humanistic,

"third force" psychology.

It

is clear from the preliminary sketch of the philosophy of

organism and some of its implications for psychological
theory which were presented in Section 3*3 and also from
the "third force" psychology mentioned above, that it is
the central concern for the individual human, for a

psychology-wi th- a -per son
2

Ibid

.

,

^Rogers, Toward
p

.

129

,

that marks the main point

of

a Science of the Person in Wann

,

ed.,

similarity between the two approaches.

However, we can

also push the similarity a little farther with the
recog-

nition that the dominant theoretical framework for many
humanistic psychologists is the existentialist perspective

which itself is an outgrowth of the phenomenological school
of Husserl and Brentano- two individuals that we were abLo

pl^ce in close contact with the development of psychology
as a human science in the middle of the nineteentli century.

In some very important ways, modern psychology has

come full circle.

In a limited frame of reference, one can

say that there is a return to the earlier thought of Dilthey

and Brentano.

In a much more inclusive frame of reference,

one can say that in some very important ways western thought
is once again asserting man to be the pinnacle of sensi-

tivity and the essence of the evolving cosmos.

The philos-

ophy of organism, because of the fundamental difference in
its basic metaphysical postulates offers a true alternative
to the problems which face those who seek human meaning in

scientific psychology.

We can state the central issues

involved in the need for a basic change in the metaphysical

approach in a few central factors as follows:
we have seen,

First, as

the development of the various types of psy-

chological theory which has taken place since the middle of
the nineteenth century, has been overshadowed by the use
the natural scientific model as the paradigm for psycho-

of'
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logical theory.

Second, since progress in science is usu—

thought of as growth toward new abstractions that have

larger explanatory power, a unifying theory in psychology
will have united what is of value in each of the several

highly specialized areas of psychology.

Third, since it is

an impossibility for the unifying principles, which must

have a larger generality, to come from within any of the

narrower specialized fields of psychology (the whole is
greater than the part), some new solution is required to

yield the guiding principles for the unification of psychological thought.

Fourth, since the various specialized

fields of psychological thought, whose history has been

covered in these chapters, all share the common parentage
in the Galilean/Newtonian paradigm, the only place princi-

ples of greater generality can be found is in a system of
thought which is more general than the basic metaphysical

categories of the atomistic and mechanistic universe that
has existed for the last three hundred years.

Fifth, the

philosophy of organism is the only system, yet devised,
that speaks to these issues in a coherent and applicable

fashion.

Gordon Allport has stated the issue in a way that
places the problem directly upon the threshold of the phi-

losophy of organism.

Speaking of the inversion in our

logic which is caused by excessive particularism Allpoi

t

V t7

says

:

All analogies and models are derived in the
first instance from a perceiving and cognizing
mind.
It is from our own experience with our
regulatory process that we derive the idea of
regulatory systems in both animate and inanimate nature. The analogy we create does not
include the creator. Rather the analogy is
dependent upon (is an aspect of) the creator.
Thus it is only aspects of our total life
that are like computers, like biochemical
compounds, rats in a maze, or like the sociaL
behavior of insects. It is only the tail aspect of an elephant that is like a rope. 2^0
the philosophy of organism is a system

As we have seen,

which precisely accomplishes the task of creating an
"analogy" which does include its creator and because of this
fact, provides an answer to the enigma which has faced any-

one who sought to find a more general unifying solution for
the various specialized approaches to the psychological

Allport put his finger directly on the prob-

study of man.

lem when he said.

The truth is that we can never have a fully
systematic eclecticism until we can resolve
the two central antimonies-- the issue of dualism and the problem of purpose

With this, we can bring this lengthy consideration

of

Those who agree with All-

historical issues to a close.

port's sentiment in the quotation immediately above, must
2Z+0
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also recognize that the issue of dualism and the problem of

purpose are not simply problems for a meaningful eclecticism
in psychology, but are, rather, issues which are endemic to
the entire tradition of modern science.

We began Chapter One, and this excursion through psy-

chological history with the assertion that the whole of the

movement toward science, was itsell

,

based upon the centu-

ries long tradition of revealed religion and faith in the

order of nature.

This faith, which was seen to be "an un-

conscious derivative from medieval theology," was not simthat
ply the faith of the church but instead was the faith

"springs from direct inspection of the nature

disclosed in our own immediate experience."

of

things as

In the contin-

assert, "To
uation of this thought, Whitehead went on to
ourselves wo
experience this faith is to know that in being

are more than ourselves:

to know that our experience, dim

the utmost depths ol
and fragmentary as it is, yet sounds
in order to
to know that detached details merely
reality:

find themselves in a
be themselves demand that they should
the
to know that this system includes
system of things:
the harmony of aesthetic
harmony of logical rationality, and
of topic lies
to know that while the harmony
achievement:

necessity, the aesthetic
upon the universe as an iron hand
ideal moulding the
harmony stands before it as a living
towards finer subtler
general flux in its broken progress

Vi 9
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Now that wo have come

to

tho ond

oi'

odyssey that began with the awakening of

the hundred-year
a

new awareness of

detached details which wanted to find themselves in

a sys-

tem of things, and which eventually did find themselves in
a system of logical harmony and aesthetic achievement,

we

are, once again, in possession of many new facts which

appear to contravene the iron hand necessity of the old
system.

In this sense history has repeated itself, for we

are midst of a new era of detached details in which the

ablest tool man has to apply to the task of renewing his

vision is that same faith that springs from direct inspection of things as disclosed in our own immediate experience.
We must, once again, have the faith that the only thing

which can cement the detachment of novel detail into the

validity of logical rationality and aesthetic achievement
is our own experience, dim and fragmentary thought it may
be,

since in all the world, it is only in the shadow

of

man's image that there can be any change in the general
flux toward finer subtler issues.
2k2

Whitehead, Science and the Modern World

,

p.
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TOWARD AN ORGAN SM 1.0 PSYCHOLOGY
'I

The purpose of this chapter is to explore ways in

which the relationship of psychology and science can be

clarified and also to extend these considerations by attempting to establish a connection between them and philosophy.

This treatment, from which there seems to be no re-

treat if the type of problem encountered as a result of in-

terpreting psychology as a human science is to be meaningly
treated, will explore the ideal of bringing the three separate areas of discourse into a joint contribution toward

increased human understanding.

It should also be added

that this does not entail seeking to amalgamate these sepa-

rate disciplines into some new discipline; rather,

we

shall simply attempt a coordination of basic ideas such
that each discipline can make its maximum contribution to
the others with a minimum of infringement.

Since we are

suggesting that the changes which might result from this
analysis will be the greatest in psychology, we will discuss it last after first presenting our position on the

character of science itself and following that with an introductory defense of the Whiteheadian metaphysical philosophy which is our primary philosophical orientation.
5.1

THE CHARACTER OF
SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE
"Science is the attempt to make the chaotic diversity

of our sense-experience correspond to a logically uniform

systom of thought.

In this system single experiences must

be correlated with the theoretic structure in such a way

that the resulting coordination is unique and convincing."

This was Albert Einstein's opening paragraph of an essay he
wrote in 19^0 in which he undertook

explain the attempts

to

he was making toward finding a unifying theoretical basis

for the various separate and specialized fields of physical

research.

He continued:

The sense- experiences are the given subjectmatter.
But the theory that shall interpret
It is the result of an
them is man-made.
extremely laborious process of adaptation;
hypothetical, never completely final, always
subject to question and doubt.

According to Einstein, the scientific way of forming concepts does not differ significantly from the methods which
are used in daily life.

One finds that the scientific en-

terprise is simply a "more precise definition of concepts
and conclusions" with the ultimate goal of reducing "all

concepts and correlations to as few as possible logically

independent basic concepts and axioms."
In this light,

science is seen to be simply

a

special-

ized form of human activity that also happens to have its
own methods, goals and characteristics.

Important for the

present context is the idea of sense-experience as it
^^^Albert Einstein, The Fundaments of Physics in
Readings in the Philosophy of Science Herbert Feigl and
May Broadbeck, eds (New York: Apple ton- Century- Cro Its,
1953), P. 253.
,

.

underlies the processes
tive theory.

of'

building

a

body of interpreta-

At this very preliminary level we must be

careful not to assume a highly abstract definition of

sense-experience.

Obviously, we are on guard against the

type of interpretation that was basic to Wundt's elementism

and are searching, instead, for a definition that will contain a larger meaning.

Phillip Frank has observed that

science actually deals with two distinct poles of experience which are formed by the contrast between cornmonsense

experiences (direct observations) and the general princiTo Frank:

ples that seem to apply to them.

The central problem in the philosophy of science is how to get from cornmonsense statements
to general principles 2
.

^

We would therefore, like to insure that the sense-experience

which goes into psychology as a human science retains the

meaning of a cornmonsense, experiential term which is used
in the "extremely laborious process" of forming an inter-

pretative adaptation or theory.

Xn this same vein, Wernex

Heisenberg has asserted that the concepts of natural language, even the vague ones, are more stable in the expan-

sion of knowledge than are the precise terms

ol

scientific

idealizalanguage since these latter terms derive from an

tion stemming from limited groups of phenomena.
2
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formed in immediate experience with reality and therefore

represent reality.

It is this immediate contact with real-

ity which is lost when the scientific attempt is made to
get a closer correspondence with a more defined aspect

oi

Heisenberg believes that it is the intrinsic sta-

nature.

-

bility of natural language that accounts for the fact that
after the nineteenth century belief in the scientific

method and precise rational terminology had passed away,
we find new versions of the age-old concepts of life, soul

and God which seemed to have had no place in the circum-

scribed skepticism which characterized the closed frame of
In this, Heisenberg feels that modern

scientific thought.

physics, by its dissolution of rigid concepts, has perhaps

opened the door to a wider outlook on the relation between
the human mind and reality.

2^5

On this same point, Michael

Polanyi asserts:

There is in fact no aspect of sciences, including even mathematics, in which the fundamental presuppositions, the methods of investigation and the criteria used for vet it ication have not undergone a series of marked
changes since the inception of modern science
300 years ago
.

2

York:

Ph ilosophy (New
196-202.

^Werner Heisenberg, Physics and
Harper and Row,

1958

)

,

PP

•

246

Polanyi, Science Faith and Society (Chicago:
versity of Chicago Press, 1964 ) p 89
,

.

Uni

5-1.1

OBSERVATION AND INTERPRETATION IN SCIENCE
It

is

those latter aspects of the scientific enter-

prise which form its "never completely final" and "always
subject to question and doubt" character that warrant the

greatest attention in the present context.

We are con-

cerned with the path between the two poles of data and interpretation, of internal realization and external description, and can make several basic observations about the

nature of the "rites of passage" which are appropriate to
theory formulation.
First of all, we have the following statement by

Polanyi which seems clear enough in light of the history

presented in earlier chapters:
Every interpretation of nature, whether scientific, nonscientif ic or anti-scientific,
is based on some intuitive conception of the
The premises
general nature of things.
of science on which all scientific teaching
and research rest are beliefs held by scientists on the general nature of things.
,

.

.

.

There is, in fact, a certain background of presupposition
To perceive is to select and to abstract

in anything we do.

in accord with our conceptual framework;

this amounts to a

complex interaction between the mind and its object.

This

vital aspect of discovery in science, is a part which is

usually lost in idealized accounts of the scientific method
2k7

Ibid

.

,

p

.

38

.

3

^0

or in the cut and dry procedures established by a teacher

for the "discovery" of the objective of the lesson.

This

selective interpretation shows the subjectivity of the scientific enterprise.

ft is also a subjectivity in which the

complexity and focus of the interaction is under the direct
influence of the orientation of the observer.

Of this in-

fluence, Jacob Bronowski has written in another but related

context
For relativity derives essentially from a
philosophic analysis which insists that
there is not a fact and an observer but a
joining of the two in an observation.
This is the fundamental unit of physics.
The actual observation. And this is what
the principle of uncertainty showed in
that the event and the
atomic physics:
observer are not separable. 440
At the very basis of science itself then,

is the perceptive,

presuming and inquiring mind of the scientist.

The true

picture of this enterprise is far different than that which

usually evolves from more positivistically oriented accounts
which look to the collection of pure facts and see theory
as simply a convenient way of classifying those tacts.

I

he

problem with this approach is that it fails to recognize
the role of the creative intelligence of the scientist be-

by
cause that sort of data has been excluded as irrelevant

rests
the narrowness of the presumptions on which the theory
2t>8

Bronowski, The Common Sense of Science (New York:
Harper and Row, I960 ) pi 175
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This leads directly to a second important character of

modern science.

In the tradition of scientific thought

there have been two main approaches toward the production
of theoretical accounts of nature.

Barbour summarizes them

succinctly in terms of the Baconian inductive ideal and the

Popperian deductive ideal.

249

In the case of the tradi-

tional Baconian method, collecting data and cataloguing
facts were seen as the main stays of scientific advance.

These inductive procedures were thought to simply involve
the generalizations necessary to interpret the data and

failed completely to recognize the fact that hypotheses are
not simple summaries of the data but in fact are mental

constructs that have an entirely different status than the
simple data.

The deductive approach in science which de-

velops much later, arose as a reaction to the assertions of
obthe pure inductive method because there was often no

servable way that the inductive statements could be tested
or disproven.

This approach recognized the hypothetical

obcharacter and different logical status of theory and
apservation and prescribed the opposite of the inductive

proach namely, that the general theoretical statements
should generate testable hypotheses.
249 Barbour,

Tn this case,

Issues in Science and Religion

,

pp.

we con

142-lVj.

find useful data on how theories are to be tested but very

little insight into how they are created.

Thus both common

approaches to theory formulation are decidedly naive as
regards the actual role of the creative leap of imagination

which is required for the production of theories.

Of this

type of behavior in which there are many important parallels
to artistic creativity Norman Campbell has written:

For it has been admitted that through discovery
of laws depends ultimately not on fixed rules
but on the imagination of highly gifted individuals, this imaginative and personal element
is much more prominent in the development of
theories; the neglect of theories leads directly to the neglect of the imaginative and
It leads to an
personal element in science.
utterly false contrast between "materialistic"
science and the "humanistic" studies of literWhat I want to
ature, history and art.
impress on the reader is how purely personal
His theory of universal
was Newton's idea.
to him by the trivial
suggested
gravitation,
product of his india
fall of an apple, was
vidual mind, just as much as the Fifth Symphony
(said to have been suggested by another trivial
incident, the knocking at a door) was a product
of Bee thoven s ^^0
.

.

.

'

We have seen examples of the two classical forms

ol

theory

in the inductive procedure proposed by B. F. Skinner and
Hull.
the deductive procedure that was followed by Clark
to
Certainly, there is nothing in either of these theories

that it
suggest either that creative imagination exists or

transcends the process of purely logical reasoning.
Norman Campbell, What is Science? (London: Methuen
1**4.
and Co., 1921), pp- 97, 102 quoted in Ibid ., p.
2 50

.

IV)

A

third important asporl of Uio

servation and interpretation is the problem
and proof.

between ob-

r.'lal ion
oJ'

evaluation

The problems in this area are difficult because

the explicit relation between theories and experience is

often not very direct.

There are several reasons for this

condition that are of vital importance in the present context.

Starting with the basis in experience first we have

the problem of what Margenau has called "rules of corre-

spondence

.

"

Experience, in becoming complete and integrated, moves from the sensory and spontaneous to the rational and reflective. By
this transition, the elements of the given
take on orderly traits and allow reason to
take hold of them.
Among the peculiarities
of bare sense data is a certain logical
haze, a tangled connectedness, which
defies classification of mere data as individuals.
The passage to orderly knowledge involves the positing of constructs, which
are the rational elements to which datal
experience is made to correspond.
Experience moves from data to constructs via guiding relations which are
called "rules of correspondence."^^
.

.

.

.

.

.

The important thing about these so-called "rules" is not

whether we can actually define them at this point but
rather, the fact that the scientific theories are connected
to sense experience by a network of interconnected con-

structs (concepts, laws, guiding relations).

Henry Margenau The Nature of Physical Reality
McGraw Hill, 1950), pp. 72-73.
,

York:

This inter-

(

New

J60

connection exists in such a
fashion that it is not possible
to give one simple proof
of a theory nor is it possible
to
assert that the one theory
is the only possible explanation
of the data at hand; for
there are often great competitions
between rival theoretical camps.
Of the things which seem true
about the character of
theories and their relations to
experience is the fact that
as the theory becomes more
general, the obvious connection
with the "logical haze" of bare
experience becomes more remote.
One finds that a whole network of
ideas is implicated
by the various subordinate components
that comprise the one

comprehensive system.

Margenau also speaks of "circuits of

verification" in this context because it is
often the case
that a set of observations must be connected
to each other

via a matrix of interlocking concepts, whose
logical path-

ways are only remotely connected with experiental
data.
Thus, the inferences which can be drawn from the
observa-

tions often lose immediate or obvious applicability to
ex-

perience or new observations.

Given this sort of complex

environment, care must be taken to account for:

a)

the re-

lationship of the theory to the data it represents, b) the
internal consistency of the whole body internal connections

between the concepts of the internal structure of the theory and c) the comprehensiveness of the theory so that it
will not only account for immediate data but will also

suggest new applications and
hypotheses.
5.1.2

2 ^2

THE PERSONAL AND COMMUNAL NATURE OF SCIENCE
These various complexities of the scientific
enter-

prise all suggest that the "royal road" to
scientific certitude, the closing of the gap between the
poles of commonsense and general principles, is not the secure
and infallible type of knowledge that it was often thought
to be.

Today, we find many modern scientists, some of whom
we have

quoted, that are of the opinion that science is a highly

personal affair.
Polanyi

'

s

The classical work in this area is Michael

Personal Knowledge

in which he completely dis-

pels the notion that a scientist is something of a truth-

machine.

f'l^iding

In the place of such views in which a

predominantly external perspective is taken, Polanyi argues
convincingly for "passionate" interest that motivates

a

scientist in his search for new facts and their proper in-

terpretation which he himself must ultimately accept as
true.
a

Of this sort of enterprise in which the scientist is

player in a game in which he also helps to make the rules

and applies them as he sees fit, Polanyi asserts:
This process is not specifiable in terms of
strict rules, for it involves a modification
of the existing interpretative framework.
2 52

Barbour,

ojd.

ci t

.

,

pp

.

ikk-lkG

253

pp

.

Polanyi, Personal Knowledge
3-68.

,

see especially Part I,
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it crosses a heuristic gap and causes
thereby
a self-modification of the intelligence

achieving discovery. In the absence of any
formal procedure on which to rely, he is
guided by his intimations of a hidden knowledge.
Where great originality is at
work in science or, even more clearly, in artistic creation, the innovating mind sets itself new standards more satisfying to itself,
and modifies itself by the process of innovation so as to become more satisfying to itself
in light of these self-set standards 2 5^
.

.

.

When the innovative acts of the mind of man are viewed from
the outside,

in an external or explanatory framework, the

passionate insistence of the innovator as the underlying
factor whereby the individual improves his own mind, becomes
lost in the determinism of the standards of interpretation

which are imposed.

Yet the scientist is no more devoid of

passions and commitments than is anyother human being.
Neither, for that matter, is a student on whom we would impose the structure of our program.

However, the fact that

in each and every case, we confront the inquiring mind of a

seeker of truth and understanding does not force the conclusion that knowledge is a subjective affair that is devoid
of objectivity.
to assert,

On the contrary, this position is intended

in Bronowski

'

s

phrase,

"That the event and the

observer are not separable," it is the recognition that it
is the whole person in meaningful contact with his environ-

ment that forms the ground rhythm of man's individual and
25 ^

Ibid.

*

pp*

395-396.
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collective intellectual advance.
An important aspect of this
interrelation of the

knowing mind and its environment
is the community of peers
in which the scientist operates.
In this light, the highly
singular aspects of the individual
quest for understanding
are also seen to be shared in
many important ways by the
scientists' community of fellows.
Science is, after all,
a corporate enterprise which
thrives by the gradual growth

of historically based ideas which is
carried on by indi-

vidual scientists under the impetus of
the mutual criticism
discussion and stimulus.
Speaking of this community nature
which has the usual attributes of human
communities, Harold
Schilling writes:
It is a group of likeminded people with
similar interests, predilections, goals, modes of
thought, intellectual equipment, training and
experience. A group of likeminded people become a community as it develops a common way
of life and work, a language of its own as
well as other means of communication, group
ideals, ethical and moral codes, sanctions,
institutions and organizations, patterns of
responsibility and authority, a collective
style of thought, customs, orthodoxies, and
so on.
As all others, this community is afflicted by the usual vagaries, adequacies and
shortcomings of human beings. It has its
politics, its pulling and hauling, its pressure groups; its differing schools of thought,
its divisions and schisms; its personal loyalties and animosities, jealousies and hatreds,
and rallying cries; its fads and fashions 2 55
.

C.

Harold K. Schilling, Science and Religion (New York
Scribner's Sons, 1962), pp 5 ^- 55
.

.

In this rather vivid portrayal of the communal
function of

science we can find something of the same theme which
has

been extensively developed by Thomas Kuhn in his Structure
Scie ntific Revolutions

.

Kuhn maintains that there are

changes in the assumptions of science which occur

from time to time and which are responsible for what he
calls a "paradigm shift" in the basic assumptions that de-

termine how scientists see the "facts" which are before
them.

One of the examples he uses is the development of

Copernican astronomy which we treated in Chapter One.

An-

other would be the rise of the concept of energy as opposed
to the concept of mass, a change whose importance to the

history of psychology we documented in the mid nineteenth
century.

We cannot enter into Kuhn's work in detail but

there is one aspect of it which is of prime importance to
the present context.

5.1.3

THE LOGIC OF DISCOVERY AND
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RESEARCH
In developing this theme we can also open the way to

concluding this brief excursion into the inner workings of
science.

The contrast to be developed here epitomizes the

difference between the internal and external views of the

processes of science and highlights the general problem of

ignoring the critical function of creative, personal judgement.

The external view is provided by Karl Popper in

work entitled The Logic of Scientific Discovery and the

a

3651

internal prospective is provided by Kuhn's Structure of

Scientific Revolutions

The crux of this argument has

.

been detailed in an article written by Kuhn in response to
critics of a "Popperian" mind. 2 56

In this article Kuhn

points out that Popper sees the progress of science as a
logic of discovery in which the scientist attempts to solve
the problems in which his theories have involved him.

To

Popper, the resolution of these problems provides a test of
the theory in question, which, of course, is why Popper

places such great stress upon the idea of "falsifability"
as an important criterion of theories.

This follows from

the fact that theories can never be proven to be true but

can only be proven wrong, that is, falsified.

This sort of

account, which is widely believed to be accurate, ignores,

according to Kuhn, a vital factor in the conduct of research.

Kuhn's argument is that we need to focus upon the

psychological processes of research, that is, its personal
or internal aspect rather than its extrapersonal or external

aspect as indicated in the phrase "logic of discovery."

Kuhn uses the term "puzzle" as opposed to Popper's "problem"

precisely because in his ordinary work the scientist uses
current scientific theory as a premise on which to build
2^6

Thomas S. Kuhn, Logic of Discovery or Psychology of
Research? in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge I.
Cambridge UniLakatos and A~ Mu s grave eds ( Cambridge
versity Press, 1970 ) PP* 1 23
,

:

,

»

.

*

the rules of his game but his real

objoel

is

puzzle which confronts him as a challenge to

solve the

to
liis

ingenuity.

The difference betwoon the two schemes may seem sma

uni.

1.

I

i

I

it is pointed out that vastly different conclusions are

drawn from them.
To Popper,

solving problems means tosting the theory

whereas, to Kuhn, solving puzzles or attempting to solve
them is a test of the scientist.

On this latter view,

is a puzzle which is a challenge to the integrity of

it

the

scientist such that if the test he devises is a failure

it

is only his scientific integrity which is impugned and not

the corpus of current theory.

This distinction between the

two approaches is central because it points up two key as-

pects of the character of science that are
this context.

ol

importance in

In the first place is the fact that major

changes can and do occur in the basic assumpt ions
ence.

ol

sc-

i

It is in this sense that Kuhn agrees with Popper,

that is,

there are times when the theory is tested and

times in which it is in fact falsified.

The result of this

quest ion
falsification is a new paradigm for the science in

orientation
and it represents a major change in the whole
small
of the scientific community, this holds for

highly

scientific comspecialized communities or for the general

munity in the case of major changes.

But, by definition,

so that in the
these changes are extraordinary occurrences

367

second place we see that

far’

and away the most frequent,

modus operandi of the individual scientist is in the normal
puzzle solving mode.

In this mode he pits his own bril-

liance against that of others in an effort which the current theory serves to define and also to guarantee that

given a sufficiently sanguine approach the problem can be
solved

Kuhn's characterization of the mode of "normal" science
is obviously in harmony with positions taken by the others

whose thought we have presented in an effort to focus upon
the "subjective" aspects of the processes of science.

The

increasing realization of the nature of the individual commitment which is involved in the conduct of scientific

inquiry also helps to explain the corporate nature of the
scientific enterprise and the development of the intense
"loyalties, animosities, fads and fashions" which are to be

observed in science in general and which have obviously
operated in the history of psychological theory.

It is im-

portant to note, and this is one of the main points we wish
to draw from the above discussion,

that this same role

of

processes,
the individual, the nature of his intellectual
intellectual
the character of his interaction with man's
invishistory and with his fellow man, has been completely

psychology
ible within the vast majority of the theories of

which we have covered to this point.

We count it as an

368

extreme irony that psychology, the study of man, has pro-

duced so little in the way of understanding the man whose
efforts at the production of physical science it has been

trying to reproduce in psychological science.

In this,

the

irony seems compounded for not only have the devotees of
the physical sciences led the way toward establishing the

original paradigm which the psychological sciences have

adopted but they have also administered the final insult of
demonstrating, by their own growth, that the model which
Kuhn

psychological theory is pursuing is no longer valid.

observes that the "transfer of allegiance from one paradigm
to another is a conversion experience that cannot be

forced."

In this, he urges, an individual's resistance is

"not a violation of scientific standards but an index to
the nature of science itself."

However, it is also true

that prolonged resistance to the changes taken by the sci-

entific community eventually become illogical and unscientific.

Therefore, Kuhn feels that the historian is justi-

fied in concluding that:
the man who continues to resist after his
whole profession has been converted has
2
ipso facto ceased to be a scientist. ^'

We would simply extend this statement to apply to psychology
in
as a science with the realization that should it persist

theories
its refusal to relinquish the narrowness of those

^^Kuhn, Structure of Scientific Revolu tions,

p.

151*
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which are the direct result of the mechanistic world-view,
then, it may well find that ipso facto it has ceased to be
a science.

These are strong words yet, what psychologist

is not more than a little embarrassed by the insights into

human nature which are provided by the Fechner's, Whitehead's, Einstein's, Polanyi's, Barbour's, Bronowski

'

s

Margenau's, Schilling's and Kuhn's, who are, to the man,

physical scientists and not psychologists?

That each of

them has made substantial contributions to areas other than

their original f ield--contributions which, by and large,
point up the central role played by persons who belong to a

community, who have faith in its methods and who work to

understand the world by accumulating

a corpus of

x

reliable

theory which is systematically related to direct observations--is to be taken as an indication that there is an im-

portant similarity in the basis of all scientific theory
and its disclosure of reality.

This leads us to the last

topic we will treat in this brief characterization of the

nature of science namely, What is the relation of a scientific theory to reality?

That is, What kind of truth is

disclosed by science?
5.1.4

MODERN ALTERNATIVES
TO NAIVE REALISM
probSince such questions are obviously philosophical

interpretalems, we must turn to the various philosophical

relation
tions that have been offered to account for the

between theory and reality.

We have seen that

a

dominant

characteristic of early scientific thought was a naive
realism in which the scientist held a strong commitment to
the ideal that a scientific description was a direct,

eral description of the true character of reality.

lit-

Newton

believed that it was "the business of true philosophy to
derive the natures of things from causes truly existent,
and to inquire after those laws on which the Great Creator

actually chose to found the most beautiful Frame of the
World."

We label this view naive realism and are sometimes

unkind in our treatment of it; however, it is also obvious
that each past scientist, in his turn, has confronted the

task of science with the same wholeness of mind, spirit and

commitment that we have come to believe is operative in

modern scientists.

What has happened is that there has

been a paradigm shift in which, since the eariy part of
this century,

the fundamental basis of this type of realism

has been destroyed.

Since that time, scientists have come

to realize that theories are not literal representations of

"the most beautiful Frame of the World."

Four basic phi-

losophical interpretations which are alternatives

to

the

old realist view and which are current in modern thought
are:

l)

theories viewed as summaries of data--posi tivi sm

2)

theories viewed as useful tools--instruinentalism,

3)

theories viewed as representations of the world--realism

371

and

>1

)

theories viewed as mental structures

Ity

— idealism. 258

mentioning each of these briefly we can provide

a

useful introduction to the type of realism which is appropriate to the organismic approach we have introduced in
ear li©r sections and which will occupy an increasing por-

tion of the remainder of this presentation.

Taking the

various positions in turn we first come to positivism.

Positivism is something of the extension into modern
times of the empiricism of Bacon and Hume.

Percy Bridgman

whose work Logic of Modern Physics and approach to opera-

tionism we have mentioned earlier was an important modern
exponent of this view.

For the positivist, theories are

summaries of the data which simply categorize the data ef-

ficiently and conveniently.

On this view the proper starting

place for the theory is simply the bare sense data which are
the basic observations of fact.

Our position which has been

repeatedly asserted is that there is no such thing as an
"uninterpreted fact."

This interpretation was introduced

in connection with Whitehead's denial that:
the primary activity in the act of experience
is the bare subjective entertainment of the
datum, devoid of any subjective form of reThis is the doctrine of mere sensaception.

tion [sensationalist principle ]. 2 59
258
25

Barbour, Issues in Science and Religion

^Whi tehead

,

Process and Reality

,

p.

183

.

,

pp

.

162-171*
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Whitehead also credits Kant with the recognition that Hume’s

problem required the imposition of some form of subjective
impression upon the data.
Einstein, Polanyi

,

Additionally the accounts of

Kuhn, etc.

,

all point to the fact that

there are simply no uninterpreted facts.

Interpretations

are the products of a selective and abstractive theoretical

framework.

The failure of the empiricist and positivist

approaches to recognize the critical role of theories in
the conduct of research is also a clear indication that

they would totally fail to appreciate the role of the the-

orist--a criticism we have more than once placed upon

F.

B.

Skinner's psychology.
The idea of theories as useful tools or Instrumental i sm

gives more credit to the role of the theorist than positivism.

Here theories are seen to be the rules of the game

by which a scientist accomplishes the task of investigation.
The problem is that theories then become disconnected from
the character of reality and do not need to have any defi-

nite observable correspondence with real entities.

Clearly,

theories which float in this manner are at a definite dis-

advantage when it comes to comparing alternative theories
about the same topic.

How is it possible to adduce evidence

for or against either theory?

Put simply,

it is not.

It

is also to be noted that a good portion of psychological

theory can be categorized in this way.

Recall the shi t

t

we

observed in the gestalt field interpretation in which its
original physical and physiological basis was given over
to the methodological form of "field" used by Kurt Lewin.

Freud's theory may be taken as another case in point though
the similarity is not as obvious without the type of analysis given earlier.

Instrumentalism can and does give rise

to a lot of critical discourse between individuals and

between individual schools of thought.

Kuhn

however,

points out that theories of this type are not at all unlike
the theories of astrology before the advent of modern

astronomy.

On this view, astrological theories are seen

to provide reasons for and explanations of the various phe-

nomena in the heavens but they fail to provide the allimportant "puzzles" that a scientist can struggle with.
This is the case because everyone expected the astrological
theories to be of low accuracy and had many cogent reasons
for these inaccuracies; reasons which were the subject of

much critical discourse.

For the mind-bending scientific

puzzles to develop it was required that the practitioners
of the science should share an explicit method and criteria

which related the theory to the reality of the observed
occurrences.

In this way, it was possible for failures to

lead to puzzles which could prompt the generation

^^Kuhn, Structure of Scientific Revolutions
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calculation, observations and instruments.

Unless the in-

genuity of the individual scientist can
be challenged
within the corpus of a theory which makes
some meaningful
statement about actual things, the level of
discourse will
remain critical but also astrological in character.

Only

puzzle solving is capable of preparing the way for
its own
replacement, hence scientific development, since critical

discourse can easily explain away the basis for further
inquiry unless it is checked by recourse to experimental
data
The third major alternative is Idealism

.

In this, we

find the ultimate step in the recognition of the contribuof

the knower.

That is, the structures of reality are

all seen as being imposed by the mind of the observer.

This is also an important factor in the Whi t eheadian frame-

work since the direct effect of this approach is to establish the fact that conscious experience is the foundation
of

all experience.

While we easily accept this position,

Whitehead explicitly denies it.

Recall that for Whitehead,

conscious experience is the culmination of experience and
not the beginning of it.

Whiteheadian "inversion."

This is a typical example of the
Kant is credited with the inno-

vation in philosophy which recognizes the subjective contribution of the individual, but Whitehead was quoted as
saying "For Kant, the world emerges from the subject; for
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Idealism then, requires that:
the datum in the act of experience can be
adequately analysed purely in terms of
universals ^°1
.

This statement refers to what Whitehead calls the "subjectivist principle" which is the companion of the "sensation-

alist principle" mentioned under positivism.

Obviously

both of these principles relate to what we consider the
process of perception to be all about and are therefore,

intimately connected with issues in psychology, ancient and
Clearly, they are also importantly related to the

modern.

philosophical history which was covered earlier.

Whitehead

uses both of them in his analysis of the various philosophies because they are important ways "to scrutinize

.

.

.

the character to be assigned to the datum in the act of ex-

perience.

The whole philosophical system depends upon

[this all important act of scrutinizing the way these prin-

ciples are applied]."
Not all idealists have been philosophers of old how-

Among moderns there has been Arthur Eddington,

ever.

The fundamental laws and constants of physics
for we could not
are wholly subjective
.

p /T

.

.

I

Whitehead, Process and Reality

,

p.

183.
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have this kind of a priori knowledge
governing an objective universe .26^

ol

laws

and also Henry Margenau who we quoted earlier on theory de-

velopment ends up by concluding:
Science defines a dynamic kind of reality,
one that grows and changes as our understanding grows and changes. ... I am perfectly willing to admit that reality does
change as discovery proceeds 263
.

not
From this it is safe to conclude that idealism is
some thegoing to provide any necessary reasons as to why
relations
ories give accurate predictions about empirical

and others do not.

Unless some reasonable method can be

between
obtained for establishing such a correspondence
our theories
events in the world and the structures of
there seems little hope of progress.

Fortunately, there

is

last category of philosan alternative to be found in the

ophical theory to be considered.

Realism

,

earlier, also
the doctrine that we criticized

asserts that what we know of
has a modern counterpart which
objective relationships in
nature does in fact have some
not simple positivistic
In this view, theories are
nature.
they float in an idealistic
summaries of facts, neither do
void.

tools for the
They are also more than simple

_
of Physical Science
Arthur Eddington, The Philosophy
1°5,
Cambridge University Press, 19^9), P*
(Cambridge:
p* 1 (•
quoted in Barbour, o£. ext
263 Margenau, The Natur e of Physical Reality p* 288,
l68
quoted in Barbour, Ibid., p.
2^2

.
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instrumentality of conscious understanding.

A realist is

one who accepts the fact that being is prior to
knowing and

that it is only by accurate reference to the world that we

can develop any understanding of it.

From the introduction to the philosophy of organism in

Section 3*3» we can see that Whitehead's organismic meta-

physics require a realist epistemology as a result of the
"ontological principle."

The importance of this premise is

stated in many forceful ways by Whitehead, having already

used one version, we can substitute another at this point:
The actual world is built up of actual occasions; and by the ontological principle whatever things there are in any sense of "existence" are derived by abstraction from actual
occasions.
Apart from the experience of subjects there is nothing, nothing, nothing,
bare nothingness. The most general term
"thing"--or, equivalently, "enti ty"--means
nothing else than to be one of the "many"
which find their niches in each instance of
concrescence .264

Whitehead's comments on the sensationalist principle as it
applies to positivism, Hume being a prime example, and also
on the subjectivist principle of Kant's philosophy, make it

clear that his realism entails that the world be viewed as
to its wholeness rather than an assemblage of isolated and

Whitehead, Process and Reality quoted in A Key to
Whitehead's Process and Reality Donald W. Sherburne, ed.
Bloomington
Indiana University Press, 1966), p. 18.
Sherburne's treatment of Whitehead involves assembling
segments of text found throughout Process and Reality into
Thus, the above quotation is Sherone complete segment.
burne's cogent patchwork of several Whiteheadian sentences.
,

,
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The reason Tor Whitehead's formulation of

idea of "actual entity" or "actual occasion" was to

underline this very point.

Actual entities exist in a

unity of interrelatedness which is determined as

a

result

both their external relatedness and also their internal
or process aspects.

The point to be made here, is simply

that the events which constitute reality, exist in inter-

related networks, do in fact have an inner (process) and an
outer (reality) and that in the process of knowing these
events we must abstract from the character of these entities

by using a selective and symbolic system of representation.
One of the first implications of this view for theories
in the human sciences, is that our experience of the world
is actually a unity of experience in which it is only by

dint of high abstraction that we create the isolated mental

states of awareness which so much of past philosophy and

psychology has assumed to be the basic elements of knowledge.

This is the Whiteheadian "inversion" argument again

and shorthand summary of the more detailed "Fallacy of Mis-

placed Concreteness" which was discussed in Section 1.3*
Since that discussion also included the scientific thought
of the seventeenth century, we are left with two important

realizations.

First, since much of the fabric of our

present psychological theory is

a

direct outgrowth of the
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basic approach inherent in seventeenth century thought, we
are

»

an reality only working with a small sampling of the

true interrelations which are important to the actual en-

tities of the world.

Said differently, scientific concepts

represent selective aspects of the richness of meaning that

constitutes the true "concreteness" of reality.

The second

point is that by building our understanding of ourselves
out of such narrow aspects of reality, by placing our trust

in the "misplaced concreteness" of what appeared to be

separate substances, we have ignored the unity of process
that is also a part of our own nature.

We may therefore

assert that there are many rich and important aspects of
the human self which have been overlooked in our fascina-

tion with the highly elaborated and brightly shinning

"baubles" of sophisticated intellectual knowledge.

In re-

lation to these high abstractions, the missing knowledge is

really rather "primitive" in the sense that it comes first
and is vague in comparison to the shrill clarity of intellectual knowledge.

Yet,

is not this

"primitive" sort of

knowledge just what we have been looking for in the tradition of psychology as a human science and in the urging of
the various romantic reactions to abstract science?

Our

conviction is that Whitehead's form of philosophical realism
is in fact just the missing link for which we have been

searching.

It is the method by which the apparently dual

580

aspects

o.l’

man's mind

mined natures,

tlie

uinl mail's

depths

ol'

Imdy,

his

rr<*«»

and deter-

his emotional being and the

heights of his intellectual knowledge, can be reunited into
an actual entity whose unity is known both in terms of its

objective and subjective realities.

This amounts to the

development of a new awareness of man's self-consciousness
in which we become aware of ourselves in rapport with and

participating in the processes of nature which extend
beyond ourselves.
5.1.5

THE UNIFYING CHARACTER
OF CRITICAL REALISM
In pulling together the various comments about the

nature of science and

theories, we can start by agreeing

it's

with Barbour that the scientific enterprise is a manyfaceted phenomenon.
Its genius has been precisely the interaction
of components which oversimplified accounts
have portrayed in isolation. It involves
both experience and theory, neither of which
It requires
taken alone constitutes science.
imagicreative
a
and
processes
both logical
are
theories
Its
logic.
nation transcending
raagreement,
evaluated at once by empirical
Incomprehensiveness.
tional coherence, and
signifare
dividual activity and originality
icant but occur within the tradition of a
scientific community and under the influence
Scientific language does
of its paradigms.
refer to the world, but only symbolically and
partially, sometimes using analogies or models
of limited scope. 265

In addition to this, we can observe that the critical

265 Barbour, op

.
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realism of Whiteheadian philosophy provides a useful correction to the various "oversimplified accounts" of the

nature of science which characterize earlier philosophy of
science.

The divisive abstractions of the positivists,

idealists, instrumentalists and naive realists can now be

balanced into a new harmony.

This new harmony is formed by

the intersection of the separate dimensions of thought

which have been created by the two sets of polar opposites.
On the one hand, ^positivism has asserted the meaningfulness
of empirical data to the exclusion of its opposite, ide-

alism, which has asserted the meaningfulness of intellectual coherence.

While on the other hand the instrumen-

talists have attempted to use the tools of their trade to

unlock the reality with which the naive realist finds himself theoretically at one.

Critical realism is the fulcrum

upon which each of these separate dimensions can be balanced.

It agrees with the positivist on the importance of

empirical statements and with the idealist in his search
for intellectual coherence.

With the instrumentalist,

critical realism holds that theories are the only guide to

useful scientific investigation while at the same time it
can agree with the old naive realist position that many

important aspects of being do, in fact, exist prior to

knowing
The modifications which critical realism provides to

h

'

i

oarh of these views are all

preciation

of

rolatocl

to a

:

more accurate ap-

the complete character of the role played by

creative human intelligence in the realization of scientific knowledge.

As man's true role in the production of

the scientific understanding of nature becomes clarified,

we can and should expect corresponding increases in man's

scientific understanding of himself.
5.2

SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY: A
METAPHYSICAL INTROSPECTION
The inclusion of the word "introspection" in the title

of this section, is meant to perform a very important func-

tion with respect to the relation of the philosophy of or-

ganism and its possible uses in the formulation of psychological theory.

On this matter, a slight digression seems

to be in order.

Introspection as a method is obviously very old within
the field of psychology; a method that has had many and

varied uses.

These uses have been so varied in fact that

the role of introspection in theory formulation has come to

mean simply a description of however it is that one finds

whatever it is that one finds when he considers his subjective reality.

What we would hope to add to this history of

the introspective method,

is an interpretation of the same

process which is based upon the alternative metaphysics

of

the theory of organic mechanism.

Of the various introspective methods which have been
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discussed, the most limiting as to its scope was
probably
that which was developed by Wilhelm Wundt.

The basic limi-

tation of this approach was the fact that it was explicitly
tied to materialistic metaphysics by virtue of the atomistic

epistemology that Wundt was constrained to use.

We assert

that Wundt was constrained to use this view because if

had not, he may well have ended up as Dilthey did.

developed

a

lie

Dilthey

more fulfilling introspective description but

only at the expense of severing any explicit contact with
the reigning epistomology and metaphysics.

He therefore,

ipso facto, became in the eyes of his contemporaries a phi-

losopher rather than a scientific psychologist.
The main character of this discussion will be to es-

tablish a basis for introspective analysis which combines
the much needed epistemological emphasis of Wundt with the

necessary subjective validity which is found in Dilthey.
This task can be achieved by enveloping them in the larger,

more inclusive framework of organismic metaphysics.

We

have argued that the main limitation inherent in traditional
science, philosophy and psychology has been its emphasis

upon the mechanistic metaphysics of the modern era.

As a

first approximation of creating a replacement for this

older view, the first level relation between organismic

metaphysics and conscious experience will be described.
We have asserted in many ways that it is a truer
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apprehension of the character of man's being in the
world
that will be the basis of a more satisfactory
intellectual

understanding of man's psychological nature.

In seeking

this expanded perspective, we are mindful of the fact that

any discussion of this sort must be humble, and in many
ways, a worshipfully meditative enterprise; yet, to seek
the transcendence of perceived limitations also calls for a

certain speculative boldness and willingness to modify
tradition
If we use our own internal awareness as a model, it is

clear that the external scientific descriptions of our own
bodies, even to the extent of allowing a neurophysiologist
to record electrical potentials deep in our brains, would

not be the same as the self-consciousness we experience di-

rectly as "I."

In this vein, we can characterize the long

asserted desire of the human scientific psychologists, the

phenomenologist s and finally the existentialists as an
effort to realize the "within" of nature that has been ex-

cluded by excessive concentration on the "without."
is,

There

in fact, no room for the scientific appreciation of

consciousness, willing, feeling and valuing except by virtue
of a change in the emphasis of the formulations upon which
the scientific enterprise rests.

The limitations of the old system, because of its con-

centration on the without of things, have been most acute

in dealing with the
human self because this
self is the
most elaborate and evolved
self in nature yet, it is
now

beginning to appear that the
same limitation also applies
in ever lesser degrees
to ever lesser levels of
being.
We
are,

therefore, in the position of
asserting that it is no
accident that the scientific
approach which focuses primarily upon the external
aspects of nature has been most
successful in describing those
levels of nature in which the
external aspects dominate. Thus,
the highly developed
state of physics and chemistry
is in part attributable to
the fact that the character
of the phenomena with which
they deal is primarily determined
by the external aspects
of their natures since the
internal aspects of determination are negligible.
Of this condition Whitehead quips to
the effect that if we desire an
uninterpreted record of experience we must ask a stone to record its
autobiography. 266

Scientific knowledge represents an approach
to reality

which is a selective and abstract process
that is described
various symbolic languages. The outcome of
this process
yields the familiar laws, hypotheses and mathematical

m

de-

scriptions of the external aspects of the phenomena
we observe.

An important characteristic of science is that
it

has developed a tremendous instrumentation and
technology

which has helped to elaborate and refine the precision
and
266

Whitehead, Process and Reality

,
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ever,

it is evident

empirical statement that science can make.

How-

that the primary effect of this elabo-

ration is simply to extend the type of conceptual framework
in which the technology resides.

For all of its sophisti-

cation and value, this type of approach really only yields
data which is applicable to the framework of abstractions
from which it originally started.

We may assume therefore,

that the various approaches which are evident in the spe-

cialized sciences provide a picture of reality which is in

varying ways an assemblage of partial abstractions expressed
in symbolic terms, and which do not necessarily provide an

exhaustive description of reality as a whole.

It is also

true that the various methods of science produce specialized

information about vastly different levels of reality.

For

this reason, the external explanatory character of tradi-

tional physical science has been most successful with meas-

uring and quantifying those aspects of nature in which external determination predominates.

On this view, the often

mentioned "primitive" state of psychological theory is not
simply attributable to the newness of scientific psychology
as a discipline but is, rather, a direct result of the

basic characteristic of science itself.

There is an in-

herent loss of explanatory power and exactness of measurement as the level of investigation shifts away from physics
and chemistry to biological and finally to psychological
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investigation.

This variability in the efficacy of scien-

tific explanation is

a

direct result of the fact that as

the transition to higher levels of phenomena is made,

the

requirement to become more sensitive to the role of the internal rather than the external factors is increased.

The

importance of subjective factors reaches its zenith in the
study of man and therefore levies the requirement that a

major segment of scientific data must be drawn from man's
analysis of his own awareness of what it means to be.

It

is with this realization that we can turn to the broader

aspects of the formulation of the philosophy of organism
and inquire into the role which is ascribed to the highest
level of subjectivity in nature--the being of man.
5.2.1

EXPERIENCE AND
SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY
In stepping outside the traditional framework of sci-

entific approach to psychology it is important to define
just how far we are required to travel with such a step.
We can put all ambiguity about the matter aside with the

following thought that Whitehead included in the Preface to
his major work, Process and Reality

.

the movement of historical and philosophical criticism of detached questions,
which on the whole has dominated the last two
centuries, has done its work, and requires to
be supplemented by a more sustained effort of
constructive thought 267
.

.

.

.

267 tIbid.
,

.

,

p.

ix.
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tachod questions and have the problem of attaching them
into some unified framework.

This replacement process is

also detailed by Whitehead as being:
the true method of philosophical construction [which] is to frame a scheme of
ideas, the best one can, and unflinchingly
to explore the interpretation of experience
in terms of that scheme. 268
.

.

.

We see the philosophy of organism as a scheme of ideas

which is highly applicable to the "interpretation of experience" and have therefore, chosen to draw the parallel

between it, the problem of introspection and the interpretation of psychology as a human science.

That the problems

of scientific psychology are a matter for "philosophical

construction" is, we feel, amply demonstrated by the material which has been presented in the first section of this
On this same point, Whitehead asserts that:

chapter.

all constructive thought, on the
special topics of scientific interest,
inated by [a basic metaphysical]
[which is] unacknowledged, but no less
ential in guiding the imagination -69
.

.

.

.

.

.

various
is domscheme,
influ-

.

Philosophy to Whitehead is the consistent and "unf 1 inching"
effort to make such schemes explicit so that they can be

criticized and improved.

We have had an ample taste of the

criticism which devolves upon the materialist scheme when
268
269

Ibid.

Ibid
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one assumes the organismic
point-of-view

,

and the time has

now come to consider those
aspects which form the basic
scheme of the philosophy of
organism and which

purport to

contain a useful interpretation
of experience.
In entering this topic, we
should also include the

final remark which Whitehead felt
was an appropriate conclusion to his opening remarks in
the Preface.

There remains the final reflection,
how shallow, puny and imperfect are efforts
to sound
the depths
the nature of things.
In philosophical discussion, the merest hint
of dogmatic certainty as to finality of
statement
is an exhibition of folly. 270

m

*

To unflinchingly explore an
interpretation of experience

which is formed as best one can but which
is, nevertheless,
shallow, puny and also poised upon the
brink of manifest
folly is a big order indeed.
Whitehead explores these
issues in the first chapter of Process and
Reality in what
has become famous as his "Defense of
Speculative Philosoplly *

271

The importance of this argument to metaphysics
in

general is underscored by the fact that Whitehead
saw fit
to begin his presentation with it and also
by the fact that

it is the most widely quoted part of the
volume.

Speculative philosophy in Whitehead's eyes is the

endeavor to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms of which
270
271

Ibid.

,

p.

ix.

Sherburne, A Key to Whitehead's Metaphysics

,

p.

191
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every element of experience can be interpreted.
[interpretation means that]
everything of which we are conscious, as enjoyed, perceived, willed, or thought, shall
have the character of a particular instance
of the general scheme.
Thus the philosophical scheme should be coherent, logical, and,
in respect to its interpretation, applicable
and adequate. 272
.

.

.

The four key words of that last sentence, coherent, logical,

applicable and adequate, are the hallmarks of Whitehead's

creation and are also the reason why the philosophy of or-

ganism sounds so foreign to someone on first contact with
it.

Focusing briefly on each notion will serve as an im-

portant basis for appreciating the more detailed metaphysics.
It is important to bear in mind that this discussion con-

siders those topics which are appropriate to the develop-

ment of an adequate scheme of ideas and does not refer di-

rectly to the ideas themselves.

Nevertheless, this is the

basis that forms the interpretative elements of the
system.

final,

That we find such an explicit statement of philo-

sophical first principles strange is simply another way of

recognizing the implicit character of the traditional system
of root ideas.

Coherence in the system of fundamental ideas means
that each basic term in the system must presuppose the

other terms.

Since Whitehead holds that no entity can be

conceived in complete abstraction from the rest
^^^Whi t ehead
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the

universe, the character’ of coherence demands that the fun-

damental ideas should be taken as mutually defining each
other in ways which are impossible if the unity of the system is destroyed in attempts to isolate one or more terms
into an abstractive context.

By way of forming a stark

contrast, we can note that Einstein saw the goal of science
as reducing "all concepts and correlations to as few as

possible logically independent basic concepts and axioms."
We must bear in mind that the contrast here is the differ-

ence between the goals of an explanatory physical science,

which can and does, seek to formulate "logically independent
basic concepts and axioms" and the philosophical goals of a

complete descriptive system that would exclude nothing from
its preview before it starts the process of systematization.

In other contexts, Whitehead uses the term "assemblage" to

convey the meaning of the large-scale notions which form
the basis of the more particularized systematic accounts of

experience which are found in specialized contexts.
The term logical refers to the usual sense of logical

consistency and freedom from self-contradiction.
is, however,

Whitehead

at pains to point out that the "scheme of

log-

ical notions" must also be contained within the more general

philosophical system.

Whitehead proposed this condition in

field of logic
1929 before two famous discoveries within the

made essentially the same point in 1931

*

We are not really
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interested in arguing Whitehead's apparent philosophical

priority but wish to underline the character of these discoveries and their major implications.

One of the best

nontechnical discussion of the discoveries of Kurt Godel
273
has been provided by Jacob Bronowski
.

Godel

'

s

work is

striking because he established the formal proof that any
logical system of more than trivial complexity can neither

prove itself to be complete nor can it guarantee that all

possible deductions from its axioms will be consistent with
those axioms.

Still another and deeper limitation was sub-

sequently demonstrated by Alfred Tarski with his proof that
every attempt to establish a system of formal language will

contain assertions which cannot be demonstrated to be
either true or false.

Bronowski, in a vein reminiscent

oi

our earlier discussion, attributes these critical limita-

tions in logical systems to their lack of "self-reference.

That is, he views the limitations of the logical systems as

being related to those very aspects of the creative and
imaginative mind of the scientist that are ignored in sysof
tems which are designed to explain the external natures

things
In returning to direct consideration of Whitehead's

coherence
thought, we find that the twin requirements of

^Bronowski On the Limits of Sci entific Knowledge
Rogers, eds
Man and The Science of Man Coulson and
pp 31-^9
,

.

,
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and logical necessity are obviously mutually impl icative
and cannot be arbitrarily disconnected without sacrificing
some of the generality of the system that is an absolute

necessity at this level of argument.
The last two special topics of applicability and ade-

quacy can be taken together and labeled the "empirical side"
of speculative philosophy as opposed to the requirements of

coherence and logic which are the "rational side" of the
system.

It hardly seems necessary to point up the simi-

larity of this division with that of within as contrasted
to without and internal as contrasted with external which

has figured prominently in previous discussion.

In this

context applicable means that some items of experience are
in fact interpretable by the system and the idea of ade-

quate is intended to assert that all items of experience
can be so interpreted.

To emphasize the generality of this

demand, we need only recall that it includes "everything of

which we are conscious, as enjoyed, perceived, willed or
thought."

In short, all aspects of immediate experience

must be capable of interpretation as a particular instance
of the general scheme.

Now that the programmatic character of speculative

philosophy is apparent, we can begin to focus more closely
and
upon the role of metaphysical interpretation in science

psychology

PSYCHO LOG l C AL M IOTA PHYSICS

Metaphysics must be thought of as the search tor generalities which unify diverse areas of experience into

a

whole such that the particular parts find additional

meaning by virtue of such inclusion.

This fact is often

ignored or played down by the tremendous bias that is pro-

duced as a result of interpretations of intellectual be-

havior which ignore the role of the individual creative
intellect in the formation of new knowledge.

Since the

more complete aspects of the actual role of the creative

intellect have figured so prominently in the previous discussion, we need not dwell on their justification here.

Instead, we can focus on Whitehead's use of the idea in the

context of metaphysical construction.
The idea behind strict empiricism as interpreted by
the Baconian method of induction implies that facts are

sufficient into themselves and do not need to be explained
by any constructive efforts on the part of the scientist.
Whitehead, of course, categorically denies this.

He ex-

pressed his feeling on the matter in a very apt and often
quoted metaphor as follows:
What Bacon omitted was the play of free imagination, controlled by the requirements of
coherence and logic. The true method of discovery is like the flight of an aeroplane.
It starts from the ground of particular observation; it makes a flight in the thin ait
of imaginative generalization; and it again

V)

r
,

lands Ion renewed ohservation .pondered acute
by rational interpre tat ion 27 ^

Without an appreciation of the imaginative construction

which is the basis of the "wholes" by which specific "facts"
become meaningful there can be little to be gained through

consideration of metaphysical problems.
The basic presupposition upon which the entire quest

for metaphysical insight rests is that the part, or indi-

vidual element of experience, is given meaning by and cannot be separated from the whole in which it occurs.

To

speak of isolated parts is a restriction of generality to
the precise extent that the part becomes an isolated frag-

ment.

Conversely, it is impossible to interpret any expe-

rience except from the perspective of an assumed whole

which functions to structure the reality of the observation.
Against the tradition of science which venerates isolated
facts and objects to metaphysics Whitehead asserts:

Unfortunately for this objection, there are
no brute, self-contained matters of fact,
capable of being understood apart from interpretation as an element in a system. Whenever we attempt to express the matter of immediate experience, we find that its understanding leads beyond itself, to its contemporaries, to its parts, to its future, and to
the universals in terms of which its definiteBut such universals, by
ness is exhibited.
their very character of universality, embody
the potentiality of other facts with variant
Thus the understanding
types of definiteness.
274
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physical interpretation as an item in a world
with some systematic relation to it.
When
thought comes upon the scene, it finds the
interpretations as matters of practice.
Philosophy does not initiate interpretations.
Its search for a rationalistic scheme is the
search for more adequate criticism, and for
more adequate justification, of the interpretations which we perforce employ. 275
Thus, not only is it true that metaphysics cannot be

completely avoided, it is also clear that the paradigm case
for metaphysical interpretation is our attempts "to express
the matter of immediate experience."

This is a basic point

in the character of metaphysical formulation.

Since "the

elucidation of immediate experience is the sole justification for any thought; and the starting point for the thought
is the analytic observation of components of this experi-

ence,"

276

and since we directly observe the fact that under-

standing immediate experience leads beyond it to its contemporaries, to its parts, to its future and the potenti-

alities for other types of definiteness we are justified in
the assertion that assumptions which involve the nature of

reality as a whole cannot be avoided.

While it is true

that we can often bracket these larger contextual issues

for the purpose of considering specific issues in special-

ized contexts, it is also clear that those enterprises are
275 Ibid.
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function within the Larger picture and can-

not manifest attributes and characteristics of which the

whole is devoid.

From what has been said so far, it is clear that the

metaphysics to which Whitehead has reference is

a meta-

physics which is constructed to describe this world and not
some abstract ideal which is removed from the context of

life as it is experienced.
thought,

As in creative scientific

the "aeroplane must again land for renewal obser-

vation rendered acute by rational interpretation."
case,

Ln

this

the goal is the "elucidation of immediate experience"

and the truth claim of Whiteheadian metaphysics is simply
the comparison of the metaphysics by the standards of co-

herence, logic, applicability and adequacy with the world
as we experience it.

One good reason for dwelling upon

this type of role for metaphysics has already been provided

by Hume.

In addition to the earlier commentary concerning

the nature of his empiricism and philosophical skepticism,
it is instructive to consider what Hume,

the man,

thought

of the true character of his metaphysics.

Most fortunately it happens, that since reason
is incapable of dispelling these clouds [deep
philosophical dread and anxiety], nature herself suffices to that purpose, and cures me of
this philosophical melancholy and delirium.
I
... I dine, I play a game of backgammon,
and
converse, and am merry with my friends;
when after three or four hours amusement
wou'd return to these speculations, they appear so cold, and strain'd and riduculous,
1

,

I

that I cannot find in my heart to enter into
them any farther. ^77

We gladly agree with Hume that nature does suffice to the

purpose of dispelling the deep darkness of skepticism; how

different indeed, would the history of philosophy have been
if Hume had listened to the promptings of his heart and as-

sumed with Whitehead that:

The proper conclusion of this discussion is,
first, the assertion of the old doctrine that
breadth of thought reacting with intensity of
sensitive experience stands out as an ultimate
claim of existence; secondly, the assertion
that empirically the development of selfjustifying thoughts has been achieved by the
complex process of generalizing from particular topics, of imaginatively schematizing the
generalizations and finally renewed comparison
of the imagined scheme with the direct expe2
rience to which it should apply. ?

etaphysics then
^Me"

is really a confession of faith as

modern man
to what the ultimate claim of existence is^/ For
the
there is no other rational recourse but to confront

by
fact that he is not going to find meaningful answers

phiexclusively relying upon either the rational side of
developlosophy or the empirical side of science for the

which have
ment of solutions to the intractable problems
interpre
confronted standard scientific and philosophical
tation.
2

cannot
Abstract science and or philosophy alone

^ Hume,

A Treatise of Human Nature
801.
A History of Western Philosophy p.

,

quoted in Jones,

,

2

^®Whitehead

,

Process and R eality, p. 20.
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provide the answer because every question they can pose
I

must necessarily contain some reference to the metaphysical

presumptions of their world-view.

The same applies to

methodological procedures and epistemology; even logic,
language and technical philosophical methods are all seen
to contain necessary assumptions about what is finally the

case with reality.

Organismic metaphysics can offer an alternative to the

views of the last two hundred years, which Whitehead claims
have done their work, by asserting the basic truth of the
type of synoptic whole which is constituted by the basic

intuitions of the human mind as they are known in immediate
Of this type of experience, Whitehead claims

experience.

that the primordial experience of man:
it enriches
arises out of the past:
of
presentation
its
purpose
and
emotion
with
its
bequeaths
it
and
world:
the contemporary
an
of
guise
the
in
character to the future,
effective element forever adding to, or substracting from, the richness of the world.
For good or for evil.^79
.

.

.

The world is clearly prior to the advent of an individual

mind and therefore must have structures which exist inde-

pendently of that mind and which are the basis of its experience.

This view does not however, restrict the totality

of that mind to those aspects which are reflected in that

279 Whitehead, Symbolism;
Capricorn Books 1959 )
York:
,

>

Its Meaning and Effect (New
PP 58-59
•

encounter

On the contrary, it is the essenc e
of organis-

mic metaphysics that it asserts the
priority of immediate
experience without also imposing upper limits
as to its

precise potential or attempting to enforce
ultimate conclusion as to what the future should contain.
In this we have
something of a paradox since at the same time the
ultimate

transcendence of the human mind is asserted, the metaphysic
is also asserting that the world itself is greater,

fore transcendent
it.

,

there-

in relation to the knowledge we have of

Surely it is one of the functions of purposive human

actions to attempt the resolution of this double paradox by

expanding the general consciousness of what is actually experienced.

Such an expansion has been the result of the

continual "demand for intellectual justification of brute
^
experience ,,280 which
has characterized the being of man.
,

In this last characterization of immediate experience
we have imbedded it in the two-way transcendence of its own

ineffable relation to its existence beyond itself and also
to its naively held grasp on the totality of the material

world.

Another way of talking about his distinction is to

refer to the institutions of knowledge which have developed

around these basic poles of being.

In the case of the

transcendent self, we have religion and in the case of the

transcendent world we have science.
280

In between, there are

Whitehead, Process and Reality

,

p.
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hOl

tho various coordinate n
C sc homos

epistemology, etc..
site functions.

of'

philosophy, metaphysics,

These two polarities have rather oppo-

The institution of religion and acts of

religious nature in one's life have the function of ex-

panding individual interest in the direction away from the
^

culari ty of the world and its scientific description

and treat issues which relate to the formation of the ex-

periencing subject himself.

By contrast, science deals

with the relation of the experiencing subject and the outside world of objects.

In both cases however, it is the

focal center of the experiencing subject that seeks expan-

sion into greater harmony with these two major categories
of experience.

This sort of interpretation is plainly true of the

early history of the epoch of materialistic science.

By

way of extreme contrast, it is also reasonable to assert
that it can even be applied to the utopian thoughts of non-

mentalistic and nonspiritual theoristists like
and B. F. Skinner.

J.

B.

Watson

Both of these men have sought to dis-

play the hypothesized efficacy of their highly abstract,
specialized concepts in the arena of generalized goals
which relate to man's transcendent nature.
It is fitting to close this discussion of metaphysics

with the observation that the basic descriptive principles

which were of central importance in past discussions of
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efforts toward the creation of psychology conceived as
human science, namely, the reality of the

a

thin of expe-

wi

rience as opposed to the without of experience, find exem-

plification and expansion in organismic metaphysics.

In

the organismic framework which centers on the validity of

the internal sensitivity of the experient subject, and

which sees the demand to justify experience as being created
by man's natural propensity toward expanded awareness, are
to be found the means to foster a deeper awareness of both

the scientific and spiritual aspects of man.

Organismic metaphysics enhances appreciation of the
fact that science and spirituality concern singularly dif-

ferent areas of individual experience.

On

the one hand,

there is the relationship to the transcendence of self by
the unknown potentialities of human nature while on the

other hand, there is the transcendence of the physical

world in relation to man's understanding of it.

In between

these two poles of transcendence, there is the sensitive

reaction of the experiencing individual which is seeking to

harmonize both aspects into expanded awareness.

Toward

what is generally considered to be the spiritual side of
renting
this relationship, it is evident that the task coni

purposes
the individual is to seek to harmonize emotion,

experiences
and the influx of man's transcendent nature with

interaction with
which are derived from rational thought and

^03
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generally considered

to be the material side of
this relationship,

the task con-

fronting the individual is to bring
rational thought into
harmony with the physical world as
experienced.
These aspects of being have traditionally
been institutionalized in society in the divergent areas
of science
and religion.
To the extent that "civilized progress" has

tended to sunder their immediate relationship
within the

individual’s awareness of life processes then, to that
extent, which has been considerable,

the "progress" of man

has been positive but destructive of the true unity of

spiritual and rational life.

The message of organismic

metaphysics is to seek positive but constructive progress
toward enhanced being.

Tts chief innovation in the crea-

tion of such positive and constructive goals is the recog-

nition of the reality of the fact that the true processes
in the world of man are none other than those which are

found in the experiencing subject himself.
This is the unity with which an enlightened science of

psychology must deal.

Psychology no longer needs to derive

its methodology, epistemology, and metaphysics from those

sciences which study lower levels of being in which external

factors predominate.

It no longer needs to believe that it

can somehow collect enough pieces of man's nature to de-

scribe him usefully.

While psychology will always have a

Wi
place for empirical precision and direct observation,

it

can only meaningly engage in such activities after

has

it

assumed the role of being the expositor of the wholeness of
man, a wholeness which it has first recognized as deriving

from the manifestation, within the individual experiencing
subject, of the unity and harmony of spiritual and rnateriaJ

existence.

Such a psychology will not shrink from the fact

that the influx of man's spiritual nature does in fact

create phenomena in the world which science can attempt to

examine and predict but which it will never control.
the same token,

By

it will also recognize that the individual

experience of its subjects is also partially determined by
conceptual experiences which derive from scientific under-

standing and rational reaction to the world as it is known.
In the place of trivializing the true nature of man's

participation in the world and his transcendence of

it,

organismic psychology venerates man by taking him as the

womb of scientific creativity and spiritual originality.
5-3

SCIENCE PHILOSOPHY
AND PSYCHOLOGY
At the beginning of this chapter it was indicated that

the separate areas of science, philosophy and psychology

could be fashioned into a meaningful whole by a coordination of the basic ideas of each discipline.
ture,

At this junc-

it is more easily asserted that the key element in

both science and philosophy is the role of the individual

sentient human being.
-L

In discussing science,

which histor-

cal Ly has been most closely identified with the
material

half of man's awareness,

the modern innovation in the char-

acter of our understanding of that enterprise centered

around the role of the creative intellect of the puzzle
solving scientist.

This critical factor in the whole

scheme of science was long ignored as a result of the same

external bias that frustrated attempts to create a human

scientific psychology and also caused great consternation

among the more poetic and artistic individuals of the

modern era.
In discussing the metaphysics behind philosophy, the

common metaphysical outlook of materialistic science and
past philosophy was apparent.

The problem of greater unity

in this area was resolved by the advent of organismic meta-

physics which asserts that the whole aim of any intellectual
enterprise is the elucidation of experience which is important to people.

This basic assertion was amplified in the

further requirement that the starting point for such an
analysis is, in fact, the observation of the experience
itself.

Once again, the statement was made that it is the

character of the individual that has priority in the development of scientific understanding.

statement is stronger.

This time however, the

Whereas the discussion of the char-

acter of science focused simply on the role of the creative

hoG

intellect

,

the discussion of organismic metaphysics in—

eludes that rninor realization in

tlie

sweeping changes which

it proffers for the character of the scientific enterprise

itself.

An understanding of science which venerates the

creative intellect requires the further elucidation of a

metaphysics which can support both halves of the reality of
man's existence which are transcendent in relation to the

awareness of the individual's immediate experience.
That both previous discussions have converged upon the
role and nature of the individual is particularly fortunate

for a discussion which is to touch upon the relationship of
science, philosophy and psychology.

It is with this type

of background that we can hope to develop an approach to

psychology that harmonizes with the past traditions of
science, philosophy and psychology and yet also adds to

these particular traditions the penetration of insight

which results from an expanded consideration of the personal
reality of internal experience.
5.3.1
:

ORGANISMIC PSYCHOLOGY
The psychology which one can envision as growing out

I

of the organismic metaphysics will, none- the-less

,

be a

specialized form of human experience with its own aims,

methods and standards which will serve to distinguish it
from other areas of science and philosophy.

Psychology

however, has the unique task of not only recognizing that

/4
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its prime subject matter is the sensitive reaction of the

experiencing individual but also, that the dynamic character of that sensitive reaction is a joint product of the

individual's faith in the character of the ultimate realities referent to the spiritual side of life as well as the

particular existential situation that the individual finds
himself in the material world.

Psychology will need to

recognize the causitive character of both these poles of
being.

Past psychology has sought the "message" for man as

a result of his situation in the world,

future psychology

can admit the partial validity of that approach while in-

cluding it in the further realization that man is also the

medium by which the message of the spiritual side of life
is conveyed.

Actually, traditional psychology can be said to have

realized the necessity of search for some permanence in
beingness, and to have further recognized the need to seek
out some universally normative core of understanding that

will satisfy the desire for expanded awareness of the con-

ditions of life.

The history of psychology which has been

considered in earlier sections amply demonstrates this
fact.

The contention which is asserted here is that those

exefforts, which were also carried forth by a desire to

pushed
pand the individual's awareness of existence, have

epistemology
the limitations of traditional methodology,

and metaphysics to their natural culmination in a worJdview which is essentially devoid of awareness of

I

real-

hie

ity of man.
The intent of the organismic approach in psychology is
not to suggest that some new desire and ability, of which
it was previously devoid, has suddenly been visited upon

mankind.

On the contrary, its assertions, though revolu-

tionary, are far more humble than that.

As is evident from

the historical discussions of earlier chapters, the basic

ideas involved in both the materialistic and organismic

understanding of man and the world have
history.

a long and intimate

The organismic interpretation is a variant which

is formed by the modification,

sometimes more and sometimes

less, of certain key assumptions of the background of

belief that animated the era of materialistic science.
Thus, its new ventures in psychological understanding are

related to past traditions as is each generation to its
predecessors.

That past psychologists have largely sought

the normative understanding of man by regarding only his

material aspects was simply a product of the me taphysica
existential materialism of the age.

J

A more complete modern

psychology is required to develop a description

of

man

which involves both aspects of the whole individual.
Thus,

the differences between science, philosophy and

psychology can be portrayed by examining the relationship
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once and philosophy
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total

human being which

is

lhis

the basis of the organism ic approach to psychology.

sort of perspective is important because it requires the

nature of psychology to be open to both the spiritual and

material aspects of being.

The psychology of the organism i<

whole is not however, an attempt to encompass the complete

understanding and approach to the spiritual aspect

ol

man

concerned
since it is obviously the task of religion to be

with the ultimate being and value of the universe.

Iv'hat

to open
this perspective does for psychology however, is

from this exits consideration of the factors which derive
of the
pression of the ultimate and insures acceptance
a psychology
reality of this aspect of man. That is to say,

which includes this premise will be protected

1

torn

the

oi man
debilitating task of attempting to find the whole
relation to the
reflected in his isolated parts. In its

aspects of man,
coordination of the rational and material
directly and unorganismic psychology will be freed to
existential meaning
flinchingly focus upon the problems of
be able to utilize the
in the material world and will
reality with which the
retical problems of the structure of

deal as important resources
physical and biological sciences
self-knowledge of the material
in the quest for increased
limitation which
Therefore, in line with the
side of life.

upon the explicit
keeps psychology from encroaching

4 10

territory

of

religion,

there

ignoring the meaning which

La

i» a

I

ho a prohibition against

to bo

derived from the more

quantitative physical and biological sciences.
In

this characterization of the tasks of organismic

psychology the attempt has been made to establish the role
of psychology as a sort of mid-point in man's attempts to

understand his being.

The concern has been to show that

the divergent poles of being can be viewed internally or

externally.

Man's awareness of his self- transcendence as

it relates to his nature and purpose and his awareness of

the fact that the physical world transcends his knowledge
it is an internal point —of —view which has its counter-

parts in the external cultural orientations which are offered by the great traditions of religion and science.

It

may therefore be said that the true unity of religion and
science is found at the point where the implications of the
two views meet in the experience of the individual

.

Since

psychology has the task of recognizing both of these aspects,
considering this relationship in greater detail will be

a

fitting close to this initial discussion of the psychology

which is indicated as

a

result of the development of the

organismic approach.
5.3.2

EXPANSIONS ON THE THEME
OF ORGANISMIC PSYCHOLOGY
In elaborating the character of the psychology which

occupies the mid-scale position in terms of man's awareness

J*ll

of

a

the spiritual and the material, it is
evident that such

psychology would have many diverse and important func-

tions.

If we truly attempt to construct a psychology

which is sensitive to and descriptive of immediate experience,

then we will be required to not only draw from both

sources but also to criticize those discordant aspects of
the interface between the scientific and the religious

point s-of-view.

In this sense, psychology will have a

closer relationship to each of these enterprises than they
will have to each other.

It is also true that in its co-

ordination of outlook between the two poles of being psychology will find that science is most useful in areas
where the spiritual perspective is of least value and that

correspondingly, the strong points of spiritual influence
are to be observed in areas where science is of smallest
value.

Again, since both of these enterprises are aspects

of the unity of the individual they can be seen to summate

meaningly in the expansion of awareness as long as their
attributes and implications are in harmony.
It is quite natural that a main contribution of the

scientific enterprise is to manifest a concern for physical
survival and to help to insure the continuance and betterment of physical life.

The direct outgrowth of this ap-

proach for theories of evolution is obvious since the idea
of physical survival is the central aspect of what is

412

considered to be the traditional explanation of the
process
ot

evolution.

Yet, man, at Least, is also vitally concerned

with the idea of living well in addition to simply living.
There is, in fact, a qualitative aspect to the processes of

man's life that is not touched upon by the explicit methods
of naturalistic physical science.

Specifically, the great

issues of meaning and purpose are almost completely opaque
in relation to the type of illumination which is derived

from the quantitative precision of scientific investigation.
The ultimate concerns which are typical of the spiritual

aspect of man are least explicable in terms of quantification and observational testing.

Given this type of approach, it is not necessary that
we formulate a strict dichotomy between the spiritual and

material aspects of being as Fechner did.

By virtue of the

organismic metaphysics, it is evident that the material and
spiritual are two aspects of the same sensitive individual
and are in fact united in that sensitive individuality.

Where Fechner was constrained to see a clear line of demarcation between the two aspects of being, a sort of linear

interface that could be submitted to quantitative expression,

the psychology of the organismic approach finds as

its primary datum the wholeness and completeness of the ex-

periencing subject himself.

In such a psychology, science

can help to provide the operational exemplification of the
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content of experience which is derived from the spiritual

aspect of man's transcendent self, but it cannot yield direct answers to matters which refer primarily to the higher-

order transcendence of that nature.

However, as if to re-

dress the balance, this view of psychology is also required
to recognize that while the content of spiritual existence

may well add to the meaning and ultimate direction of the
scientific investigation, it does not also provide explicit
insight into the details of the observable physical world.
To carry the comparison to another level of detail,
we can assume the position of this sort of center-scale

psychology and consider the character of various issues as
they interact in our sensitive experience which is a joint

product of both poles of being.
Such an outlook finds the emphasis of facts to be pri-

marily a virtue of scientific understanding in the material
world whereas a concern for values is surely a product of
the spiritual side of being.

Where material science ven-

erates physical survival, spiritual insight prizes fulfill-

ment of existence.

Science finds peak experiences in

statements of precise theory, spiritual concerns focus on
the final generality of knowledge.

Ideal science is ex-

pressed in terms which are completely devoid of reference
to a person,

spiritual matters are completely devoid of

meaning if the person is not included.

Science requires

4l4

public verifiability of its data, spiritual insights
are

often not reproducible and certainly are not publicly
verifiable in the same sense.

Unique events have no meaning

for normative science whereas uniqueness is apt to be the

hallmark of an experience which can alter the whole basis
of the spiritual life of an individual or, for that matter,

mankind.
We are confronted then, with a complex being that is

complexly aware of many levels of generality.

In our

earlier consideration of scientific thought, the ability
to test a theory was seen as closely linked to the gener-

ality of the assertions it was making about the nature of
physical reality.

As the generality of statement increased,

the difficulties of actually verifying the theory became

such that no true verification was possible because a
"whole network of ideas" is always implicated as a result
of the generality of statement.

In this same way, we can

look to the possible generalities of the spiritual side of
life as also entailing a large network of interconnected

beliefs which also make precise examination or refutation
impossible.

As a result of this sort of understanding of

the nature of the enterprises which cluster around the two

main aspects of being, organismic psychology can be seen

to

have the task of not only being concerned with the complex

interrelations of the various avenues of understanding but

415

also and more importantly, of rostering an increased appre-

ciation

,

among those whose life it touches, of their per-

sonal role in the expansion of man's individual and collective awareness of his transcendent nature.

With organismic

psychology, faith in man and his transcendent destiny is

now added to the centuries long traditions of faith in reason and faith in science.

The art of being and the process

of becoming are wedded in the unity of the experient indi-

vidual

.
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6.0

THE PROBLEM OF PURPOSE
It is possible to summarize many of the discussions

that have arisen in connection with earlier topics under

the general heading of the problem of purpose.

This topic

provides an unusual opportunity to summarize key aspects of
the organismic position while also affording the possibility

of integrating other types of data from diverse fields into
the general topic of psychology and education.

A recurrent theme of this presentation has been the

importance of the role which is played by the background of

belief that is the over-all orientation for the culture and
the personal commitment of the individual scientist.

Also,

we have characterized the advent of the Whiteheadian organ-

ismic approach as a change of emphasis and outlook that

amounts to what Thomas Kuhn would call a paradigm shift in
the basic assumptions of science.

These aspects of our

past concern can now be combined into the task of formu-

lating a basic orientation toward the problem of purpose.
This orientation should not only masquerade as a paradigm
shift in scientific inquiry must also make a basic state-

ment about the appropriate background of belief which is

required to support an augmented role for the idea of purpose as a meaningful explanatory parameter of scientific

understanding
Past discussions have been freely critical of the

4l8

scientific and philosophical problems which are created in
the wake of the mechanistic approach to understanding man

and his world.

The problems of determinism and reductionism

have been cast as major factors in frustrating the growth
of increased appreciation of the nature of life and the

true character of man.

Against these overpowering forces

it has been impossible to do much more than to assert some

atavistic sounding form of spiritualism or an even weaker
attempt to instill a form of vitalism as an explanation of
the living phenomena of the world in which we live.

In attempting to surmount these limitations we have

seen that the dominant response of those who have considered
the full meaning of human life has been to divorce the ex-

planatory or epistemological structure of their system from
the metaphysical basis which was designed to explain dead

matter and the immutable laws by which it operated.

As a

result of this basic inconsistency between an explanation

and the fundamental principles upon which it rests, there
have been those, like Bertrand Russell, who, as we have
seen, were forced to conclude that man is the "product of

causes which had no provision of the end they were
achieving; that his origin, his growth, his hopes and
fears, his loves, and his beliefs, are but the outcome

accidental collocations of atoms."

of

Against such views

and without
which assert the belief that life is purposeless
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moaning

Lhoro aro those who beliovo that purpose and

,

meaning are only

to be found in the

reality of man's exis-

tence and that the rest of the cosmos is meaningless.
Thus, the existentialist is concerned with man's "thrown"

condition or the "thrown" plight of man from which existen—
tial, anxiety arises. 281
,

.

.

,

.

For the man who takes himself as

the epistemological center of the world there is only a

strange confusion as to his metaphysical relation to the
rest of the world as long as that basis is defined along
the lines of the materialist cosmology.

Why else would the

existentialist find meaninglessness and emptiness, loneliness and isolation to be some of the major anxieties he
must face as a result of being thrown into his plight in
the world?

These divergent interpretations of man and his world
and also those which have marked the difference between

psychology interpreted as a natural science and psychology
interpreted as a human science have the common property of
arising from the basic inconsistency between man's organic
awareness of himself and his mechanistic understanding of
the world about him.

Since there have been those who can

find no meaning or purpose anywhere, and those who can only
find some meaning and purpose in their self-awareness, it
is clear that to add significantly to the understanding of
pO 1

Bugental, The Search for Authenticity

,

Chapter

2.
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moaning and purpose we must portray them as elements of the
world itself.

Here, we come to the central idea with

regard to purpose as it functions in the organismic context,
and are now in a position to delineate the basic assumptions
of the following discussion of the problem of purpose.

The position taken with regard to the general topic of

purpose is:

a)

that the world which we know in science and

in human experience is both purposeful and full of meaning;
b)

that its proper understanding requires a teleological

interpretation but one which is also consistent with contemporary scientific knowledge; c) that this framework
denies philosophical views which are primarily concerned

with substances and the laws by which they were invested
with attributes and focuses upon the fact that that which
endures is the actuality of patterned action, action which

must be characterized both in terms of its internal and
external reality; d) that to the scientific view which

focuses upon observed processes and structures but which
does not see the inner life of organisms we must add the

metaphysical intuition which recognizes that there is a
drive in things

— an

advance in the universe.

This advance

is the expression of the fundamental creative urge which

underlies the evolutionary hierarchy of valuing, experiencing organic beings

— beings

whose own reality consists in

the dynamic realization of their potential; e) that it is
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in the realization of this potential, which is a
process

basic to all forms of life, that the experient individual

actualizes his own self- transcendence by seeking his satis-

faction in the experience of increased subjective value.
Thus, we have purpose as a statement of the primary

process in the universe.

No longer is it necessary to con-

ceive of the universe in static terms.

We can recognize

the advance in the universe as a basic characteristic of
the cosmos.

Objectively we can view this advance in terms

of increased complexity of structure, subjectively it can
be viewed in terms of the increased satisfaction which is

felt by increasingly sophisticated experient individuals.

This conceptualization of purpose is also a way to describe
the dynamic reality of social processes in which the unity

of the whole functions meaningly in the fulfillment of the

purposes of the interacting parts.

It then becomes a state-

ment of the interconnectedness of societies and the series
of events which comprise the society.

connectedness can be seen in two ways.

But this inter-

First, it is an

expression of the contemporary relation between the part
and the whole to which it belongs.

In this, it is some-

thing of a statement of horizontal relationship.

Second,

it can become an expression of a directional interconnect-

edness in which the idea of purpose can function meaningly
in the description of the emerging hierarchical forms which
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we observe as the transition of complexity from atoms to

Adam
With these thoughts in mind, we can turn to the consideration of specific aspects of the general topic of purpose with the intention of relating what we know scientifi-

cally and what we know experientially to the view that the

evolutionary cosmos is a purposeful rather than a purposeless process.
6.1

A BASIC CONTRAST BETWEEN
PHYSICAL DETERMINISM
AND EVOLUTIONARY PURPOSE
In a series of lectures given in 1929

»

Whitehead as-

serted that:
The function of reason is to promote the art
of life 282
.

This assertion provides a definite contrast to an important

aspect of theory in the physical sciences contained in the
science of thermodynamics.

Thermodynamics is something of

a manufactured science in that its explanatory power is

"brought about by principles operating above the plane of
laws, principles unable in themselves to generate laws but
pQo
Notwithstanding
substance."
and
scope
them
give
able to
like
the fact that its central concepts are rather more
2®2

Beacon

The Function of Reason (Boston:
Press, 1958), p. 4, Whitehead's emphasis.
2

Whitehead

,

^Margenau, The Nature of Physi cal Reality,

p.

212.

principles

Ilian

the usual scientific law,

commonly spoken of as containing laws.

thermodynamics is

The combined opera-

tion of two of these laws characterizes what Whitehead

refers to as the "stealthy inevitableness" of the "degradation of energy" in which, the "sources of energy sink downward and downward." 284 In contrast to this over-all decay

physical nature, the rising tide of biological evolution
is seen to be a force of equal importance and opposite di-

rection.

From this perspective, it is a greater apprecia-

tion of the true function of reason that can provide an

insight into why the trend of evolution has been upwards

while the trend of the physical universe appears to be

downwards
We can make the contrast between the physical and bio-

logical aspects of nature more explicit by touching upon
the two laws of thermodynamics that are in question here.

The first law of thermodynamics asserts a variant of
the law of conservation of energy and gives elaborate

meaning to the quantitative relationships involved in
physico-chemical energy exchanges.

It is the second law

that is responsible for adding the downward direction to

This law, which is also known as

these energy exchanges.

the concept of entropy, is a statement of the irreversi-

bility of thermodynamic processes.
284

Whitehead,

ojd.

ci

.

,

p

.
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That is, it states that

424

heat can naturally flow in only one direction, from hot
cold.

to

On this view, since each physico-chemical change

involves a transfer of heat energy, the amount of heat
energy, or the difference between hot and cold, is gradually

diminished; therefore, there is a fundamental irre-

versibility of the cosmos which will one day result in its
"heat death."

Further inquiry into the details of the

thermodynamic argument is not necessary to support the
over-all assertion which is important in this context.

Our

concern is simply with the fact that what we know of the

material universe indicates that it will not be able to
continue on its way indefinitely.

Somewhere in the distant

eons of time, the cycle of the material world is destined
to end in a state of unusable energy where there is only a
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Whitehead is not the only one who sought a contrast

to

the laws of the material universe in the function of reason.

For example, in speaking of the growth of reason as the

elaboration of greater consciousness, Teilhard de Chardin
finds a similar counterpart to the function of entropy:

This absolute of physics [entropy] has thus
far not only resisted all attempts at relativisation, but, if I am not mistaken, tends
to find its counterpart in a current moving
in the opposite sense, positive and constructive, which is revealed by the study of the
the ascent of the
earth’s biological past:
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Universe towards zones of increasing improbability and personality. Entropy and life;
backward and forward:
two complementary expressions of the arrows of time. 285
In another and more poetic expression Teilhard characterized

views of nature which fail to recognize that the trend of

evolution has been upwards as being constrained to see life
and reason as a phenomenon
that only bursts to be extinguished; an
eddy rising on the bosom of a descending current
So says science:
and I believe in science:
but up to now has science ever troubled
to look at the world other than from without ?286
.

.

.

....

Thus, once again, we have the standard physical interpreta-

tion of the world from without contrasted with the deep

seated requirement to appreciate the within of things that
is responsible for the upward trend of evolution.

In this

case however, we have perhaps the ultimate form of the con-

trast since the example of entropy and life is surely one
of the fundamental dualities in the universe.

Teilhard

calls the ordinary observable kind of physical energy "tan-

gential" to the process of complexif ication and intensification which is indicated in the rise of life processes and

which he views as the product of a "radical" energy.
In speaking of the character of living things, Jean
285

Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, The Future of Man (New
Harper and Row, 1969)* P* 51*

York:
28

York

^Teilhard de Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man (New
Harper and Row, 196l), p. 52, Teilhard's emphasis.
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Piaget concluded in his extensive essay on the relations

between biology and knowledge that:
the fundamental reality about living
things is constituted neither by timeless
structures,
nor by a historical succession of chances or crises.
All that
needs to be said here is that in all levels,
whether historical stages or echelons of some
organizational hierarchy, we find the simultaneous intervention of exogenous factors,
causing disequilibra but also setting off
"responses" and endogenous factors, producing
these responses and acting as equilibration
agents 287
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

Since Piaget's concern is to reveal the similarities between

organic processes and cognitive processes, his assertions
about the function of reason do not go as deeply into the

heart of the matter as do those of Whitehead and Teilhard.
Nevertheless, it is clear that his understanding of the
"fundamental reality of living things" also implicates the
role of internal factors in the regulation of transactions

with the environment.

In fact, Piaget's thesis is much

stronger than mere implication; a guiding hypothesis

oi

tu s

entire approach to psychological theory is that cognitive

functions are an extension of organic regulations and actually constitute a differentiated organ for regulating exchanges with the environment.

"

Cogni t ive processes serHii

to be," Piaget writes,
An Essay of
Piaget, Biology and Knowledge:
Cognxtiv£
and
tions
the Relations Between Organic Regula
1971 ),
Press,
Chicago
Processes (Chicago: University of
p. 3^7
2

^Jean
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at one and the same time the outcome of organic autoregulation reflecting its essent ial mechanisms, and the most highly differ'
entiated organs of this regulation at the
core of interactions with the environment,
so much so that, in the case of man, these
processes are being extended to the universe
itself 288
.

Piaget's thesis, for which he marshalls a considerable
amount of biological and psychological evidence, is important in this context because it asserts the absolute con-

nection between cognitive processes and life processes.

In

making this assertion Piaget also finds it necessary to
point up the limitations of two important aspects of our

traditional understanding of evolution, i.e., his relerences
to the uselessness of views which are based eithei

on

"timeless structures" or "a historical succession of chances

and crises."

We can pass over reference to the problem of

"timeless structures" here since it is recognized to be

essentially a philosophical problem, which is eliminated
and focus
once we accept the evolution as a viable concept,
criticism.
our main concern upon the second aspect of his
about
Piaget's assertion that the "fundamental reality

historical succesliving things" is not to be found in "a
denial oi the
sion of chances or crises" is simply a flat
of the
standard evolutionist doctrine of "the survival

expression of the twin
fittest" which is said to be a joint
selection.
processes of random variation and natural
288

Ibid.. p. 26

,

Piaget's emphasis.

The
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problem with

th.i s

traditional view is that in focusing upon

the idea of mere survival, it misses the main characteristic of life which is to reach beyond survival.

On this

same point, Whitehead asserts that the fallacy of this doc-

trine "does not consist in believing that in the struggle

for existence the fittest to survive eliminate the less
fit," this condition he is willing to accept as a plain
fact whose evidence is too obvious to dispute.

lacy," rather,

"The fal-

"is the belief that fitness for survival is

identical with the best exemplification of the Art of
Life."

289

Whitehead's intent here is to draw attention

to the fact that many things survive for great periods of

time and that the more complex organisms are, the lower

appears to be their survival value in relation to other
organisms.

This is the same point Teilhard was making when

he spoke of "zones of improbability and personality" as

being the second expression of the universe and the complement to the condition of entropy.

Obviously, there is an

important sense in which the traditional doctrine is true
since it does appear to offer an explanation of the process

by which the struggle for existence between organisms can

produce the survival of some at the peril of others.
are, instead,

searching for a more general principle

We

— one

which will offer some account of the principle (s) by which
2

^Whitehead, The Function of Reason

,

p.

4.

such complex organisms over evolvod in the first place.

Why has the trend of evolution been upwards ?^

)()

This key question goes directly to the heart of the matter.
Since standard accounts focus primarily on the without of
things, it is natural to see the environment as being the

responsible agency by which the rules-of- the-game are imposed upon those who must play the game in order to exist.
However, the central factor of upward evolution indicates
that the rise of life is accompanied by an increasing power
to modify the environment and which acts

to

diminish the

environments' ability to modify the organism.

A portion of

this meaning is contained in the traditional view; yet, it
is also true that the role which is ascribed to the internal

factors is usually negligible.
In

light

nl'

the previous discussions of philosophy,

science and psychology, it is natural that selective em-

phasis has been placed upon the exogenous aspects of the
organisms' relation to the environment and that the endogenous reality of organic life should be largely missing

from man'

s

accounts of the history of the world.

Surely

since the dominant trends of man's efforts to understand
his own nature, of which he is directly aware, have Iuj goly

failed to capture the fullness of lived experience and have

often denied their own existence or proclaimed their own
29

°Ibid.

,

p.

7,

emphasis added.

absurdity, we have only the narrowest of grounds on which
to expect the scientific description of evolution to yield

insight into the increasing ability of organisms to modify

their environment.

Modification of the environment requires more than the
basic notion that life's aim is to be alive.
In fact, the art of life is first to be alive
secondly to be alive in a satisfactory way,
to acquire an increase in satis’

1

’

It is from this perspective that Whitehead explains that

the function of reason is to promote the art of life, since
"the primary function of Reason is to direct the attack on

the environment."

292

Whitehead is quick to point out the

heretical character of this view since it demands that

reason be considered to be an element in experience that
functions to direct and criticize.

It is the urge towards

goals which are potentialities for actualization and not yet

actualized in fact*

But what is this except a statement of

the fact that there is a certain type of "freedom" asso-

ciated with the phenomena of life?
The point here, is simply another statement of the central argument that animated previous discussions.

Here

however, by contrasting the downward entropy laden processes
2^1

Ibid.

,

p.

8,

Whitehead's emphasis.
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of the material cosmos with the upward expansion of life as

represented in evolution, we find a primary ground upon

which to assert the limitations of the methodologies and
metaphysics of the physical sciences.

There is an absolute

requirement to recognize that the mysterious counter-agency

which is the impulse for the energy of the universe to run
upwards is not meaningly treated within the materialistic

framework
By applying the idea that the growth of reason is a

way to characterize the evolutionary process, principles
can be developed which are in harmony with the fact that
there has been a gradual development, over vast periods of
time, of increasingly complex beings which are increasingly

effective in modifying their environment.

The most impor-

tant aspect of this view is that reason is elaborated

beyond the everyday mode of problem solving in the contem-

porary world and is seen in the function of dealing with
the puzzles of existence, of being that agency in the con-

duct of human affairs which also underlies the ability to

direct behavior toward desired ends.

This aspect of reason

deals with the problem of purpose and the notion of final
causality, those very aspects which were least congenial to

views of the world which relied on physical principles.
However, it is well not to get ahead of the story.

Before we begin to talk of the character of human life as

432

it impacts immediately upon issues
in personality and edu-

cational theory it is necessary to consider
principles

which can account for the emergent evolution
of life.
Again, the basic contrast which is the foundation
for this

discussion is that the old notion of causality in the
physical world, which related physical effects to physical
causes, can only end in the realization of the downward

trend of the physical universe.

In place of physical de-

scription, we are searching for organic principles which
are descriptive of more than mere survival and which, in
fact, encompass the expansive upward development which has

led to mankind.

This view sees evolutionary emergence as a

va l ue creating system of structured processes which are

capable of self- transcendence and recognizes that the world

which we know in our science is both purposeful and full of

meaning
A good portion of the following discussion of the

principles which apply to the upward tendency of evolution
can be seen as an attempt to consider the scientific evi-

dence which fills the gap between the organic and the

physical in the following description:
In our experience we find appetition, effecting a final causation towards ideal ends
which lie outside the mere physical tendency.
In the burning desert there is appetition
towards water, whereas the physical tendency
is towards increased dryness of the animal
body.
The appetition towards esthetic
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salisJ ucl, ion by somo orijoymont oi' boauly is
equally outside the mere physical order. 293

Whether we refer to the low-order or the high-order
aspects
of appetition, the craving for water or the ardor for
aes-

thetic achievement, we are dealing with the problem of

interweaving efficient and final causation into a coherent
system.

In earlier discussions, we have treated the prob-

lem on a philosophical and metaphysical basis, here we can

develop some correlation between that philosophical perspective and the present-day scientific understanding of

evolution
As we begin to consider the evidence which supports
the view that evolution can be interpreted as an increase

in the power to manifest purposive behavior, it is appro-

priate to call attention to an explicit bias which is held
by the author.

Rather than being animated by the purpose

of attempting to prove that life processes can be completely

explained in physico-chemical terms and therefore are pur poseless

,

this author is motivated by the purpose of demon-

strating that the idea of purpose is not only valid, but
also essential, if we are to conceive a basis for the reso-

lution of the two central antimonies which Gordon Allport
saw as the prime impediments to formulations of meaningful

psychological theory--the issue of dualism and the problem
^^^

Ibid

.

,

p

.
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of purpose.

6.2

A METHOD FOR INTERPRETING
THE PURPOSEFUL COSMOS
In attempting to synthesize the scientific
knowledge

and metaphysical intuitions of earlier sections,
we can
start from the explicit premise that an adequate
metaphysics

must account for both the inner and outer aspects
of experience.

In this light, the "dualism” which derives from

the analysis of the duality of human experience, i.e.,
the

internal mental and external bodily aspects of experience,
is the most profound clue to the nature of the whole of
r>ea lity.

This type of dualism applies to the highest levels

of the evolved cosmos while, at the same time, affording

increased understanding of the lowest levels of that evolution that are described in the twin concepts of entropy and
life.

The hierarchical reality suggested by this view in-

dicates that we should look for aspects in the relationship

which are indicative of the transition to higher forms of
consciousness.

Teilhard expresses the basic Whiteheadian

insight into the use of concepts in science which are analogous to some aspects of human experience as follows:
It is impossible to deny that, deep within
ourselves, an "interior" appears at the heart
of things, as it were seen through a vent.
This is enough to insure that, in one degree

or another, this "interior" should obtrude
itself as existing everywhere in nature from
all time.
Since the stuff of the universe
has an inner aspect at one point of itself,
there is necessarily a double aspect to its
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Our concorn is to focus upon the "ono dogree or other"
in

which the "interior" obtrudes itself as existing everywhere.
This view can be characterized as a panpsychism which assorts that the duality of inner and outer applies to the

whole range of organisms from the lowest to the highest.
In the extreme case, we recognize that experience for atoms
is vastly different than for man.

This however, should not

hinder the realization that the idea of an organic event
means that there is always a possibility for a typo of internal awareness of being which is appropriate to the level
of process of the being involved.

That all levels may bo

said to have some degree of this self-enjoyment demands
that there should be principles which describe how such an

arrangement can bo structured.

Whitehead has proposed a rough division of six major
types of occurrence in naturo which ranges from the first

level of human existence, mental and physical, to the

second level in which all lower forms of animal life are
grouped.

The third level encompasses vegetable life and

the fourth is comprised of single living colls.

The fifth

and sixth levels refer to large scale inorganic aggregates
294
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Of this hierarchical arrangement it is important to note
that the various classif icatory levels do not exist in

sharp separation from each other.

On the contrary, the

repeated Whiteheadian assertion that all things influence
each other can be said to demand that each level

should be required by the others.

ol

being

This mutual implication

predicts that the different modes of natural occurrence
the
should fade off into the transition between levels; in

classification of real things it is always a hazardous
between
process to attempt to draw a sharp distinction

levels of being.
6.2.1

STRATIFIED STRUCTURE
AND ITS BOUNDARIES

satisfactory exThe main problem in reaching a more
the achievement
planation of life processes is explaining
ability to contradict
which is represented in life's basic
In life processes

processes.
the dictates of pure physical

purpose as important factors
we recognize achievement and
In physical
matter.
which are not contained in inanimate
world of matter, the conand chemical descriptions of the
Similarly
are meaningless.
cepts of achievement and purpose
with machines which are the
one does not use these terms
and are constructed to
achievements of the human intellect
295 Whitehead, Modes of Thought

,
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For machines we can only speak of per-

suit its purposes.

formance and not achievement since the "achievement" of a

machine is to extend the powers of human achievement via a
specific performance.

296

A prominent and consistent advocate of appreciating
the irreducible structure of physical and life processes
is Michael Polanyi

,

whose over-all position is quite simi-

lar to many of the arguments which have been advanced in

earlier sections:
Our comprehension of a living individual
entails a subsidiary awareness of its parts
which is not wholly specifiable in more detached terms. This understanding acknowledges a particular comprehensive--! e
"molar" achievement of the individual sell
Since our knowledge of this molar function
is not specifiable in "molecular" terms,
the function itself is not reducible to
molecular particulars; it must be acknowledged therefore as a higher form of being,
not determined by these particulars. We can
reach this conclusion by recalling that the
understanding of a whole appreciates the
coherence of its subject matter and thus acknowledges the existence of a value that xs
absent from the constituent particulars.
.

—

Polanyi’

s

.

,

a hxghly
use of this basic position is, however,

the structure of
developed system for the comprehension of
that a
In particular, he makes it evident

living things.

relation to maDe fining the problem of purpose in purposive beproblem of
chines is best delayed until the
See Section 6.5
unit.
complete
havior can be treated as a
will not, however
Delaying the introduction of the concept
general topxcs.
hinder the development of the more
296
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biologist in dealing with living things must use a "logic
of achievement" to describe phenomena which are not factors
in the physical sciences but which, in fact, are the very

subject matter of biology.

For example, there are no acts

which achieve a purpose in physical and chemical processes;
however, in living organisms we can recognize both physical

and chemical processes and purposive acts.
Polanyi develops many explicit contrasts relating to
the concept of levels of functioning in which the same

logical structure that pertains between inanimate nature
and nature alive can also be found to exist between other

levels of functioning.

A favorite Polanyian example is the

situation which pertains between man and his machines.

A

machine for Polanyi is something which has been constructed
by man for some purpose.

He points out that the structure

and working of machines are shaped by man while their material and the forces which operate them obey the laws of

inanimate nature.

From this relationship he concludes that

machines operate under the control of two distinct principles:

the higher, or the principles of the machines'

design and the lower, or the physical and chemical processes

appropriate to the materials involved.
In describing a wrist watch by this type of argument,

Polanyi points out that the task of keeping time via the

uncoiling of £ spring which is controlled by various parts
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fashioned for that purpose, is carried out
by principles of
operation which can not be described in
terms which apply
to the inorganic nature of the parts.
Even a complete
physical and chemical topography of the watch would
not
reveal that it is a device for telling time.
can only reveal the composition of the object.

Such analysis
Clearly,

the operational principles of the watch transcend
the

chemical processes of its parts and are not amenable to

description in those terms.

Applying this same logic to

the problem of physiologists and biologists, we have:

Any coherent part of the organism is indeed
puzzling to physiology, and also meaningless
to pathology, until the way it benefits the
organism is discovered. And I may add that
any description of such a system in terms of
its physical chemical topography is meaningless except for the fact that the description
may covertly recall the system’s physiological
intorpre tation much as the topography of a
machine is meaningless until we guess how the
device works, and for what purpose. 298

—

From this general relationship, Polanyi asserts that
the living organism, like the machine, incorporates two

different principles of operation to account for the phe-

nomena which are observed on different levels.

This leads

to the concept of "boundary condition" and an important

characteristic of the logic of achievement which applies

to

a hierarchically organized system of interdependent but
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Polanyi Life's Irreducible Structure in Knowing
and Being Marjorie Grene ed (Chicago
The University of
Chicago Press, 1969), p. 227
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irreducible levels.

Boundary conditions describe the relation between
the

higher-order organizing principle and the lower order
processes which are thereby harnessed for the transcendent
purpose.

There are two types of boundary conditions.

The

first type is the type we have already discussed; namely,
the situation in which restrictions are imposed of the

lower order processes to harness them to our purposes.

In

this situation, the primary interest is on the effect of
the boundary condition and not on the laws by which the

lower order operates.

An example is the strategy that one

would use in a game of chess.

The strategy imposes bound-

aries on the number of possible moves which follow the laws
of chess; however, our interest is not primarily in the

specific rules which apply to the various pieces on the

board but in the strategy (the boundaries) which are superadded to the basic laws.

The meaning is in the strategy

and not in the moves as examples of the laws.

The same

situation is true of a painter or a sculptor who imposes

boundaries on his material so that we can appreciate them
(the boundaries) by way of being interested in his creation

and not in the material as material.

These boundaries are

referred to as "machine boundaries" since the interest is
always "in the boundaries which are imposed by a comprehensive restrictive power rather than the principles harnessed
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by them." 299

The second category of boundary is known as a

"test-tube" boundary because it is the difference between

constructing a machine and setting up an experiment.

In

the latter case, the primary interest is not in what is

imposed on the material but is rather in the material itself.

That is to say, restrictions are placed on the lower

order phenomena in order to observe their behavior.
"A boundary condition is always extraneous to the

process it delimit s

Polanyi asserts by way of ex-

,

plaining that the structure of a machine is not to be described in terms of the laws which are harnessed.

With

both types of boundary, it is true that the laws of physics
and chemistry or the type of materials available for con-

struction do not determine the interest or the purpose of
the scientist or engineer.

An expanded example of this

relationship and one that makes the applicability of the
argument to multi-leveled hierarchies more obvious is pro-

vided by the following example which demonstrates that each
level of the hierarchy relies upon the workings of the

levels below it but is nevertheless irreducible to a de-

scription in terms of those lower levels.

Polanyi demon-

strates this type of hierarchical structure by considering
the five levels that make up a spoken literary composition.
2

" lbid

300

Ibid

.

,

p.

226

.

,

p

227

.

.

The lowest level is the
production of a voicehe second, the utterance of
words; the third’,
the joining of words to make
sentences; the
w ° rkin S ° f sentences into a
style;
nd hlShe5t 13 thS com P os ition of
the

tex^30?

Clearly, the principles which operate
on any one level are
under the control of the next higher
level.
"The voice you
produce is shaped into words by a vocabulary;
a given vocabulary is shaped into sentences in accordance
with a
grammar; etc.." 302

This example demonstrates the principle

of dual control which applies to the various
levels of the

hierarchy.

On the one hand, there are the laws which con-

trol by applying directly to the elements
themselves, i.e.,

the rules of grammar or of chess while, on the
other hand,

there are controls which are imposed by the laws of the

powers that control the entity which is formed by the elements in the construction.
In examining the relation between levels of the hier-

archy, it becomes evident that "such multiple control is

mado possible by the iact that the principles governing the

isolated particulars of a lower level leave inde t erininant
conditions to be controlled by a higher principle
the example of communication given above,
301

302

303

Ibid.
Ibid.

Ibid

,

p

.

233

.

In

this means that

the words of a vocabulary loave open tho
ability to combine

into an indefinite number of sentences which
aro controlled

by tho laws of grammar.

With this sort of logic, wo can return to tho ovor-all
c

Lassii

i

ca t Lon which Whitehead set up regarding the six

niejor divisions of the actual hierarchy of life processes,

in the sequence of levels which places living beings near
the top of tho hierarchy, we can assert that the processes
on the lowest levels are caused by the forces of inanimate

nature and that the operation of higher levels is only

possible by virtue of boundary conditions which aro left
open by the laws of inanimate nature.

Thus, vegotativo

life is seen to operate in intimate contact with the open

boundaries of tho inanimate world while at the same time
supporting, by virtue of its own open boundaries,

tho pos-

sibility for the development of the muscular operations of
animal life.

And so it goes, on up the line until in man

wo have the ability to appreciate still higher principles

of moral, esthetic and spiritual value.

This view is also descriptive of tho unity and inter-

connectedness of nature.

Since each love! rolies on the

one below it and also delimits tho operation of tho lower

level by channeling the operation of its principles into
the unique character of its own functioning, there is a

system of graded control in which the control is transmitted
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successively downwards to the lowest level.

In line with

our earlier discussion we will use this view in the service
of an outlook that describes the evolutionary process as

one which represents the emergence of an increasing degree
of complexif ication, the development of new stages of life

in which each new level represents a distinct principle of

operation that can harness the open boundaries of the level

below it while at the same time is not also reducible to
those principles.
In Whiteheadian terms, we can characterize the operasome
tion of each level as entertaining the capacity for

potentiality of
form of self-expression in which the latent
into its
the level below it is awakened into realization

level of being.

Thus, the latent potentiality of lifeless

vegetable
matter is made manifest in the functioning of
add yet another
life, while the animal grade is seen to
the average exability by virtue of its capacity to exceed

and add to it
pression of survival of the vegetable world
in its ability to
the particular aim at value as manifest
it is possible to
modify the environment. In this sense,
inanimate matter is posassert that each basic element of

virtues of the universe;
sessed of a capacity to express the
physical universe possesses
every atom of the interconnected
of life.
or reflects all of the virtues

It is also true

countertendency to the
that upward press which is the

443

increase of entropy or "negative entropy" as it is sometimes defined, is the product of a single power which ani-

mates and dominat.es all things.

Whitehead's characteriza-

tion of the function of reason as promoting the art of life
is perhaps only a first approximation of what that "radial"

energy of the evolving cosmos might be; however, it seems
sufficient for present purposes in that it permits greater

theoretical coherence in views about evolution and ulti-

mately about psychology.
To make the application of this hierarchical view to

psychology more explicit, we can recur to the idea

of

"inversion" that has been expressed in many and varied contimes.
texts ranging from the eighteenth century to present
is,
This time we can treat the topic in a new way; that

strucfrom the perspective of a hierarchically organized

ture of interdependent and irreducible levels.

By utilizing

can contrast
the familiar concept of within and without, we
to an upper level
a relatively low level of the hierarchy

of the hierarchy as follows.

At the level of nonliving

character of the
entities, it can be said that the average
laws of nature,
entity exists in total conformity with the
and no choice but
there is no individuality of expression
the laws of nature-- there
to conform to the formalities of

increased dryness of the
is the "physical tendency towards
the scale, we have the
animal body." On the other end of
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reality of human individuality that is so far removed from
the compulsion of physical law as to be unaffected by

them--"the appetition towards esthetic satisfaction

which is outside the mere physical order."

.

.

.

While it is

clear that the individuality of human expression is also

constrained by these formalities, it also passes beyond
them to the realization of purpose and the achievement of

intimate and delicate forms of expression.
Thus, the growth up through the hierarchy of an in-

which
crease in the function of reason is also a growth

within
attributes greater emphasis to the function of the
of new compreof things as represented by the emergence

each nev
hensive principles of operation which apply to
within this sort of a context that Whitehead
It is

level.

asserted
Consciousness is the first example of the
selectiveness of enjoyment in the higher
It arises from expression coordianimals.
funcnating the activities of physiological
tionings 30 ^
.

treatment of inverWe can come to the point of this
In the hierarchical view, consion in the following way.
coordinating the
sciousness first arises from "expression
and it is not
activities of physiological functionings"
levels, i.e., mankind,
until we get to the most evolved
reference to the environment
that the ability to formulate

3°^whitehead

,

Modes

of

Thought, p. 29-
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in symbolic terms is manifest.

Obviously, this agrees with

conventional interpretation but it also passes quite glibly
over the essential character of this relationship.

In

terms of our true relationship with the world of nature,
the organic permanences which are derivative from lower

levels of consciousness are actually of far greater perma-

nence than the ordinary type of relationship with the environment which we maintain by virtue of the outer powers of

sensory functioning.

Whitehead claims that "there is a

baseless notion that we commonly observe those activities
when in
of nature which are dominant in our neighborhood,"

truth "the exact opposite is the case."

^

In other words,

to that
human and animal sensory apparatus are most attuned

xs permawhich is changeable in nature and not that which
that
course, this is simply another way of sayxng

nent.

Of

lower levels
human actions arise from the coordination of
xn terms of
but also introduce a new level of individuality
intimate
expression and reception that can be purposeful,

and emotional.

However, it is also true that we do not

dependence on our
easily discriminate the character of our
reason for doing so.
bodies unless there is some particular
pain, some specxal
Unless we have some sort of sickness or

connection with the
signal from our lower order levels of
rely upon the results of
world, we are quite content to
305 Ibid

sensory experience as being our most important contact with
the world and to take the intimate connection and infinite

complexity of our derivation from the physical cosmos quite
for granted.
"The first principle of epistemology should be that

the changeable,

shifting aspects of our relations to nature

are the primary topics for conscious observation,

is

the way Whitehead phrased the notion that the type of rela-

tion with the environment that animals maintain via their

sensory apparatus is to be highly sensitive to the changeable elements in the environment.

It is in the most

changeable aspects of the environment that an animal finds
the greatest opportunity to catch its food and also the

greatest source of danger from other animals.

Speaking of

the importance of this sort of sensory contact with the
wox'ld J.

J.

Gibson writes:

It is clearly of biological importance for
a sentient individual to be able to distin-

guish or discriminate plant from animal,
prey from predator, own species from other
species, and mate from rival.
The environment consists of opportu nities for perception, of available information, of potential stimuli. Not all
opportunities are grasped, not all information is registered, not all stimuli excite
The animate environment
receptors.
affords even more than the physical environment does since animals have more
.

.

306

Ibid.

.

.

.

.
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characteristics than things and are more
changeable 307
.

The purpose of this discussion is not to dispute the

pragmatic value of sensory experience in providing useful

information about the environment.

Further, it is obvious

that this sort of information is also the type about which

something can be done by the sentient individual, that is,
he can respond to the environment in accord with his own

desires.

What is at issue here is the fact that the tradi-

tional tendency in philosophy, science and psychology has

been to focus purely upon the data which are supplied by
sensory experience and to assume that these changeable and

superficial data represent the only way to understand

either the reality of the physical world or the reality of
man.

This, in fact, was the dominant outlook throughout

the entire era of materialistic science and was the basis

for the naive realism which characterized pre- twentieth

century science.

As long as man was secure in the fact

that he actually observed reality with his senses, that

atoms were really indestructible and separate, that there
was only one geometry of three dimensions rather than an

infinite number of geometries and dimensions, etc., there
was no problem with the epistemology and metaphysics which

James J. Gibson, The Senses Considered as Percep p. 2 3
19 66 )
Hought on Mifflin Co
tual Systems (Boston:
Gibson’s emphasis.
.

,

>

was built exclusively in terms of the absolute realism of

sensory information.

That view, of course, was scientifi-

cally exploded in the twentieth century and in the wake of
those shattering revelations has come exactly the type of

awareness which led to the view of the world as structured

along organismic rather than mechanistic lines.

What else

is the so-called "Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness" except
a criticism of exactly this type of orientation toward the

character of sensory data as being the sole source of in-

formation about the world?
It would seem that we have come rather far afield from

our original discussion of the character of a stratified

hierarchy.

But have we really?

Recall that we entered

this discussion by attempting to explicate the character of
the relationships that exist between various levels of a

hierarchy while at the same time considering the whole

hierarchy as the expression of an undefined yet plainly
evident upward progression of greater and greater levels of

consciousness.

In this trek through the various levels we

finally came to the contrast of human consciousness with
lower levels of consciousness and asserted, in the process,
that the human ability to entertain conceptual novelty that
is free from any direct infringement by the boundary condi-

tions which are determined by the physical world, was an

outstanding characteristic of the station of man.

Since

human consciousness has burst through the limitations
of
animal instinct and is to be distinguished from lower

levels by its ability to conceptually entertain unrealized

possibilities in novel ways, we were led to consider the
most important aspects of this most highly developed form
of consciousness.

To relate this discussion to the earlier

material the topic was handled as an example of idea of
"inversion" of experience that has figured so prominently
in previous discussion.

This time, it was the superficial

character of sensory experience in relation to the other
forms of consciousness that are also a vital part of man's
true nature that was at issue.

To be sure, the topic is

far from exhausted but it has, however, served to bring the

discussion to the desired outcome.

Namely, the assertion

that the level of consciousness which applies to man, that
is,

the reality of man, is not usefully described in philo-

sophical, scientific and psychological terms whose primary

contact with reality is maintained via an analysis of man's

sensory understanding of the world about him.
As useful for worldly purposes as they are, it is an

absolute certainty that the ultimate greatness of human
life does not derive simply from the ability to take account
of sensory data.

However complex our analysis of these

data may be and however abstract our systems of logic, philosophy, psychology, art, science, history, economics, etc.,

h

32

may become, sensory faculties are but the outer
relation of
man's inner being to the underlying necessities of his
true

nature.

Analytical minds have been led to repudiate the

deep intimacy of being because the vagueness of those

depths did not harmonize with the fashionable fables about
the character of an underlying reality which is only

knowable via the method of clear logical analysis of discrete sensory information.
It is this type of understanding of the character of

"inverted" knowledge that can begin to pave the way for the
type of organismic approach to psychology that was inlrooqo

duced in earlier sections.

In those sections the topic

was introduced in terms of the contrast between the material

and spiritual aspects of existence that derived from extensions of the relationships between science, philosophy and

psychology.

In the present context we are making essen-

tially the same point but from within the framework of an

organismically inspired hierarchical characterization of
the structure of reality.

It is not possible to pursue the

characterization of human consciousness which develops from
this type of approach further at this point without

aJ so

detracting from the immediate purpose of this chapter which
is to consider the character of the scientific data which

Instead, we can conclude

support the organismic position.
Sections 5»3»1 and

5

»

3»2

.
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this introduction of stratified structure and its boundaries

with the following example which is expressive of the more
complete generality which separates man's understanding of

reality from the immediate dictates of sensory experience.
Should it be objected that sensory experience and

a

clear logical intellect are in fact the primary aspects of
man's reality and his only means of seeking to develop his

understanding of himself and his world, it will be useful
to consider the experience of someone who was cut off from

the world of man by the crushing weight of the combined

deficits of deafness and blindness.

Speaking of her "two-

fold solitude," Helen Keller described her release from the
"invisible hands" which held her as follows:
As the cool stream gushed over one hand she
spelled into the other the word water first
slowly, then rapidly.
I stood still, my
upon
the motions of her
attention
fixed
whole
misty consciousfelt
a
Suddenly I
fingers.
ness as of something forgotten--a thrill of
returning thought; and somehow the mystery of
That word
language was revealed to me.
awakened my soul, gave it light, hope, joy,
and set it free! 309
,

.

.

.

And further, speaking of her ability to participate so effectively in the full character of human life, she declared
It seems to me that there is in each of us a
capacity to comprehend the impressions and
emotions which have been experienced by mankind from the beginning. Each individual has
a subconscious memory of the green earth and
3° 9

Helen Keller, The Story of My Life (New York:
Publishing Co., 1969 )> P* 3^*

Dell

murmuring waters, a blindness and deafness
cannot rob him of this gift from past generations.
This inherited capacity is a sort of
s ixth sense— —a soul— sense which sees, hears,
feels, all in one 310
.

To this we would add that the "soul-sense" of which
Ms. Keller speaks need not be restricted to the "gift from

past generations" and is, in fact, not simply an effect in

relation to its past but also a cause in relation to its
future
In the terms of our earlier discussion, we can say

that the basis of our primary consciousness is a large

generality that includes sensory information as but one
aspect; it is an aspect that interfaces with consciousness

precisely because the character of sensory data provides
open boundary conditions which can come under the control of
a higher-order operating principle.

It is recognized that the above discussion is a de-

scription rather than an explanation of the character of
conscious processes; however, it is also clear that such

descriptions are more nearly free from the debilitating conflicts between epistemological analysis and metaphysical

beliefs which were the hallmark of interpretations deriving
from the sensory oriented materialistic framework of traditional scientific psychology.
310

Ibid

.

,

p

.
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6.3

PURPOSE AND MODERN
PHYSICAL THOUGHT
In demonstrating the connection between the type of

purposive issues we are interested in and the character of

modern physical thought, it will be helpful to establish
its plausibility by first comparing the classical view of
the physical world with the view of modern physics.

Up to this point, Whitehead's treatment of the character and development of the era of modern science has been

used almost exclusively because his is the only such analysis that is also a part of a larger interpretative schema

which is capable of generating direct implications for psychology and education.

Other authors have developed inde-

pendent accounts of the same era which harmonize with

Whitehead's analysis and also provide additional insights
into the history of the transition to new foundations for

modern science.

In addition to the familiar works of

Barbour 311 and Capek, 312 Harris 313 also provides an account
of this transition which is very congenial to the approach

taken by Whitehead.
311
312

Physics

,

Speaking of the nature of physical

Barbour, Issues in Science and Religion

,

Chapter 10

Capek, The Philosophical Impact of Contemporary
Part II, pp. 143-399*

313

Errol Harris, The Foundations of Metaphysics
Science (New York: Humanities Press, 1963 ) Part iTj
pp. 37-159*
.

,

m
.

.

phenomona as they arc known today Harris suggosts that:
contemporary philosophy, to be in harmony with science, should expound a metaphysic holistic in type, and a logic of order,
system and hierarchical structure. A pluralism devoid of any overarching principle of
unity would be entirely out of keeping with
scientific trends, and an atomistic logic of
propositions independently true or false
would be irrelevant to physics. 31^
.

.

.

With this type of orientation in mind as a goal of this
discussion, we can briefly consider the summary characteristics of the old order.
6.3.1

THE OLD VIEW OF MATTER
AND ITS REPLACEMENT
The metaphysical outlook of the classical physical

sciences was essentially unchanged from the time of Galileo

until the end of the nineteenth century.

During that time

the world was thought of as consisting of hard impenetrable

particles which moved in space and time according to the
immutable laws of nature.

It was just as common to think

of space and time as independent of each other as it was to

believe in the "Laplacian Illusion" that knowing the com-

plete state particles in the world at one point would make

prediction of the future possible.

The outstanding charac-

teristics of this entire era are its naive realism and re-

ductionism
~^^

J

.
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It was a primary belief that the true

p.
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315 Barbour, op

.

.

ci

.

p.
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reality of the world was picturable in the common sense
ideas that apply directly to everyday life.

Additionally

the theoretical world machine which operated with indi-

vidual parts (atoms) that were externally connected with
each other easily created the apparent requirement to view
the whole function of any system or its parts as being

completely defined in terms of its component parts.
Capek calls this the corpuscular-kinetic view of nature and suggests that although the scientific veracity of
the classical physical concepts has been completely dis-

credited, we cannot turn our backs on its concepts for two

important reasons.

First, its pronouncements still remain

valid for the macroscopic three dimensional world of our
daily lives, which is part of the reason why we still teach
these concepts in our schools; and second, the standard

habits of thought in the classical view are so ingrained in
our culture that they form a part of the very fabric of

common sense.

These hidden habits of classical thought re-

main as an influence on our thinking, especially in the

human sciences, and constitute a sort of "Newtonian-Euclidian
subconscious" that requires the modern epistemologist to

behave rather like a psychoanalyst in order to reveal the
remnants of classical thought beneath the rhetoric of modem
science

316

316 Capek,

oj3.

cit
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,
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Capek also makes the observation that the difference
in meaning between the terms "classical picture" and

"modern conception" of matter reveals an important difference between the two periods of scientific development.

unquestioned
He feels that the long-standing and seemingly
scientireliance on visualization and pictorialization of

epistemological
fic concepts was one of the most salient
In forming

characteristics of the classical theories.

theorists used
visualizations of their concepts, classical
namely, the visual
two main channels of input information

and tactile senses.

Tactile information was thought to

of matter by the
reveal the impenetrability or solidity
and visual terms were
sensations of contact and resistance
express the mechanical
viewed as the appropriate vehicle to
constructed out of our tacproperties of matter which were

tile sensations.

imaging to
The particles of matter were
position;
sess a certain bulk, shape and
in time,
vary
to
imagined
positions were
the particles
in more ordinary language,
J
space
imagined to move through

posthei
or,

were

‘

character of classical science
This view of the sensory
discussions on the role and
agrees well with our earlier
man's interpretation of the
place of sensory experience in

world about him.
317 Ibid., p. 5, Capek'

s

emphasis.
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In considering the character of the "modern concep-

tualizations" which have replaced the "classical pictures"
of nature, we find complete corroboration for the White-

headian views which were incorporated as the interpretative
basis of the earlier philosophical and psychological material.

Capek believes that:
Not a single component of this
[traditional corpuscular-kinetic] model of nature
remained unaffected by the contemporary storm
in physics. 318
.

.

.

And Harris makes the highly restrained criticism that:
Some biologists and psychologists also seem
to lag behind in their awareness of the extent to which modern physics has cut away
from their sciences the old materialistmechanist conceptions of reality. 319
In place of the old ideas of space, time, matter and energy,
we now have one complex whole rather than an assortment of

The modern concern is with the total

independent elements.

system of mutual interdependence.

Space and time are not

absolute pre-existent containers of matter in motion, but
are instead part of an interdependent matrix of systems of

This revolution is largely due to

interrelated activities.

the two basic reinterpretations that affected modern physics.

On the one hand there was the challenge to the macroscopic

views of classical physics which came from the advent of

^^ Ibid
319

.

,
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relativity physics, whose salient effect has boon tho
uni 1

i
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t

i

on and coalescence of the earlier discrete compo-

nents into a systematic whole.

On the other hand, there

was the development of modern quantum theory which created
an entire new aspect of microphysics whose effect upon the

old structure was no less shattering than had been the de-

velopment of relativity.

Matter could no longer be viewed

as tiny bits of impenetrable stuff moving in space, but

rather became a series of events in which the units (entities) are only resolvable into subordinate chains of ac-

tivity— probability--waves became more fundamental units
than the old planetary atom. 321
the physical world has been revealed as
a single, continuous whole of interconnected
parts, distinguishable but interdependent
both for their existence and for their character.
It is not, however, a static whole-a mere pattern of diff erentiations--but a
spatio-temporal process, a dynamic totality,
or a flux of energetic activity, structured
both in space and time 322
.

.

.

.

This statement underlines the repeated Whi t eheadian assertions about the realities of the universe being actual en-

tities whose main character is that of an event.

Events

occupy a certain minimum of space and a certain minimum of
time and must be considered as to their internal and external
320

Ibid
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aspects
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Wo oan put the matter back into a complete White-

headian context with the following:
For the modern view process, activity and
change are tho matter of fact.
At an instant
there is nothing.
Each instant is only a
way of grouping matters of fact.
Thus since
there are no instants, conceived as simple
primary entities, there is no nature at an
instant.
Thus all interrelations of matters
of fact involve transition in their essence.
All realization involves Implication in the
creative advance. 323
Wo can now turn from explicit consideration of the

character of the dynamic, complexifying physical world
which has given rise to progressively more complicated
forms of organization to the consideration of the general.

philosophical implications which flow from the revised

character of modern metaphysics.
6.3.2

PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS
OF MODERN PHYSICAL SCIENCE
Since this entire presentation can also be read as an

investigation of the "philosophical implications"
physical theory, it is obviously unnecessary
Rather,

anything comprehensive here.

to

modern

of

attempt

the main intent

consider narrower issues which are directly related

hierarchical model of interrelated processes.

is

to

to

the

Tho goal is

to connect the findings of modern physical science with

organi smic metaphysics and thereby provide additional sup-

port for its continued usage.
323 Whitehead, Modes
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uaagu of a hierarchical model comes from

a predominant characteristic of physical

theory that may be

characterized as the recognition of the unity in the diversity of phenomena that man can investigate.

While the con-

cept of unity in diversity can be utilized in the descrip-

tion of all levels in a hierarchical structure, in the present context of physical theory we can assert a characteri-

zation of it that derives from the most fundamental characteristic of what we now know about the physical world of

microcosmic elements.
In entering this discussion, it is also important to

keep in mind that the hierarchical model does not inforce
strict discontinuity between its various levels and that
i

here Hfp imporloiil

wny.s

in

which nil

levels run be snid to

Whitehead phrased this thought, while

be similar.

el

the

same time reaching from the highest to the lowest level of
the hierarchy,

in the following way:

The key notion from which construction [of a
cosmology built in terms of our experience]
should start is that the energetic activity
considered in physics is the emotional intensity entertained in life 32
.

Perhaps, one can say that the primary emotion in the world
of creation is the idea of love conceived as the power

which binds together all things
32k

Ibid

.

,

p

.

168

— the

unifying power in the

hC[i

diversify
doJ

i

o(

the world,

The point, hero howovor

no the character of this power but,

instead

,

is

to

not to

point to

its existence and the fact that the interrelatedness we

speak of that exists between all levels is not simply an

arbitrary characteristic but is, in fact, an expression of
the unity of all things.

There is a basic relationship between the logic of the

hierarchy and the behavior of atomic phenomena.

This rela-

tionship demonstrates a fundamental principle about the nature of a whole and its parts and is also one which com-

pletely obliterates any meaning that might still attach to
the possibility of explaining a whole in terms of its
pax'ts,

in other words,

the old problem of reduc tioni sin

Barbour summarizes the extended argument provided by

Margenau in a most useful way. 325
Barbour is always appropriately cautious about extra-

polating the explicit concepts of physics to other levels
of reality and points out that in this case, the physical

phenomena are indicative of a pattern that appears at other
levels and therefore this similarity of pattern is worthy
of comment.

He has reference to the Pauli Exclusion Prin-

ciple which is "a law concerning the total atom that cannot

conceivably be derived from laws concerning individual
Margenau 's work is
29^-298.
The Nature of Physical Reality Chapter XX.

^^Barbour,

o £.

cit

.

,

,

electrons.

This principle assorts that no two elec-

’

trons in an atom can have exactly the same quantum states;

quantum states take account of the electrons' energy,
angular momentum, orientation and spin.

This means that a

new electron which enters a molecule is apparently influenced by the presence of those already present so that its
state will indeed be unique; that is, some possible states
are excluded.

The influence on the electron is only

apparent because quantum theory is explicitly different
than the old mechanistic reasoning of classical physics.

Barbour uses Margenau

1

s

statements on the requirement of

modern physical theory to analyze the system of things as
whole as follows:
The essence of mechanistic reasoning is seen
fnrst that
to cluster around two beliefs:
entities are divisible into parts, and second
n space and
(hut those parts uro LocalizabLo
Prior to [the exclusion principle],
time.
all theories had affected the individual nature of the so-called "parts"; the new principle regulated their social behavior. With
respect to a single particle it has nothing
It is as though here, for the
to say.
first time, physics had discovered within its
own precincts a purely social law, a law that
is simple in its basic formulation and yet
immense in its collective effects. Mechanistic
reasoning, already far behind, has gone out ol
sight as a result of this latest advance.
In the Pauli principle is a way of understanding why entities show in their togetherness laws of behavior different from the laws
The
which govern them in isolation.
emergence of new properties on composition is
i

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

326 Ibid.

,

p

.

295

•

.

.

.

.
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a rather general phenomenon in modern physics
and owes its occurrence to the exclusion
principle 327
.

Important in this context is the fact that this physical

theory establishes something of a "social” law even at the
level of atomic events, thus even modern physics is con-

strained

to

consider the organic nature of an organized

system as a whole.

In this way too, matter and energy and

space and time are indissolubly united.

The similarity to

the more general treatment of hierarchical logic which is

found in Polanyi's work also constitutes an important aspect of the present discussion.

Polanyi's position on the

general nature of hierarchical logic is clear enough:
The higher principles which characterize a
comprehensive entity cannot be defined in
terms of the aws that apply to its parts in
themselves
And, in a less abstract way, he is willing to assert that

what seems to be logically true of hierarchies is also true
of the reality of things

— an

assertion that seems well an-

chored in reality by the Pauli Principle.

Of the evolu-

tionary progression toward increased complexity and intellectual capacity in living things, he maintains:
We can recognize then a strictly defined progression, rising from the inanimate level to
^2

^Margenau, The Nature of Physical Reality pp 442,
444 quoted in Barbour, Ibid ., p. 29 & Margenau's emphasis.
,

328

.

Polanyi, The Structure of Consciousness in Knowing
and Being Marjorie Grene ed. p. 217*
,

,

,

U<jG

f>vor

Thi.s,

higher add!

of course

t

j

ona

I

principles of life.

is a reiteration of a basic theme
in the

,

earlier discussion of stratified structure
(hierarchy). 330
It

also serves to underline the fact that
wholeness, unity

and organic structure are as much a part of
reulity as the
older views of plurality, individuality and
diversity.

Atomistic, independent facts have now boon roplaood by

a

logic which stresses the necessity of organic unity and tho

necessity of recognizing tho internal relations which are
appropriate to each level of reality.
Thus far in our consideration of specific philosophical

implications of modern physical thoory wo havo focused pri-

marily upon the now typo of unity which is implied by the
hierarchical view and elements of quantum theory* equally
important in

placed on ac

tills
t

i

v

i

ty

regard is the associated emphasis which is
and creativity in nature.

This aspect

is

demonstrated by the development of novo] forms of organization which have become the elaborate hierarchy of tho

evolving cosmos.

On this aspect of what is already a fa-

miliar topic, wo can add to the development of the previous
material by considering an analogy which

is

developed by

Capek in his treatment of the search for now ways of
329
330

Ibid., p. 2’y I,

Cf

.

emphasis added.

Section 6.2.1 above.

UG'J

understand ng the implications of modern physics.
i

33

^

Starting with Whitehead’s observation that;
the texture of observed experience, [illustrates a] philosophical scheme,
such
that all related experience must exhibit the
same texture. 332
.

.

.

Capek develops the idea that the past fascination of scientists and philosophers with the information they derived
about reality from visual and tactile stimulation has

caused them to emphasize the constancy of matter and the

unchanging nature of space at the expense of appreciating
the truly dynamic nature of things.

By way of correcting

this deficit, Capek suggests that auditory sensations pro-

vide an important cluo which is obscured by the other modes
of sensory knowledge.

To make the contrast vivid, he

points out that arithmetical units are like the indivisible
That is, they can be grouped together

atoms of the old view.

but such grouping does not affect their nature in any way.

The relationship is entirely external to the meaning of the
Thus,

unit.

"the relation of arithmetical units to their

sum total is the same as the relation of the parts to the
333
whole in space [classical space, that is]."

The importance of the shift in sensory modality becomes
331

Capek,

0 £.

ci

.

,

Chapter XVIII.

332

Ibid

.

,

Whitehead, Process and Reality
370
p
.

3 33 Ibid.

,

p.

371

.

,

p.

5>

quoted in

468

clear when ho develops the analogy by
considering the oxpericnoe of listening to a piece of music.
The musical phrase is a successive
differen tiated whole which remains a whole in
spite
of its successive character and which
remains
differentiated in spite of its dynamic wholeness.
Like every dynamic whole it exhibits a
s ynth es is of unity and multiplicity,
of continuity and discontinuity; but it is not the
unity of an undifferentiated simultaneous
whole nor is it the plurality of juxtaposed
units; it is neither continuity in the mathematical sense of infinite divisibility nor is
it the discontinuity of rigid atomic blocs.
For this reason, paradoxical as it may sound,
the traditional distinction between succession and duration must be given up. 33^
Thus, Capek sees a parallel between musical wholes and the

physical phenomena of modern science which makes for much

greater intuitive clarity in our apprehension of the character of becoming.

He summarizes the main qualities offered

by auditory models as follows:

first, they stress the in-

completeness of becoming and its pulsational character;
second, they provide for the emergence of novelty within
the causal influence of the past;

third, individual events

are retained in the continuity of the flux; fourth, they

demonstrate the futility of attempting to take instantaneous
cuts of the whole while retaining its meaning; fifth, what

before could only be interpreted as contemporaneous, isolated things can now be thought of as the co-becoming of
33 ^

Ibid

.

,

pp.

371-372, Capek'

s

emphasis.

related events.
The parallel of this sort of
''imageless dynamic model"
to both the hierarchical
interpretation and Whitehead's
organismic position is obvious in the
following.

m

Thus
the organic theory, a pattern need
endure in undifferentiated sameness through not
time.
The pattern may be essentially one of
aesthetic contrasts requiring a lapse of time
for its unfolding.
A tune is an example of
such a pattern.
Thus the endurance of the
pattern now means the reiteration of its succession of contrasts. This is obviously the
most general notion of endurance on the organic theory, and "reiteration" is perhaps
the word which expresses it with most directness.
But when we translate this notion into
the abstractions of physics, it at once becomes the technical notion of "vibration."
This vibration is not the vibratory locomoti°nj
it is the vibration of organic deformation 33o
.

the argument has again converged upon the central

themes of a) unity in diversity, as represented by the fact
that the hierarchical interpretation can span levels ranging

from the realization of "aesthetic contrasts" to the "vibration of organic deformation" at the molecular level and
b)

the dynamic and creative as represented by the fact that

patterns endure but not necessarily in "undifferentiated
sameness through time."
335 Ibid

336
Ibid.

,

.

p.

Whitehead

P-

375.

378.

Science and the Modern World, quoted in

CONCLUSIONS REGARDING PURPOSE AND PHYSICAL THOUGHT
The destruction of the eld
materialistic, mechanistic,
and deterministic views of
classical physics also amounted
to a destruction of the basis
for substance philosophy.
In their place, there is emphasis
upon chains of events and
a

hierarchically structured universe.

It is however, of

vital importance that we do not repeat
the modern version
of past reductionist thought.
It is erroneous to assume
that the content of the now physics
applies directly to

human experience and to education.

A protection against

reductionist theorizing is afforded by the hierarchical
model in that its purposive and organismic interpretation
of reality is also open-ended in the sense that it
places

man at the pinnacle and therefore invites meaningful com-

parison with issues of human free-will and the spiritual
nature of man.

Of this condition Barbour writes:

Atom
rnln tormina c
and human freedom are
not
directly related to each other, and
occur on very different levels. They are
both examples of "weak causality" in which a
sot of potentialities is determined.
nd v dim events display some unpredictability, whereas exact laws are the result of
large numbers.
Insofar as man is a collection of particles, atomic indeterminacy is
lost in statistical regularities.
But insofar
as human experience is an integrated event,
it displays a new type of unprodic tabili tynot derivative from atomic inde t erminacy but
from its organization at a higher level.
Perhaps coordinated individual events, at
various levels, have multiple potentialities,
i

(•

i

.

.

.

.

1

i

i

.

.

I

,
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though only at higher’ levels is there freedom 337
.

Tlius,

even though we can derive a meaningful corroboration

of the model from physics, physics is and always will re-

main based upon a very limited set of phenomena and the
suggestive implications of its ideas will always require

correlation with other sciences and ultimately with the
data of human experience.

Physics can never be the basic

source of definition for the whole of concrete reality.

Further exploration of the relation between human
freedom and the character of the hierarchical model will be

considered in later sections here, in relation to the implications of physical thought for the problem of organic
purpose, we should observe that the physical world which

spawned the now defunct concepts of classical physics is
still the same old world that seemed to function according
to that type of causal concept and law.

It is also true

laws
that within the old limits of understanding those old

are still valid.

They work because the abstractions in-

world
volved "explained" the everyday three dimensional
that was assumed to be concrete reality.

That we have come

of both the charto the more complete modern understanding

involved
acter of the physical world and the possibilities
the continuing
in human freedom is itself the result of

337 Barbour, op. cit., p. 314, Barbour’s emphasis.
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Mm* purposive cosmos.

Man
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t

only

deepened his understanding of the nature of the levels
wliirli

ol

lie below him but has also heightened his awareness

the possibilities of seeking his true nature in that

which lies ahead and is transcendent in relation to his
present position.
6.4

PURPOSE AND MODERN
BIOLOGICAL THOUGHT
We can now seek to match our organismic, unified and

dynamic view of the nature of physical processes with a

compatible explanation of the nature and mechanisms of biological evolution.
In opening this subject, it is hard to circumvent

appreciating its historical aspects since it is obvious
that the theory of evolution which was widely popularized

by Darwin is one which grew up in the materialistic era of

scientific thought.

It therefore naturally assimilated the

Evolution was thought

idea of a completely lawful universe.

to be a process equally as absolute, universal and deter-

ministic as the orderly behavior of

a

chemical reaction.

338

But the view was not without rival for in much the same

fashion as we have observed in the growth of psychological
thought, there wore those who departed significantly from

this thesis.

To go back into history a little, we find

338 George G. Simpson, This View of Life (New York:
1964 ) p. 177*
Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc
.

,

,

that an important name among those who dissented was that
of Jean Baptiste Lamarck who, in 1809, published a complete

This theory was an outgrowth of the

theory of evolution.

eighteenth century version of the Aristotelian hierarchical

view that the world consisted of a Great Chain of Beings
who were arranged in increasing complexity from inert molecules, to living molecules, to microscopic animals, etc.,

until finally man is reached.

The philosopher J.

B.

Robinet

affirmed that:
The Scale of Beings constitutes a whole infinitely graduated, with no real lines of
This great and important
separation.
truth, the key to the universal system, and
the basis of all true philosophy, will day by
day become more evident, as we progress in
the study of Nature. 339
.

.

.

Following this quotation, Lovejoy points out that a dominant
approach to the topic of evolution was
I'oreii

t

to

divide the "dii-

orders which constitute the scale of being into four

general classes:

inorganic, 2) organic but inanimate

l)

reason,
(i.e., plants), 3) organic and animate, but without
4)

organic, animate and rational

,l

.

^°

The principle

ol

consequences
continuity of being had important philosophical
have some
because it seemed to demand that all beings should

anything.
degree of any quality which is possessed by
339j. B< Robinet, De la Nature
Great Chain of Being p. 275*

,

quoted in Lovejoy,

,

3^°ibid.

,

p.

275

,

emphasis added.

Thus,

J_he
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we find Robinet expressing sentiments that have a certain

familiarity with a major theme of the organismic philosophy
of Whitehead.

For myself I would rather give even intelligence to the least atom of mat ter--provided
it were in a degree and of a quality suitable
to it--than refuse organization to the fossils and make them isolated beings, having no
connection with others. It is to no purpose
to tell me that this is a bizarre opinion,
and that it is not possible that a stone
thinks.
I should deem it a sufficient reply
to say that I am not responsible for conseif the law
quences correctly deduced,
of continuity is admitted, we ought likewise
.it
to admit all that follows from it;
is inexcusable to abandon so general a principle without a sufficient reason. 341
.

.

.

.

.

Thus, while there are important similarities to modern or-

ganismic thought, the fact that it was based on a deductive

conclusion from an abstract logical principle renders the

view incompatible with scientific thought.

One of the

things which Lamarck added to this approach was the attempt
to establish a mechanism by which such a chain of being

could be produced.

Lamarck’s solution was to add to the

continuity interpretation of evolution the ability

ol

or-

ganisms to make habitual adaptations to their environment.
that
He further believed that it was from such adaptations
to the
structural changes would result in the animal owing

changes
use or disuse of various organs and that these
341 Robinet, in Ibid

.

,

p.

277*

would bo immediately inherited by subsequent generations.

Lamarck

1

s

theory, though popular at the time, did not

survive because of two main faults; first, he was in trouble

with the upholders of the biblical account of creation as
any early evolutionist would be; and second, the fact that
he put so much stress on the upward striving of organisms
to increase their complexity made his argument sound en-

tirely too teleological to those who were seeking scientific
explanation.

Therefore, when Darwin published his Origin

of Species in 1859 (fifty years after Lamarck)

,

in which he

explained evolution in terms of mechanical principles that
did not rely on any sort of outside reference, he met with
the instant and lasting approval of the scientific commu-

nity.

The reaction of the religious community aside from

being well known, is also of little interest in this context

.

It would be counterproductive to pursue a strict his-

torical treatment of the rise of evolutionary theory here.
Our purposes will be better served by focusing on specific

topics that have bearing on the modern scientific interpre-

tation of evolution and the relation of those issues to

modern psychology.

In relating evolutionary thought to

psychology, there are two general observations that should
Simpson, The Meaning of Evolution (New Haven:
University Press, 19^9) PP 266-267.
^^ 2

»

•

Yale

476

be made.

First, the type of psychology that reached its

new maturity in the latter half of the nineteenth century
in Germany (and this includes both psychology as a natural

science and psychology as a human science), was primarily

oriented toward the study of adult intelligence and did not
concern itself with any investigation of the development of

children into adults.

Of this condition Lowry colorfully

remarks
Nor was it merely accidental that this was so,
for, however great its scientific enthusiasm,
the "new" German psychology was guided throughout by two assumptions that were hoary with
age and questionable at best:
the first, that
psychological processes find their clearest
expression in the "human, normal, adult mind";
the second, that all such processes may be
referred back to sensations and their vicissitudes in perception and thinking. 343

There was practically no direct influence of the Darwinian

evolutionary view upon the nineteenth century birth and
adolescence of psychological theory.

This condition is a

direct outgrowth of the empirical psychology and philosophy
of earlier times and also the fact that the science of

physiology provided a direct link with the physical world
through which man's operation could apparently be understood.
A second important characteristic of evolutionary

theory in psychology is that it provided the concepts with
343 Lowry, The Evolution of Psychological Theory

,

p.

111.
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which to correct the above condition.

Once it was reason-

ably held that man's past was somehow immanent within him

and that the evolutionary ancestry of man might be therefore available for study, the goal of psychological inquiry

became more than the study of the adult human mind.

Theo-

rists now had just cause to pursue such studies as "devel-

opmental psychology" and "comparative psychology."

In this

way, psychology received a great redirection into many and

diverse areas of investigation.
6

.

4.1

STANDARD EVOLUTIONARY THEORY
Today, it is commonly accepted that the Darwinian view

of evolution can be summarized as follows:

What do we mean by twentieth-century Darwinism
and what do we mean by the synthetic theory
of evolution? I think its essence can be
characterized by two postulates: l) that all
events that lead to the production of new
genotypes, such as mutation, recombination
and fertilization are essentially random and
not in any way whatsoever finalistic, and
2) that the order in the organic world,
manifested in the numerous adaptations of
organisms to the physical and biotic environto the ordering effect of natural
ment, is <’
selection

This position with regard to the total efficacy of random

variation and natural selection is, of course, precisely
the same interpretation which was considered earlier in

q44

Ernst Mayr, quoted xn C. H. Waddington, The Nature
Atheneum, 1962), p. 85.
of Life (New York:

478

connection with the general problem of purpose .^ 5

At that

time this doctrine was criticized from the perspective

which was generated by the contrast between entropy and
life.
loi

In the present context, we can continue the search

expanded meaning in the concept of purpose by consid-

ering some of the alternatives which are offered by modern

biologists
Of

those who stress that chance variation and natural

selection are necessary but not sufficient elements in ex-

plaining the evolutionary processes are
a paleontologist,

G.

G.

Simpson,

146

and C. H. Waddington, 347 a biologist.

Essentially, their approach is one that stresses the com-

plex interactions between a population and its environment;
these are interactions which also occupy extended periods
It is from the intermixture of these factors that

of time.

evolutionary processes are believed to produce a certain
amount of direc tedness

,

creativity or quasi-purposiveness

which acts to balance out the effects of pure randomness.
In speaking of the insufficiency of random mutation

and natural selection, Waddington uses an interesting phrase
that we have seen in quite another context:
345

Cf

.

Section 6.0 above.

^^Simpson, This View of Life

,

pp

.

63-84.

'^Waddington, The Nature of Life pp 72-98 and The
Ethical Animal (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
I 960 ), pp. 84-100.
^

,

.
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I"

my op

biology has already mado nil
discoveries of matters of principle which
can be reached by this way of formulating
the
situation.
The time seems to have come when
we need to take account of two further
aspects
of the evolutionary mechanism 348
Ul °

.

The phrase,

"The time seems to have come" is interesting

for two reasons.

First, Waddington is asserting the need

to modify a long-standing tradition and therefore
is defi-

nitely in a heightened condition of using his own creativity
and beliefs as a primary basis from which to maintain
that

change is necessary.

We have, therefore, an example of the

type of theory formulation that was the chief topic of the

earlier discussion of the character of scientific thought.
Second, this is the exact phrase that was used by J. B.

Watson when he launched behavioral psychology.

The main

effect of Watson's dictum was to read consciousness entirely
out of the picture of scientific psychology; the main effect

of Waddington'

thought is going to be to begin to reassert

s

the role of other than material factors in the behavior of

animal s

Waddington'

mechanism are:
ative system.

s

l)

two additional aspects of the evolutionary
the epigenetic system and 2) the exploit-

Thus, Waddington postulates a four-factor

evolutionary system as follows:
348

added

Waddington, The Ethical Animal, p. 89, emphasis

w uiu
wiu.uii engenders now varij
ation by the process of mutation and transmits
it by chromosomal genes; 2
an epigenetic sys)
tem, which translates the information
in the
fertilized egg and that which impinges on it
from the environment into the characters of
the reproducing adult; 3 an exploitative
sys)
tem by which an animal chooses and modifies
the environment to which it will submit itself;
and f) a system of natural selective pressures,
originating from the environment and operating
on the combined result of the three other sys,

...

,

tems. 349

Doth of the aspects which Waddington is proposing are seen
to operate in between the role of the two traditional fac-

tors of evolutionary theory.

In other words, they refer to

the endogenous factors or the within of things as opposed
to the strict external interpretation of traditional

theory

Of the epigenetic system, Waddington observes that the

pressures of the environment do not operate on the genetic
inn

tori ul

if so

I

I'

but

instead operate on the organisms as

they develop from fertilized eggs into reproductive adults.

Assigning indices of selective value to individual genes is
he points out, only a convenient mathematical shorthand

which ignores the reality of the developing individual.

He

and others have performed experiments which demonstrate
that the epigenetic system is one which coordinates the

isolated notions of acquired and inherited characteristics
into the combined notion that "In reality all characteristics are both acquired and inherited."
349 Ibid

.

,

pp

.

9^-96.

Of this mechanism

481

which he refers to as "genetic assimilation"
of an acquired
character, he says:

Although this mechanism is quite different
from the Lamarckian inheritance of acquired
characters, being entirely based on the concepts of orthodox Mendelian genetics, it can
n
play in evolutionary theory the very
role for which Lamarckian hypotheses have
often been invoked 350
-'-

.

Thus, after more than one hundred and fifty years, we
have
a scientifically acceptable version of a form of teleo-

logical behavior.

The importance of this formulation and

the need for it is demonstrated by Jean Piaget's ready

usage for the concept as a very suggestive analogy in the

construction of his psychological theory:
Waddington has suggested the name "chroods"
(necessary routes) to describe developments
particular to an organ or a part of an embryo,
and he applies the term epigenetic system
(or, epigenetic "scene") to the sum of the
chreods taken as being--to a greater or a
lesser degree--channeled
It is
a new concept of equilibrium as something
which is, as it were, kinematic, and which,
in determining such processes, is nevertheless
quite distinct from homeostasis:
there is a
kind of "homeorhesis " (guidance) when the
formatory process, deviating from its course
under outside influence, is brought back on
e interplay of coercive compen,

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

And now, with the additional terms of "chreod" and "homeorhesis" which Piaget has taken over as a way of describing
3 50

Ibid.

,

p.

94.

351 Piaget, Biology and Knowledge

,

p.

19*

482

tho ovor-all epigenetic process, the analogy
with mentaJ

functioning can be fully developed:
In the cognitive field, chreods can indeed be
singled out which are more or less independent, each with its own homeorhesis, and forms
of final equilibrium (in the sense that they
continue to exist in stable condition while
s till being capable of eventual integration
into wider fields of equilibrium) which might
be the cognitive equivalent of homeostasis 352
.

In addition to the obvious applicability of the epigenetic

concept to psychology, there is a basic similarity between

Piaget's idea that a "stabilized" homeorhetic equilibrium
is the basis for "eventual integration into wider fields of

equilibrium" and the hierarchical logic of boundary conditions which Polanyi advances as a generalized schema for

under s tanding the relationships between successive layers
of operating principles.

The reconsideration of biologicai evolution which

is

offered by Waddington and adopted by Piaget as a meaningful
way of describing cognitive evolution, as well as biological
evolution, is, by its very nature, a criticism of mechanical

causality on the one hand and traditional empirical phi-

losophy on the other.

Both Piaget and Waddington recognize

this point and speak to it directly.
part,

Waddington for his

takes Whitehead as a major guide toward reworking

concepts in embryology and genetics and Piaget, though he
352 Ibid

.

,

p

.

25

•

cJ()('s

not mention Whitehead for anything other
than his

early work in mathematics, and then only to
point up the
Jact

that mathematics has progressed since Whitehoad
pub-

lished in that field in 1911, has been guided by the
pro-

ductiveness and cogency of his years of research into the

problem of genetic epistemology to appreciate the importance of the view which was inspired by Whitehead and de-

veloped in biology by Waddington.
As would be expected therefore, we find that Piaget

dovotos a lengthy discussion in his Biology and Knowledge

*

*

to the issues of evolution taken in the Aristotelian sense
oi

final causality, the idea of vitalism in biology, the

formulations of Descartes, the problems of empiricism and
Lamarckism, and the philosophy and psychology of associationism.

In short, he touches on many of the major per-

plexities that have been considered in earlier chapters.
No attempt will bo made here to reproduce Piaget's argument

for the validity of the over-all position taken by WaddingIon.

He says in summary,
It took a great embryologist turned geneticist, like Waddington, to make clear, at Last
how out of the question it is to explain evolutive variation simply in terms of preformation or chance.
As soon as it is recognized that
the environment is just as
much organized by the organism as phenotypic
variation is directed by the environment, then
,

.

.

.

.

.

.

353 Piaget, Biology and Knowledge
137.

,

Chapter III, pp. 70-

*

it becomes possible to speak of the
"cybernetic circuits"
and development can be
seen as a series of organizational ladders,
all different and all perpetually subject
to
cyclic causality .354
.

Wliat

.

.

xs xmportant in this context is that Piaget
analyzes

the new position on evolutionary development
in terms of
the xnsight s provided by cybernetic models and
develops his

version of the over-all life force in the following way:
[with cybernetics], we can today retain all
that is positive in the idea of finality but
at the same time replace the notion of
"final cause" by an intelligible feedback
causality .355

Once again, we can point to the similarity of Piaget's
"series of organizational ladders" and Polanyi

'

s

generalized

hierarchical logic and also to the fact that Piaget readily
recognizes the idea of process in which the environment is
as much organized by the organism as the organism is di-

rected by the environment.

What is most significant here

however, is the fact that there is no attempt to generalize
the insights derived from this study as is found in White-

head.

This seems natural because Piaget is a psychologist

interested in circumscribed issues while Whitehead had

philosopher's view of the cosmos.

a

This very fact points up

the all-important role which is played by the over-all

orientation of the theorist.
354

Ibid.

355 Ibid

.

,

p.

135

p

132

.

>

Since Piaget is concerned to

emphasis added.

explain the mechanisms of cognitive development
and to make
as much sense out of the relation between
biological
and

cognitive development processes as possible, he is
satisfied
to accept a limited

view of teleological processes which

develops by analogy with cybernetic circuits.

From this,

he gets the concept of "cyclic causality" as a replacement
foi

1

inal causality."

The problem with this approach is

that it fails to answer the main part of the central ques-

tion with which evolutionary views must deal; namely:

has the trend of evolution been upwards?"

"Why

Giving various

levels of a hierarchical organization the prerogative of
"cyclic causality" may improve our immediate scientific

understanding of specific problems but it does little to
straighten out the over-all problem of the directionality
that exists as a result of the fact that life has indeed

arisen toward higher levels of attainment.
Piaget's work puts a challenge to the philosophical

position we have taken with respect to Whitehead's organismic process explanation of reality.

The challenge is this:

With the advent of the modern position on evolutionary

theory and the development of cybernetic theory, scientists
like Piaget can meaningly compare life processes (biological

and cognitive) to the behavior of goal-seeking machines.
The Lask then, is to decide if such orientations to the

problem yield a satisfactory solution to the problem of

purpose as it is manifest in evolution,
as it exists in the
theories of scientific psychology, as we
experience it in
our lives, and as it is manifest in the
children we hope to
educate
schools.
Our eventual answer to this question
will be that such explanations are insufficient
to answer

m

these larger questions.

The precise reasons for this con-

clusion will be considered presently after a few additional

considerations relating to the standard accounts of evolutionary theory are introduced.
Before we go on however, we should note that Piaget

himself does not believe that his formulation is the ultimate answer, but only that it is the most scientific one at
present.

Thus, he says, near the final page of his Biology

and Knowledge that
It is to be hoped that biologists and psychologists will collaborate in future, so
that together they may uncover the secrets of
the organizing organization, once they have
discovered those of the already organized
organization. 356

Clearly, since one must have some belief as to the nature of
the organizing organization before he can tackle the problem

of the organized organization, we must at some point address
that larger issue in a scientific as well as philosophical

way
In the expanded version of evolutionary theory the role
3 56

Ibid.

,

p.

348

ol

process,

the action within the organism, has
been

stressed as an important determinant of the
processes of
evolution; lacking, for the present, an
appreciation of a

larger framework into which to fit the activity
which
exists at various explanatory levels, the idea
of causation

has been likened to cybernetic machines.

This approach is

appealing to scientists because it provides a reasonable

mechanism by which an important problem can be understood.
Simpson demonstrates this by analogy to the age-old problem
of the chicken and the egg 337
.

Naturalists, he says, have

always been more interested in hens whereas, geneticists
are partial to eggs.

Hen-evolutionists, e.g., Darwin and

the Neo— Lamarckians and the Neo— Darwinist s

,

were primarily

concerned with the hen and her ability to survive the rigors
of the environment.

Egg-evolutionis t s focused on the proc-

esses of reproduction and the importance of events in cells

during critical periods in the reproductive process.
Simpson's solution, and that of many biologists, has been
to point out that either view is incorrect when taken by

itself.

There is, in fact, a hen-evolution and an egg-

evolution which are synthesized in the modern view.

In

other words, it is recognized that what happens to the

chicken and to the populations of chickens sooner or later
will affect the eggs and, obviously, what happens to the
3 57

Simpson, This View of Life, pp

.

64-65.

488

eggs affects the chickens.
it comes to explaining the selective processes

that operate to counter the random mutations in genetic

material some biologists, Simpson being one of them, hold
that
It has been demonstrated both theoretically
and experimentally that selection acts in a
positive way tending to increase
the
chances not only of favorable genes but also
of favorable hereditary combinations 358
.

.

.

.

Other biologists, Waddington and that part of Jean Piaget

which he still considers to be a scientific biologist,
stress the role of mentality and internal states in the

creation of adaptive behavior.

Here, novel behavior and

opportunistic reactions on the part of an organism are seen
to indirectly give rise to acquired characteristics.

It is

therefore a mechanism that "exactly mimics inheritance of
an acquired character, but one which depends not on the

direct induction of a hereditary variation, in the manner

suggested by Lamarck, but on selection operating on the
359
genetical structure of the population.

The following statement of Waddington is a fitting

summary of the popular biological view of evolution and one

which also puts the central problem squarely before us:
^^^ Ibid
^J

.

,

p.

209.

^Waddington, The Ethical Animal

,

pp

.

92-93*

It remains true to say that we know of no

other way than random mutation by which new
hereditary variation comes into being, nor
any process other than natural selection by
which the hereditary constitution of a population changes from one generation to the
next.
But if one confines oneself to the remark that the basic processes of evolution
are not finalistic, this, while true, can no
longer be regarded as adequate. The nonfinalistic mechanisms interact with each
other in such a way that they form a mechanism which has some quasi-f inalistic properties, akin to those of a targe t-following
gunsight 360
.

Here, of course, is the problem of purpose in man and tho

biologists' assertion that human purpose is similar to a

"target-following gunsight."

The concept of human purpose

we are seeking sees man not as a "projectile" of the evolu-

tionary process but, rather, as a sell -guiding missile that
is aiming at a destiny entirely out of range of any target
a cybernetic gunsight might select for him.

6.4.2

PURPOSE AS A MECHANISM
OF BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION
Sir Julian Huxley says, near the beginning of his

Evolution in Action

,

that in comparison with the immensity

of the inorganic sector, i.e., the whole ol space,

those

and
bits of matter that are assembled into the galaxies

which
stars show only the simplest of organization and of

he believes:

^°Waddington, The Nature of Life

,

p.

96.

Nowhoro in ail its vast extent is Lhoro any
trace of purpose, or oven of prospective significance
It is impelled from behind by
blind physical forces, a gigantic and chaotic
jazz dance of particles and radiations in
which the only over-all tendency we havo so
far been able to detect is that summarized in
the Second Law of Thermodynamics-- the tendency
to run down. 361
.

Against this meaningless inorganic universe he projects two
other layers of moaning or increasing complex! ty-- the

organic or biological and the human or psycho-social.

Of

these two segments he feels that evolutionary transformation is strictly a result of natural selection; however, he

admits a fundamental difference between them:

Evolution in the biological phase is still
impelled from behind; but the process is now
structured so as to be directed forward. 3&2
In considering development in the human sector, he finds

that due to the ability of humans to combine accumulated

experience with conscious purpose,
the main unit of evolution in the human phase
is not the biological species, but the stream
of culture, and genetic advance has taken a
back seat as compared with changes in the
^63
transmissible techniques of cultural advance.

and of the idea of purpose in relation to this human phase,
he asserts:

Julian Huxley, Evolution in Action (New York:
New American Library, 1957 ) PP 11 - 12
>

^^^
3

6

Ibid

.

,

p

.

13*

Ibid.

,

p.

14.

•

*

The

In a way most important, purposo lias now entered the process of transformation itself;
both the mechanisms of psycho- socia I evolution and its products have a truly purposeful
component, and evolution in this sector is
pulled on consciously from in front as well
as being impelled from behind.
1

The key thing about Huxley's position is that the p>urpos-

iveness he is willing to grant to human evolution is still

basically a trial-and-error affair in which that which
exists today is simply the result of the accretion of a

certain configuration out of the numberless opportunities

which have occurred in the billions of years of which man
is aware.

Evolution is viewed as pseudo-purposive since, as
Simpson so clearly states,

Man is one of the millions of results of this
material process.
He is by far the most adaptable of all
organisms because he has developed culture as
a biological adaptation. ...
A world in which man must rely on himself, in which he is not the darling of the
gods but only another, albeit extraordinary,
aspect of nature, is by no means congenial to
the immature or the wishful thinkers. ...
It is possible that some children are
made happy by a belief in Santa Claus, but
adults should prefer to live in a world of
reality and reason.
It is a characteristic of this world to
which Darwin opened the door that unless most
raof us do enter it and live maturely and
dim,
is
tionally in it, the future of mankind
36
indeed--if there is any future.
.

.

.

.

•

•

364 Ibid

^^Simpson, This View of Life

,

PP

•

2h-<l

r
)
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of a modern and respected biologist, they are an important

corroboration of the basic philosophical issues that have

plagued the modern era.

Later on he says:

Adaptation by natural selection as a creative
process ... [is] the answer of the synthetic
evolution to the problem of plan and purpose
in nature.
This natural process achieves
the aspect of purpose without the intervention
of a purposer, and it has produced a vast plan
without the concurrent action of a planner.
It may be that the initiation of the process
and the physical laws under which it functions
had a Purposer and that this mechanistic way
of achieving a plan is the instrument of a
Planner of this still deeper problem^ the
scientist as scientist, cannot speak.
.

.

.

—

There can be no clearer exposition of the basic problems of
the entire modern era.

Simpson says it all.

God really

i_s

the great mechanical inventor that the thinkers of the

seventeenth and eighteenth century came to understand, man
really
self,

i_s

responsible to himself, for himself and by him-

existentialism is correct and scientists do feel that

they can be scientific without also having some sort of

larger background of belief that animates their lives.

Whitehead says:
Scientists animated by the purpose of proving
that they are purposeless constitute an interesting subject for study. 3^7
^6

Ibid.

,

p.

212.

367 Whitehead, The Function of Reason

,

p.

l6.

As

493

It also sooms odd that it was possible to interpret many of

the modern discoveries in the physical sciences along lines

which fitted into the organismic metaphysical interpretation of Whitehead while there seems to be little room for
such insights in the very science that is supposed to study
the phenomena of life.

In light of the above, it is rea-

sonable to assert that the field of biology is in many im-

portant aspects bereft of an appreciation of either l) the
extent to which its views are a product of the materialist-

mechanist era or 2) the extent to which modern physical
sciences have undermined those old materialist-mechanist

conceptions of reality.
Purpose, far from being simply an apparent process is,
in fact,
I

i

the most significant and central aspect of evolu-

unary processes.

Among those few biologists who have

been willing to admit this and to attempt to incorporate it
in their scientific studies was Edmund Sinnott.

Sinnott's

biology is, in general, supportive of the type of outlook
that was contained in the characterization of organismic
3^9
368
In Two Roads to Truth
psychology developed earlier.
he maintained that both reason and spirit give valid knowl-

edge of the universe and that the products of both areas of
3^ 8

Cf

.

,

Sections 5*3*1 and 5.3.2.

Sinnott, Two Roads to Truth (New Yoik.
Viking Press, 1953) P* 73*

^^Edmund

W.

>

human sensitivity should be incorporated into all fields of

scientific activity.

The serious divisions in the world

today were, he felt, problems of understanding what man

really is, whether
Man's true nature [is that]
he is a
child of God with an immortal soul and actually a part of the great spiritual power that
rules all nature, or whether he is simply a
clever brute, risen out of the primordial
slime; a chemical mechanism that has evolved
into a glorified calculating machine whose
aspirations, seemingly so exalted, are nothing
but motions among molecules, a puppet whose
fate is no longer in his own hands. 370
.

.

.

Sinnott clearly saw that the belief a person holds about

himself is closely related to his concept of nature and his
beliefs about God.
For Sinnott to profess such views was one thing,
give scientific meaning to them was quite another.

to

His

solution was to view mental life and the physical body as
but two aspects of the same protoplasmic process.

Proto-

plasmic goal-seeking was thought to provide a sufficient
basis upon which to assert that there is a teleology im-

plicit in every organism.

The closest he seems to have

come to being able to explain the idea of purpose is to see

organic pattern as an:

Organized system, maintained by the regulatory
control of its activities, [this] implies the
370

Sinno 1 1 Matter, Mind and Man (New York:
pp 18-19
,

1968 )

,

.

Atheneum,
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presence

w l/hin it oi' something lo which
those ac
vi ti oa tend to conform
a norm, a
standard, a goal or end, what the philosopher
would call a telos inherent in the whole
i

l..i

,

.

,

living mass.37T

The main problem with this type of approach, in spite of
the provocative theme of the over-all proposal, is that it
is clearly open to the following sort of well deserved

criticism.

Simpson says of Sinnott's earlier works, which

sounded even more spiritualistic and vitalistic,
The scientific problem was to explain biological regulation, and we have decided that
its cause is the principle of organization
That is not enlightening
I do not deny
and in fact rather envy Sinnott's revelation,
but it is a revelation private to him.
With
respect to
biological considerations,
it is prejudice and not conclusion 372
!

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

We can conclude from this that this approach to the problem

of purpose is really an effort to insert purpose into the

basic explanations of biological phenomena at a point before
the explicit metaphysical basis of the old theories has been

clarified.

The net result is that purpose will always seem

to be an ad hoc concept

(which it is in the old system)

that has been imported into the discussion in an effort to

explain something that did not need explaining in the first
place
371
372

emphasis

Ibid

.

,

p.

35-

Simpson, This View of Life

,

p.

223

>

Simpson

'

Another modern biologist who seems to have been
mori
successful in treating the philosophical aspects of
purpose
and teleology is Sewall Wright.

Wright's main contentions

are not open to the same sort of criticism that the
normal

use of teleological concepts is because he argues that
there is in fact a hierarchy of organisms in which there is
no discontinuity and that therefore:

If the non-living world is completely devoid
of mind, and if, as it seems necessary to
believe, there was a time when no life could
exist, how did mind appear?373

Wright finds that the only solution is to assume that
If the human mind is not to appear by magic;
it must be a development from the mind of the
egg and back of this, apparently, of the DNA
molecules of the egg and sperm nuclei that
constitute its heredity
.

.

.

Therefore, he concludes:
The only satisfactory solution of these dilemmas would seem to be that mind is universal, present not only in all organisms and in
their cells but in molecules, atoms and elementary particles 374
.

The thing that protects Wright from a rather embarrassing

repetition of the same sort of philosophical approach that
we saw in the eighteenth century thinker Robinet, who,
.

.

would rather give intelligence to the

.

373 Sewall Wright

Philosophy of Biological Science xn
Process and Divinity Reese and Freeman, eds (LaSalle
Open Court, 1967 ), p. 113*
,

37 ^ Ibid

.

,

p

.

114

,

.
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Least atom of matter— provided it
were in a
degree and of a quality suitable to
it
.

is

.

Uiut Wright develops a hierarchical
structure for the

biological and physical sciences which
allows him to appreciate the character of the operating
principles of each
level.

Thus, if physical phenomena appear to be
determin-

istic it is because of the lawful regularities
that pertain
at that level.
to be

Similarly, if freedom of the will appears

meaningful at the human level, then it should be

addressed freely without fear of having to deny its own
nature because of the character of matter or of having to
deny the realities of matter because of its own character.
Wright believes:
The task of science is not complete until it
has followed phenomena through all levels of
the hierarchy, up and down as far as possible,
and after obtaining the best statistical description at each, has tied them all together.

Such a view is neither anthromorphic or mechanomorphic nor
is it simply a hopeful philosophical outlook.

Wright goes

on to describe the utility and developed potential of such
a view.

In modern genetics, this has meant working
down from the statistical rules at the level
of the individual to those of chromosomes and
genes and to the chemistry of these, and up
again into the x^hysiology of gene action at
the level of cell, tissue, organ and individual, and finally to the properties of populations.
All statements are ultimately in
terms of probabilities but all are related.

375 Ibid

.

,

p

.

123

•

;

More wo oaa ond our consideration
of the problem of purpose
and biological thought and summarize
the main points of the
argument before considering further
aspects of the basic

definition of purpose.
6.4.3

CONCLUSIONS REGARDING PURPOSE AND BIOLOGICAL THOUGHT
The work of Waddington and Piaget goes a
long way

toward establishing not only the reality of the
internal
factors which constitute an organism but also the
fact that
it is absolutely necessary to take these into
account if

one

s

create a useful scientific description of bio-

logical phenomena.

This realization which is now estab-

lished as an important parameter in modern evolutionary
theory is clearly a corroboration of those faint philosoph-

ically and mystically inspired urgings that came from an

ever-growing line of scientists, philosophers and psychologists.

For our purposes it can be seen as a partial ful-

fillment of the quest for increased realization of the
wi thin of things that we first saw in the Romantic Movement,

that was evident in Fechner

1

s

complete psychophysics, that

was the basis of Dilthey's descriptive psychology and that

has ultimately culminated in the existentialist philosophy

which focuses on the exclusive validity of internal experience.

This is not an attempt to establish a clear-cut

causal link between these various diverse events.

Rather,

it is a reassertion of the fact that the entirety of the

dovo oprnont of modorn science has boon
I

wIikIi,

lr.vol.vod

an oru

In

though it has come to believe in the absoluteness

and completeness of its scientific
descriptions,

Is

still

an era in which the total nocossary
meaning for man's oxis-

tonco is not contained within the basic structure
of its

scientific world-view.

That we have observed a sporadic

outpouring of tho human spirit, here and there along the
way,

is an

indication of the fact that as a real element in

the structure oi
i

ts

reality, it had to be some place and in

own pragmatic way seems to have taken up whatever tem-

porary quarters the doubting materialistic world was uncautious enough to leave "unexplained."
An important aspect of the present biological inter-

pretation is that it admits only to

a form of

causality

that can bo mimicked by machines, i.e., cybernetic "cyclic

causality."

We have said that this is insufficient and will

consider why this is so in tho next section; here, it is im-

portant to underline the fact that this form of causality
can be regarded as

a

reflection of the fact that modern

physical science has disproven the validity of total physical determinism.

Whether biological science came

to

this

understanding on its own or whether it did

it

of physical discoveries is not important.

Tho important

with the aid

thing is that biological science also recognizes the inade-

quacy of deterministic, materialistic metaphysics.

The

reus on that the particular metaphysical problem*
that have
b 0on 80 prominent in oarlior discussion*
of physical sci-

Gnce have not been of prime concern in our
treatment of

biological thought is found in the fact that biology,

psycho ogy
l

,

Like

grow up, assimilating the major assumptions of

tlio

materialist ora.

(-lif’

background

of

Slneo those assumptions have formed

its thought, biology has largely on

I

y

observed reflections of those basic issues in the foreground of its analysis.
It remains to be said that the most

likely solution to

the ovor-all problems with interpreting purpose from within
a

scientific biological context is to be found in the type

of hierarchical view characteristic of Wright's interpreta-

tion of biological philosophy.

Once again, we have found

the hierarchical process model to bo an Important way in

which explicit problems in an area of scientific investigation can be solved.
Here, as with the conclusions of physical science,

biological principles should not bo taken as the complete

description of reality.

However, we can take the modern

biological interpretation of the limited cybernetic type of

teleology as a clear indication of the need for scientific

methods which are sensitive

to the

internal and external

relations of phenomena and also of the need for a clearer

appreciation of the character of purpose as it applies to

501

I'Jii'

1

1

b o rarchb c ti.l

view.

Now that the discussions of
physical and biological
sciences are behind us, it is clear
that there

is suffi-

cient corroboration of the hierarchical
view to successfully counter the old claims of
reductionist science. We
have yet, however, to see the problem
of why the trend of
evolution has been upwards in its own right
as the central

problem with which

a

complete science, philosophy and psy-

chology of man must deal.
6.5

TYPES OF PURPOSIVE EXPLANATION
This section considers types of purposive explanation

as

they relate to the organizing perspective of the
hierar-

chical process model of explanation.
As

lias

been indicated in a number of ways in earlier

discussions, the role of internal factors which are appro-

priate to each level of a hierarchy varies greatly in importance.

The internal factors of inert substances are

negligibly small while the personality and self-hood of
humans demand the most sophisticated conceptualization of
internal processes.

Whitehead has, in fact, created an

elaborate description of the entire operating range of the
various levels

of

activity.

Of central importance here, is

the fact that it is not until the higher forms of organic

life are reached that we find any appreciable amount of

consciousness.

Since this is the case, and because our

502

over-ul

concern i» with psychology and education,
„e can
concentrate upon those levels which are
closer
J.

to the top

of the hierarchy.
In earlier discussions,

there has often been a need to

clarify the characteristics of purposive
behavior as it
applies to various levels of operating
entities. Whether
we have been talking about machines, evolving
animals,

emergent cognitive processes, or the spiritual
aspects of

human life the concept of purpose has had an important
but
rather undif f erientiated involvement.

Barbour has provided

a cogent summary of four separate meanings of the concept

of purpose that are directly applicable to the present discussion. 376 „Spocil ically he breaks the concept down into
,

thb categories of a) functional behavior, b) self-regulating

behavior, c) goal-directed behavior and finally, d) pur-

posive behavior.

By taking each type in turn we can build

an appreciation of the increasing importance of internal

factors at ever higher levels of teleological functioning.
The first category of meaning which attaches to the

concept of purpose is that of functional behavior.

Entities

such as organs of the body act to perform a vital role in
the operation of the whole organism and are sometimes de-

scribed as fulfilling a specific purpose, o.g., filtering
blood, eliminating wastes, etc..
376

Barbour

op

.

ci

.

,

PP.

However, in such cases,

337-341.

50 'j

wh.vro

Uion> is not a separaio purposive o»iU!,y
bu

tlial.

i

J i

k

a

I,

I

only one

ask which contributes toward the mainte-

nance of the whole organism,

the word function is a more

appropriate description of the activity.
There are many possible uses of this style of teleological behavior.

Recall that this was the dominant mode

sxplanat on that was used by the first truly American
i

school of psychology.

As its name indicates, Functional

Psychology was primarily concerned with the functions which
were operating and the contribution they made to the total

organism.

It is in this school that the concept of "drive,"

especially in the early work of
great deal of emphasis.

R.

S.

Woodworth, received a

It is here also that the great

emphasis on physiological explanation of drive and need
states became such important concepts in much American psychology.

A primary reason for this was to avoid the criti-

cism which came to those who attempted teleological expla-

nations

.

Functional explanations are important in many contexts

because they permit a wide variety of complex and variable
things to be conveniently summarized.

We recognize that

the functions of the heart, liver, and lungs, etc., are the

same even though most of their explicit physical character-

istics vary markedly from species to species.

It is also

possible to refer to functional aspects of animal behavior

50
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endless variety

spec
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1,

el,

/i

av-

comprise nesting, grooming or oven escape

behavior can be summarized and described in terms
of the
functions they perform with the result that regularities
can be

1

ound and testable hypotheses can be formulated.

Functional behavior is then, an important category of

teleological explanation.

But,

since there is no explicit

reference to a specific goal, it is better thought of as a
low level explanation which simply recognizes functional

characteristics
A more powerful explanatory concept is found in the
idea of self-regulating behavior.

This is the style of

explanation that has become popular in many areas of science because of its direct relation with the science of

cybernetics

In terms of our interests, the fact that Jean

Piaget makes such extensive use of the concept indicates
its utility.

In this case behavior can be called teleo-

logical because, by analogy to target- seeking gunsights and
the like, it is possible to define some sort of end state

which is not yet attained but which is the apparent goal of
the behavior, and also to recognize the ability of a cer-

tain adaptiveness in reaching the goal which can compensate

for changing conditions.
The key concept in such self-regulating cybernetic ma-

chines is the idea of a feedback mechanism.

It is from

'jU'j
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"cycle"
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sail t y since

information relating

the output of the system back to
the input of the system

so that its performance can be adjusted
toward the desired

end state.
The attractiveness of this view is obvious since
it is
a much more inclusive concept than simple
functional be-

havior.

Yet, it is still a machine-like concept with
I

little intrinsic appeal as an important way to characterize

human behavior.
The next category of goal-directed behavior comes

closer to the kind of explanation that is needed for living
things.

There is however, a close relation between the

ideas of self-regulating machine behavior and those of
goal -direc ted behavior.

An animal, like a cybernetic ma-

chine, may be seen to act to achieve a goal and also to

exhibit the ability to cope with changing external conditions which would otherwise prevent its success.

However,

there is a main difference which forever prevents a total

explanation of animal goal-seeking in terms of self-

regulating cybernetic feedback.

Animals do, in fact, find

novel ways of achieving standard goals, e.g.,

the lions on

game preserves in Africa that ride atop automobiles so that
they can more easily pounce on unsuspecting prey.

In addi-

tion, animals also anticipate future occurrences, even to

U '° point or

suukijit;

objects, 1.0.

nono within sight or smoli.

,

loud, when there

j

s

Thus, while there are many

important characteristics which are shared between the two
styles

of

explanation, animal behavior is not exhaustive]

explained via the self-regulation of cybernetic machines.
In the final category ol

teleological behavior we have

that which is called purposive behavior.

The term purposive

is reserved for cases where it is evident that higher-order

operatives like beliefs, desires and intentions are functioning.

It is this category which is obviously most ap-

plicable to man since the other modes of explanation do not
produce a description of teleological behavior that compares
with what we know to be true in our own life experience.
It
I

i

is

os

only in man that the full consciousness which undorthis type' of behavior is to bo found.
Tlius,

while there are many similarities in the various

styles of teleological explanation, the all-important dif-

ferences which pertain to each mode are differences which
are most easily understood in terms of the hierarchical

status of the behavior in question.
The proper conclusion of this discussion is

to

return

to the earlier insight that causal and teleological expla-

nations are not mutually exclusive modes of analyzing

particular pattern of events.

a

The main difference between

the two modes is simply the perspective from which the
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HO ° l,ohavior a » caused by the
presence of certain

stimuli yet on the internal perspective
the same event has
the flavor of being the function of
desired goals rather
than of mechanical causes. A statement
of Whitehead that
was used
an earlier discussion makes this
point very
clearly.
Of the actual entities which are the only
really
real things in the universe and which have
an organismic

m

nature ho maintains that each "occasion arises as
an effect
facing its past and ends as a cause facing its future.

In

between there lies the teleology of the universe."
We can also look at the two poles of explanation which

are provided by the old dichotomy of efficient cause and
final cause with the realization that on the organismic

interpretation of reality, they are most meaningful when
viewed as aspects of the self-causation or self-creation of
the entity in question. 377

6.6

THE CHARACTER OF HIERARCHICAL EXPLANATION AND
THE FLOWERING OF HUMANITY
Since it is a pronounced characteristic of this docu-

ment that its discussions seem to involve trenching upon

issues which range freely over the surface of man's sentient

relationship with the world in which he finds himself, it

may have occurred to some readers that there seems
377 Cf

.

Section 3*3*2

to

be no

Lopic which Aw immu no from the
assertions of the

o r/;ati

i

mlorpretation or the meddling of the
present author.
concerns are not unfounded.

smle

Such

When Whitehead said that

modern philosophy had been ruined by
its assimilation of
the basic assumptions of the
materialist era, ho meant

it.

And when he offered the organ! smic
alternative, he meant
that too.

To take his viev seriously is to attempt
to see

the world from an entirely new perspective.
is the result of one such attempt.

This document

But it must also bo

added that such recreated metaphysics do not assimilate
aLl
of

man's characteristics into their explanatory scheme.

As

Whitehead said in the conclusion of his last book:
Philosophy begins in wonder. And, at the end,
when philosophic thought has done its best,
the wonder remains. 378
What wo want to assert here is that there is a definite

place at the top of the organismic hierarchy for just those
aspects of human existence which constitute that part of man
that is ever merging into the future of unrealized potential

.

No metaphysics can touch it since it is the explicit

province of the Divine Providence that has been in evidence
throughout the traditions of Revealed Religion.

Whitehead says of the God that makes the organismic
world work,
378

Whitehead, Modes of Thought

,

p.

168.

No reason can be given for just that limitation which it stands in His nature to impose.
God is not concrete, but lie is the ground for
concrete actuality.
No reason can be given
for the nature of God, because that nature is
the ground of rationality 379
.

While explicit consideration of such topics is obviously
out of the range of this discussion,

there is a legitimate

sense in which we can, and indeed must, address those
issues.

Why this is so can be brought out in the following

way
The development of modern science began as an "uncon-

scious derivative " from the theology which belonged

Middle Ages.

to

the

An important effect of the Judaeo-Chris t ian

tradition of God as Creator of heaven and earth was

to

foster an essentially static view of the world in which all
things were created in their given forms.

This orientation

helped the early physical scientists to proclaim the world
to be a

mechanical system which was completely determined
This amounts to a closed system of cause

by physical laws.

and effect in which the original order in the world which

had been established by God could not now be violated by
God.

The predominant effect of this orientation has been

to obscure the possibility of understanding the relation-

ship between personal experience and the impersonal material
world.

Man has been cast in the role of an actor in a

Whitehead

,

Science and the Modern World

,

p.

17^.

divine drama which is played upon the stage of tho material
universe.

In this case,

it is the human who acts and

changes from scene to scone in progression toward the natural

conclusion

of

the drama, while changes in the material

stage are illusory, superficial and in no way parallel

to

the redemption which is obtained by the skilled actor who
is successful in his role of actualizing a portion of God's

Grace
In sharp contrast to the old static view, the organis-

mic alternative offers a dynamic interpretation of nature
in which there is both structure and flexibility.

In addi-

tion to views which stressed the regularity of nature, tho

concept of a hierarchically arranged structure requires the
concept of novelty as an explanation of the fact that new
levels derive from the potentialities of lower levels and
also add new form to the developed potentialities of tho

evolving cosmos.
An important aspect of this view is that it is open to
a different role for God's immanence in the world.

A

rather profane way of describing this relationship is to be
found in the importance which attaches to the "within" of
things as they are conceived to function in the organismic

hierarchy.

In this view, creation is a continuing and

evolving process in which all levels, each
gree, are directly related to the immanence

to
oi

its own de-

God in
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should wish to avoid all reference

anything except the narrowest interpretation of what it

moans to attempt to be scientific, there

is an

important

sense in which it is not possible to do so since the history
of thought amply demonstrates that the background of man's

belief

,

as expressed in his deeply held religious convic-

tions, forms the framework of his view of the world.

The organismic position, with its operative under-

standing of the process of existence opens the way to the

recognition that self-cause is a more complete descrijition
of reality than the superficial dichotomy of physical causal

i

and spiritual teleology.

ly

This realization when com-

bined with the hierarchical model which has emerged in

modern literature, contributes to a more complete understanding of the spiritual generality of man's being in the
380
r n
following
way.
•

In a hierarchy, it is clear that lower order principles
are harnessed by the more comprehensive operating principles
of the next higher stage.

The result of this interaction is

the production of a new comprehensive entity which operates

according to principles which cannot be reduced to
ooo

a

The place of spiritual factors iri the composition of
organismic psychology is treated more fully in Chapter 5>
Sections 5*3 through 5*3*2.

description in terms of those which apply to the lower
level.

When we focus upon the idea of an actual entity in

the Whiteheadian sense, and realize that a comprehensive

entity occupies a specific level of the hierarchy by virtue
of

the fact

that it is mostly a Joint product of these two

main factors, we now have the basis for the creation of a

new model for psychological processes.
The psychological processes which accrue to actual en-

tities in such a hierarchy are most generally described in
the statement about the entity being an effect facing its

past and a cause facing its future.

This implies that the

idea of process is inherent in reality; but it goes beyond
that point because we are also required to admit that the

teleology of the universe is operative in the turn around

from effect to cause which is the process of the entity.
When we place man at the top of the hierarchy of

evolved beings, an interesting thing happens.

We are well

aware of the source of man's derivation from the physical

world and see many magnificent, though often horrible, examples of man's mastery over all those levels which are

subordinate to his station.

However, since we know that all

levels of the hierarchical structure are the joint product
of both lower and higher-order principles of organization,
we are also obliged to acknowledge that if man is to bo

considered as a part of the natural order of things,

lie

too
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highor-ordor nature

tlian

those which have produced being-

ness at any subordinate level.

Two important consequences

follow directly from this realization.

First, all attempts

to obtain an exhaustive
description of man and his psycho-

logical and educational needs in terms
of the content which
is to be found at lower levels must
necessarily fail.
Second, it must also be true that some
aspects of human nature are capable of being influenced by the
operation of

those higher principles.

Note that there is no injunction hero that would in
any way letter the true search for knowledge and under-

standing.

It is not a statement of what science should

find as the result of its labors but an indication of the
structui

e

of things wi thin which scientific investigation

is carried out.

There is also a very real limit to the

specificity of this knowledge since, by definition, those

higher-order principles which are transcendent in relation
to our present level are in fact transcendent and therefore

are unknowable through the outer capacities of the senses

and the clarity of the rational intellect which deals most

effectively with lower-order phenomena.

This is whal

Whitehead had in mind when he said, "no reason could bo
given for the nature of God, because that nature is the

ground of rationality.

Slated plainly, the nature of man provides open boundary conditions lor the operation of higher-order principles
that,

are responsible for the formation of a new comprehen-

sive entity at a new level of the hierarchy.

Yes,

the

teleology of the universe does operate in the being of man
as he carries the change-over from effect to cause in the

process of his life.
But this asserts that the most important, indeed,

the

evolving aspect of mankind is something about which he can
not have explicit knowledge.
is wiiere

How is this possible?

This

the critique of materialism which is found in

Whitehead comes in.

The essence of that position is that

what we know about the world is not to be defined solely in

terms of the way we are connected to it by the outer powers
of our sensory apparatus.

This is the INVERSION of knowl-

edge that has often come up.

There is something more,

something of a greater generality, an inner nature of man
that has additional capacities which permit the open bound-

aries to be maintained toward the higher principles of the

evolving cosmos.
Why else would Helen Keller have the ability lo demon-

strate in her actions and to believe in her heart that each

individual has a subconscious memory of the green earth and

murmuring waters, that blindness and deafness cannot rob
from him?

Where else could the basis of this gift from

pawl,

generations bo maintained but in Lho larger generality

which, is more complete,

transcendent, in relation to spo-

cilic sensory information and a clear logical intellect?
Since the crux of this orientation hinges upon the

ability of man to respond to and be influenced by something
which is spiritual, that is, nonmaterial and not explicitly

knowable in the rational sense, it will be helpful to observe the operation of a similar mechanism at lower levels
of the hierarchy that we can explicitly understand.

This example comes from the biologist Alister Hardy
who used it in a sense very similar to that which Waddington and Piaget develop as a description of the necessity to

consider internal as well as external factors in the process
of evolution.

38l

Though the evolutionary mechanics to which

Hardy has reference are similar, his example goes beyond
theirs because it demonstrates that the role of transcendent

and unknown forces can have a vital effect upon lower-order
levels of living things.

External factors play an obviously important role in
shaping the destiny of the organism.

However, Hardy at-

tributes those adaptations which have been responsible for
the main diverging lines leading to new groups of animals,

e.g.,

the development of running, digging, swimming and
oQ

1

Alister Hardy, Another View of Evolution in Biology
and Personality I. I. Ramsey ed. (Oxford: Basil Black,

well, 1965 ), pp. 77-78.

,
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to the creative behavioral
selection of the animal

himself.

This selection process is seen to be
the source
from within that can give rise to
novelty.
It is also true
that such creative selection on the
part of animals, in-

cluding man is a continuing process and
that novelty of
form and function in animal life is not
a

thing of the past

but a continuing process that forever
gives rise to novelty.

Our concern is to describe a possible mechanism
for
this advance into novelty that can fit into the
hierarchical

structure while also avoiding the limiting mechanical in-

terpretations which are based on random mechanism and the
lack ol insight inherent in a simple vitalism which does
not explicitly relate to what we know of the world.

Wo can

observe the operation of a mechanism of this type by

dropping down a couple of kingdoms in the hierarchy of
living things to observe the paramount differences between
the plant and animal kingdoms
The organic life of plants is of a lower order than

that of animals and the structure of the plant is largely

determined by the external selective forces of the environment

.

Animal life, on the other hand, while being subject

to the same external forms of selection as plants,

demonstrates

a

also

much greater ability for internal selection

of alternative behaviors.

It is in this sense that we

began this chapter on the note that "the function of reason

317

is

to

promote the art of life."

The companion assertion

that life's aim is beyond simple survival to levels of
in-

creased satisfaction, is also demonstrated in the ever in-

creasing ability

of

higher levels of the evolutionary

hierarchy to modify their environment.
It

we examine the various adaptations to the external

environment which have been made by plants, one class of

adaptations stands out as an important and striking example
of the hierarchical mechanism we are seeking.
the fantastic variety of color,

In developing

structure and odor of their

flowers, plants have responded in a most beautiful way to
the external selective pressures which mainly derive from
the behavior patterns of pollinating insects.

Pollinating insects are, however, a kingdom above
plants; the possessors of qualities and capacities forever

unknowable to the plants whose structure they serve to determine.

In this example then, we have the type of situa-

tion which is asserted to be true of man at the top of the

hierarchy.

Obviously, this is not to insist that there is

any concrete similarity between the two cases.

We can how-

ever, assert that finding such examples at lower levels of
the hierarchy where we can explicitly understand the rela-

tionships in question, also makes it possible to postulate
the operation of similar functional mechanisms at the

highest level of the hierarchy where we, like the plants,

r

>L8

arc not explicitly aware of the forces that mold the flow-

ering of our own beings.
6.7

SUMMARY
1

rom what wo have seen of the old system of ideas, it

is clear that it does not contain a coherent explanation of

the dillerent ontological status of living and nonliving

entities.

The dead matter of that system has consistently

frustrated attempts at unifying observed phenomena into

a

single system of explanation and has forced philosophers,

from Descartes on, to formulate a strict mind-body dualism
in an effort to provide some place for the characteristi-

cally human sentience they knew in personal experience.
The problem of vitalism which is apparent in modern biology
also has deep roots in traditional dualistic philosophy.

Within this view, the traditional style of scientific ex-

planation has been in terms of physical causality which is
based largely upon the supposed mechanism of the physical
world.

Efforts

to go

beyond pure physical causality have

been generally categorized as teleological and relegated

to

the ephemeral half of the dualistic position.

Fortunately, we now have ample grounds on which to
assert that the strict division between living and nonliving,

mind and body, freedom and determinism, cause and purpose,
etc., are useful but misleading dichotomies which do not

stand up in the face of developments in modern science.

519

Against the standard form of scientific explanation

which is predominantly roduc tionistic

,

and seeks the epit-

ome of scientific explanation in terms of the mechanism of

physico-chemical processes, popular developments in many
areas have been asserting that

(die

simple one — levelled meta-

physics of materialism is too restrictive
"purposiveness" of many phenomena.

to

explain the

Aided primarily by

analogy to cybernetic machines, the concept of simple
physical causality (efficient cause) has been augmented to
include the cybernetic type of cyclic causality.

However,

since the apparent "purposive" behavior of machines is the

obvious result of a collection of inanimate parts, this
sort of higher-order behavior is generally understood to be
a direct result of the complexity of organization of the

parts.

One may find useful analogies in the behavior of

such machines, but to equate human behavior with machines

by requiring that the cause of behavior must be as exactly

specifyable as the input of a machine, as in behaviorism,
is to ignore the essence of what it means to be human.

A first approximation of an approach that can begin

to

uncover the more complete meaning of the problem of purpose
is also one that grows out of modern insights into the

topic of a multi-level analysis.

What we have seen of (his

style of explanation in this chapter clearly indicates that
there are important scientific reasons for maintaining that

520

li i

gho r- 1 ovol concepts and theories are not complete!

Ly

ducible to the terms of explanation of lower levels.

rei'li

is

view, in which, neither the higher or the lower are loss

real, creates an obvious need to explain the transition

between ievels.

The character of this transition

is

clearest when we are dealing with biological phenomena because at this level of complexity it is most obvious that

mechanical and teleological explanations need to be balanced
with each other.

When viewed from without, the mechanical

tendency is to analyze events in terms of "causes" and when

viewed from within,

the teleological tendency is to analyze

events in terms of the goals or purposes of the individual
enti ty
Ln

this type of discussion the single most important

aspect of a multi-level explanation is the additional insight which opens the way toward appreciating the fact that
the two styles of explanation (mechanical/causal vs.

teleo-

logical/purposive), are in fact simply different ways of

regarding the same complex entity with its pattern of events
through time.
It is interesting to compare these insights which now

have firm footing in the theories of modern science with
the view of an individual that is of great importance to
the history of psychology.

The words

ol

the pioneer o

perimental psychology, Gustav Fechner, echo across the

f

ex-

r
)

decades
said

,

wLtli a

resonance almost loo

I,

me

lo

i

i

he

mailin';

in a previously quoted passage:

The natural scioncos consistent y employ the
external, standpoint,
the human! tios aro
internal. Tho common opinions oi' everyday
life are based on changes of the standpoints,
and natural philosophy on the identity of
what appears double from two standpoints.
A
theory of the relationship of mind to body
will have to trace the relationship of the
two modes of appearance of a single thing
that is a unity.
I

.

11,

is

.

.

at this point that tho insights due to White-

head's metaphysics become most important.
obvious that Whitehead did not intend

to

By now,

it

is

simply create an

explanatory schema that had some hierarchical properties.
On the contrary, the basis of the Whiteheadian assertion

is

that the actual entities whoso principles of operation and

interrelation he describes are in fact metaphysical entities.

He is insisting that those levels also have a being-

ness--that they are, in fact, the real objects of which the
world is composed and of which wo can bo directly aware.

Fechner believed this to bo true but he could not amass the
sort of evidence that is available today which supports

such a view.
The reality assertion which Whitehead makes

i

s

sup-

ported by those developments of modern science which stress
the importance of the system of events that aro rightful

and irreducible properties of the whole which occupies

level in the hierarchy.

a

From the exclusion principle in

5~’2

physios

tho opigonotio systems of modorn biology,

l.o

beyond, support can bo found for this stylo of

i

one!

n torpro Lo-

tion

.

eu

realism” which was reached after examining the rela-

I

should also bo no tod that the position of "cri li-

It

tionship between science, philosophy and psychology also

supports this conclusion. 382

Further, the Initial consid-

*'

erations as regards the organ smic interpretation of psyi

elm Logical process

also find a more complete moaning

within the reality of a metaphysical hierarchy.
With the model provided by

tlio

flowering of plants

in

mind, wo can scale the evolutionary hierarchy to the highest
level

of personhood in the world- -mankind

,

with the realiza-

tion that the boundaries which we recognize at the borders
of our awareness are, in fact, the conditions of our lives
in

which we entertain the potontiality for obedience to

higher demands.

Man's collective and individual becoming

resonates to the highest order of his attained status via
the transcendent generality of his spiritual nature which

functions to include tho emotions, purposes and enjoyment
of life as the boundary conditions of the experienced world

which is the material basis of his existence.
is in this model of man and his potential i ties that

It

we find tho grounds to invert knowledge by removing the
*

2

)85
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.

Chapter

5,

Cf., Chapter 5,

Section 5.1.5.
Section 5*3*
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factual and the material from the center of our view of the

cosmos and to replace it with the sensitive reaction of the

experiencing subject himself as the ultimate determinant of
the texture of reality.

A reality which is constructed in

this fashion reflects a recognition that man's desire to

find meaning and purpose in experience comes from deep

within his being and is an expression of that same upward
press which in past ages was responsible for mere survival
of the species and is, today, urging him onward to new at-

tainments far removed from mere physical survival.
Thus, the human striving which we know in our own ex-

perience can be directly related to the metaphysics and

epistemology of the hierarchical process interpretation of
reality.

It is from the internal consistency which is af-

forded by this interpretation that we can derive the grounds
on which to assert that it offers a coherent solution to

the age-old problems of jDsychological theory--the issue of

dualism and the problem of purpose.
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7.0

TOWARD AN 0UGANISM1C J3ASIS
FOR PERSONALITY AND EDUCATION

This final chapter has the goal of
collecting the insights afforded by the philosophy of
organism into the beginning of a model for human psychological
processes. This
task can be viewed as a natural outgrowth
of the organismic
position because, in itself, that system is
an effort to
frame a philosophical scheme which is a
"coherent, logical,

necessary system of ideas in terms of which every
element
of experience can be interpreted."

The past discussions of

the philosophy of organism in Chapter Three and
the material

of Chapters Five and Six, have largely been descriptive
of
the contrasts between mechanism and organism and explicative

of the character of reality which derives from the organis-

mic interpretation.

There remains the task of being pre-

scriptive of a framework of ideas that relates to that portion of experience which the organismic interpretation

defines as the creative activity of the individual who
stands as a cause facing his own future.
The psychology of personality is the most natural area
of psychology in which to begin the organismic reinterpre-

tation because the philosophy of organism is, after all,

based on the paradigm of human experience.

The topic of

education is important not only because it is the vehicle
for conveying the enlivened knowledge which derives from
the hierarchical realism of organismic metaphysics but also,

326

because it is an important factor in
molding the internal
experience of human beings.
Since earlier discussions have
clearly shown that those who think
deeply about the character of human psychological processes,
also tend to see
the potential of man from within the
explanatory framework
of their psychology, it is important
that the insights of
the philosophy of organism should be
elaborated within the

framework of a model of psychological processes
that can
replace those old models while also opening the
way to an

increased appreciation of the reality of man.
Chapter Five introduced the philosophical position of
critical realism which evolves into an organismic psychology

appreciative of the two-way transcendence in which the being
of man is embedded.

These divisions were roughly described

as the material and spiritual aspects of man and were fur-

ther seen to be institutionalized in man's scientific and

religious expressions.

Central to the whole discussion was

the basic metaphysical intuition of the philosophy of

organism:

namely, its confession of faith in the fact that

the ultimate claim of existence and the true processes in
the world of man, are those found in man himself.

Chapter

Six continued the development of an outlook which can pro-

vide a valid place for the role of internal factors in the

constitution of actual entities by developing an interpretative framework of hierarchical processes.

It is a basic

527

cliaiac Loris lie or this view

lhaL

the complexity o i struc-

ture increases, so does the ability to
experience increased
satxsf ac txon it was seen that the experient
individual
;

actualizes its own self- transcendence by
experiencing increased subjective value. This hierarchical

view, as sup-

ported by evidence from the physical and biological
sciences, ended in the realization that human
experience, as
the upper level of the hierarchy, was not only
most removed

from the compulsion of lower-order physical laws, but
also
was open to the influx of unknowable higher-order principles

which could mold the flowering of its own being.

Thus, we

have a description of the possibility of purposive behavior
in humans which requires recognition of spiritual factors
as higher-order operatives and also subsumes the more lim-

ited notions of efficient cause and final cause under the

category of self-causation.
With this material as a background, we can turn to the

examination of issues in personality and education.

In so

doing however, it is important to keep in mind that the

orientation taken toward these topics will be that which
derives from the perspective of an actual entity, in this
case man, in the system of a hierarchy of beings which is

both purposeful and full of meaning.

It is important to

stress this point and to take this position because to do
less than this would be to trade off much of the uniqueness
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of the organismic explanation before
any application of its
basic ideas is attempted. The material
that follows uses

more of Whitehead's special vocabulary
and is a more technical approach to the Whiteheadian system
that which has

characterized the previous discussion.

This is not an

arbitrary choice expressive of the writer's penchant
for
technical detail. Rather, the issues are so closely
in-

volved with the specialized vocabulary that Whitehead
created that they cannot be totally divorced from it at
this point.

This discussion also attempts to bridge a gap which
exists in current interpretations of Whitehead.

There are

many erudite technical philosophical accounts of Whitehead's philosophy.

These efforts, while illuminating to

the professional, are essentially written by philosophers

for philosophers with little concern for practical application.

On the other hand, the usual interpretation which

popularizes Whitehead's thought is generally written with
considerable disengagement from the technical details of
the system.

The result is usually a highly suggestive

prose that is apt to foster creative ideas for practical

applications

.

However, these ideas are easily pushed aside

by the latest version of a long-standing approach to a par-

ticular activity.

As an example, £he suggestions for an

"organismic psychology" presented in Chapter Five have just
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this status.

One more thought is important before
beginning the

actual topic.

In each and every instance where the
details

of orgamsmic cosmology have come up, an
extreme effort has

been required to avoid getting trapped into
uncovering one
level of detail after another at the expense
of making some
sort of coherent progress across the many
opportunities for

deep involvement.

Nowhere however, is that problem more

acute than in the present chapter.
this condition.

There are two main re-

First, the discussion will not by

any means go into the depths that are involved.

Second,

the

fi na l level of discussion will necessarily be a general

statement of orientation as regards psychological and educational theory.
In describing the basis for the organismic approach,

Whitehead was quoted as saying, "the true method of philosophical construction is to frame a scheme of ideas, the
best one can."

Since this scheme of ideas has been somewhat

elaborated, we are now on the threshold of the next step,

which is to "unflinchingly explore the interpretation of
experience in terms of that scheme."
7.1

THE ORGANISMIC BACKGROUND
The concept of personality in the organismic framework

is an important aspect of the being of man that is related
to both his higher and lower-order characteristics.

One way
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to phrase this condition is found
in the earlier contrast

between the spiritual and the material.

Whitehead, at one

po±nt, referred to this as the immortal
and mortal aspects
of man by way of indicating that "the
two words refer to
two aspects of the Universe which are
presupposed in every

experience which we enjoy.

It is important to note that

there are three major factors here; while the
higher and
the lower-order factors seem clear enough, it is
necessary
to stress

that our concern is the experiencing being that

exists as a real element on a level of the hierarchy.

Not

only is he our primary concern, he is also, as we shall see,
the vehicle by which the two other factors are brought

together.

Recall that the ontological principle states "in

separation

1

rom actual entities there is nothing merely

non-enti ty-- the rest is silence."
Prom the position of the experient individual, either
aspect of the Universe can only be evaluated by reference
to the other.

Thus, while the World of Value is conceived

to be timeless and immortal,

with an essence that is not

"rooted in passing circumstance" and "the World of Activity,
the Creative World,

the World of Origination,

creates the

38^4

Whitehead, Immortality in The Philosophy of Alfred
North Whitehead Paul A. Schlipp, ed ( Evanston
Northwestern University Press, 19 ^l), p. 683.
,

385

.

:

Whitehead's article on Immortality provides the
framework for this discussion and his terminology for the
major categories involved is largely preserved.
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Present by transforming the Past
and by anticipating the
386
Future ,"
The description of either of
the two Worlds
involves stages which include,
characteristics
borrowed from the other World. The
reason is
that these two Worlds are abstractions
from
the Universe; and every abstraction
involves
reference to the totality of existence.
There is no self-contained abstraction 387
.

This is also another way to characterize
the familiar
theme of within and without that has come
up in many different contexts.
If it seems unfamiliar here, it is because
it is couched in its most general form as
the two aspects

of the Universe.

Starting the definition of personality at

this level of generality would seem strange indeed were
it

not for

the.

fact the essential criticism we have made of

the past foundations of psychological theory is that it is

based on premises which are abstractions of very limited

generality
Wbile it is true

that.

Value and Activity are only com-

pletely understood as to their interaction in the world, we
can discuss them separately.

In particular,

the World of

Value must be understood as a "general name for an infinity
OQO
ol'

Values."

This multiplicity of Values provides a

method of describing the fact that there is order, structure,
386
387

388

Ibid

.

,

p

684

Ibid.

,

p.

683

Ibid.

.
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and system in the Universe.

Given that there are different

grades of Value, and that all Values have

a

capacity for

realization in the World of Action, then:
The World of Values must be conceived as active with the adjustment of the potentialities
for realization. This activity of internal
adjustment is expressed by our moral and
aesthetic judgement s 389
.

We now have a statement of the process of the Universe con-

ceived as the internal appreciation by actual entities of

graded values.

The result is that an "immortal factor of

Value enters into the active creation of temporal fact." 390
In other words, the World of Activity, in conjunction with
the World of Value can also be seen as the world of open

boundary conditions and the world of higher-order principles
such that their essential junction creates a new compreThe resultant comprehensive entity, as

hensive entity.

with all comprehensive entities, can only be described in
terms of the value which is actualized (its level of value

cannot be explained in terms of lower-order values) while
the open boundary conditions which are provided by the

operation of values on lower levels can be seen as potentialities for the realization of the higher value.
7.1.1

PERSONAL IDENTITY
Actual entities, as the results of this process, can
389 Ibid

390

Ibid.

,

p

.

687
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bo said to bo involved in a process of
evaluation.

The

idea of evaluation refers to the fact that an entity
in the

World of Activity, by being more open to some values than
to others,

is making an internal judgement for the embodi-

ment of the Value.

Since the internal judgement of the

actual entity (the within of things) plays such an important
ro ^ e

•*-

n the realization of Value in Fact, Whitehead asks,

"Can we find any general character of the World of Fact

which expresses its adjustment for the embodiment of Value?"
He responds:

The answer to this question is the tendency
of the transitory occasions of fact to unite
themselves into sequences of Personal Iden tity
Each such personal sequence involves
the capacity of its members to sustain identity of Value. 391
.

Here, we have personal identity as a description of the way

order, structure and system are introduced into the world

by the influence of value and it is easy to see how personal

identity can function as a description of the internal consistency of the actual entities on any level of the hierarchy.

The entity whose process forms "a whole sequence of

actual occasions, each with its own present immediacy, is

such that each occasion embodies in its own being the antecedent members of that sequence with an emphatic experience
of self-identity of the past in the immediacy of the
391

Ibid.

,

p.

688, emphasis added.
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present.

This is the realization of personal identity

A little further on Whitehead asserts:
This problem of "personal identity" in a
changing world of occasions is the key example for understanding the essential fusion
of the World of Activity with the World of
Value. 393

Personal identity then, is the concept that makes it possible to understand how immortal values can be involved in
an entity whose essential character is that of process and

mortality.

Personal identity is exhibited when the
change in the details of fact exhibits an
identity of primary character amid secondary
changes of value. This identity serves the
double role of shaping a fact and realizing
a specific value. 394
If personal identity is the means by which a character-

istic unity is introduced into what would otherwise be an

endless confusion of nothingness in the World of Fact, then
it follows that the unity of that identity must be such

that it functions to create a new comprehensive entity by

adding its intrinsic value to the open boundaries of the
elements of the World of Fact that are already structured

by values of lower order.

Thus, personal identity is far

more than a simple aggregation of Fact into an entity of
392 Ibid

689

p.

.

393 Ibid.
394 Ibid.

,

pp

.

689-690.

essentially passive character, it is, rather, a
concept
which expresses the dual aspect of the actual entities
in
the world; namely,

that they shape the world and are also

the vehicles for the realization of value.

The intent of this discussion becomes more obvious

when it is pointed out that of all the personal identities
which comprise the world of realized fact, human "personality is the extreme example of the sustained realization
a type of value.

That is to say,

"

"when we enjoy

'realized value' we are experiencing the essential junction

between the two worlds." 396

By introducing the idea of

personality as an extreme example of the case of personal
identity, we can recap the derivation of the concept in
less technical terms that are more recognizable as applying
to human experience.

Since personality is an elaborated example of personal

identity which, in turn, is an expression of how the World
of Action is internally adjusted so as to manifest a spe-

cific coordination of the World of Value, and since the

infinity of Values are all interrelated into an ordered
scheme,

the maintenance of a specific character of person-

ality can also be conceived of as being the relation that
exists between the realized potential of the actual world
395 Ibid

.

p.

690.

396 Ibid.

P-

688

.
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of possibility that

the World of Values.

is

Lho charac Lor of

Each human personality is not only a

product of the most elaborated realization of the World of
Value in the World of Activity, but of equal importance,
that personality may also be viewed as to its relation with

the infinitude of possibility of the World of Values.

This

condition is the birthright of every actual entity in the
organismic cosmology but for man it means that human potentiality may largely be seen as the realization of those

higher grades of value which are recessive and yet to be

actualized in the fact of his existence.
7.1.2

PERSONALITY, HIERARCHIES AND KNOWLEDGE

Now that we have come to the use of a familiar concept
via a route that is unfamiliar and strange, it is well to

pause to take account of our position.

One of the basic

reasons for the unfamiliarity is that the orientation of
the argument has shifted from what it has been throughout
the majority of the previous discussions.

In the earliest

phases we discussed the narrow abstractive character of past

philosophical and scientific concepts, and gradually elaborated the growing recognition that phenomena in the world
must be regarded as to their within as well as their without.

From the early philosophical recognition of this truth

into its modern elaborations in the physical and biological

sciences, the emphasis has been on substianting the validity
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of the "internal " against the slings
and arrows of a disbe-

lieving, materialistically oriented
intellectual world.
In extreme contrast to that approach, this
discussion

of personality, by assuming the orientation
of the philos-

ophy of organism, has started from the validity
of internal

experience and has proceeded with the analysis of the
Universe from that position rather than through a set of
abstract categories that only bear a tangential relation
to the completeness of lived experience.

Thus,

the rather

weak metaphorical statements of the previous chapter which
refer to the possibility that the flowering of man's being
could be the result of transcendent values of which he is
only dimly aware, i.e.

his religious sense as opposed to

his intellectual forcefulness and clarity, have become

transformed in this chapter via a different perspective on
the Universe.

Since we may now define ourselves as beings in the

hierarchy of organismic levels, beings who are obviously
aware of their own internal experience, we already have two
of the three key elements in the composition of a compre-

hensive being at our disposal.

In descriptions of all lower

comprehensive beings, we have been able, according to the
logic of hierarchical relations, to define a) the lower-

order principles which provide the basis upon which, b) a

higher-order principle can formulate,

c)

a

new comprehensive
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with its own distinctive characteristics.

In con-

sidering ourselves, it is most truthful
to say that we are
primarily aware of ourselves as comprehensive
beings with
distinctive characteristics and that we are
only secondarily
aware of the explicit character of either
set of principles
which border our being and mold its character.
Of the two sets of principles, it is certainly
true
that our intellectual understanding of the various
subordi-

nate grades of being in the hierarchy has occupied the

greater portion of modern man's efforts.

These efforts are

known under the general heading of "Science" and are generally explicitly recognized as being the product of man's

intellectual analysis of the data which are presented to
his sensory faculties.

Man obviously has a great capacity

for this type of activity.

His mind is a supreme instrument

of analysis, apparently capable of penetrating the mysteries
of all phenomena that it can know through sensory processes

and analyze with the rational intellect.
However, the information gained in this fashion tells

only part of the story.

It necessarily only refers to the

analysis of lower-order levels of being and beyond that, it
has been primarily concerned with the analysis of the ex-

ternal aspects of those phenomena.

The meaning of materi-

alism in science and society is to be found in just this
aspect of our cultural heritage.

Our predominant orientation
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has been toward the external
aspects of lower-order phenomena.
Obviously, scientific knowledge
is a powerful instrument of great value to humanity.
But it is an abstraction
m the complete Universe. It has
been developed primarily
abstraction from the World of Values
and does not contain
an elaborated reference to the
totality of existence.

m

The growth of philosophical and
scientific concepts
that have increasingly come to support
the validity and

necessity of recognizing the role of internal
factors in
the composition of phenomena has provided
the second major
element in the hierarchical triumvirate. But we have
not

been allowed to become complacent in this realization;
the
character of the explanation itself requires the existence
of the third major element.

It is the function of this

element to provide the higher-order goal that is to become

actualized in the level upon which a new comprehensive entity is being formed.

We may also say that it is in the

operation of this element that we can find the mechanism to
answer the problem of why the trend of evolution has been
upwards.

All entities have an essential reference to the

World of Value, and since that World is a multiplicity of
ordered Values, the evolutionary course of the actual world
must follow the graded structure of the World of Value.
7

.

2

THE ORGANTSMIC FOREGROUND

Formulating a model for personality processes that is

5^0

in harmony with the organismic approach
requires an inves-

tigation of the idea of actual entity.

As we have seen,

Whitehead has based his philosophical formulation
on the
use of this concept which was derived by analogy
to human
experience.

Of course, the human experience he refers to

is significantly different than the model of
human experi-

ence that was the basis of the early formulations in
science

and philosophy.

In.

that case it was assumed that sense

experience was the only means by which the reality of the

physical world could be known.

It seemed reasonable at the

time that a dualism of mind and matter should exist and
that matter was essentially inert and of a completely dif-

ferent realm.

Whitehead's use of human experience involves

the notion that all things in the world have a "beingness"

that involves experience.

That is, even atomic "things"

are seen as atomic events which are connected with one

another in much the same way that successive occasions of

human experience are interconnected.
7.2.1

THE ACTUAL OCCASION
AND HUMAN EXPERIENCE
In defining the character of an actual entity Whitehead

maintains
the actual world is a process, and that
the process is the becoming of actual entities.
Thus actual entities are creatures; they are
also termed "actual occasions "397
.

.

.

.

397 Whitehead, Process
and Reality p. 2 7, emphasis
added.
It is important to keep this similarity in mind.
,
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It

is lioro

pliy--

"

that one finds

tl.o

basis of "procoss" philoso-

the actual world is a process" and
actual entities

are, in fact, occasions in that process.

The idea of oc-

casion is important because it permits
experience to be
unitized without also making disconnected
particles out of
things.
In relating the idea of an actual occasion
to ex-

perience as we know it, Whitehead holds that "an
occasion
of experience is an activity, analyzable into
modes of func-

tioning which jointly constitute its process of becoming."
He further asserts that,

"each mode is analyzable into the

total experience as active subject

." 398

His concern here

is to avoid the dissolution of the occasion into pieces

that would appear to take on a separate reality in addition
to that of the actual occasion.

An actual occasion must be

considered as to its unity which, since it is an event in
the life of an individual, be it an atom or a person, is

best characterized by regarding it as to its subjective

forms of self-enjoyment.

While the doctrine sounds strange, it does function
well in the integration of scientific information.

For ex-

ample, Whitehead demonstrates that the vector transmission
of energy in the physical sciences can be explained as a

succession of "physical prehensions" (to be defined below)
and says of his doctrine:
398 Whitehead,

Adventures of Ideas, p. 176.
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In the language of science, it describes
how
the quantitative intensity of localized
energy bears in itself the vector marks
of
its origin, and the specialties of
its specific forms; it also gives a reason for
the
atomic quanta to be discerned in the building
up of a quantity of energy.
In this way, the
philosophy of organism-as it should— appeals
to the facts. 399
In focusing our concern on the actual entity
of the

high grade human personality, we can best start from
the
familiar topic of inversion.

It is in the analysis of an

actual occasion that the topic finds its clearest expression.

Sense experience, as would be expected, does not

play a fundamental role in the determination of an actual
occasion; its role is important but not fundamental.

Sense

data, as the most variable element in our lives, also appear
to be the most definite and are traditionally thought of as

being the basis for the mind against which all other experiences should be evaluated, i.e., emotions, fears, love,
hate, intentions, etc..

reasons:

Whitehead denies this for several

a) loss of sensory modalities does not necessarily

mean death, b) states of sleep, meditation and prayer have

nothing to do with sense perception and c) after birth the
use of sense data is only a gradually acquired art of corre-

lating fundamental experience with unique sense data.^^
Thus, the basic priority in experience is not dependent on
399 Whitehead, Process and Reality

400

Whitehead, Modes of Thought

,

,

p.

p.

138.

112.

5*0

learning how to correlate sense experience
with the environment
This is easiest to see at lower levels
.

than man.

In the extreme case, even beings with a low
level of bodily

organization, e.g., the amoeba, react to the external
world
in ways that suggest that they possess a sense
of being and

recognition of the objectivity of the world.
hand,

On the other

the most highly developed sensory abilities belong
to

the animals and not man.

Again, sense experience is im-

portant but it is, none- the-less

,

a product of our more

basic bodily experience; it therefore, enhances appreciation
of reality but it does not totally determine the character
of that reality.

This point is best seen in Whitehead's use of the evi-

dence of physics and physiology to support his position.
In applying this scientific evidence to an occasion in the

experience of a human actual entity, he asserts:
Unless the physical and physiological sciences
are fables, the qualitative experiences which
are the sensations such as sight, hearing,
etc., are involved in an intricate flux of
reactions within and without the animal body.
These are hidden below consciousness in the
vague sense of personal experience of an external world.
It is not necessary to go into the multitudinous data ref-

erent to the actual processes and physiology of the human
*+01

k02

Ibid

.

Ibid.

,

p

.

p.

113
121.
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organism to appreciate the point at issue.

Our awareness

of the external world obviously involves
many stages of

complex neural organization in the body and
the brain.
Further, the result of this tremendously
complex activity
is the experience of the world which is
external to the

body.

That is to say, molecular events in the external

world interact with light in such a way that when the
light
strikes the retina, and the subsequent phases of processing
ensue, we have an experience of these events in our brain,

not as events in themselves, but as a quality of the external world which is projected back into space at the same

location where the original molecules are located.

An

example will help to make the point more explicit; Whitehead
says

,

For example, "I see a blue stain out there,"
implies the privacy of the ego and the externality of "out there." There is the presupposition of "me" and the world beyond. But
consciousness is concentrated upon the quality
blue in that position. Nothing can be more
simple or more abstract. And yet unless the
physicist and the physiologist are talking
nonsense, there is a terrific tale of complex
activity omitted in the abstraction.^ 0 ^
403

This statement is an answer to the problem left open
in Chapter 2, Section 2.2.2 where the following statement
seemed unintelligible.
"In the process framework, space and
time are not the containers into which matter can be placed
and therefore simply located; rather, a region of space and
time is a simply located unit of realized experience." The
material of the present section provides a further amplification of this theme.
404

Ibid.
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This complex activity is obviously physical
activity
in the normal sense of that term;

that is, there is no con-

sciousness involved in any of those necessary complexities
that enter into the final conscious experience
of the ex-

ternal world.

Another quotation will help to provide a

basis for discussion of this topic;
This survey supports the view that the predominant basis of perception is perception
of the various bodily organs, as passing on
their experiences by channels of transmission and enhancement.
According to this
interpretation, the human body is to be conceived as a complex "amplifier’'-- to use the
language of the technology of electromagnetism.
The various actual entities, which
compose the body, are so coordinated that
the experiences of any part of the body are
transmitted to one or more central occasions
to be inherited with enhancements accruing
along the way, or finally added by reason of
the final integration.
The enduring personality is the historic route of living occasions which are severally dominant in the
body at successive instants. 405
.

.

.

Thus, the final stages of conscious perception are the result of a myriad of events that go on inside our bodies as
a result of the impact of the physical world.

Whitehead

terms this unconscious physical derivation of consciousness

pole"^^ of experience which

the "physical

is the means by

which we know ourselves as "a historic route of occasions."
That is, we experience a derivation from our immediate past.
405
Z+

°6

Whitehead, Process and Reality
Ibid.

,

p.

280.

.

,

p.

140.
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Yet, at the same time, all those events are
hidden from

consciousness.

This aspect of the physical pole of expe-

rience Whitehead terms "physical prehension.

Physical

prehension is the means by which one occasion of experience
is related to its predecessor such that the prior
occasion

functions as a cause for the later occasion.

This causal

relationship between actual occasions, which are the elements from which the final conscious occasion we know in
experience is constructed, is known as "causal efficacy."^ 08
My process of "being myself" is my origination
from my possession of the world. 409
Thus, one physical prehension follows upon the other as

thousands of them are involved in mediating the final pro-

duction of high-level conscious experience.

Again, these

basic events which are causally efficacious in experience
are actual entities which function as building blocks in

experience; but we also know that these various actual entities have to add up, in some fashion, to the central occasion that is of the much higher-order level of experience we

know in consciousness.

This latter mode of experience is

known as "presentational immediacy,
407

408
409

410

Whitehead

410
"

it arises out of the

Adventures of Ideas

,

pp

Whitehead, Process and Reality

,

p.

Ibid.

Ibid.

,

p.

79.

.

234-238.
99.
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causally efficacious background as a synthesis of its data.
It is in this mode experience that we find the basis for

the descriptions of sense data that have been the basis for

traditional philosophy.

Whitehead's formulation makes it

clear that a more complete analysis of experience necessarily involves a description in terms of the scientific

data we have regarding the operation of the causally efficacious bodily functions that underlie final perception.

When this is done, it is seen that the objects in the environment which we know in presentational immediacy and which
we generally assume to be the causally efficacious elements

in our perception of the world are, in fact, derivative

from the truly causally efficacious data that constitute
our physical prehension of the world of actual entities.
The role of the synthesis of actual entities that
leads up to the familiar aspects of presentational immediacy
we directly experience can be shown as follows.

In an ear-

lier example, Whitehead demonstrated that forming the idea
of a patch of blue, located in the environment, was in fact
a very abstract concept.

This is so because we know that

the events which take place in the retina and various other

parts of the brain do not, in and of themselves, have any

quality that resembles "blueness."

Since neurons most cer-

tainly are not blue, it must be that some quality is ab-

stracted from the causally efficacious events that yields
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the final percipient event of "I see a blue stain out
there."
It is in this sense that the final perception of a quality

"out there" in the environment may be said to be both simple

and abstract.

It is simple because it appears that the oc-

casion of experience is a direct function of the thing experienced.
case;

It is abstract because the exact opposite is the

the object in the environment is actually a contribu-

tion of the experiencing subject whose lower-order causally

efficacious physical prehensions have been "transmuted"^411
(transformed) into an occasion of experience.

This is also

known as the "mental pole" of the occasion of experience.
Whitehead maintains that all actual entities are bipolar,
that is, they have both a physical side and a mental side.

However, only in the case of high grade entities does the

mental aspect play an important role.

This, Whitehead main-

tains is the basis for the solution of the mind-body problem
of traditional philosophy and psychology.

412

Each actual entity is an integration of its physical
and mental aspects into a unity.

As far as the mind-body

problem is concerned, it is the physical pole of the entity
that relates to the spacial aspects of nature while the

mental pole of the entity is primarily concerned with the
conceptual emphasis of aspects of the experience and also
4ll
4l 2

Ibid.

,

p.

32 .

Ibid.

,

p.

128.
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with the introduction of novelty.

Whitehead says:

So though mentality is non-spacial, mentality
is always a reaction from, and integration
with, the physical experience which is spacial.
All the life in the body is the
life of individual cells. There are thus
millions upon millions of centers of life in
each individual animal body.
So what needs
to be explained is not dissociation of personality but unifying control, by reason of
which we not only have unified behavior,
which can be observed by others, but also
consciousness of a unified experience *413
.

.

.

.

It is the formation of this unified experience that is,
as

Whitehead believes, the primary fact that needs to be explained in the determination of the final actual entity.
The model of hierarchical beings developed earlier helps to

clarify this point.

*4

*4

The beings who are the actual enti-

ties on the lower scales of the hierarchy have very rudi-

mentary levels of integrated mental poles of experience.
It is only as one rises higher in the hierarchy that the

center of experience becomes more prominent in the composition of the entity.

Finally, in man, centrality of control

is elaborated to its highest peak while the physical pole

or causally efficacious aspects of experience are relegated
to the background of experience.

In a living body of a high grade type there
are grades of occasions so coordinated by
their paths of inheritance through the body,
that a peculiar richness of inheritance is
*413
41*4

Ibid.

Cf

.

Chapter

6,

Section 6.2.
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enjoyed by various occasions in some parts of
the body.
Finally, the brain is coordinated
so that a particular richness of inheritance
is enjoyed now by this and now by that part;
and thus there is produced the presiding personality at that moment in the body. ^5
This description, of the way the experiences of the lowest
level entities of the body are coordinated so as to be

transmitted to evermore integrated experiences, finally

culminating in the production of one of the central occasions that forms an occasion in the life of a human personality,

should be looked upon not only as a solution to the

mind-body problem but also as a complement to two themes
that were of importance to earlier sections.

First, in the

immediately preceding section, the idea of personal identity and ultimately of human personality was seen to be the

result of the most highly sustained realization of the World
of Value in the World of Fact.

That interpretation was also

shown to be compatible with the model of hierarchical organ-

ization which thereby provided a means by which that very
abstract formulation could be related to more concrete matters.

In terms of the present context, when speaking of the

integration of actual entities into higher-order occasions
of experience, it should be recognized that we have covered
two of the three elements which were descriptive of each

level in the hierarchy.
415

Ibid.

,

pp.

The accounts of successively more

128-129-
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integrated actual entities describe an operational version
of the earlier distinction between a new comprehensive en-

tity and the lower-order principles of operation out of

which it arises.

Thus, in the present context, for all of

its complexity, we have yet to provide for the role of the

all-important third element of hierarchical logic, namely,
the higher-order principles by which the new comprehensive

entity is formed.

We will come to this element presently,

after considering the second theme of the earlier discussion that is important to this context.
Here, we have reference to the familiar theme of within

and without that was developed as the mainstay of the argu-

ments of those who initially sought to surpass the limitations of the mechanistic scheme.

In the present context, we

can repay the debt of gratitude owed to this concept by ex-

plaining it from the perspective of an actual entity that
has both mental and physical (within and without) aspects.

Whitehead has done this in a way in which it seems certain
that Gustav Fechner and Wilhelm Dilthey, to name only two,

would have deeply appreciated.
In principle, the animal body is only a more
highly organized and immediate part of the
general environment for its dominant actual
But the
occasion, which is the percipient.
transition from wi thout to wi thin the body
marks the passage from lower to higher grades
The higher the grade,
of actual occasions.
the more vigorous and the more original is

'

'i
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the enhancement from the

of experience

.

.

.

[mental pole

!

Here, and in its proper organismic context, we can expand

upon the role of the within or the mental pole; this expanded definition also opens the way toward appreciating
the true character of the formative third element that has

yet to appear in the discussion.

Whitehead continues,

Pure receptivity and transmission gives place
to the trigger-action of life whereby there
is a release of energy into novel forms.
Thus the transmitted datum acquires sensa
enhanced in relevance or even changed in
character by the passage from the low-grade
external world into the intimacy of the human
body 4l6
.

7.2.2

MENTALITY AND SUBJECTIVITY
Thus, the formative third element in the system of hi-

erarchical logic may also be defined as the mental pole or
the seat of the introduction of novelty into the formation

of higher-order actual occasions.

There are complex char-

acterizations of the process by which this novelty is introduced which can be omitted in the present discussion.

In

its most general form the introduction of novelty is called
the "subjective form" of the prehension.

417

This subjective

form is a product of what the actual entity prehends.

extreme cases will help to clarify the point.

Two

First, the

physical prehension, as we have seen, is one in which the

.

,

p.

l4l

^~^Ibid.

,

p.

28.

Ibid

,

emphasis added.
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object oT the occasion is another actual entity.
case,

In

this

the new occasion simply inherits the subjective form

that belongs to the antecedent occasion.

This is the pri-

mary mode of low-order entities in which the mental pole is
not highly developed.

Thus, the second case is one in which

the mental pole can be thought of as highly developed such

that it dominates in the occasion.

Here,

the prehensions

are called "conceptual prehensions" 4l 8 rather than physical

prehensions because the objects prehended are not in the
physical past of the occasion but are forms, qualities or
relations (pure potentialities) which can be considered in

abstraction from any particular actual occasion.

The ob-

jects of this conceptual prehension are known as "eternal

objects." 419

Of this condition Whitehead remarks:

Thus the process of becoming is bipolar,
(i) by reason of its qualification by the
detormina toness of the actual world, (physical
prehension) and (ii) by its conceptual prehensions of the indeterminateness of eternal
The process is constituted by the
objects.
flux of eternal objects into a novel determinateness of feeling which absorbs the actual
world into a novel ac tuali ty ^+20
.

Examining the role of eternal objects and the idea of novelty
more closely will help to round out this brief treatment of
Ibid
Whitehead also adds that "consciousness is
not necessarily involved in the subjective form of either
type of prehension.
.

^ 19

420

Ibid.

,

p.

38.

Ibid

,

p

59

.

.
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Whitehead's detailed metaphysical statements and will also
open the way toward understanding his system in relation to
the logic of hierarchical relations,

the third or higher-

order element of which is still unaccounted for.
It is first necessary to distinguish the idea of "sub-

jective form" from that of "subjective aim."

In an earlier

statement, in conjunction with introducing the organic nature of an actual occasion, the idea of subjective form of

self-enjoyment was used as a means of underlining the unity
of an actual occasion and its nature as an event in the life
of an individual (atomic or human).

Subjective form de-

scribes how the actual occasion interacts with its environment.

In Whitehead's terminology,

"there are many species

of subjective forms, such as emotions, valuations, purposes,

adversions, aversions, consciousness, etc.."

421

The unity

and character of a subjective form is derived from the eternal objects which are involved in the prehensions of the

occasion.

Physical prehensions contribute to the realiza-

tion of eternal objects which were included in the past

actual occasions prehended at the physical pole of experience.

In addition to this way of contacting eternal objects,

the conceptual prehension of the present actual occasion, to
the extent that it is developed, also directly prehends the

eternal objects via the mode of conceptual prehension.
Up l

Whitehead, Process and Reality

I

,

p.

28.
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Conceptual prehension is the primary source of novelty because of its direct reference to a definite eternal object.

This definite reference provides additional grounds upon

which the subjective form of the actual occasion is modified.

A conceptual prehension therefore, may be seen as a

valuing or devaluing of the eternal objects which were
present in the physical pole of the occasion.

Thus, even

if there are no further grounds for the introduction of

novelty, the mechanism of conceptual valuation which results

from conceptual prehension can be seen to provide the basis
for autonomous action on the part of each new actual occasion;

7.2.3

this is "subjective aim."

THE SOURCE OF SUBJECTIVE ORIGINALITY
The concept of "subjective aim"

422

adds an element to

the process of an actual occasion that is responsible for

actively shaping what the occasion is to become.

Whereas

prehensions at the physical pole involve the use of past
actual occasions as objects (objectification) such that they

"constitutes the efficient causes out of which that actual

entity arises; the 'subjective aim' at 'satisfaction' constitutes the final cause

,

or lure, whereby there is

determinant actual occasion]."
Z|22

Ibid

.

,

p.

24.

-^Ibid.

,

p.

105

Z+2

,

...

[a

In the formation of final

emphasis added.
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cause Whitehead is referring to the fact that each actual

occasion is ultimately responsible for its own nature, it

may inherit from the past and it may introduce some novelty
via conceptual valuation of eternal objects, but there is a

much stronger sense in which each actual occasion is, in
fact, its own subject and by which it becomes a unique in-

dividual.

It would therefore appear that some additional

input is required for the introduction of the character-

istics which constitute the individuality of the occasion
and its ability to transcend the data which are given to it

via its other sources.

Such indeed is the case.

The initial stage of its aim is an endowment
which the subject inherits from the inevitable
ordering of things, conceptually realized in
the nature of God. ^24

However, this inheritance from God does not mean that the

actual occasion is thereby determined and without freedom.
It is more correct to say that the role of God is to provide

for each actual occasion a vision of the ideal that it might

achieve.

Further, it is in the attainment of this vision

that the actual occasion finds its maximum satisfaction.

425

On this point Whitehead maintains,
424
42 5

Ibid

.

,

p.

286.

Satisfaction as used here is a technical term that
refers to the idea of what the actual occasion will be once
In terminating
it has completed the process of becoming.
its process of becoming (satisfaction) the actual entity becomes a datum for the physical prehension of future actual
occasions
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What is inexorable in God, is valuation as
an aim towards "order"; and "order" means
"society" permissive of actualities with
patterned intensity of feeling arising from
adjusted contrasts.
In this sense God is
the principle of concretion; namely, he is
that actual entity from which each
[actual occasion] receives that initial aim
from which its self-causation starts. 426
.

.

.

Thus, it is in the nature of God's interaction
with the

world that one finds the basis for the self-causation
that
is required if there is to be any freedom in the
world.

Subjective aim as derived from God's immanence in the world,
is the means by which the relevance of eternal objects in

conceptual prehension is determined and also, is the basis
for evaluating the physical prehensions of the actual entities which are in the past of present actual occasion.

In

this way, God and the actual world are seen to jointly form
the character of the creative actual occasion.

Since actual

occasions are bipolar, that is, since they have both a

physical and mental pole, then it is clear that whether the
outcome of the actual occasion is a simple physical re-

enactment of past pattern, therefore nonmental, or whether
the occasion achieves some highly novel form of mental in-

tegration that modifies the character of the whole occasion,
this process is one of self-determination in which the

actual occasion is always its own autonomous master.
426

Ibid
.

.

,

p

.

286c

I

•
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God's Immanence in the world in respect to
his primordial nature is an urge towards the
future based upon an appetite in the present.
Appetition is at once the conceptual valuation of an immediate physical feeling combined with the urge towards realization of
the datum conceptually prehended.
For example, "thirst" is an immediate physical
feeling integrated with the conceptual prehension of its quenching.
Appetition is an immediate matter of fact
including in itself a principle of unrest,
involving realization of what is not and
what may be. The immediate occasion thereby
conditions creativity so as to procure, in
the future, physical realization of its mental pole, according to the various valuations
inherent in its various conceptual prehensions 427
.

On numerous occasions in past discussion, we have been

able to summarize important aspects of the topic at hand by

repeating a quotation.

Here too, it is possible to do so

with the added advantage of also implicating those past discussions in the present context.
The point to remember is that the fact that
each individual occasion is transcended by
the creative urge (appetition)
belongs to
the essential constitution of each such
occasion.
It is not an accident which is
irrelevant to the completed constitution of
any occasion.
In the formation of each occasion of
actuality the swing over from re-enaction
to anticipation is due to the intervening
touch of mentality. Whether the ideas thus
introduced by the novel conceptual prehensions be old or new, they have this decisive
result, that the occasion arises as an
effect facing its past and ends as a cause
,

427

Ibid.

*

p.

37.
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fac ng j L s i u turn
In between there is the
toi oo ogy oi' the Un.i verso 428
i

.

l

.

We have, therefore, come to the final answer to the

major question which has been implicit in the last three
chapters.

Organismic metaphysics and process philosophy

require the concept of God as an inseparable reason for the

advance of the world.

Thus, implicit in those earlier dis-

cussions of teleology, organism, self-causation, science,
evolution, etc., has been the realization that God is the

ultimate urge toward the realization of potential.

His

role is that of an all-pervasive influence that gives form

and direction to actuality; He is the single source of order

and His immanence is the ultimate answer to the question,

Why has the trend of evolution been upward?^29
It seems somewhat unnecessary to point out that we need

search no further for the answer to the question as to the
source of the third element in the system of hierarchical

logic that is responsible for the formation of a new compre-

hensive entity.

Whitehead puts it thusly:

God can be termed the creator of each
temporal actual entity. ^+30
.

.

.

428

Whitehead Adventures of Ideas pp 193-194,
emphasis added; cf also, Chapter 3> Section 3*3*2.
.

,

429

Whitehead The Function of Reason
Chapter 6, Section 6 1
.
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Whitehead

,

P*
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.

Process and Reality

,

P*

263.
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7.2.4

THE PROBLEM OF
ETERNAL OBJECTS
Up to this point, the role of "eternal objects" has

been implicated in the vital processes of an actual occasion without much explanation, or at least any attempted

explanation, of their rather enigmatic character.

Some of

the problems in dealing with eternal objects are easily
seen.

First, there is Whitehead himself, who, in one of

his very infrequent personal letters, said to Charles
Hart shorn e

There is one point on which you and-everyone misconstrue me obviously my usual
I mean
faults of exposition are to blame.
my doctrine of eternal objects. It is a
first endeavor to get beyond the absurd
simplemindedness of the traditional treatment
of Universals.^-^

—

—

Whitehead made this statement well after the doctrine was
widely publicized in a systematic fashion in both Science
and the Modern World and Process and Reality

432

Second,

.

it should be pointed out that Whitehead reserves the use of

the term eternal object for those contexts in which he is

developing his metaphysics in a systematic fashion.
other major works, i.e., Adventures of Ideas and Mode

In his
r-.

—

o_f_

Whitehead, Letter to Charles Ilartshorne in Alfred
Kline
North Whitehead: Essays on His P hilosophy, George L.
Inc
19
3
Prentice-Hall
ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
^ 31

,

p.

.

,

)

199.

—arU
^-^The 'statement dates from 1936 whereas Science
Process
the Modern World was published in 1925 and
Reality was published in 1929*
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Though

1-

Making

,

as well as the Iohsoi’ ones

I

i

Holigion

R<*

in

the

Symbolism and The Function of Reason Whitehead only

used the term briefly (six times in Adventures of Ideas );
it does not occur in the remainder of his published works.

Third, there are many equivalent expressions which are used
to carry the meaning of the more precise terminology

.

^

Fourth, the philosophical reasons for getting involved in
the concept are anchored deep in tradition and are also

contemporary problems.

For example, Whitehead sees Plato's

use of Universals in the following way:

When Plato is faced with the problem of expressing the relationship of God to the World,
and of the relation to the World of those
Ideas which it is in God's nature to contemplate, Plato's answer is invariably framed in
When Plato
terms of mere dramatic imitation.
turns to the World, after considering God as
giving life and motion to the ideas by inclusion of them in his divine nature, he can
find only second-rate substitutes and never
the originals.
For Plato there is a derivative
second-rate God of the World, who is a mere
Also when he
Icon, that is to say an image.
looks for the ideas, he can only find, in the
Thus, the World, for Plato,
World, imitations.
includes only the image of God, and imitations
of his ideas, and never God and his ideas. ^35
433

William A. Christian, An Interpretation of White Yale University Press, 1959),
Metaphysics
(New Haven:
head's
p.

195-

434

\
/
are
Some examples from Christian's summary Ibid
forms, ideal forms, ideal forms of possibility,
as follows:
abstract forms, eternal forms, possibilities, abstractions
and potential forms.
(

^^^Whi tehead
Ibid.

,

p.

,

Adventures of Ideas

198.

f

,

p.

.
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It is Whitehead's feeling that metaphysics should admit to

no gap between God and the World; the union should be com-

plete and mutual.

That is to say,

"what metaphysics re-

quires is a solution exhibiting the plurality of individuals
as consistent with the unity of the Universe, and a solution

which exhibits the World as requiring its union with God,
and God as requiring his union with the World," the doctrine
of eternal objects was created to fill just this need. 436
It is the foundation of the metaphysical position which I am maintaining that the understanding of actuality requires a reference to
ideality.
The two realms are inherent in the

Eternal
total metaphysical situation.
abstract.
By
their
nature,
objects are, in
is
object
eternal
an
abstract I mean that what
essence--is
in itself--that is to say, its
comprehensible without reference to some one
particular occasion of experience ^37
.

.

.

.

We are thus provided with an important clue to the nature of
As in the previous section, where the de-

eternal objects.

scription of either the World of Value or the World of Fact

necessarily involved characteristics borrowed from the other
world, here too, both the realm of actuality and the realm
of ideality are inherent parts of the whole metaphysical

situation.

But what is the whole metaphysical situation?

Simply, according to the ontological principle, the answer

must be

— actual

entities.

^^^Whi t ehead

,

Ibid

.

,

That is, what is real and concrete

p.

l68.

Whitehead, Science and the Modern World

,

pp

.
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are the actual occasions of experience which belong to actual individuals.

Thus events are concrete and object

are

abstract in the sense that they can only be understood in

relation to an actual occasion.

There are only two classes

of objects in the Whi teheadian system and both have this

relationship.

An actual occasion prehends the world in two

ways, at its physical pole and at its mental pole.

At the

physical pole there are past actual occasions which have
become "objectified" as data for the new actual occasion.
While those prehensions at the mental pole of the occasion
are prehensions of "eternal objects."

Whitehead says of

both types of prehension that:
The positive prehension of an entity by an
actual entity is the complete transaction
analyzable into the ingression, or objectifi cation of that entity as a datum for feeling,
and into the feeling whereby this datum is
absorbed into the subjective satisfaction. *+3°
,

There are many things which could be said about the

nature of eternal objects that are outside the focus of this
discussion.

Obviously, their nature as abstract pure poten-

tials for the becoming of actual occasions is a difficult

concept to express and Whitehead was clearly frustrated by
it.

It is the opinion of this writer that much ot

ficulty in interpreting this concept is due to
take Whitehead's system on its own terms.

^-^Whi t ehead
added.

,

Process and Reality

,

p.

the dif-

a failure to

Unless one is

66,

emphasis
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willing to explicitly grant, as Whitehead does, the central
role in Creation to God, then the concept of eternal object,
as forcefully put forth by Whitehead, appears inconsistent

with the way the world is usually thought of in science and

philosophy

.

This writer has no trouble in agreeing with

Whitehead on this point.

The role ascribed to God in the

philosophy of organism is the key term in recreating the
metaphysical basis for scientific and philosophical activity.
Since God is the ultimate element of coherence in the

Whiteheadian system, we can best close this account of the
details of Whitehead's cosmological system and the enigmatic

character of eternal objects with a brief summary of the
nature of God's participation in the processes of organismic
actual occasions.

7.2.5

THE IMMANENCE OF GOD
In entering this discussion of the nature of God as it

applies within the philosophy of organism, it is important
to remember that the discussion bears only on the metaphysi-

cal nature of God's action in the world as it appears from

within the system of organismic metaphysics.

It is not the

intent of this discussion to make either theological or

religious assertions about the nature of God.

Obviously,

there are implications which can not be ignored as regards

one's personal outlook; however, for the purposes of this

discussion the God of Whitehead's cosmology should be seen

363

as an al lo ilia live lo the

Clod

that

w;is

tin*

"Father"

ol

the

mechanistic world.— view of the past scientific era.
Throughout the discussions of organism! c metaphysics,
the ontological principle has provided the explicit state-

ment that everything must be thought of as existing in some
actuality.

That is, Whitehead does not believe that expla-

nations can float around in a void until they are needed to
explain some fact of actuality.

On the contrary, in a

realist system, everything must be some place that is "real"
or it will be imaginary; that is to say, unreal.

Therefore,

Whitehead locates the general potentiality of the universe,
that must be somewhere, in a very special actual entity

known as the nontemporal actual entity or, God.
Since the temporal actual occasions arise by their

participation in (prehension of) that which is timeless and
abstract, that is, the objectified world of past actual oc-

casions and the realm of eternal objects, some means of

combining that which is temporal with that which is nontemporal (objectified) is required.

Whitehead maintains,

The things which are temporal arise by their
participation in the things which are eternal.
The two sets are mediated by a thing which
combines the actuality of what is temporal
with the timelessness of what is potential.
This final entity is the divine element in
the world. 439
Thus, God is seen to be the divine element which is the
439 Ibid.

,

p

.

33
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ultimate ground for connecting Value and Fact, potentiality
and actuality.
It is also in this connection that the basis for the

creative advance is to be found.

This is accomplished by

the condition in which it is in God's nature to value the

entire realm of eternal objects.
^ a ^- n

That is, there is a cer-

"togetherness in the realm of eternal objects that

grades them into a hierarchy of relationships with one
440
another.
Thus, the order inherent in the realm of eternal objects and their reflection in the creative order of
the world are both a direct function of the relevance of

God.

In the more general terms of the previous section of

this chapter, this means that God is both the "persuasive

coordination of the essential multiplicity of Creative
Action" and also, "he is the unification of the multiple

personalities received from the Active World."

441

The earlier reference to God as a nontemporal actual
entity, that is, as the actuality wherein the potentiali tie
of the Universe are ordered and whereby creativity is condi

tioned, introduces an important aspect of the relation

between God and the World.

Since the nature of God is not

subject to the temporality of the created world, i.e., He
is eternal,

it cannot be said that there is a past for God.

^^Whi t ehead
44l

,

Science and the Modern World
,

Whitehead, Immortality

,

p.

.

694.

,

p.

l60.
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Further

,

since it is the past of an actual occasion that is

objectified in the prehensions at the physical pole of each
temporal occasion of experience, it is the conceptual or

mental pole of God's nontemporal nature that predominates
in the divine occasion.

nature"

442

This is known as the "primordial

of God in which the unity of conceptual feeling

includes all eternal objects, graded in the relevance of
God's vision.

The physical pole of God's nature is known

as God's "consequent nature" 443 and derives from God's pre-

hension of the actual entities of the actual world.

It is

in this way, therefore, that pure potentiality and actuality

Whitehead expressed this at one point as

are combined.

follows
This is the conception of God, according to
which he is considered as the outcome of creativity, as the foundation of order, and as the
"Order" and "novelty"
goal towards novelty.
are but the instruments of his subjective aim
which is the intensification of "formal immediacy "444
.

And, in a less technical terminology

The wisdom of [God's] subjective aim prehends
every actuality for what it can be in such a
perfected system--its sufferings, its sorrows,
its failures, its triumphs, its immediacies
of joy--woven by rightness of feeling into the
442

443
444

Whitehead, Process and Reality
Ibid.

Ibid

.

,

p

.

106

,

p

105.
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harmony of the universal feeling, which is
always immediate, always many, always one,
always with novel advance, moving onward and
never perishing.
The image and it is
but an image-- the image under which this
operative growth of God's nature is best
conceived, is that of a tender care that
nothing be lost.
The consequent nature of God is his
judgement on the world. He saves the world
as it passes into the immediacy of his own
life.
It is the judgement of tenderness
which loses nothing that can be saved. It
is also the judgement of a wisdom which uses
what in the temporal world is mere wreckage ^5
.

.

—

.

.

And finally, there is metaphysical poetry,
What is done in the world is transformed
into a reality in heaven, and the reality
in heaven passes back into the world.
By
reason of this reciprocal relation, the love
of the world passes into the love in heaven,
and floods back into the world.
In this
sense, God is the great companion-- the fellowsufferer who understands.

^

We can conclude the investigation of the necessity of

including the role of God in organismic metaphysics on the
above note.

It would appear that not only is the nature of

God a necessary element for the coherence of Whitehead's
system, but also, that the resultant intimate connection

between God and his creation resulting from the organismic
approach is one which opens the way toward enhanced depth
of feeling in individual experience.

It seems quite cer-

tain that this is what Whitehead had in mind when he said
4Z+5

Ibid., pp. 407-408.

^^Ibid.

,

p.

413.
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"breadth of thought reacting with intensity of sensitive

experience stands out as an ultimate claim on existence.
It should also be added that the intent of this
limited

consideration of Whitehead's detailed metaphysics has been
to prepare the ground for the next section.

Though the

details considered above have been lengthy, even if very
sketchy, there are important elements that have yet to be

introduced.

These topics will be considered as an intro-

duction to a summary statement of the key problems which
the philosophy of organism places upon the doorstep of con-

temporary psychology and education.
7.3

MACROCOSMIC ORGANISMIC RELATIONS
We can begin by noting that the disparity which exists

between the technical philosophical and popularized versions
of Whitehead’s thought, which was mentioned at the beginning
of the chapter, is also present in Whitehead's writings.

Whitehead himself had a problem in bridging the gap between
the systematic terminology of the philosophy of organism

and concepts which are used in the usual descriptions of
The problem in the formulation of terminology

experience.

applying to eternal objects cited above, is a case in point.
However, a multiplicity of terminology does not mean that

Whitehead was unsure of the concept he had in mind.

In

fact, it would seem that the clarity and forcefulness of

447

Ibid

.

,

p

.
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concept,

I-Ih'

in

usual ability
0:r

a

liis

in

i
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ruJ

mu si, have boon

at.

Lho basis of his

up with a highly suggestive metaphor

evocative words that could carry the meaning of

his more precise philosophical insights.

While the rich-

ness added by such discussion is important beyond estimation, it is, however, often difficult to tell whether

Whitehead is attempting to develop a systematic term or to
create a plain language bridge into a philosophical detail.
One such terminological problem lies at the base of those

aspects of the system that were reserved for inclusion in
this section.

Since the previous section focused primarily upon the

microcosmic nature of an actual occasion, there was little

opportunity to go beyond those details into a consideration
of how they are related to the macrocosmic world that we

know in everyday life.

This section, therefore, considers

the macrocosmic aspect of the philosophy of organism.

The

problem in terminology that is found in this aspect of
Whitehead's thought centers around the use of the term
"organism."

Since Whitehead called his system the philoso-

phy of organism, it would appear that there is some precise

meaning in the term.

But if microcosmic actual occasions

are organismic, what is the status of the macrocosmic or-

ganisms in the world that we know in experience?

As it

happens, "organism" is not a systematic term for Whitehead
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himself maintains that:
In the philosophy of organism it is held that
the notion of "organism" has two meanings,
.
namely the microscopic and the macroscopic meaning.
The microscopic meaning is
concerned with the formal constitution of an
actual occasion. ... The macroscopic meaning
is concerned with the givenness of the actual
world, considered as the stubborn fact which
at once limits and provides opportunity for
the actual occasion. ^^9
.

.

Clearly, the meaning of organismic relations is different
in each case.

For the actual occasion, organism refers to

the complex events that occur within the actual occasion.

In the macrocosmic sense, organic relations refer to the

interconnection of actual occasions and therefore are of a
different character than those of the actual occasion, and
require an additional set of concepts for their explication.
In the present instance, the terminological problem is not

very large since there is little chance of getting led too
far astray by the difference in usage.

The problem will,

however, be more acute in future discussions; seeing it here
in a rather neutral context should be of benefit at those

times

7-3.1

INTERCONNECTION
As we have seen, the final indivisible entities in the
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icir prehensions of each other.

Entities which are

interconnected by their prehensions, that is, entities
which "objectify" each other, however loose the connection

may be, are said to form a "nexus.

"*lj0

It is the strength

of interconnection that determines the character of a nexus.

_

Nexus 451 are strengthened into a "society" when there is a

common eternal object in the prehensions of each actual

occasion in the nexus.

By virtue of this common defining

452
characteristic, they may be said to have "social order."

The social order of a nexus provides an explanation of the

way actual entities become coordinated into the "things" we
know.

For example, a molecule, a rock or an animal body

are all examples of a type of a nexus that sustains itself

with a certain type of order.
At this point, there is an interesting parallel to the

hierarchical logic of the previous chapter.

Whitehead ob-

serves, that since each society is brought together out of
a larger background environment of actual occasions,

soci-

eties do not exist in isolation and are, in fact, subject
to the influence

450 Ibid
451

.

,

p

(open boundary conditions) of their social

24

.

The plural f o rm
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written, nexus.
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background. ^53

Also, the laws which dominate the social

environment of the nexus are said to be the result of the
common defining characteristic of that background society.
Thus, the new comprehensive entity which is formed on the

open boundary conditions of the lower level (social background), is not reducible to a description in terms of its

parts or the defining properties of the lower-order society.

Clearly

,

two of

the three terms of hierarchical logic are

evident in this account of nexus.

The third or higher-order

term is present but submerged in this account since it is a

factor functioning wi thin the actual occasions of the nexus
whereas, the other relations are concerned with the wi thout
or external relations between actual occasions.
To recap briefly, the concept of a society of actual

occasions is seen to be one whose character can vary over a
wide range of organization and complexity.

Since everything

that has gone before suggests that organization in the em-

pirical world of "stubborn fact" should be thought of in

hierarchical terms, it is not surprising to find that there
is a hierarchy of societies.

Now that we are dealing with

the hierarchical relations of the societies that actually

compose the world, it is important to pay attention to their

character and a slight digression is required to demonstrate
453 Ibid.
454

Ibid.

p.

108.
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Whitehead's thinking on this matter.
Since Whitehead always seems to catch an idea
in its

widest sweep, he defines the basis of the system
of societies we know in our world, as but a part
of a "vast nexus
that extends far beyond our immediate cosmic
epoch.

"

Thus, his cosmology would readily accept other
epochs with

vastly different social orders.

On this view,

the fact

that our present epoch is characterized by three spacial

and one time dimension, or a four dimensional space- time
system, is something of an accident.

That is, Whitehead's

system provides no intrinsic reason as to why there are
four dimensions in our epoch; there could just as easily

have been five or

t

if teen dimensions.

Such considerations

serve mainly to help grasp the most general relations that

prevail in our epoch.

Whitehead does not bemoan the fact

that there are only four dimensions in our system, he

accepts it as an empirical fact that does not require logical demonstration.

Now we can return to considering the

character of the societies in our epoch.
Since all societies have the social relationship men-

tioned above, and since societies are hierarchical, the
lowest societies in the hierarchy of our epoch must have the

broadest application.

^ Ibid
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Thus the physical relations, the geometrical
relations of measurement, the dimensional
relations, and the various grades of extensive relations, involved in the physical and
geometrical theory of nature, are derivative
from a series of societies of increasing
width (decreasing degree of order) of prevalence, the more special societies (higher,
more ordered) being included in the wider
societies. This situation constitutes the
physical and geometrical order of nature. 456
The important aspect of this, for our concern, is that the

societal order that determines the order of nature, is at
one and the same time the basis of the higher orders and is

also formed by the same means as all higher orders, i.e.,

nexus composed of actual occasions that are ordered by the
effect of the eternal objects that they prehend.

This real-

ization will be of importance in subsequent contexts.
7.3.2

SOCIETIES
In moving to higher levels of the hierarchy, societies

rapidly become more complex as the various levels from electrons to minerals, to vegetables, to animals, to man, are

traversed.

As soon as the complexity is great enough to

support a society within a society, e.g., a molecule, societies become "structured societies."

457

Similarly, a mole-

cule within a living cell is also a structured society such
that the lower— order society within the higher— order one is

^^ Ibid

.

,

p.

110.

457 Ibid.

,

p.
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.
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said to be a "subordinate society." 4 58

In the simple case

of a molecule, which is a society of actual occasions whose

members are related serially, i.e.

,

successive physical

prehensions, the society is said to have a "personal
order." 459 In this case, the personal order is of a low
grade since the actual occasions which comprise the nexus
are primarily involved in prehensions of their physical

poles such that there is little opportunity for the intro-

duction of novelty into the actual occasion.

Such novelty,

should it occur, would subsequently produce a change in the

character of the nexus.

Since the novelty does not arise,

this type of nexus is called an "enduring object."

460

Thus,

enduring objects may be seen as the basis of the stability
In fact, they are the material

of the material world.

As a final step in this type of complexifying envi„46l
that are comronment there are "corpuscular societies"

world.

.

.

.

,

,

posed of varying degrees of union between enduring objects.
All of these societies of whatever complexity are pri-

marily characterized by the fact that they are specialized
for their environments.
to novelty,

458

their complexity is such that it stands in a

Ibid
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459 Ibid
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Ibid

That is, since they are not given

.

Ibid.

.

constant relation to the wider social environment; hence,
they are stable.

Also, it should be stressed that the

degree of interconnection, though stabilized within a given
nexus, is highly variable across nexus
ample,

.

Compare, for ex-

the internal relatedness of atoms in a diamond with

those of a gas.

There is another type of highly complex society that
is not stabilized into such inert relations with its envi-

ronment.

The living cell, for example, is a type of society

that exhibits a changing relationship with its environment.

According to the detailed account of actual occasions the
only way that the novelty associated with living societies
can be obtained is by the addition of conceptual prehensions
at the mental pole of the actual occasions in the nexus.

It

thus becomes the definition of a living society that it is
one in which there is at least some touch of novelty arising
462
In
from the conceptual prehension of eternal objects.

this way, mere repetition is transformed into basis for a

living occasion.

Extension of the role of mentality as it functions
within a nexus in the production of a living society, leads
to consideration of the extreme case where there will be a

living society such that all members of the nexus will
have mental poles that introduce novel reactions to the
462
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Since life Is defined ns involving at least

.

a touch of novelty, a nexus that is entirely involved in

novelty is said to be an "entirely living nexus

"
.

^

There is a shade of definition that is important to
the difference between nexus which are living and those

which are not.

A nonliving nexus is a society that forms

an enduring object.

That is, the endurance of the nexus is

not intimately dependent upon the support of the environIn the case of an entirely living nexus the situa-

ment.

tion is quite the opposite, since a living nexus must be

thought of as one in which the final high-grade mentality
of the living body is an outgrowth of the lower-order levels
of nexus that comprise the various subordinate societies of
the body system.

Thus, it is maintained that the complex

inorganic system of interaction is built up for the protection and maintenance of an entirely living nexus and that,
the original novel actions of the living elements

in return,

in the system are protective of the character of the whole

system

There is, of course, a direct comparison between this

relation of the living to the nonliving and the accounts of
"cyclic causality" that were of such great value to WaddingClearly, there can be no mxstakxng

ton and Piaget.
Z+63
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the similarity of the two descriptions.

Piaget, it will be

remembered, maintains that:
As soon as it is recognized that
the
environment is just as much organized by the
organism as phenotypic variation is directed
by the environment, then it becomes possible
to speak of "cybernetic circuits"
and
development can be seen as a series of organizational ladders, all different and all perpetually subject to cyclic causality ^65
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

By way of emphasizing the similarity, we see that Whitehead

maintains that
A complex inorganic system of interaction is
built up for the protection of the "entirely
living" nexus and the originative actions of
the living elements are protective of the
whole system.
On the other hand, the reaction of the whole system provides the intimate environment required by the "entirely
living" nexus. We do not know of any living
society devoid of its subservient apparatus
of inorganic societies ^6
.

It is important to note that the correspondence between the

two systems of interpretation is a function of two entirely

different levels of explanation.

Whitehead, by his own ad-

mission is "conjecturing" about the character of living
bodies based on the categories of his metaphysical system.
Piaget, on the other hand, is talking with reference to

empirical fact that has emerged in recent biological and

psychological science.
f.

/T

Thus, just as it is possible to

g

^Piaget, Biology and Knowledge
466
467
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demonstrate a comparability between organismic metaphysics
and basic categories of physical phenomena, e.g., the vector transmission of physical energy, 468 there is also an

important sense in which it can be maintained that organismic metaphysics also conform to the facts of the empirical

biological sciences.

Yet, it is also true that a corre-

spondence with empirical data in this fashion does not
exhaust the meaning of the metaphysics.

In fact, the mutu-

ality of the two views should lead to greater confidence in
the applicability of the metaphysics in other areas of sci-

entific activity, i.e., psychology and education.
Some of the additional meaning of the metaphysics can
be shown as follows.

By defining life as the result of the

introduction of novelty not associated with the inherited
data from the physical pole of experience, the phenomenon
of life is not only inextricably bound up with physical

phenomena, it is also given the property of responding to
"values,” i.e., the development of subjective aim and all
that is implied by that process.

469

The additional meta-

physical meaning is associated with the fact that life can
not be thought of as something abstract from the animal
body.

That is,

"entirely living" nexus, exist only as a

result of the protective environment provided by the animal
Section 7*2.
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body.

In this sense, life must be thought of as the name

for originality and not for tradition.

Thus,

the idea

of acting on and reacting to an environment can be viewed
a larger sense in which action and reaction are proper-

ties of all societies, living and nonliving.

However,

special attention to the character of living societies
shows that their reaction to the environment is continued

by conceptual experience which functions to adapt reaction
so that it captures the maximum intensity of experience for

the organism as it is confronted with a broad range of envi-

ronmental circumstances.

It is therefore asserted that the

reaction of a living body is dictated by the present and
not by the past;

"It is the clutch at vivid immediacy."

471

But vivid immediacy is not license to complete freedom

of action.

Living nexus, those societies which are depen-

dent upon the lower-order nonliving nexus, may be said to
be a living person in the sense that they can sustain a

thread of personal order from occasion to occasion; however,

when such a society clutches at vivid immediacy the degree
of originality is necessarily limited by its dependence upon
the limits of the nonliving society.

Thus, mental origi-

nality as manifest in personal mentality must adjust its
functioning to insure the safety of the material organism
470
471

Ibid
Ibid

.
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upon which it depends; "Thus life turns back into society:
it binds originality within bounds, and gains the massive-

ness due to reiterated character.

Finally

the assertion must be made that of the var-

,

ious examples of "entirely living" nexus that support the

personal order of a living person, the human body and its
"entirely living" nexus must be thought of in the sense
that "our own self-consciousness is direct awareness of

ourselves as such persons." 473
Yet, if we take the metaphysics seriously, there is

still something missing from an account that simply provides
that life processes have a cyclic feedback nature such that

physical order gives rise to mental originality which, in
turn, is so structured as to protect the physical order.

Organismic metaphysics also provides that the conceptual

generation of novel mentality is a direct result of the
relevance of God for the novel situation as it is expressed
in the ordering of the eternal objects involved in the ex-

perience.

It is therefore the case,

that all mental origi-

nality in "the temporal world is conditioned, though not
determined, by an initial subjective aim supplied by the
474
ground of all order and of all originality."

472
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7.3.3

THE PRESIDING OCCASION

Examining some further implications of the account of
living occasions given above, leads to an account of the

complexity of the animal body that reaches the rather

astounding conclusion that the functions of life within

a

living cell are associated with the empty space within the
ce ll*

"Life lurks in the interstices of each living cell,

and in the interstices of the brain.' ,/+

^

Associating life

with empty space is a strange doctrine that requires some
explanation.

Fortunately, the more familiar logic of hier-

archical relations will help since the concern really reduces to a form similar to the problem associated with the

formation of a new comprehensive entity.
A living society, as a complex structure of inorganic

societies which are woven together into the production of a

new comprehensive (living) entity, may be said to be built
upon the open boundaries of the material animal body.

How-

ever, a comprehensive entity cannot be explained in terms of
the lower-order operating principles which formed the open

boundaries which support the integrated experiences of the
Thus, its conceptual reaction to the environ-

whole animal.

ment, which constitutes the unity of the animal as a compre-

hensive entity, must be thought of as existing in some place
other than the space which is occupied by the lower-order
475 Ibid.

,

p

.

125

•

38^4

entities.

Clearly, since all the material entities

(enduring objects) which comprise the animal body are re-

stricted to pure physical prehension, the space which they
occupy cannot be thought of as containing the novelty that
is life itself.

The mainstay in the argument which Whitehead develops
to account for this state of affairs is that it is God's

purpose in the creative advance to evoke the intensities of
experience that characterize the unity of life on each
level of the hierarchy.

He sums this up by saying:

So far as the functioning of the animal body
is concerned, the total result is that the

transmission of physical influence, through
the empty space within it, has not been entirely in conformity with the physical laws
holding for inorganic societies. The molecules within an animal body exhibit certain
peculiarities of behavior not to be detected
outside the animal body. In fact, living
societies illustrate the doctrine that the
laws of nature develop together with societies
which constitute an epoch. ^7 6
One final thing remains to be said about the order of

nature that is the result of this view.

By providing for

the intimate interweaving of mental and physical experience,
the way has been paved to understand the integrated expe-

riences of the whole animal as they are summed into a

"presiding occasion" of experience that is not necessarily
^ 76

Ibid.
pp. 123-126; cf. also, Chapter 7, Section
7.2.1 as regards the coordination of actual entities into an
enduring personality.
,
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restricted to any part of the body.
Thus, in an animal body the presiding occasion, ... is the final node, or intersection, of a complex structure of many enduring
objects.
Such a structure pervades the human
body.
The harmonized relations of the parts
of the body constitute this wealth of inheritance into a harmony of contrasts, issuing
into intensity of experience.
The human
mind is thus conscious of its body inheritance.
There is also an enduring object
formed by the inheritance from presiding
occasion to presiding occasion. This endurance of the mind is only one more example of
the general principle on which the body is
constructed ^77
.

.

.

.

In coming to this description of the presiding occa-

sion of human experience as it has developed out of the

details of the microcosmic and macrocosmic accounts of the

philosophy of organism, we have once again come to the position that was adopted in the first section of this chapter.
That is to say, the enduring object that is formed by the

inheritance from presiding occasion to presiding occasion,
is the detailed cosmological way of phrasing the problem of

"personal identity in a changing world of occasions [that]
is the key example for understanding the essential fusion
478
of the World of Activity with the World of Value."

7.4

TWO MAJOR IMPLICATIONS FOR
PSYCHOLOGY AND EDUCATION
The extended development of organismic relations
4
Z+

^ Ibid
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^ 8 Whitehead,
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considered in this chapter provides the basis for the following characterization of two topics which impact on contemporary psychology and education.

Since these topics

derive directly from organismic metaphysics, we may look

upon them as the animating background of specific theoretical formulations and empirical investigations in exactly
the same sense that the mechanistic world-view fostered the

formulations of associationis tic stimulus-response models
of mental processes.

No attempt need be made at this point

to recount the history of psychological thought or to sub-

stantiate the assertions about its metaphysical parentage.
That task has been addressed in Chapters One through Four.
Also, in an important sense, the present concern is not

with issues of metaphysics; instead, we are now faced with
the derivation of an orientation toward the appropriate

epistemology for an organismic psychology.

Since the gen-

eral impact of the organismic approach has been considered

by interweaving its perspectives with the history of the
first four chapters, and also by considering the interpretations of modern science and organismic relations of Chapters
Five, Six and the first three sections of this chapter, the

proper concluding discussion should now consider the basis
for the organismic approach to psychological theory and edu-

cational practice.
The two major topics of this section are views of an

organismic opis tomology which derive from two distinct,

perspectives on the unity of human experience.

The first

topic to be considered focuses upon the organismic perspective of man's immanence in nature while the second topic

opens consideration ol the organismic assertions regarding

man's transcendence of nature.
The following consideration of these two aspects of

knowing attempts to state the issues at hand without introducing new evidence or elaborate reconsideration of previous material.

The narrower aspect of immanence will be

considered first before the broader topic of transcendence
can enter as a concluding theme.

Both these topics may be

viewed as a more detailed account of the organismic psychology considered in Chapter Five. 479

Or,

to be more accu-

rate, the earlier organismic psychology may be seen as a

philosophical interpretation of organismic metaphysics while
the present discussion may be viewed as an epistemological

interpretation of the same metaphysical orientation.
7.4.1

IMMANENCE
In focusing on man's immanence in nature from the or-

ganismic point-of- view as it impacts on concerns relevant
to psychology and education,

the basic fact to be considered

is the source of man's knowledge about his environment.

In entering this discussion, the problem of the use of

Chapter

5>
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terminology in
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an scheme arises as an initial

As indicated above, in connection with the vari-

ous characterizations applied to the concept of "eternal

objects" and the separate meanings of the term "organism,"
the precise meaning of terms is often difficult to deter480
mine
In the present instance there is an extreme ex•

ample of this problem and one which appears to be a major

factor in obscuring more detailed empirical investigation
of the validity of theories deriving from organismic meta-

Also, the presence of a problem in terminology

physics.

should alert concern as to the special nature of the thought

which is so difficult to express.
Whitehead’s position on the problem of everyday knowledge of the world is that there are three primary phases

involved.

The ordinary mode of experience is called sym-

bolic reference which is considered to be a mixed mode of

knowing deriving from the two more primitive modes of
knowing considered earlier; namely, presentational immediacy
and causal efficacy.

Of these two, causal efficacy is the

This is the mode that derives from physical

more basic.

prehensions of past data.

It is therefore,

the mode in

which the inheritance of personal identity that involves
all layers of the material body is transmitted into the

present occasion of experience.
480
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Since Whitehead is always
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cautious to contrast this mode of inheritance with tho data

derived from conceptual prehension at tho mental polo of
experience, i.e., presentational immediacy, he characteris-

tically uses terms for the physical fooling of past data

which emphasize its causal nature while at tho same time

denying or tending to deny any of the meanings associated
with the other mode.

Thus

,

causal efficacy is given de-

scriptions such as vague, crude, inarticulate and massive
as a way of characterizing this felt efficaciousness of the

past
His reason for doing this is that one of his primary

insights into the nature of metaphysical knowledge involves
the assertion that normal knowing as considered in past

philosophy and science is really based on the mode of presentational immediacy.

It is a primary characteristic of

this mode of knowing the world that it is concerned with
that which is highly articulate, vivid, and sharp.

Thus,

standard accounts of the world are couched in terms of iso-

lation in space and time which also emphasize the separateness of the entities of the extensive world.

These accounts

of experience are primarily based on visual perception and

consider the world in exclusion of the data which derive
from the past.

Whitehead does not argue that the knowledge

of

world which is derived from specific consideration

the
ol

the
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extensive world is wrong, rather, he maintains that it is
limited.

The traditional emphasis is understandable since

the higher phases of consciousness are those which dominate

in our experience.

It is also in this context that the

familiar topics of "Misplaced Concreteness" and "Inversion"
find their source and we can now sum up their meaning rather

easily
By relying on the previous detailed accounts of the

microcosmic and macrocosmic relations of actual occasions,
we can take the position that the final level of conscious-

ness in human experience definitely involves the "objectification" of antecedent states of the human body as a basic
element.

Since these antecedent states are really actual

occasions which exist on every level of the hierarchy that
leads up to the final percipient event, i.e., normal con-

sciousness, the character of those actual entities opens

another important factor for consideration.

Actual occa-

sions are, as we have seen, dependent on the realm of eter-

nal objects as the determinant of the social order of all

enduring objects in the world.

Thus, it can be maintained

that the material enduring objects which comprise the human

body are subject to the same requirements of possibility,
as
as determined by the structuring of the eternal objects,

the
are the material enduring objects which are not part of

body.

The importance of this realization is seen in the

391
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are defined as having the same structure as the structure
of the world which is known in the higher phase of experi-

ence or presentational immediacy.

Thus, on the organismic

view, the relations which we know to pertain between the

things in the world are exemplified for us by two separate

paths of knowledge which are grounded in the common deter-

mination of possibility in the real world.
A slight digression will help to clarify the above.
Whitehead’s cosmology is built upon the assumption that the
world of fact requires some reason to be structured.

While

he is open to accepting any structure that has developed as

an empirical fact, his concern is to describe a mechanism
by which some limitation can be placed on the world of fact
if entities of specific characters are to develop.

That is,

there must be a reason for the development of a specific

realization of Value in Fact.

He proposes a solution to

this problem that asserts that each actual entity contains
a reference to the realm of graded value (eternal objects)

that is the basis for the structure of the world.

Thus, a

basic fact like the construction of the physical world in
terms of three dimensions has also been determined in this
way.

In fact, all of the basic determinants of the struc-

ture of the world we know in visual perception, which is

most of what we know about the world, may be said to be

1
,

I.
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represented through the inheritance of the body as veil as
through visual perception.
To return to the problem of epistemology, it can now
be asserted that Whitehead's use of terms such as heavy,

vague, crude, etc., as regards the character of inheritance

from the physical past (causal efficacy) is somewhat misleading.

It is misleading in the sense that it implies

that there can be no specific content in this sort of knowl-

edge whereas, the exact opposite is the case.

When he talks

of vagueness and crudeness his primary reference is to a

comparison with higher forms of consciousness, i.e., presentational immediacy and he does not mean to imply that
there is no specific information as to the actual construc-

tion of the world which is derived from this source.

The

information as to the true structure of the world which is
supplied in causal efficacy is as precisely determined by
the realm of eternal objects as is the information which is

supplied by the input of visual perception in the mode of

presentational immediacy.

This is true since from the

accounts of the actual occasions given above, there is abso-

lutely no grounds on which to assume that there is any arbitrariness involved in the way an actual occasion prehends
the defining aspects of the realm of eternal objects.

Thus, it can be maintained that the visual experience
of a young child for example, is determined not only by the
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enduring object he is looking at but also by his bodily

inheritance which has been structured by the properties of
the same environment from which the enduring object arises.
It is this characterization of conscious experience

that derives from two decidedly different modes of knowing
the world that can be the basis for theories relevant to

psychology and education.

The organismic assertion that

experience is structured from within as well as from without while not also involving predetermination of experience,

suggests important implications for psychological theory

especially in the areas of cognition and perception.

Simi-

larly, traditional approaches to education which are also

thoroughly grounded in the type of empiricism that derives
from the analysis of higher grades of consciousness in ex-

clusion from the causal aspects of knowledge of the world,
can be modified so that undue emphasis is not placed on
"basic" concepts that are given as a result of being an

organism in a world of real organisms.
While the content of this section does no more than to

open the possibility that other approaches to the problem
comof epistemology are possible, there are many levels of
that
plex description contained in Whitehead's philosophy

investican well serve the cause of supporting a detailed

gation of the issues involved.
amply
The need for investigations of this type is
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demonstrated by the following example of the approach to
knowledge that is current in the contemporary world of eduJerome Bruner maintains:

cation.

Knowledge is a model we construct to give
meaning and structure to regularities in experience. The organizing ideas of any body
of knowledge are inventions for rendering
experience economical and connected. We
invent concepts such as force in physics,
the bond in chemistry, motive in psychology,
style in literature as means to the end of
comprehension 481
.

The intent of this quotation is not to attempt to label
Mr. Bruner an empiricist of the Lockean variety.

Rather,

it is to assert that without the larger aspect of a more

complete view of knowledge which is provided by the compre-

hensiveness of organismic metaphysics, there will always be
a

pronounced tendency to look upon knowledge as a mere model

which is constructed "to give meaning and structure to regularities" that do not have any apparent relationship to the

meaning and structure of life as it is experienced.

The

position which is taken here is that in order to have meaning
and structure in experience, the knower must believe that
his own being is a part of the beingness of the rest of the
world.

Thus, considering knowledge as a mere model of the

world, one that is not also related to the realities of the

evolving cosmos, is antithetical to supporting a position
1181

Jerome Bruner, On Knowing (Cambridge:
versity Press, 1964), p. 120.

Harvard Uni-
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from which the knowing subject can establish
a relation to
the other aspects of his nature that
transcend his immediate awareness.
7.4.2

TRANSCENDENCE
The second major topic which derives from the
organis-

mic position and which impacts on psychology and
education
concerns the possibility that there are other grounds for

knowing the realities of the evolving cosmos than the type
knowledge which is derived from perceiving the realities
of the world realized fact.
In the organismic scheme it is necessary to consider

this topic as an aspect of the more general topic which

concerns the role of God in the unfolding events in the
world.

Whitehead's position is that God is the primordial

ground of order and is therefore involved in the subjective
aim of every actual occasion.

In this way, the organismic

scheme defines God's role as that of eliciting the self-

creation of individual entities in a way that allows for
freedom as well as structure and directionality in the

processes of the universe.
The function of God's immanence in the world is espe-

cially important to man as the highest evolved creature.
Here, the graded relevance of possibility which is provided

by God as the ground of all order also functions as a lure
for actualization within the process of the individual.

In
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this way, God is also the ground of all novelty.

Thus

,

the influence of God in the world of organ! smic

metaphysics is seen to be limited to the extent that his

valuation of possibility is experienced by the world.

In

other words, the flowering of man's potential is a direct

function of the degree to which man actualizes the inevitable ordering of things as they exist in the nature of God.

Since the entire structure of organismic metaphysics

requires the defining role of God to be both the ground of

order and the ground of novelty, and since the realized
order of the world is included in the subordinate levels of
the being of man, it follows that the presiding occasion of

consciousness, which is man's awareness of his bodily inheritance, should also be primarily involved in the conceptual prehension of the increased grades of value which it
is God's nature to provide.

The important aspect of this discussion for the present
topic involves the fact that if any use is to be made of the

systematic nature of organismic metaphysics within the
fields of psychology and education then, it is absolutely

necessary to admit that the ultimate determinant of the
meaning and structure of life is not

a set of

arbitrary

principles that have been created to simplify the relationships observed in the world.

The structure of the world is

a gift of our physical inheritance of the world of created

J
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fact, an inheritance which is manifest in the processes of

knowing the subordinate world.

On this view, educating the

conceptual process of children does not amount to the creation of relationships which are unavailable to the child.

Rather, the process is one of raising to the level of ex-

plicit recognition the characteristics of realized Value in
Fact that are a natural part of his physical inheritance.

However, just as organismic metaphysics can provide no

grounds upon which to assert that there must necessarily be
three spacial dimensions rather than thirty, no reason can
be given for limiting the extent to which it is possible

for the subjective reaction of the experient individual to
be influenced by the higher grades of value which are also
a part of God as the primordial ground of order.

It there-

fore seems quite reasonable that the solution to many of the

perplexing problems in the psychology of personality and the
processes of education, is located in the increased subjective realization by the experient individual, of the grades
of value that border the upper level of his awareness.

Thus, when the structure of the knowledge is in harmony with
the true character of realized value that forms the subordi-

nate orders of his own being the child will experience a
sense of deepened awareness that provides its own motivation

toward greater understanding.

It is in this sense that

knowledge may be said to be relevant to the learner.
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The ultimate importance of man's transcendent nature

lies not in the realization of the conceptual exemplifica-

tion of values which structure the realized grades of existence but in the creative appeal to increased depth of ex-

perience that comes with spiritual insight into the pur-

posiveness of God's valuation of a new order of achievement
for man to obtain.

It is in this sense that the philosophy

of organism may be said to be open to the possibility of

religious experience as it has been known down through the
ages of mankind's existence.

A primary value then, of the

organismic approach is that it opens God's participation in
all levels of nature.

For man, at the top of the hierarchy,

there is prayer and meditation as the primary means of

knowing the increased grades of value that constitute the
advance of humanity and are the vehicle of his transcendence.

And should it happen, as it periodically does, that

mankind is given fresh insight into the Purposes of God for
man;

then, he has the words of the Prophet to assure him and

guide him in the knowledge that his deepest urgings are not

simply idle fancies and vain imaginings
,
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